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Abstract 
 
 
 
This work examines security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict 
states.  It proposes that intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are 
significantly impeded in their pursuit of coherent and effective SSR 
programmes by internal and external rivalry and contradictory 
agendas.  These difficulties occur at both systemic and actor levels.  
Current institutional theory has little to say on the role of confusion, 
rivalry and competition in shaping IGO behaviour when operating in 
the security sector.  As SSR is a crucial but challenging component 
of peacebuilding it is essential to identify the sources of these 
influences, explain their impact, and suggest ways by which 
impediments to SSR outcomes may be mitigated. 
 
Using the 2006 Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) as a 
case study, the thesis analyses how inter- and intra-IGO 
relationships affect SSR.  It explores the lack of a clear definition of 
SSR and the dispute over its scope and application.  It then evaluates 
relationships between international and local actors and the efficacy 
of SSR monitoring methods.  
 
The thesis reveals that confusion, competition and rivalry are 
common in a SSR programme.  By diverting attention from the 
objectives of SSR, inter-and intra-organisational and inter-personal 
enmities are key factors in undermining security reform initiatives.  
Dispute over the practical application of local ownership of SSR and 
how programme effectiveness is measured serve also to dilute the 
impact of SSR. 
 
The thesis provides policy recommendations intended to reduce the 
effects of inter-and intra-organisational rivalry and competition.  It 
proposes greater inclusion of the private sector and academic 
institutions in the planning and execution of SSR.  It suggests areas 
where academics and practitioners might direct their efforts to 
improve SSR planning, employment and evaluation thereby 
producing a more effective approach to future security sector reform 
activities. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction  
 
Post conflict situations are among the most complex challenges facing the 
international community.  Responding to them requires a cogent blend of political, 
military, civilian, humanitarian and development activities (UN, 2005, pp.15-16).  
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a crucial part of this mix.  Post conflict recovery and 
development is aided by the creation of a secure environment with the security sector 
under civilian democratic control; an approach that includes institution building, 
organisational reform and support to civil society organisations (CSOs).   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the challenges that affect SSR policy 
making and practice.  Confused aims, competing remits and roles, within and 
between intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), dilute efforts to achieve security 
and detract from the objective of creating stability and peace.  As SSR is a crucial but 
demanding component of the peacebuilding process it is essential to identify the 
sources of discord, explain their impact and suggest ways in which competition and 
confusion can be overcome.  The objectives of the thesis are to identify impediments 
to successful security reform and to make recommendations for future SSR 
programmes. 
 
Violence and intra-state conflict often are consequences of governmental 
failure to provide stability and security for citizens.  Although IGOs are aware that 
peace and development processes cannot be effective in situations of societal 
disorder, peacebuilding programmes traditionally have concentrated on institution 
building rather than security reform.  However, as a broader understanding of the 
security sector has overtaken early definitions of civil-military relations, SSR has 
become an integral part of third party peacebuilding interventions (Forman, 2006, pp. 
26-32). 
 
Nevertheless donor governments are frequently reluctant to finance activities 
relating to the security sector.  This is based on a belief that SSR focuses on achieving 
efficient military capacities and counter-terrorism programmes (Von Tangen Page & 
Hamill, 2006, p.2).  Some donor states claim that security sector structures are, by 
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their nature, hierarchical and authoritarian and therefore are contrary to the values of 
conflict transformation.  Others point to the militarism that they see as endemic in 
security structures and pervasive in states that are strongly influenced by their 
military elite. These traits are viewed as obstacles to peacebuilding (McCartney, 
Fischer & Wils, 2004, pp.5-9).  However, SSR is a reform process that should be 
applied in areas where development is hindered by weaknesses in the security and 
justice sectors and exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight.  Additionally, SSR 
can encompass a range of key development objectives, including poverty reduction, 
conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and the promotion of human rights 
(Helly, 2006, pp.1-2).  Recognising this fact, in 2009, the then UK Secretary of State 
for International Development (DFID), Douglas Alexander, announced that central to 
his Department’s future strategy would be the creation of security along with 
development: “people want security and justice in the same way as they want 
sanitation, education and healthcare” (Baldwin, 2009, p. 33). The new Coalition 
Government has endorsed this sentiment and DFID’s 2011-2015 Business Plan 
reflects a commitment to promoting a secure base for development in post-conflict 
and fragile states (DFID, 2010a, pp.2; 13). 
 
This wider application of SSR can, however, bring difficulties. The 
broadening of the scope of SSR to include reforms that exceed the traditional concept 
of civil-military relations means that security reform programmes have become 
particularly demanding.  Such multi-faceted programmes must be understood and 
managed with care to ensure the success of the intervention.  In addition, broader 
SSR means that IGOs and international organisations (IOs) find that they are 
competing over both the concept and management of SSR and, as a result, expensive 
programmes may fail to achieve their objectives.  
 
The need for a democratically controlled security sector was well demonstrated 
in Kosovo.  Following the 1999 conflict and the creation of a United Nations (UN) 
led administration it became apparent that the security sector would have to be 
rebuilt.  This undertaking had to consider the likelihood that the province would gain 
its independence from the Republic of Serbia.  The security institutions would first 
become the responsibility of the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) and then the government of a sovereign state.   
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The 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Internal Security 
Sector Review (ISSR) is one of the more recent SSR programmes undertaken under 
the auspices of the UN.  The ISSR has the distinction of being the only SSR review to 
take place in an internationally administered province of a sovereign state, a situation 
that provided numerous opportunities for confusion, competition and rivalry within 
the context of SSR.   There were also external considerations, which included time–
critical negotiations over the province’s political status and the reactions of 
neighbouring states.  In addition, the province had an inexperienced and partly 
functioning local government, hampered by inter-ethnic tensions.   
 
  The UN, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and the Organisation represented the international community in Kosovo for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Each had their separate understanding 
of, and agendas for, the reform of Kosovo’s security sector.  The ‘international 
community’, in particular the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America 
(US), Germany and Russia were keenly interested in the status of Kosovo and its 
security sector.  While the ISSR programme was being conducted the Kosovo PISG 
pressed for a decision on the final political status of the province.  However the 
Serbian Government insisted that Kosovo should remain a part of the Republic of 
Serbia and the UN endeavoured to reach a negotiated settlement on the issue.  Thus 
the ISSR was conducted in an atmosphere of contending opinions and agendas that 
would impact on its viability and outcomes.  The ISSR programme therefore provides 
an effective case study for this thesis and for examining the competition, rivalry and 
confusion, which detracts from the objective of creating stability and peace after 
conflict.   
 
When examining the influence of institutional competition related to SSR, 
there is a lack of literature specifically dedicated to the subject.    In addition, there is 
little cross-fertilisation between different academic areas.  Security literature seldom 
takes note of organisational and institutional theory, social psychology and 
sociological behaviour concepts (Palmer & Dunford, 2008, pp.20-32; Albanese & van 
Fleet, 1985, pp. 244-255).  Indeed, Higate and Henry (2009, p. 16) suggest that: 
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“sociological, anthropological and post-structural approaches to 
peacekeeping remain underutilised at the expense of macro-level political 
science or international relations theorising…[there is a] scarcity of 
accounts that take the embodied experiences, beliefs and feelings of both 
host populations and those employed in missions...”    
 
This thesis draws together theories on group and institutional behaviour and 
the causes of both inter- and intra-organisation and inter-personal rivalry and 
competition.  It relates these theories to the practice of SSR and makes 
recommendations for the conduct of future security reform interventions and for 
further research into the conduct of SSR programmes. 
 
The thesis will also examine the problems associated with the measurement and 
evaluation of SSR programmes.  Peake and Scheye (2005, pp. 295-327) contend that 
because SSR is a process, many of its goals are vague and lead to badly constructed 
indicators.   Brozka further emphasises the imprecision related to the measurement of 
SSR:  
“Currently, the security sector reform debate reflects a disparity 
characterised by a long list of general recommendations of what could and 
should be done, on one side, and a shorter list of concrete suggestions 
based on a thorough analysis of the problems in a particular post-conflict 
situation on the other side”(2006, pp. 1-13).  
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) also stresses the need to close the gap between 
concepts and practice.  It describes the analytical deficiency of SSR thus:  
“There is a need to develop more comprehensive approaches to 
assessment that result in the design of realistic and focused programmes 
that support partner countries.  A more effective approach to monitoring, 
review and evaluation is also vital.  Indicators are needed to track progress 
through the results chain from inputs, process, outputs and outcomes 
through to impact” (OECD, 2007, p. 24). 
 
Donor states increasingly need to justify the cost of SSR and security 
sector management programmes to their finance ministries.  IGOs engaged in 
these programmes are constantly under pressure to monitor their activities and 
more accurately evaluate the outcome of their endeavours.  The way that the 
current monitoring and evaluation regimes might be improved will explored in 
this thesis. 
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1.1. The Setting for the Thesis  
 
Achieving a common approach to SSR has proved difficult, as demonstrated by 
contemporary international peacebuilding and post-settlement security reform 
initiatives.  There have been several examples of post conflict reform programmes 
that have been unable to achieve their desired aims and objectives.  Afghanistan and 
Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and East Timor, for example, 
continue to be problematic for the international community as the intended transition 
from conflict to sustainable peace has faltered (Rathmell, 2005, pp. 1013–1038; 
Krause & Milliken, 2002, pp.753–774; Chopra, 2000, pp. 979–1000; Bieber, 2002, 
pp.25-29).  Post-conflict countries can seldom mobilise the human and financial 
resources needed for humanitarian relief and subsequently for economic recovery and 
the burden therefore falls upon the international community (UNDP, 2008, p.3).  
 
The involvement of international agencies in the remit of sovereign states has 
increased in recent years (Law, 2007, p. 17; Fitz-Gerald & Lálá, 2003, p. 9).  The 
international community has been faced with a series of intra-state conflicts and 
humanitarian crises, which have led to action to resolve disputes, restore order, and 
build a viable security and economic base.  In the Balkans and Eastern Europe the 
collapse of communism saw the elites within former communist countries striving to 
adopt pluralistic, democratic models of government.  Although there were non-
violent transitions, some states found this process challenging.  Violence amongst 
ethnic groups, as they endeavoured to promote and protect their own identities and 
economic standing, has both caused and fed instability (Verdery, 1994, pp.33-59; 
Horowitz, 1985; Toft, 2003).  Inter-ethnic violence, in some cases, has caused 
substantial population movements and the destruction of economic and social 
infrastructures.  The ensuing disorder has provided a platform for the growth of intra-
state violence in the vacuum left by the breakdown of the rule of law. 
 
Kaldor (1999) argues that the emergence of such ‘new wars’ marks a fresh 
development in conflict and the efforts required to overcome it.  Despite her claim 
that the post Cold War period has seen a transformation in the nature of conflict, the 
change may not be as dramatic as suggested as intra-state violence has existed 
alongside inter-state conflict.  Nevertheless, statistics indicate a shift in the direction 
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of intra-state violence; for example, of the 118 conflicts between 1989 and 2004, 90 
were intra-state, 21 were internationalised intra-state conflicts, and only seven were 
‘traditional’ inter-state conflicts (Harbom, & Wallensteen, 2005, pp. 623–635).  A 
further development since the Cold War is the increase in ‘frozen conflicts’: areas of 
disputed territory whose status is unresolved. 
 
Transnational organised criminal networks are active in such weak states 
(Kemp, 2004, pp. 43-59).  Such networks expanded after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the deregulation of international financial 
markets in 1989.  Current estimates suggest that trans-national crime accounts for 
nearly one-fifth of global gross domestic product (GDP) (Glenny, 2008).  Lord West, 
the former Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Security and Counter Terrorism, 
believes that, “the threat of organised crime to weak and post-conflict states is high 
and is exacerbated by the downturn in the global economy” (2009, p.7).  In such 
environments, states can lose their monopoly on the use of force with the rise of 
criminal and terrorist groups (Williams, 2004, p.37).  Individuals are the main victims 
of this “terror-crime nexus” (Benedek, 2010, pp.3-16) and due consideration must be 
given to the role of human security in SSR.  Whilst military and internal security 
forces can moderate violence, the re-establishment of human security and the rule of 
law necessitate much wider engagement and substantial effort.   
 
Over the last twenty years, missions have been undertaken to resolve conflict 
and restore political systems. These have ranged from peace operations in Cambodia, 
El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia in the early 1990s to the administration of 
collapsed societies, such as BiH, Kosovo, East Timor and the Solomon Islands in the 
late 1990s.  Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of such missions 
have steadily risen.  In the forty years from 1948 to 1988, the UN had 15 
peacekeeping operations around the world.  In the period 1989 to 1999 that number 
increased to 31, a frequency approaching one every six months (United States 
Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.3-6) and, by the end of 2009, there were 39 operations 
involving 96,328 military and police personnel (United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 2010).  The UN, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have adapted to this 
new environment by widening their mandates in the area of promoting peace and 
security (UN General Assembly, 2004; European Communities, 2005; Ferrero-
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Waldner, 2008; NATO, 2009).  However, one of the international community’s most 
difficult challenges has been how to translate the lessons learned from experiences 
gained from security sector interventions into strategies for promoting sustainable 
peace and security in post-conflict and transitional societies (Hänggi, 2005, pp.119-
125). 
 
 The need for coherent security sector strategies is urgent as the cost of post-
conflict intervention in terms of lost lives, divided communities and devastated 
livelihoods can be immense.  In Iraq there have been over 4,500 killed and 44,000 
wounded coalition troops.  In Afghanistan, there have been more than 1,250 coalition 
deaths (iCasualties, 2010).  The numbers of civilian causalities in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are not accurately recorded but are estimated as in excess of 95,000 
(iCasualties, 2010).  Additionally, the financial cost continues to rise; for example, 
the UN peacekeeping budget for FY 2006/7 was some US $5.5 billion and for 2008/9 
circa US$6.8 billion (UN DPKO, 2007; United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 2008).  In 2006, a US congressional analysis showed that Iraq post-war 
activity was costing circa US$ 2 billion a week and the coalition presence in 
Afghanistan was costing US$ 370 million each week (Bender, 2006).  In 2008, the 
US Congressional Budget Office stated that US$1 trillion to US$2 trillion a year was 
a more realistic figure for continued engagement, depending on force levels 
(Herszenhorn, 2008).  The financial and human cost to the international community 
of resolving violent conflicts is, therefore, substantial and the processes for achieving 
sustainable peace and development must be carefully considered (Chalmers, 2005,   
pp. 4-7; DFID, 2003, pp. 2-9).  
1.2. The Hypothesis  
 
The principal assumption of this thesis is that IOs and IGOs (1)*, acting either bi-
laterally or multilaterally, have a shared desire to ensure peace and stability in post-
conflict states. However officials, in international institutions and their member 
states, have their own agendas and perceptions with regard to SSR and these may 
conflict.   
 
* Notes and interview information related to the Thesis Chapters can be found at Annex A. 
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The hypothesis of this work is that IGOs are significantly impeded in their 
pursuit of coherent and effective SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry 
and contradictory agendas.  Inter-and intra-organisational and inter-personal rivalry 
and competition substantially diluted the effectiveness of the Kosovo ISSR 
programme.  The thesis identifies the sources of confusion, tension and antagonism 
within the ISSR programme, explains their impact and suggests ways that 
competition and rivalry can be alleviated in future SSR endeavours.   
 
The presence of competition within and between organisations is well 
documented.  Competition and rivalry is studied in developmental psychology, in 
social psychology and sociology, in administrative sciences and political science as 
well as in economics (Smith, 1984, p. 248; Alcock, 1984, pp. 385-408).  Additionally 
there is a body of literature referring to institutionalism and inter-organisational 
relationships.  Although some current literature analyses regime-building processes, 
few studies examine the interaction of whole organisations.  Therefore, research on 
organisations has not produced scientifically robust models for interaction, nor have 
concepts of competition and rivalry been sufficiently tested in various policy areas 
(Borchert, 2001a, pp. 165-215; Nerlich, 1994, pp. 283-304; Peters, 2004, pp. 381-
402; Schmidt, 2001, pp. 149-63; Yost, 2007).  Significantly, the effect of rivalry and 
competition on the conduct of SSR programmes and their impact on IGO 
relationships with local actors and institutions has not been closely examined. 
Academics have tended to follow a rationalist methodology looking for causal 
relations between actors; however inter-organisational competition is defined broadly 
in terms of whether one institution affects another’s development, performance or 
effectiveness (Gehring & Oberthür 2004, p. 247; Stokke, 2001, p. 2; Loewen, 2006, 
pp.11-15; Young, 1996; Oberthür and Gehring, 2006a, b, c.).  Only a small number of 
studies have focused on the difficulties caused by competition among international 
organisations (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp. 699-732). 
 
Nevertheless, bureaucratic politics manipulate the course of SSR programme 
planning and execution.  Officials try to influence or shape the policy-making 
process. In most cases, this process is characterised by conflict and bargaining as 
officials compete for control of the same policy space (Brewer, 2008, pp. 37-53).  
Often the routines they establish and the devices they employ to cope with 
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uncertainties and work pressures influence the decisions made by these bureaucrats.  
In effect, these influences fashion the policies (Lipsky, 1983, pp.3-23).  However, 
Page and Jenkins (2006, pp.13-18; 137-142) believe that the policy roles of middle-
level bureaucrats are largely neglected in sociological theories of bureaucracy.  They 
suggest that, "much policy work is usually conducted with few direct and specific 
instructions from ministers and senior officials” and that bureaucratic reality does not 
necessarily conform to theoretical models. They argue that despite many studies 
concerning bureaucracy a variety of activities that affect policy outcomes, particularly 
among mid-level officials, have been neglected in contemporary studies (2006, pp. 
181-182).   
 
IGOs are prone to bureaucratic competition; indeed, fundamental to the 
hypothesis is that competition is universal among international and national 
institutions and this impacts on the judgement of all those involved.  It is argued that 
SSR has typically been viewed from the perspective of its place within the 
peacebuilding lexicon where it is seen as a tool used to assist in stabilisation.  
Consequently contemporary research into the evolution of SSR has largely neglected 
the detrimental effect of inter- and intra- institutional competition and inter-personal 
rivalry on post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.   
 
 Nevertheless, there is a considerable body of literature on inter-organisational 
associations in International Relations (IR), much of it concentrating on Euro-Atlantic 
security institutions.  This literature examines competition among organisations, 
especially among trade and environmental regimes.  Most of these studies discuss the 
symptoms of competition and rivalry, perceived as dysfunctions that hinder the 
potential of inter-organisational cooperation.  Nonetheless, theory-driven research 
takes little notice of this phenomenon.  International organisations are perceived 
mainly as instruments in the hands of nation states, created by self-concerned 
hegemony, or as “arenas for acting out power relations” (Martin & Simmons, 1998, p. 
746; Rittberger & Zangl, 2006, p. 6).   
 
 As institutional theories have proliferated across the social sciences the impetus 
has been to explain how social orders are produced, whether they are developed in 
markets, political domains, the legal field, or between organisations.  Researchers 
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have strived to show that the institutionalisation, particularly in Europe, has occurred 
through a set of self-reinforcing processes. As one set of European institutions has 
grown, it has influenced the behaviour of others and actors have begun to take 
decisions in light of institutional structures and their norms and rules (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, pp. 936-957; Fligstein & Sweet, 2002, pp. 1206-1243).  However, neoliberal 
and sociological institutionalists seldom view institutions from a rivalry perspective.  
Many academics believe that organisations are essentially ‘good’ and few have 
pointed to serious conflicts between them (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).  Indeed, 
Keohane (1989, p.174) suggests that: 
 “…without international cooperation, I believe that the prospects for 
our species would be very poor indeed. Cooperation is not always 
benign; but without cooperation, we will be lost. Without institutions 
there will be little cooperation”. 
 
Arguably, such a view is based on a predisposition to discourage deep 
analysis of the internal and external agency of organisations and, therefore, the 
significance of competition and rivalry.  This tendency applies equally to the study of 
SSR.  There is therefore a requirement to reconcile the theoretical view of 
international organisations with the empirical reality of intra- and inter-organisational 
competition within the field of SSR.  It is posited in this thesis that neoliberal and 
sociological institutionalism, although contributing to the understanding of SSR 
practice, does not adequately explain the influence of the rivalry and competition that 
occurs at the inter- and intra-organisational and personal levels.  In addition, there 
remains a need to discover how competition is provoked within institutions and to 
identify the causes of conflict.  Examining theoretical views of institutional and 
personal behaviour and relating these to empirical evidence, the thesis will draw 
conclusions on how competition and rivalry impacts on the application of SSR.   
 
 In addition, the thesis will explore the confusion that it generated by the lack 
of a viable monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for SSR. Security sectors 
consist of many elements and each differs in its purpose, functioning and orientation.  
The difficulties encountered go to the very root of M&E practice in that there are no 
agreed criteria for determining indicators of effectiveness within SSR or what 
outcomes are to be achieved.  It is therefore difficult to track and evaluate changes, 
especially as several others may affect one sub-sector.  Additionally, there is no 
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international blueprint for what a security sector should look like and therefore there 
are no agreed international models against which to measure outcomes (Chanaa, 
2002: Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, pp. 4-20; Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, pp. 4-5).  
Consequently it may be argued that SSR is a process established by the social 
practices of the actors concerned in SSR programmes and this view will be explored 
in the thesis.  
 
 There are also issues of donor bureaucracy and politics in that donor-supported 
SSR often promotes interventions more closely in line with the donor’s needs than 
those of the host state.  Caparini (2005, pp.82-83) notes that donor priorities tend to 
shift frequently, with resultant fluctuations in the levels of funding.  With donor-
driven implementation, planning tends to be top-down and influenced by donor 
priorities, while accountability is directed upwards towards the donors.   SSR 
programme goals are sometimes intentionally ambiguous, either to give the 
programme space to develop or because the programme is guided by unstated 
external political objectives (Chianca, 2008).  Thus the practical and often urgent 
need to produce measured outcomes from SSR programmes conflicts with the reality 
of the lack of a credible means of doing so.  It therefore might be suggested that 
measuring and evaluating the SSR process is a fruitless undertaking, given the 
difficulties of quantifying its impact and effectiveness.   
 
 However, current M&E frameworks for SSR programmes are typically defined 
by the donor’s institutional requirements. External funding is essential to most SSR 
programmes and donor organisations and finance ministries require detailed 
explanations of how effectively their money is being spent.  Additionally, host states 
need to be reassured that SSR interventions are designed for the good of their 
government and people and not solely the projection of the external actor’s national 
interest priorities (Behn, 2003, pp. 586-589).  Although the difficulties of evaluating 
SSR programmes are acknowledged, it is suggested that M&E is now a firm 
requirement of donor states.  Indeed, the latest DFID’s review of their bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral programmes has stated that the Department will, in future, subject all 
candidate programmes to a rigorous assessment of their value for money and how 
results will be monitored and evaluated (DFID, 2011a, iii, 1-6; DFID, 2011b, pp. 13-
14; Hansard, 2011, p. 167-169). 
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1.3. Field Research and Methodology 
 
1.3.1. Case Study Methodology 
 
In order to explore the influences of competition and confusion on the practice of 
security sector reform, research by case study was chosen as the methodological 
approach for this thesis. Several authors have provided guidance on interpretative 
research (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Klein & Myers, 1999; McKay & Marshall, 2000) 
and, in particular, case studies (Yin, 1984; Walsham, 1995; Darke et al., 1998).   
Stake (1995, pp.18 -21) suggests that cases studies concern people and programmes 
and seek to come to an understanding of their activities.   He asserts that each case 
studied is similar to others but, at the same time, unique.  Research focuses both on 
their uniqueness and their commonality and observes the subjects with a desire to 
learn how they function.   
 
Erickson (1986) proposes that the most distinctive characteristic of case 
studies is the emphasis on interpretation.  He argues that case studies are situations 
where the key analysis is not based on the researcher’s views but those of the people 
being studied and, therefore, interpretation is a major part of the research.  The aim of 
a case study is to understand what is going on.  The facts will then emerge from the 
research process in what Parlett and Hamilton (1976) describe as progressive 
focussing.  Marshall and Rossman (2006, p.61) assert that unless a study is narrowly 
construed, researchers cannot examine all the relevant circumstances and 
personalities in any depth.  Some research is location specific, as in this case where 
an actual SSR process in a post-conflict territory has to be studied.  Critics of case 
studies suggest that the decision to focus on a specific setting can be constraining, as 
the study is defined by, and linked to, a particular event and population. In debates 
over the merits and disadvantages of case studies the problem of generalisation is 
raised.  However, it is argued that such study is less constrained by place or 
population as many detractors might suggest, as the results of the work can be 
extrapolated to other situations of similar enquiry and then tested by further research. 
A case study is an experiment to test a theory; “case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (Yin, 
1994, p.10).  Niederkofler (1991) suggests, “ the case study investigator's goal is not 
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to demonstrate the validity of an argument for statistical populations or universes. 
Rather he aims to create and expand rich theoretical frameworks that should be useful 
in analysing similar cases ”.   The selection of a case study methodology for this work 
was based on this premise: SSR, as a new and complex undertaking, does not lend 
itself to being neatly fitted into existing theories.  SSR is evolving and, it is proposed, 
so should the investigation of the theoretical basis for interaction within the process.  
It can be argued that the strength of case studies is their internal validity, but their 
weakness is the external generalisability.  However, it is submitted that there is a 
trade off between the two types of validity that, in the study of SSR, can be helpful.  
If is considered that a case study is complementary to more extensive research, then 
follow up research may provide answers about frequency distributions and statistical 
answers (Swanborn, 2010, p. 71).  
 
 There are also differing opinions as to how many case studies should be 
undertaken to ensure that the evidence revealed could be generalised.  A frequent 
criticism of case study methodology is that, if it is dependent on a single case, then it 
is not possible to reach a comprehensive conclusion.  Giddens (1993) suggests that 
case studies are suspect because they lack sufficient robustness to constitute a broad 
analysis.  However, Yin (1994) and Hamel, Dulfour and Fortin (1993) argue that the 
goal of a case study should be to establish parameters and then apply them to future 
research.  Consequently even a single case study can be considered acceptable 
provided that it meets the established objective. Moses & Knutsen (2007, pp. 289-
290) believe that there is “need to encourage problem-driven (not methods-driven) 
science” in terms of research methodology. 
 
The typical characteristic of case studies is that they work towards a holistic 
understanding of cultural systems of action (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991).  
Cultural systems of action refer to sets of interrelated activities engaged in by actors 
in a social situation (Stake, 1995).  Feagin (1991), Stake (1994) and Yin (2002) 
believe that although case studies are not sampling research, the selection of a case 
must maximise what can be learnt from it, taking account of the time and funding 
available for the study.  Case studies therefore tend to be selective, focusing on issues 
that are essential to understanding the structure being examined.  This means that the 
researcher considers not just the perspective of the participants, but also the 
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perception of relevant groups and the interaction between them (Feagin, Orum & 
Sjoberg, 1991). 
Literature provides an insight into the acceptance of case studies, despite 
criticism of them as a methodology when used as a single case.  Hamel (1993) 
characterises the use of a single study as a concentration of the global in the local.  
Yin (1989) believes that general applicability results from case study methodology, 
which can be seen to satisfy the three tenets of qualitative research: describing, 
understanding and explaining.  Despite reservations about the application of the 
particular to the general in case studies there has been a renewed academic interest in 
their application.  Strauss and Glaser (1967) developed the concept of grounded 
theory and this, in part, stimulated the renewed use of case study methodology 
(Tellis, 1997, p.13). 
Grounded theory is a systematic generation of theory from data that contains 
both inductive and deductive thinking.  One goal of a grounded theory is to formulate 
hypotheses based on conceptual ideas and to discover the participants’ main concerns 
and how they try to resolve them.  Thus grounded theory attempts to conceptualise 
what is going on by using empirical data. The researcher does not formulate the 
hypotheses in advance since pre-formed hypotheses are excluded (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  Consequently qualitative research logic, which employs a systematic and 
comprehensive examination of a limited number of cases in order to provide 
generalisations, is created and is termed analytic induction (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 2006).  Cressey, (1971), suggests the stages of analytic 
induction are: defining the field; hypothesising an explanation; studying one case to 
see if it fits the facts; modifying the hypothesis or the definitions in the light of this; 
and reviewing further cases.  According to Cressey, analytic induction re-defines the 
phenomenon and re-formulates the hypothesis until a universal relationship is 
established.  
In terms of the process of how theory is generated, such qualitative research is 
broadly characterised by the process of analytical induction, in which the researcher 
moves from observation to generalisation.  Inferences are made from specific 
observations to more general rules in order to construct a hypothesis.  This 
methodology was developed as a means of systematising and adding rigor to the 
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process of analysis and the development of theory from data. Within the broad 
tradition of qualitative research, rather than collecting information to test a 
hypothesis, the explanation arises from the findings of the research (Charmaz & 
Mitchell, 2001; Clarke, 2005; Pidgeon, 1996; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2006). 
 
1.3.2. Selection of the Kosovo ISSR  
 
It is posited that, by using the Kosovo ISSR as the single case study, the 
author was considering the latest and most holistic example of security sector review 
and reform available.  This imperative drove the decision to take the Kosovo ISSR as 
the subject of study.  SSR is not an established and well-tried practice; it is barely 
twenty years old and is still evolving.  There remain differences of opinion over its 
definition, scope and applicability.  In addition, there is a lack of consensus over who, 
in terms of both application and ownership, should take the lead on SSR programmes.  
The fact that the international community was so intimately involved in the 
governance of the province of Kosovo and that the ISSR was part of the process of 
transferring responsibility for the security sector from the UN to local government 
control made the presence of confusion and competition, at all levels, a major factor 
in influencing the outcome of the programme.   
 
It is submitted that the case of Kosovo is particularly germane to the study of 
SSR as its model of international intervention and transitional administration in post-
conflict situations has been repeated, since 1999, in Iraq, Afghanistan and East 
Timor.  The UN Integrated Mission, first conceived in Kosovo, is now the standard 
for UN stabilisation missions.  As in Kosovo, subsequent international transitional 
missions have been particularly concerned with the democratic management of the 
security sector and this functional area is typically the last to be handed back to the 
local authorities.  Thus, the Kosovo experience has laid down the norm for current 
stabilisation and SSR missions. 
 
The Kosovo ISSR was, and remains, the most holistic SSR programme ever 
undertaken.  It took place within the wider model for international intervention and 
transitional administration in post-conflict territories, which has now become the 
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standard, and as such presents a worthy case for study.  Additionally, the underlying 
tensions, rivalry and institutional confusion demonstrated in Kosovo are being 
repeated across current practice of SSR.  The author asserts that if time and resources 
were available for other case studies this would improve the evidence of applicability 
of his findings and indeed, he recommends that such studies take place. 
 
1.3.3. Field Research  
 
The field research for this thesis has consisted of a series of interviews carried 
out during the period October 2007 – March 2008.  In all, 60 interviews were 
conducted.  The interviews were designed to allow participants, who are or were 
involved in the Kosovo security sector, to discuss the 2006 Kosovo ISSR and relate 
their views on the interactions of the actors in the process.  
 
Semi-structured questionnaires were used as a basis for dialogue. Tailored 
questionnaires were prepared for members of the international community 
(representing the EU, KFOR, OSCE, UN, UNDP and Diplomatic Corps) and those 
participants from the local population (See Annex B).  It was found that the set 
questions frequently led the participant to cite examples to support his/her perceptions 
on matters of inter- and intra-institutional and personal rivalry and competition. 
 
During 2006 the author was involved with the Kosovo ISSR.  However, the 
only association between the work undertaken by the author and other ISSR 
researchers, as recorded in their Final Report (Cleland Welch, Kondi, Stinson et al, 
2006) and that undertaken for this thesis is that the ISSR programme was used as a 
case study.  Apart from the modalities of the ISSR process, described in Chapter 
Four, none of the work carried out in 2006 for the ISSR programme has been used as 
part of this thesis.   
 
  In 2007/8, interviews were undertaken in the United Kingdom, Belgium and 
Kosovo.  Each interview lasted between 40 minutes and one and three quarter hours, 
dependent on participant responsiveness.  The majority of the interviews were 
conducted face to face, with only three being conducted on the telephone.  In some 
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cases, participants were interviewed more than once; this was either because 
additional information had been gained from other sources and needed to be verified 
by a second (or third) participant or because the participant ran out of time and the 
interview had to be continued at a later date.  The selection of participants was based 
on two factors, firstly, the overall population of Kosovo (see Table 1. 1 below): 
 
        
                           Table 1.1: Population of Kosovo (Source: UNMIK Communities Section FOU/DCA). 
 
Secondly, the interview schedule took account of the ethnicity of those who had been 
involved in the ISSR process (see Table 1.2 below). 
 
                                
         Table 1.2: Community Participation in ISSR. 
 
Of the 60 participants interviewed 34 (56.6%) were members of the 
international community, 26 (43.4%) were members of the Kosovo community.  Of 
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this second group, 17 (65.3%) were ethnic Albanians, 6 (23.2%) were Serbians and 3 
(11.5%) were from other ethnic groups.  Within the distribution of interviewees there 
were further divisions, according to the professional affiliation of the participant.  The 
breakdown of this distribution, which corresponded with the level of involvement of 
the organisation/group in Kosovo’s security sector and the ISSR process, is shown in 
Table 1.3 below. 
 
 
                                                   Table 1.3: Participant Professional Affiliation. 
 
It will be noticed that the percentage of international participants is lower by 
7% than the percentage participation in the ISSR process.  There are two reasons for 
this discrepancy. Firstly the rapid turnover of international personnel in Kosovo 
meant that a number of persons involved in the ISSR process had left the province 
(and in most cases, the international organisation) in the period between the end of 
the ISSR process in December 2006 and the start of the interviews for the thesis in 
October 2007.  Secondly, it was important to ensure that the local population, 
particularly the minorities, was adequately represented in the sample. 
 
The Serbian political leadership in Kosovo boycotted the ISSR process. The 
Serbian objections were not to the security review process per se but on being asked 
to work with the PISG and leaders of Albanian political parties. As they did not 
recognise the PISG or Albanian political structures, they could not be involved in a 
Steering Committee that had the Kosovar Albanian President, Prime Minister and 
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leaders of the major Albanian political parties as members. Nevertheless, as the 
second largest ethnic group in Kosovo, it was important that Kosovo Serb views were 
addressed during research for this thesis.  Indeed, a small number of Kosovo Serbs 
had contributed informally to the ISSR discussions.  Therefore six persons were 
interviewed; these were Kosovo Serbs involved in diplomatic, political, academic life 
and the media.  
  
The participant numbers for the other ethnic groups was increased from 3%, 
(percentage participation in the ISSR process) to 11.5% (3 persons) of the local 
participants interviewed to take due account of their views.  Among those interviewed 
were eight members of the ISSR Steering Committee, representing a cross section of 
both the international community in Kosovo and the local political leadership.  The 
latter participants were selected to reflect the balance of ethnicities on the Steering 
Committee.   
 
In all eleven persons did not wish to be interviewed and, apart from the 
expected reluctance of the Serbian community to participate, members of the 
international community were less disposed to share their views, particularly on 
matters related to intra-institutional competition.  Nine persons, who consented to be 
interviewed, wished to remain completely anonymous.   
 
The basis of the methodology for the field research was analytic induction 
(Znaniecki, Becker and Katz, 1934, pp. 102-137; 1958, pp.652-660; 1983, pp.127-
148; Becker, 1958, pp. 653 & 658).  Analysis was tentative and provisional 
throughout the study and only became comprehensive once the data was collected.   
Analytic induction was chosen as the method of research because it requires a 
researcher to look at an event and develop a hypothetical statement of what has 
happened.  Whilst gathering data for this thesis the hypothesis was developed and 
refined. 
  
Auerbach (2003, p.24) suggests that, “…the qualitative research paradigm 
assumes that the best way to learn about people’s subjective experience is to ask them 
about it, and then listen carefully to what they say.”  Although, examination of current 
social practices shows that interviews are a pervasive way of acquiring information, 
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the understanding of the information gained from such interviews is often complicated 
and this was the case during the research.  In order to gain maximal understanding as 
many as possible of the interviews were tape-recorded.  The recorded and fully 
transcribed interview provided distinct advantages over the non-recorded interview 
where notes are taken, either contemporaneously or made soon after the interview was 
concluded.  The recorded interview allowed the researcher to analyse the responses of 
the interviewee; emotions, hesitations and responses which might otherwise have been 
missed had the interview is not been taped.  In addition, by being able to transcribe 
every word and response, the possibility of missing vital information was reduced. 
 
However, in interviews conducted in the Albanian language, the advantages of 
the recorded interview were lost.  The immediacy of the response was frequently 
impeded by the need to translate back and forth in two languages.  The added length 
of the recording also tended to outweigh the advantages of recording the interview as 
transcription became convoluted and time consuming.  Unrecorded interviews 
presented difficulties; the process took longer and the flow of the dialogue, on 
occasions, was interrupted when the researcher needed to check that a point had been 
fully understood or clarification of a statement was required. 
 
The traditions of the Balkans region dictate that lengthy reviews of history, 
cultural differences and perceived wrongs are undertaken whenever participants are 
asked to comment on their relationships with other nationalities, organisations or 
political parties.  This tendency was ably demonstrated during the interviews in 
Kosovo.  Auerbach (2004, p.24) believes that people almost always talk about their 
experience in a storied form and thus qualitative research is based on stories.  This 
belief was borne out during the research.  Allied to the tendency to relate experiences 
in story-form, the participants preferred to have the full attention of their interviewer 
and this was difficult when taking contemporaneous notes.  The problem was 
overcome by having an interpreter/assistant make notes of the interview alongside the 
researcher.  This had two advantages; firstly, it allowed the researcher to concentrate 
more fully on the participant’s demeanour and body language and, secondly, the 
opportunity was presented to be able to check that he had correctly noted what was 
being said.  
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At the outset of the research phase it was intended that the computer-based 
qualitative data analysis software program ATLAS.ti would be used to code and 
analyse of the data.  This programme provides a reasonably easily understood and 
operated tool for the systematic coding of data.  It is beneficial to the analysis of the 
research in that it saves time and collation effort whilst presenting a record of analysis 
and interpretation of data which could be interrogated by other researchers or 
reviewers.  In practice the data from interviews, whether transcribed from notes made 
by the researcher and the assistant during the interview or in the case of taped 
interviews soon after the event, was manually coded using a naming and colour-
coding process.  This time consuming manual process was the only practical way of 
capturing the information given the acute lack of electricity in Kosovo, which 
precluded the reliable and efficient use of computers and the software package 
designed to assist in this task.  It was also believed that the author and the 
assistant/interpreter were sufficiently conversant with the subject matter to be able to 
analyse the data in a more systematic and critical manner, using data immersion 
techniques, than the ATLAS.ti specialist package could provide.  However, it is noted 
that Lee and Fielding (1993) and Dey (1993) suggest that the shortcoming associated 
with computer coding have less to do with the programmes and more to how they are 
used and applied.  
 
In interviews, conducted in a language other than English, an interpreter was 
used.  Although the author has a working knowledge of the Albanian and Serbian 
languages, he was not confident that it was sufficiently fluent to conduct in depth 
interviews.  However, it is acknowledged that difficulties can arise when using an 
interpreter during interviews and therefore great care was taken in the selection of a 
suitable individual.  The person who filled this position was a Kosovar Albanian.  She 
was chosen for three reasons; firstly, the author had worked with her for a period of 
eight years and had developed an excellent relationship which allowed the interpreter 
to very accurately mirror his questions and even the tone of his voice; secondly, she 
holds a first class honours degree from a United Kingdom University and has 
undertaken research methods training and, thirdly, she had worked as a Research 
Associate at the Kosova Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) 
and had a full understanding of the ISSR process.  In light of these additional skills 
the interpreter doubled as an assistant and shadowed the author whenever possible. 
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The interpreter/assistant was paid for her work, using Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) funds, and signed a contract, which outlined not only her duties but 
also the ethical parameters that applied to her work during the field research.  
 
Although the interpreter attended all interviews in the Albanian language, 
some interviews in English were conducted without her presence.  This was for two 
reasons; firstly, there were security restrictions (for instance, when visiting the KFOR 
Headquarters and Serbian areas) and, secondly, there were a few occasions when the 
participant wished to speak to the author privately.  Whenever possible, however, the 
interpreter was included in the interview process to verify that data had been recorded 
accurately.  This was achieved by her making notes in Albanian during the interview 
and then, in the evenings, comparing her notes with those taken by the author.  In 
matters of interpretation from the Albanian language the author generally deferred to 
the native language speaker’s elucidation of what had actually been said rather than 
what he thought had been said.  
 
Interviews with the Serbian participants were conducted in English.  This was 
necessary as no Serb participant would consent to be interviewed with a Kosovar 
Albanian present and it was deemed more beneficial to conduct the interview in 
English rather than using an unknown interpreter.  However, no discernible difference 
was noted between the attitudes of those being interviewed with the interpreter 
present and when she absent. 
  
Conventions covering the protection of the rights of participants were observed 
throughout the interview process.  Whenever a tape recorder was used it was essential, 
given the sensitivity of the subject, that principles on the usage and ownership of the 
material were established.  There was, therefore, a need to confirm that the participant 
was comfortable with a recording being made, thereby gaining informed consent.  
Several participants indicated that they were unwilling to have their voices recorded 
whilst others wished to be assured that the recording would be destroyed immediately 
after transcription.  In all, 13 (22%) of all the interviews were recorded.  A number of 
those interviewed, when asked if they wished to remain anonymous, made it clear that 
they did not wish to be identified by name or position.  Although the comments of 
those who wished to remain anonymous may have been used in the text of the thesis, 
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the participant is not identified and their names and occupations do not appear in the 
list of those interviewed attached at Annex C.  
1.3.4. Relating Theory to Practice 
 
Security sector reform programmes grew out of the need for development agencies to 
take note of the effect of the security situation when dealing with the aftermath of 
conflict or transition.  SSR programmes, therefore, are most likely to driven by 
external actors. These actors can be national governments in their capacity as 
development donors, NGOs or IGOs.  Indeed IGOs have assumed, in recent years, 
significant responsibilities in shaping the SSR agenda.  They have played a central 
role in designing and delivering SSR programmes and a number of them have 
developed, or are developing, policy frameworks to guide their various SSR activities 
(Law, 2007, p.4).  It is clear therefore that, when seeking models to explain the 
influences that impact on SSR, institutional theory should be considered. 
 
The investigation of the way institutions affect society began in the late 19th 
and early 20th century. The early study of political institutions concentrated on the 
instruments of government and the state with an early exponent, Weber, focusing on 
effect of bureaucracy and institutions on society (Radkau & Camiller, 2009).   In the 
late 20th century however, institutional studies expanded; Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
DiMaggio (1983), Powell (1983; 1991) and North (1993) wedded neo- 
institutionalism to economics and sociology, as well as international relations and 
political science. 
It may be argued that an institution is a compilation of rules and practices.  It is 
embedded in structures of meaning and resources, which can normally endure even in 
the face of rapid personnel change.  Indeed, it is considered by some to be able to 
resist the personal preferences and expectations of individuals and overcome 
changing external circumstances (March & Olsen, 1995).  While the concept of 
institution is central to political analysis, there is a wide diversity within and across 
disciplines as to what type of rules and relationships can be construed as institutions 
(Goodnin, 1996, p.20).  The term institutionalism suggests a general theoretical 
approach to the study of institutions and a set of ideas and hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between institutional characteristics and agency, coupled with 
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performance and change.  Institutionalism emphasizes the social construction of 
institutions and points to their inward-looking nature.  Institutions may be said to 
enable, mold and constrain actors and are creators of identities and roles (March & 
Olsen, 2006, pp.4-5).  Within the institutional perspective it is assumed that 
institutions serve to create order and predictability.  However, there is evidence that, 
in the field of SSR, this order and predictability is often absent.  Indeed, when faced 
with the realities of IGO engagement in SSR, institutional theory has nothing to say 
on why such missions, undertaken by international institutions either singly or in 
concert, frequently fail to achieve sustainable results, thereby condemning millions of 
people to poverty, misery and even death. 
 
The author suggests that there is a gap between theory and practice when 
observing the security sector.  There is a discrepancy between a westernised ideal of 
how the security sector should be structured and function, and the reality of how 
security sectors actually operate.  In addition, although contemporary literature 
focuses on the roles and interaction of institutions and international organisations, 
there is an absence of understanding or theoretical discourse on rivalry and 
competition within and between IGOs when attempting to stabilise post-conflict 
countries and reform their security systems.  The author proposes that no one theory 
or theoretical approach is sufficient to explain what governs the practical delivery of 
SSR.  The study of security sector management and reform is in its infancy and the 
evolution of SSR theory is not well developed; indeed, Fitz-Gerald (2009, pp. 13-15) 
agrees the author’s contention that SSR does not conform to a single set of theories 
and is at a too early a stage of development to have formed its own.  However, 
institutionalist understanding of cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks 
might be applicable to the work of IGOs in the field of SSR but it may be that, as 
Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond observe, “the social world, including the activities of 
institutions, is complex and beyond the comprehension of a single body of theory” 
(2004, p. 14).  This proposition will be explored throughout the thesis.  
 
Underlying the complexity of social interaction in the field of SSR and germane 
to this discussion is the reaction of states and institutions to the issue of inter-state and 
IGO cooperation over matters of security.   Lipson (1984, pp.1-23) believes that when 
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economic or environmental relations are at stake, “cooperation can be sustained 
among several self-interested states”, whereas such collaboration is “more 
impoverished …in security affairs.”   He suggests that, “significantly different 
institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security 
issues” and the likelihood of cooperation is markedly different within these two areas 
(1984, p.18).   
 
Conscious of the political, human and economic cost of failure in the security 
sector, there is an ever increasing international donor community requirement for the 
monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes but, as yet, no methodology has been 
found that adequately fulfils this remit (Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, p.1).  Practical 
conceptual tools need to be developed to analyse the actors involved in the security 
sector, the process in which they interact, and the outcomes from those interactions as 
the reform process is undertaken.  The current discrepancies in M&E serve to 
exacerbate the confusion that surrounds SSR activities.   The thesis will explore 
possible models for overcoming the deficiencies in this area. 
 
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into two sections; the first section examines theories 
related to international stabilisation and state building interventions, IGO and local 
involvement in the processes of achieving sustainable security, the evolution of SSR, 
its concepts and possible related theories.  It identifies and discusses consensus and 
divergence in the views of academics and practitioners on what constitutes SSR and 
whether there should be a more holistic approach to the problem of security, as used 
by the Kosovo ISSR.  Starting this first Section, Chapter Two explores intervention 
and institutional theory and the challenges of measuring progress in SSR 
programmes.  Chapter Three considers theories of cooperation and competition 
within and between institutions and between both international and local 
functionaries. Chapter Four examines academic and practitioner debate on the 
concepts, theories, structure and methodology of SSR and its relationship to peace 
building, human security and local ownership.  It analyses the processes by which 
those involved in the security field have reached their conclusions on how SSR 
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should progress and what this has meant in practice.  The fifth Chapter discusses the 
principal IGOs involved in SSR and examines their relative competencies and their 
relationship with one another.   
  
The work contained in the second Section of the thesis is largely based on the 
research data collected in the field during 2007/8, described above.  Opening this 
section, Chapter Six examines the historical background to, and development of, the 
Kosovo ISSR.  Chapter Seven explores the principal IGO involvement in the Kosovo 
ISSR and considers the relationships that were critical to the outcome of the process.  
It analyses the dynamics of the interactions, at both international and organisational 
levels, between actors who formed part of the international community response to 
the SSR process.  The empirical findings are synthesised with the theoretical 
literature explored in Chapters Two and Three.  In Chapter Eight the relationship with 
Kosovo’s local leadership is examined, including how deeply the Kosovo political 
leaders were engaged in what was described by the OECD as, “…one of the most 
ambitious and holistic efforts at SSR undertaken in recent years, both in scope and 
methodology” (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 249).  In Chapter Nine, the above discussion is 
related to the wider field of SSR, particularly its association to ongoing dialogue in 
the EU, the UN and NATO on the application of SSR.  It also connects the theoretical 
literature and empirical findings on competition and confusion within and between 
international organisations.  In this concluding Chapter recommendations are made 
on the direction of future research in order to produce more coherent SSR 
interventions. 
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SECTION ONE 
Chapter Two:  Considering Intervention, State Building 
and Institutionalism  
 
Introduction 
 
The hypothesis of this work is that IGOs are significantly impeded in their pursuit of 
coherent and effective SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry and 
contradictory agendas.  An examination of the conduct of IGOs and their officials 
when creating or restoring democratic governance and management of the security 
sector is long overdue.  In particular, inter- and intra- organisational confusion and 
competition and the relationship between the international community and local 
actors is an area that has not yet been fully explored.  However, academics have made 
detailed studies of international intervention in the affairs of post-conflict and failed 
states and have theorised on the nature of institutionalism and the relationships 
between organisations and states. 
 
In endeavouring to determine the role of competition, rivalry and confusion in 
the conduct of SSR by IGOs it is necessary to review the relevant theories of state 
building intervention, institutionalism and performance measurement.  This Chapter 
therefore examines the literature dedicated to international intervention and 
transitional administration.  It relates the theories of institutionalism to the growing 
involvement of the international community, through IGOs, in stabilisation missions. 
The Chapter explores these approaches and theories in order to determine if any can 
adequately explain the competition and confusion nexus.  Whilst proving useful in 
setting a baseline for SSR activities, it is suggested that none of the theories examined 
have explored their relevance to the security sector in any depth.  Neither do they 
provide explanations for the effect that competition and confusion has on the conduct 
of SSR, which the author argues, impacts significantly on the outcome and 
sustainability of security reform programmes. 
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2.1. International Stabilisation and State Building Interventions 
There are currently between forty and sixty states, with a total population of some 
two billion people, which have either collapsed or are on the brink of failure.  The 
world’s most pressing problems: terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, extreme 
poverty, ethnic conflict, disease and genocide tend to originate in such states (Ghani 
& Lockhart, 2008, p.23).  Thus fragile and post-conflict states pose a threat not only 
to the security of their citizens but also to democratic states and their way of life.  The 
problem, however, is not new; the 1947 Truman Doctrine noted that the half of the 
world’s population was living in poverty and constituted a threat, not only to 
themselves but also to the more prosperous areas of the world (Duffield, 2001, p. 35).    
Given this dilemma, the logic of the security paradigm in the early 21st 
century has necessitated the consideration, by the international community, of 
intervention in the sovereign affairs of failed and failing states to encourage stability 
and to provide the momentum for development and economic progress.  This type of 
intervention has become more prevalent, in recent years, and is promoted by western 
democratic governments as state building in the name of global stability (Chandler, 
2004; Duffield, 2007).  In the light of increasing international intervention in the 
governance and administration of post-conflict territories, an understanding of the 
theories that elucidate the drivers of international engagement, in post-conflict and 
fragile states, is necessary.   
 
 Current intervention theory literature is largely based on empirical observation 
of the practices and normative frameworks of international transitional 
administrations and on the imposition of democracy by external actors (Caplan, 2002; 
Chesterman, 2004; Bain, 2003; Paris, 2002; Zaum, 2003, 2004).  This literature is 
drawn from four separate approaches that have a direct bearing on contemporary 
issues in the field: firstly, those dealing with concepts of sovereignty, trusteeship, and 
neo-institutionalism, secondly, those concerned with the challenges of weak or failed 
states, thirdly, the literature dealing with peace-keeping and peacebuilding and 
fourthly, theories directly concerned with the practice of international interventions.   
 
A common feature in this literature is an interest in the concept of sovereignty 
and the international community’s right to interfere with it (Krasner, 2004; Keohane, 
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2003; Fearon & Laitin, 2004).  Zaum (2004, p. 13) suggests that the international 
community’s authority to govern “has remained largely unquestioned.”  However, 
others challenge this assumption, considering such intervention as neo-colonial due to 
its authoritarian nature (Paris, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; Chopra, 2000b; 
Chandler, 1999).  
 
 It could be stated that imperialism did not end when the European empires 
relinquished their colonies after the Second World War but was just pursued by other 
means.  If this premise is accepted then the expression, neo-colonialism, might be 
used to describe the ongoing nature of imperialism.  Yet it may also be contended that 
the term is controversial because its meaning is complex, being used not only as a 
synonym for contemporary forms of imperialism and also, in a polemical way, in 
reaction to any unjust and oppressive expression of western political power.  
However, scholars in postcolonial studies such as Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 
(1998) do see neo-colonialism as being advanced firstly through "development and 
dependency theory" and then through "critical development theory" (pp. 49-56).  
Young (2001) suggests that developing, transitional and post-conflict states find it 
difficult to escape from the western notion of development.  Classification, economic 
growth factors, the way economic output is measured, and the progressive linear 
model of development, along with the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
have become so deeply entrenched that post-conflict and developing states have no 
other recourse but to be part of the western system.  Nkrumah (1965) explains how 
western powers responded to the success of national liberation movements, such as 
the one he led in Ghana, by shifting its tactics from colonialism to neo-colonialism:  
"Without a qualm it dispenses with its flags [and] claims that it is 
‘giving’ independence to its former subjects, to be followed by ‘aid’ 
for their development…Under cover of such phrases, however, it 
devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly 
achieved by naked colonialism" (1965, pp. 21-22). 
 Zisk Marten (2004) makes a comparison between modern peacekeeping and 
former colonial interventions by Britain, France, and the US.  She suggests that 
modern peacekeeping operations are very similar to colonial dominance at the end of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  First among these similarities is the 
motivation behind the operations.  She notes that national interest took precedence 
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over humanitarian goals during the colonial period but, whilst acknowledging that 
modern peacekeeping missions give consideration to humanitarian objectives, she 
argues that national interest remains key to peacekeeping and stabilisation operations.  
Another similarity she explores is that both colonisation and peacekeeping strategies 
are directed to winning the local population’s hearts and minds.  Colonisation and 
peacekeeping were, and are, undertaken to stabilise and then mold the target country 
and population in a manner acceptable to the interventionalists.  Furthermore, both 
peacekeeping operations and colonialism require that the intervening authorities 
select the political winners in the new local order and, when doing so, they favour 
those people who are supportive of their efforts.  Such practices occurred in both 
modern peacekeeping models and in the colonial period examples that she studies. 
 
 Security Sector Reform is becoming a key dynamic in stabilisation missions 
and the external political weight involved in such programmes is immense (Smith, 
2001, p. 13).  The prospect of obtaining NATO or EU membership, for example, has 
been used as a ‘soft’ condition to motivate new and potential members implementing 
SSR (Avagyan & Hiscock, 2005, p. 15).  As with any other development issue, the 
extent to which donor activities in SSR are motivated by political motives is moot.  It 
may be questioned for whom SSR is being designed, in whose interest, and whose 
criterion constitutes operational success.  The activities related to SSR also presents 
the risk of concealing obscure motives and attracting unrelated projects.  Additionally 
it might be suggested that, in some cases, there are financial and economic incentives 
behind SSR, determining where the reform efforts will be carried out.  It should not 
be overlooked, for instance, that the “UK and US, at the forefront of SSR, are also 
leaders in the international arms trade” (Smith, 2001, p. 15).   Although the 
correlation between SSR and financial motives remains difficult to verify, such 
potential linkages should not be disregarded.  
 
 Concern over the use of SSR as a neo-colonial tool has been raised in the UN 
Security Council.  During a debate held in 2007, Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, in his 
capacity as Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, spoke 
on behalf of the 118 non-aligned states expressing concern as to the motivation 
behind security sector reform initiatives. He stated that: 
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“Carrying out the rehabilitation of security sectors in states 
emerging from conflicts is a matter that should be decided by 
national governments as part of their nationally-led strategies for 
post-conflict peace building, taking into consideration their own 
needs and priorities, the socio-cultural particularities, and the 
specificities of each case. It is not the prerogative of the 
international community to prescribe the road ahead for them. 
National ownership is key in this regard” (Díaz, 2007). 
Thus it is clear that there are valid questions over the use of SSR and its motivation.  
It might therefore be argued that SSR is part of a neo-colonial agenda, which aims to 
fashion developing states in the image, and to the advantage, of the western powers 
providing stabilisation assistance.  
 
Authors, such as Chopra & Hohe (2004), Chesterman, (2004) and Caplan 
(2005), address this inequality of authority and influence between external and 
internal actors in stabilisation situations.  The debate revolves around questions as to 
how deeply external actors should intervene, how long the intervention should last 
and what should be the stabilisation strategy.  In all these works, however, discussion 
centres on the international approach and does not examine the internal stresses 
affecting the international transitional mission or the relationship between it and the 
local authorities. 
  
It has been suggested above that one of the key areas of international 
intervention is SSR and there is a continuing debate over the linkages between it and 
stabilisation, state building and development (Fitz-Gerald & Lálá, 2003).  The scope 
for debate is wide as SSR brings together political entities, the military and 
development agencies in a combined approach that creates dispute over which 
security and related functional areas should be included in the process (Ball and 
Brzoska, 2002; Hendrikson & Karkoszka, 2002).    
 
The practice of SSR is typically undertaken, on behalf of western democratic 
states, by IGOs and therefore institutional theory is germane to the understanding of 
SSR implementation.  In addition, but not examined by current security literature, 
there is the question of the relationships within and between IGOs and the interaction 
of their functionaries.  The association between IGOs and the host nation is of 
particular concern when accessing the viability of externally imposed SSR.  A 
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complexity of SSR is that the requirement for reform typically occurs at the same 
time as a whole range of other interventions (political, governmental, developmental 
and economic) and, in some cases, unstable situations including open conflict.  There 
are academics that question the viability of SSR in such contexts, believing that it 
cannot deliver sustainable outcomes (Egnell & Halden, 2009).  This poses significant 
concerns for stabilisation and the promotion of democratic governance because the 
creation of legitimate institutions is predicated on the achievement of sustainable 
security (Hänggi, 2005, pp.14-17).   
2.1.1. The State Building Paradigm  
 
In the new millennium, state building has become a focus of international 
attention to promote stability in the face of seemingly growing threats from terrorism, 
illegal migration and organised crime originating from failed or fragile states.  
However, the institutionalist theoretical view of state building is shaped by a Western 
concept of what a modern state should look like.  The state building paradigm is 
predominantly one where failed or transitional states are encouraged to evolve along 
the lines of Western models to the point where they become rational bureaucracies 
with a democratic, free-trade, pro-growth orientation that provides them access to the 
benefits of the international system. 
 
It is necessary, therefore, to consider the foundations of state building, which 
have increasingly been used in the development of stabilisation theory and practice.  
State building interventions, by the international community, are rooted in Weberian 
understanding of state legitimacy and Western concepts of state formation (Sica, 
2004).  Weber argued states must attain a legitimate domination that demonstrates the 
extent to which the bureaucracy and social groups acknowledge the authority of a 
leader.  He also maintained that there are three types of legitimate domination: 
charismatic, traditional and rational-legal.  Importantly, Weber recognised that 
legitimacy formation, creation and maintenance are not single or separate events, but 
a continual process based on engaging the citizens and their emotions (Collins, 1986).  
Germane to this thesis, these requirements are difficult to convey in matrices and 
logical frameworks, something that is often overlooked by donor states when 
demanding precise monitoring and evaluation of stabilisation and SSR programmes. 
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Whilst Weber was concerned with legitimacy formation, Tilly (2000; 1990; 
1975) has focused on a process that, he argues, essentially involves violence, control 
and taxation:   
“State building provided for the emergence of specialised 
personnel, control over consolidated territory, loyalty, and 
durability, permanent institutions with a centralised and 
autonomous state that held the monopoly of violence over a 
given population” (1975, p.70).  
 
The conduct of war brings territory under a ruler’s control, which then 
requires governance and protection, necessitating taxation and the formation of 
bureaucracies.  Taxation then becomes a primary driver of resource accumulation.  
Tillian and Weberian theory has several commonalities.  Firstly, they agree that the 
formation of a state requires significant violence; secondly, once in power, elites must 
monopolise the internal threat of violence and, thirdly, they must create an 
administration to raise funds to provide benefits and protect the state from external 
threats.  Indeed, civil war or intra-state violence could be considered the first stage of 
state formation (as in the case of Kosovo) and it might well be argued that external 
interventions could hinder the process of state formation (Luttwak, 1999).   
 
The latter two stages in state building, monopolising violence and raising 
funds, translate in the 21st Century as the “construction or strengthening of legitimate 
governmental institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict” (Paris & Sisk, 
2009, p.1).  This requires significant security governance and economic management 
reform. DFID has issued a Working Paper (Waites, 2008), which argues that 
stabilisation is a political process rather than just a question of technical capacity 
enhancements.  Drawing on Waites’ model, which focuses on civil society theory and 
the relationship between civil society and the state, the Working Paper sees 
stabilisation involving political compacts, the prioritisation of core government 
functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations.  
 
Despite this seemingly logical evolution, some commentators argue that 
modern state building is ineffective.  Firstly, it is argued that intervention is unable to 
escape the realpolitik of international relations (Chandler, 2004).  Secondly, 
intervention may not always be in the best interests of the local population who, in 
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many cases, are assumed by external actors to be incapable of improving their own 
situation (Hellander, 2005).  Bellamy (2010, pp. 51-57) argues that the international 
intervention in Kosovo acted as an important catalyst for subsequent development of 
thinking on sovereignty as responsibility.  However Judah (2000, p. 84) claims that, 
while NATO member states emphasised that violations of human rights in Kosovo 
led to intervention, this was not the central issue: 
“At the heart of the matter was a fundamental struggle 
between two people for the control of the same piece of land. 
… However, human rights have become an influential factor 
in shaping international politics. This is not to say that the 
Kosovars did not suffer grievous human rights abuses at the 
hands of the Serbian authorities … but … we can now see 
how the question of human rights became another weapon in 
the arsenal of the Kosovars.”  
 
The rules governing intervention constitute an important part of international 
law but intervention, as a distinct practice in international affairs, did not exist until 
there was a state into which military troops could be interjected (Lang, 2009).  This 
understanding was to be enshrined in the 1965 UN General Assembly Resolution 
2131(1965) which undertook to protect the sovereignty of developing states in the 
context of the Cold War.  However, there are assumptions surrounding stabilisation 
intervention that derive from the “responsibility to protect” concept (Evans, 2008; 
United Nations General Assembly, 2005, pp.1-5; Baranyi, Salahub et al, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the Kosovo intervention exposed a lack of constitutional order, at the 
global level, to cover this type of eventuality (Lang, 2010, p. 76).  
2.1.2. The Limits of Euro­Centric Approaches 
 
The difficulties of stabilisation and state building could arguably be the result of 
flaws in applying existing state building theory to post-conflict situations.  Firstly, the 
empirical evidence base for ideas of state formation rest upon the Western European 
experience, which may not be entirely applicable to non-Western state building, 
particularly in countries without colonial histories (Ayoob, 1995).  This is particularly 
significant for stabilisation and SSR as currently there are many nations that are 
deemed to need state building assistance but have little experience or understanding 
of Western democratic ideals.  These include Afghanistan, Nepal, Yemen and 
Somalia as well as others, which have a colonial past, including Georgia, the Balkans, 
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the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Indonesia and Kazakhstan 
(Stabilisation Unit, 2008).  Intervention, in the European context, was historically a 
process of forming a state system.  However, the type of wars that formed European 
states are not the same as the ‘new wars’ of the post Cold war era, which are more 
likely to be internal conflicts rather than inter-state wars (Luckham, 2004; Kaldor, 
1999).   
Contemporary thinking on stabilisation and state building seems to reflect a 
modern version of both Tilly and Weber’s work.  The aim is the creation of a 
democratic state that is managed by an efficient bureaucracy, with territorial integrity, 
which can raise taxes (Helander, 2005; Call, 2008).  These theories do not take into 
account the processes required for externally led (or assisted) state formation and the 
dangers this may engender (Barnett & Zurcher, 2009).  Indeed, externally led state 
formation may require certain pre-conditions in order to succeed, including a 
homogeneous core of political leaders and the creation of a national identity (Taylor 
& Botea, 2008).  Grindle and Mason (2002; 2007) argue that, for many countries, 
good governance is a distant possibility.  States that suffer from weak or nonexistent 
institutions, insecurity and poorly developed human resources are likely to be 
overwhelmed by all that is needed to achieve good governance.  They posit that it 
makes sense to find ways to reduce this burden on developing states by reordering the 
objective of reform activities to be that of ‘good enough governance’.  Nevertheless, 
getting good enough governance is fraught with the potential for failure.  Grindle and 
Mason make the valid contention that obtaining of good governance is a long-term 
objective, requiring substantial local buy-in, and efforts to achieve it will often be 
drawn out and uncertain. 
 
The bar for state formation is set high; there are very few examples since the 
17th Century where any sovereign state has been able to provide all attributes of the 
model state in all of its territory (Milliken & Krause, 2003).  Therefore it may be 
argued that post-conflict or fragile states have little hope of growing into the modern 
form of statehood.  However there are alternatives to European state formation 
model.  These tend to emerge in historical anthropology, particularly from the Early 
State School, which is centred on the work of Claessen and Skalnik (1978, pp.3-31).  
They argued, drawing upon Engels, that that there were two paths to state-formation; 
as result of class and/or surplus imbalances and as a result of coercive force.  It is in 
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the application and study of state formation in non-European states where the analysis 
opens up several alternative understandings the state.  Furthermore, not only are there 
several forms of state, an idea that draws upon Weberian thinking, but also state 
formation in different parts of the world have distinct attributes.  There may be 
several processes of state formation, which acknowledge local physical imperatives 
(land mass, climate etc.) and that the cultures which evolve in these spaces may 
desire different forms of statehood, distinct from a homogeneous European inspired 
model.  If this premise is to be acknowledged, then too must be the concept of local 
ownership primacy in any intervention and stabilisation process. 
 
2.1.3. The Use and Impact of Democratisation in State Building 
 
As the peace dividend heralded by the end of the Cold War proved transitory it 
became clear that IGOs, including the UN and NATO, were faced with a growing 
number of world crises, including challenges from globalisation.   It also saw a more 
engaged western international community striving to ensure that the ideals of good 
governance were promoted.  In conjunction with expanding multi-lateral 
programmes, bi-lateral donors also enlarged their activities in this arena, increasing 
their financial and political involvement in programmes aimed at state building in 
response to their own geo-strategic need for stability.  This has involved an evolution 
in the terminology to address emerging issues and an expansion of the institutions 
that are involved in the process.  For example, within the international system there 
are now some 24 organisations involved in peacebuilding and stabilisation missions 
(Barnett, 2007).  
 
The existing instruments for supporting state building are typically centred on 
the UN Security Council, which can mandate missions under Chapters VI and VII of 
the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945, Art: 33-51).  The political nature of UN 
interventions has grown since the end of the Cold War.  This has enabled the UN to 
take on a more robust role, an ideal that has been sponsored by successive UN 
Secretary-Generals since Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 
1992).  The number of UN peacekeeping missions has grown rapidly since the 1990’s 
and in order to meet these expanded political goals, UN agencies have extended their 
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remits, with a bureaucratisation of development and state building practice especially 
in the security sector (Ball, 2001, pp.45-66).  The paradigm, which has driven 
interventions since Namibia in 1989-1990, has drawn significantly from Western 
traditions of state building.  Additionally, the international community methodology 
has relied on modern Western experience and systems of governance rather than more 
nuanced and culturally sensitive processes. 
 
This approach has also influenced SSR programmes, which are often 
instigated in a form that assumes that they should be generally the same process as 
was used in the last place they were implemented.  The emerging practice is to 
employ a form of ‘liberal peace’ as a way of expanding international, normally 
Western, influence (Chandler, 2004; Duffield, 2001; 2007).  This is not dissimilar to 
the process of state building in the 19th and 20th Century when British colonial 
functionaries relied on experience gained in the early days of the British Empire to 
institute state building processes (Dodge, 2006).  It should not, however, be 
overlooked that the current international focus is on linking security to good 
governance and economic development as a method for ensuring a social contract 
between population and state (DFID, 2009, pp. 69-88; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008).   
This approach suggests that, by delivering basic security and justice, coupled with 
adequate education, health and infrastructure, citizens will more willingly accept the 
state authority. 
 
It is helpful to understand why democracy is seen, in the Western prospective, 
as a justification for international community interventions “...and the 
universalisation of Western liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1992, pp. 42-43).  The 
democratic peace agenda argues that democracies are more peaceful than non-
democracies and they seldom take up arms against one other (Tures, 2001, pp.227-
228).  However the concept, which promotes the Kantian view of a perpetual 
democratic peace, is flawed.  In order to demonstrate the peaceful nature of 
democracies, academics have sought to measure monadic, dyadic and systemic 
relations between states (Mitchell et al, 1999, pp. 783-789) but these interpretations 
have ignored long-term trends.   Farber and Gowa (1997, pp. 393-398) suggest that it 
is not democracy in itself that promotes peace, but it is common interest that is crucial 
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for international stability.  Derrida is dismissive of Fukuyama’s view on the 
universalisation of Western liberal democracy, proposing that: 
“… at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in the 
name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realise itself 
as an ideal of human history; never have violence, inequality, 
exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many 
human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity” (1993, p. 
63).  
 
Indeed, it may be argued that, by ignoring the realities of contemporary intra-state 
conflicts, democratisation models tend to focus on inter-state relations and ignore the 
fact that establishing democracy can be a highly adversarial measure within states 
(Huntingdon, 1997).  
 
Many democracy promotion theories arise from structuralist, modernist and 
transitional positions.  The structuralist model, which stems from Moore’s (1996) 
theories on the social origins of democracy and dictatorship, relied heavily on class as 
an explanation for the paths taken by states.  However, the causation impact between 
class structure and political strategy, the changing character of the state or the impact 
of the nationalism is in doubt (Potter et al, 1997).  Lipset’s modernist approach argues 
that democracy is an inherent evolution as development indices increase (Lipset, 
1959, pp.69-105; Rustow, 1970, Potter et al, 1997).  Inevitably this is linked to the 
liberal peace agenda, which attempts to combine development, economic growth and 
democratic governance (Duffield, 2001, Paris, 1997).  The theory is however 
challenged by the difficulty in identifying causality in the variables and how they 
influence democracy (Potter, et al, 1997).  Rustow (1970) proposed a less 
developmentalist hypothesis that is predicated on the transitional nation.  He 
identified the key requisites for democracy as being national unity, which is often 
born out of conflict.  It might be suggested that once the fighting abates a stage is 
reached when a conscious decision is made, by leading factions in the conflict, to 
move to a democratic system of governance.  This system must then be habituated so 
that it becomes the norm (Rustow, 1970, pp. 337-363).  
 
Thus is can be argued that much of the literature concerning the peace making 
nature of the democratic system ignores the potentially destabilising impact that the 
imposition of democracy by outside agents might engender.  The promotion of liberal 
democratic governance is often viewed as the overarching panacea for a fledgling 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER TWO   
 
39 
 
state’s ills.   However, this approach can be problematic when applied to weak and 
failed states, where the imposition of democracy may lead to renewed conflict by 
allowing space of dissent (Mousseau, 2001, p.458).  Therefore the need to address the 
governance of the security sector becomes a very pertinent issue.  SSR, particularly in 
post-conflict settings, is often necessary to establish a system that is able to provide 
genuine public security on which to build the framework of overall democratic 
governance (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p.32). 
2.1.5. Development, Capacity Building and Stabilisation 
 
The developmental approach to stabilisation, favoured by the international 
community, tends to focus on donor state led processes that are often being carried 
out in the context of a global policy framework.  However, it was the political 
conditions of the Cold War that prevented the merging of development and security 
endeavours and distorted their conceptual relationship (Duffield, 2001).   Providing 
support to the security sector during the Cold War effectively became “an instrument 
of power politics” (Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p.4).  Security was essentially a military 
issue, which meant that non-military institutions did not engage.  This was 
particularly the case when confronting the economic and developmental aspects of 
the military (Ball, 2001, pp. 45-66).  Development and capacity building during this 
period, while linked to foreign policy, was separate from military activities.  
However, towards the end of the Cold War there was a greater appreciation of the 
links between security and development as a tool for democratisation (Thompson, 
1987, pp. 126-149) and this linkage has grown considerably since that time.  
 
What is significant in a development paradigm, geared towards stabilisation 
and security reform, is the degree to which bi- and multi-lateral donors have taken an 
interest in the way these activities support politically orientated goals.  Of importance 
in the debate on the role of development and capacity building in stabilisation is the 
understanding of how development can contribute to stability and security reform.  
However, it is not clear that development activities, implemented in insecure 
environments, necessarily lead to greater stability.  Polman (2010) and Maren (1997) 
assert that Western development aid, in post-conflict situations, is frequently 
manipulated by local elites.  They suggest that, when Western states react to human 
rights abuses and the breakdown of security in post-conflict situations, they flood the 
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country with money, food and materiel.  A high proportion of this development aid 
will not reach those requiring it most but will be appropriated by corrupt elites and 
will often finance the resumption or continuation of conflict.  Additionally, evidence 
from Afghanistan indicates that there is no causal link in delivering development and 
capacity building programmes and increased support for the host nation government 
by its people (Wilder, 2010).  Furthermore, in some cases communities seem to have 
no difficulty in accepting development and capacity building support at the same time 
as assisting or participating in attacks against their benefactors (Lister, 2006). 
 
Therefore development and capacity building does not necessarily lead to 
stability, nor does it seem to promote legitimacy in insecure environments over the 
longer-term.  Although in secure areas aid can have a role in promoting state 
legitimacy, the gains are often reversed if the security situation deteriorates (Wilder, 
2010).  Moreover, there is evidence that not only can development be ineffective, but 
that it can also be counter-productive in promoting stabilisation.  Okuonzi and 
Macrae, when studying medical aid and health sector capacity building in Uganda, 
argued, “that inappropriately designed rehabilitation strategies obstruct rather than 
enable the development of sustainable systems” (1995, pp.127).  Similar negative 
outcomes have been noted in Afghanistan where development aid has, in some 
instances, had a destabilising affect (Wilder, 2010). 
 
Whilst these concerns are emerging from the field, there is also broader 
unease regarding the ability for development assistance, at the macro level, to 
encourage stability.  Evidence from Sri Lanka suggests that pledges of international 
development, in the context of other non-aligned donors and national policies, can 
hinder the potential impact of the overall recovery package thus undermining the 
belief that development leads to security (Goodhand & Walton, 2009, pp.303-323).  
Therefore, doubts about impact of development and capacity building in insecure 
environments abide.  In light of these uncertainties the concept of development, as the 
key driver of security, may well be incorrect and a significant level of effort and 
funds, provided by the international community, is wrongly directed.  Stabilisation 
theory recognises the goal of a stable political settlement, but the current 
concentration of the stabilisation effort is heavily weighed towards development 
assistance.   Efforts to reform the security sector and foster local political legitimacy 
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are less well developed (Berger & Weber, 2010).  It is suggested that a greater focus 
on the external funding for SSR, ensuring the democratic management of the security 
sector, can greatly assist in achieving the donor states’ political and strategic 
objectives.  It is also mooted that, if SSR planning and execution is carefully 
managed, less of the donor’s funds will be vulnerable to misappropriation and can be 
channelled towards achieving sustainable security and, therefore, sustainable 
development.  
2.2. International­Local Balance  
 
Whilst external actors, engaged in stabilisation and SSR programmes, may enjoy 
extensive political authority they rarely exercise it without contact and consultation 
with the local elites (Chesterman, 2004, Chap.4).   One of the most vital roles of the 
intervening organisation is to liaise and cooperate with local authorities and leaders.  
However, Doyle (2002, p.73) suggests that in reality, “from a domestic point of view, 
a local authority shares temporarily, and usually conditionally, some of its own 
legitimacy with the international peace operation”.  Tension or competition between 
international and local actors is thus almost inescapable. Indeed, this was illustrated 
in Rwanda where: 
“Rwandan state officials … found the process of security sector 
review, championed by the OECD and the UK’s Security Sector 
Development Advisory Team (SSDAT), overly intrusive”(LSE., 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010, pp. 14-15). 
 
 The most common international intervention mandates are to advise, assist 
and monitor.  This is often the approach taken when the international community 
cannot achieve consensus or where the need for intervention is not considered 
significant.  It also occurs when there is a belief that deeper international commitment 
will not succeed or is too expensive.  Such mandates place international officials in a 
mentoring or monitoring relationship with officials of a domestic government.  This 
is the UN’s traditional approach to peace support operations (PSOs) and how it is 
most used to operating.  An international presence can provide assistance, coherence 
and an international standard for the development of government structures and 
democratic norms.  This often means that when the: 
“…local structures in place may be mishandled or abused, 
spawn an opposition, and constituted a source of conflict, the 
trust authority behaves as an independent advisor, identifying 
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flaws in the local system and suggesting corrections” (Chopra, 
1998, p.14).  
 
Examples include Sierra Leone (UNSCR 1998c, para 8) where the mandate was “to 
establish a presence…to assist the Government” and “to cooperate with the 
Government”.  In Afghanistan the mandate is to “monitor and assist in 
implementation…advise the Interim Authority” and “use…good offices…to 
facilitate resolution” (Bonn Agreement, Annex 11). 
 
 Krasner (2004) suggests that international transitional administration 
succeeds best where the key actors are willing to work in concert.  However: 
 “…it is more difficult is cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq; that is where local leaders have not 
reached agreement on what the ultimate outcome for their 
polity should be and where they think about positioning 
themselves to win support from parochial constituencies 
when transitional administration, along with its large 
foreign military force, comes to an end (2004, p.105) 
 
Keohane (2003, p.275-298) and Krasner (2004, pp. 85-120) have evaluated the role 
of external actors in the reintroduction of sovereignty, with Krasner proposing a 
graduated view of sovereignty and a phased transference of power to local 
authorities.  Keohane points out that, “…at first, sovereignty may not be unbundled, 
but actually denied, as in trusteeship arrangements” (2003. p. 297).  Caplan suggests 
that “…the pace of devolution [must be] commensurate with the demonstrated ability 
of the local leadership to meet specified benchmarks” (2005, p. 215). 
 
 However, in many conflict-affected countries the actors within the security 
sector often have acquired powers that are above the law.  Sometimes, instead of 
serving the population, security actors are used by the state to oppress the opposition 
and increase the militarisation of society.  In some states, powerful militaries have 
destabilised civilian governments.  In others, the security sector receives a 
disproportionate amount of the national budget, thus redirecting resources from social 
development to military expenditure.  In the reconstruction and transformation of any 
post-conflict situation, SSR is a key component of stabilisation.  Undoubtedly, 
reducing the size, budget and scope of the security sector and reforming it to become 
more transparent and accountable to its citizens is a difficult task in any country.  
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER TWO   
 
43 
 
Nevertheless, the character, size and function of a national security system are critical 
to shaping the nature of the government and society (UNDP, 2000a, pp. 12-13).  
 
 In recent years, international donors have begun to support SSR in developing 
and post conflict countries.  Their focus has been on the importance of good 
governance and civilian control of the security sector.  Their activities include the 
provision of technical advice to governments on issues of fiscal responsibility and 
oversight.  They have offered training programmes for military and civilian leaders in 
accountability, transparency and human rights.  Work on strengthening government 
institutions and building civil society capacities to provide input into and monitor of 
the security sector is also provided.  Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005, p.1) note that: 
“Without a secure environment and a security system that ensures 
security even after the departure of international peace operations, 
political, economic, and cultural rebuilding is impossible. The 
latter can take place only in an environment where the local 
security sector is subjected to a rigorous democratisation process, 
putting the security forces in the service of society’s safety, not its 
destruction, and where both internal and external security forces 
are contributing constructively to the rebuilding of process”. 
 
 Engaging in SSR requires a long-term commitment by external actors.  It also 
requires sustained funding and resources.  Providing adequate money and resources 
however are not enough for a successful outcome, as demonstrated by the failure of 
SSR in Haiti despite major pledges by numerous donor states, including the US, 
France and Canada (Law, 2006b, p. 34).  More important is the political will to 
sustain involvement until national actors are mature enough to assume responsibility 
for their own security sector governance.  This requires political ‘exit strategies’ to be 
replaced by ‘transfer strategies’ linked to realistic and durable benchmarks (Bryden & 
Hänggi, 2005, p. 36).   
 
 The potentially negative impact of external actors on post-conflict societies 
must, nevertheless, be acknowledged.  There are criticisms of the authoritarian 
approach employed by some external actors.  Knaus and Martin, examining the 
intervention by the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, argue that the 
High Representative undermined local democracy by forcing European-based reform 
on local elites.  They liken the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to an 
Imperial Raj (2006, pp.6-74).  Chopra (2000b, p.35) makes a similar observation 
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about the UN administration in East Timor.  Local officials are often overwhelmed by 
the demands made on them by external missions.  The United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)  “frequently presented regulations on 
complex matters to the [East Timor] National Council but gave it little time for 
study” (Gorjao, 2002, p. 317).  This type of disregard frequently engenders frustration 
at the lack of opportunity for local participation.  Chesterman describes the 
annoyance of the East Timorese who saw their role “as observers rather than the 
active players we should start to be” (2001, p.67).   Mango (2001) has asserted that 
UNTAET had very different priorities from those of the East Timorese, with all 
legislation and decision making power reserved to the UN Transitional Administrator, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello.  The members of the National Council were appointed, not 
elected so “the East Timorese had a voice, but the people had never been told how to 
use that voice” (Mango, 2001, p.1).  Etzioni suggests that “…external powers are 
particularly hampered in promoting deliberate change [by] a limited understanding of 
the local culture and societal formation; an unwillingness to make the sacrifices 
involved; the opposition generated by the mere presence of outsiders; and faulty 
theories of societal engineering” (2004, p.5).    
 
 In some cases, local consent turns to non-compliance, resistance and 
parallelism.  In the worst case the international stabilisation mission is subjected to 
direct attack.  In Cambodia, despite prior agreements, the Government rejected UN 
oversight (Dobbins et al, 2003, p.73).  The Khmer Rouge was regularly obstructive 
and the Phnom Pehn authorities undertook a media campaign against the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).  UN officials were unable to 
gain access to administrative structures and were prevented from monitoring and 
supervising officials (Doyle, 2002, p.84).   The continuing insurgency in Afghanistan 
demonstrates both the inadequacy of external intervention, as a force for change, and 
the way that the perceived illegitimacy of outsiders can strengthen groups opposing 
the creation of new structures.  In terms of achieving sustainable peace, the situation 
in post-conflict Iraq revealed how creating a stable democratically governed society is 
impeded by the inability to provide basic levels of security as a precondition for 
rebuilding the economy (Slocombe, 2004, pp. 232-255).   
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 However, not all commentators hold a negative view of external intervention.  
In contrast to Chopra, Mango and Chesterman’s belief that the UN were too 
authoritarian in East Timor, Hood (2004, pp. 48-51) asserts that UNTAET, despite its 
difficulties and failings, has assisted the building of an independent nation and the 
creation of a civil administration after centuries of colonial rule and an oppressive 
military occupation.  This achievement, he believes, was underpinned by credible 
security guarantees and an international presence that was largely welcomed by the 
local population.  Thus it is posited that rather than the success of a stabilisation 
mission being predicated on the levels of internal and external authority, and the 
efficiency of the international IGO, it is a subtle mix of all these elements plus the 
ability to foster the confidence and support of local elites and civil society that 
determines the outcome.   
 
   SSR is an integral part of the stabilisation process and is subject to similar 
challenges.  Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, pp. 19-45) offer a comprehensive 
account of the problems facing SSR implementation, with a particular focus on the 
role of the international donor community.  They note that the importance of SSR for 
national, regional and international security has only recently been acknowledged by 
international donor states and recipient societies.  However, the recipients of such 
assistance are often sceptical about the conditions attached to reform efforts, and 
attempts by external actors to force their own institutional and structural preferences 
on societies in post-conflict transition.  The manner of the intervention is also critical; 
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, p.21) argue that, ‘‘past security assistance 
programmes were often ill-conceived and poorly implemented.’’  They emphasise 
that close cooperation between local stakeholders, the implementing IGO and the 
international donor community is crucial in ensuring successful security reform 
efforts.  
 
In recent years, however, the problems facing the implementation of SSR 
have become more pronounced.  Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, p.25-32) point to 
the potentially detrimental effects of the war on terrorism may have on SSR in 
countries where state compliance is needed to suppress terrorist elements.  In some 
such cases, repressive states and security apparatuses will be strengthened if their 
authoritarian grip on power is considered to be useful in fighting terrorism.   
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER TWO   
 
46 
 
Additionally, there is a danger of causing a dependency culture which creates de facto 
multi-lateralist states that leave nothing behind when international support is 
withdrawn (Cawtha & Luckham, 2003, p. 325).  
 
SSR is a complex and multidimensional political process.  In its most holistic 
form it embraces security, political, social and economic dimensions.  While it is 
necessary to define appropriate measures and timetables for SSR programmes, this 
can be difficult when the approach is not paralleled by ‘‘high-level strategic and 
administrative coordination’’ among the different actors involved in post-conflict 
peacebuilding tasks (United Nations, 1998, para 64).  Moreover, to assure any chance 
of sustainability, SSR programmes must have as an aim the timely transfer of 
responsibilities.  In this context, the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) notes that, ‘‘the long-term aim of international actors in a 
post-conflict situation is ‘to do themselves out of a job’ . . . [allowing] local actors to 
take over responsibility for rebuilding their society’’ (ICISS, 2001, para. 5.31). 
  
 However, the need for local inclusion is not solely confined to the international 
community.   Local ownership of security reform activities must not be reserved to an 
elite group of military or internal security officers.  It is noted that very few women or 
even local NGOs enter into the discussions surrounding the security sector, as it is 
often perceived to be the domain of security experts and is sufficiently mysterious to 
discourage non-military individuals and groups from entering the debate (UN, 2002).  
 
 On occasions, however, advocacy groups such as human rights and women’s 
organisations can press for reforms and insist on transparency, while raising public 
awareness through the media and ‘town hall meetings’.  For example, in Nepal, 
women’s groups have trained the military in human rights law to give them a better 
understanding of how to treat the public (Chuter, 2000).  In South Africa, local NGOs 
raised concerns about the environmental and health damage that military activities 
might cause, including the harmful affects of depleted uranium from weapons 
systems (Anderlini, 2004).  Yet despite the opportunities that exist, more often than 
not, civil society is excluded or chooses to stay away from security sector discussions.  
During the peace talks in Sudan, the committee addressing security sector issues was 
made up entirely of military commanders (Farr, 2002).  In Nepal, the National 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER TWO   
 
47 
 
Security Council was comprised solely of army personnel and representatives from 
the Defence Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office (Chuter, 2000).  
 
It is in these difficult, and often confrontational, circumstances that attempts 
at SSR and the fostering of democratic civilian management of the security sector is 
undertaken.  Both local elites and donor states will be expecting certain outcomes 
from the SSR programme. Often these expectations will be dissimilar and, on 
occasions, diametrically apposed.  It is therefore necessary to set benchmarks, 
baselines, aims and outcomes for a SSR programme which have the agreement of 
donors, the wider international community and local leadership and civil society. 
 
2.3. The Challenge of Monitoring and Evaluation  
 
When considering SSR, it is important to understand that reform programmes 
are costly undertakings, which are typically financed by the international donor 
community.  The justification of the cost of a SSR programme is often a matter of 
concern to national audit authorities.  For example, the Kosovo ISSR cost 
£1.15million, shared between five donor states and the UN.  All the donors called for 
a full account, from the ISSR Secretariat, of how their funds had been utilised.  
Herbertson (2010, p.2), of the DFID International Director’s Office, has stated that, 
“what concerns donors and finance ministers is not how much money is spent but 
what are the measurable outputs achieved”.  This imperative is summed up in DFID’s 
recent paper on stabilisation practice (2010b, p. 48): 
“DFID is planning to pilot test a revised approach to value for 
money (VFM) that includes specifying the expected returns of each 
intervention.  This pilot can help test the viability of assessing 
VFM in the area of state-building and peace-building, where there 
are particular challenges in defining and measuring impact”. 
 
 The need for a credible M&E system for the conduct of SSR is self-evident, 
based on the practical requirement to have an effective programme strategy that will 
ensure that agreed objectives are achieved and that sufficient donor funding is 
available.  
 
 The question of how to measure agency and programmes effectively in ways 
that help improve performance is one of the more taxing issues in both public 
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management (Behn, 1995, pp.213-324) and in non-profit organisations (Young, 1997, 
pp.193-201).  Performance measurement is the study of objective, quantitative 
indicators of various aspects of the performance of programmes and agencies. 
Different kinds of performance measures are defined to track particular dimensions of 
performance, such as operating efficiency, productivity and cost-effectiveness 
(Poister, 2003, pp.3-5).   
 
 Performance measurement is intended to produce objective, relevant 
information on programme or organisational performance that can be used to 
strengthen management of the project, inform decision making and increase 
accountability (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  Monitoring and evaluation is designed to 
have a significant impact on behaviour, decision-making and outcomes or, as 
Osborne and Gaebler put it, “what gets measured, gets done” (1992, p. 146).  M&E 
focuses attention on what is being measured and on the performance itself.  It 
motivates practitioners and organisations to work to improve programme 
implementation.  Hatry (1978, pp.28-33) asserts that there is a need for M&E 
because, “unless you are keeping score, you can’t tell success from failure”.  Thus, 
M&E is essential for letting practitioners and officials know how a programme is 
progressing so that they can act accordingly to maintain or improve performance. 
 
While characterisations of M&E are numerous, the OECD-DAC (2002b, pp. 
21-27) definitions will be used for the purpose of this thesis: 
“Monitoring:  A continuing function that uses systematic collection 
of data on specified indicators to provide management and main 
stakeholders with indications of the extent of progress and 
achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated 
funds; 
 
Evaluation: The systematic and objective assessment of an on-
going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, 
implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance 
and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, 
impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide 
information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation 
of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both 
recipients and donors.  Evaluation also refers to the process of 
determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or 
programme.  Evaluation, in some instances, involves the definition 
of appropriate standards, the examination of performance against 
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those standards, an assessment of actual and expected results and 
the identification of relevant lessons”. 
 
The need to plan change, set targets and monitor the progress towards 
achieving objectives has led to an proliferation in studies on the difficulties facing 
SSR programme M&E.  Researchers (Albrecht, 2009; Armytage, 2006; Babaud, 
2009; Borchert, 2009; Flew & Rynn, 2009: Hvidemose & Mellon, 2009; Fitz-Gerald 
& Jackson, 2008; Engel et al, 2006) have all identified a broad list of challenges 
relating to the M&E of SSR.  These are categorised as the difficulties faced when 
undertaking M&E generally; SSR-specific challenges and problems arising from poor 
programme design and management: 
a. General Challenges.  The most significant challenge to any M&E 
system is resistance to the process by those who are invited to make 
use of it.  Programme staff and management often perceive M&E as 
burdensome, unnecessary or threatening. There is often resistance to 
investing in expensive M&E systems, regularly set at circa 5-10% of 
the programme cost (OECD- DAC, 2008b; DFID, 2005).   Researchers 
have also noted that practitioners and local elites may see donor-
driven, results-oriented M&E, as undermining local ownership.  
Moreover, project managers do not devote enough time to developing, 
agreeing and building support among key stakeholders for a 
methodology to measure change (Foglesong, 2003, p.12; Rynn & 
Hiscock, 2009, pp. 4-20). 
 
b. SSR-Specific Challenges.  Security sectors consist of many elements 
differing in purpose, functioning and orientation.  The difficulties 
encountered go to the very root of M&E practice in that there are no 
agreed criteria for determining indicators of effectiveness within SSR 
or what outcomes are to be achieved.  It is therefore hard to track and 
evaluate changes, especially as several others may affect one sub-
sector.  It is also difficult to find evaluators with the knowledge of 
both SSR and M&E, especially from developing countries.  
Additionally, there is no international blueprint for what a security 
sector or system should look like and therefore a lack of agreed 
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international models against which to measure outcomes (Chanaa, 
2002: Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, pp. 4-20; Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, 
pp. 4-5).  There are also issues of donor bureaucracy and politics in 
that donor-supported SSR often promotes interventions more closely 
in line with the donor’s needs than those of the host state.  Caparini 
(2005, pp.82-83) notes that donor priorities tend to shift frequently, 
with resultant fluctuations in the levels of funding.  Heavy reliance on 
external donors can undermine longer-term capacity and sustainability.  
With donor-driven implementation, planning tends to be top-down and 
influenced by donor priorities, while accountability is directed 
upwards towards the donors.  Many SSR programmes do not pay 
sufficient attention to building host country M&E capacities and 
information management systems and, therefore, M&E is often seen as 
solely part of a donor agenda (Chapman & Mancini, 2008).  
Programme goals are sometimes intentionally ambiguous, either to 
give the programme space to develop or because the programme is 
guided by unstated external political objectives (Chianca, 2008).  The 
OECD-DAC Handbook (2007, pp.  240-243) advocates an integrated 
approach to security and justice reform but differing donor policies on 
SSR present a challenge.  This makes coherence an issue for both 
monitoring and evaluation.   
 
c. The Challenges of Programme Design and Management.   Many SSR 
programmes make little preparation for M&E during the project design 
stage (Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, p.4).  In addition, M&E is often under-
resourced; rarely adhering to the proposal that 5–10 percent of 
programme budget should be spent on M&E systems.  Local 
participation in the M&E is also inadequate, with marginalised groups, 
beneficiary populations and rural inhabitants routinely being excluded 
from the process.  Undue reliance on information from security sector 
institutions and partner government officials is often observed (Fitz-
Gerald & Jackson, 2008, p. 5).  SSR project managers have difficulty 
setting benchmarks and baselines, using primary research and external 
data sources, given time pressures and the difficulty of collecting 
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information, especially as national systems and capacities for data 
collection and analysis are often weak (Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, p.6).  
Consequently, the underlying change management that should inform 
the design of an SSR programme is obscure.  M&E systems therefore 
tend to concentrate on monitoring programme goals and do not 
explore whether the programme design is appropriate, is addressing 
the right issues and deploying an appropriate methodology.  
Evaluators tend to concentrate on the views of the SSR programme 
staff in order to explore the basis for the project, rather than analysing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the programme approach (Dalrymple, 
2009; Clingendael, 2008). 
 
 In recent months the UK Government has turned its attention to the need for 
measuring the efficiency of their activities in post-conflict environments, including 
the M&E of SSR.  They have acknowledged that the Departments of State involved 
in post-conflict activities are lacking credible M&E tools (Blair & Cleland Welch, 
2010, pp 3-4) and that an imperfect M&E system cannot, in these circumstances, be 
simply abandoned; it must be improved.  Such improvement can only be achieved by 
cooperation between governments, host nations and the IGOs charged with providing 
stabilisation and SSR.  
 
2.4. The Role of Institutionalism  
 
Intergovernmental Organisations play a vital role in both security sector reform and 
management initiatives.  In virtually all of the recent SSR programme deliveries, 
IGOs have either led the activities or supported the lead provided by other actors 
(Law, 2007, p. 3-4).  How this role is undertaken is vital to fostering durable security 
and to providing a firm platform for sustainable development, which is necessary for 
the revitalisation of post-conflict and fragile states.   
 
 The mechanism for the realisation and promotion of human security and the 
protection of human rights tends to be the promotion of democratic governance. 
Fragile states often lack the capacity, legitimacy and the will to deliver a 
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democratically managed security sector.  In such cases the international community 
may have to act as the catalyst for democracy and good governance in the interests of 
both the transitional state and wider regional and international security.  The concept 
of SSR has grown out of this realisation and it has fallen mainly to IGOs to undertake 
the processes of reform on behalf of their member states.  It is therefore, apposite that 
the key theories dealing with the work of institutions and organisations are considered 
when ascertaining what influences the way that IGOs function.   
  
Institutionalism can be traced back to organisational theory and has developed 
its own distinct schools over the last thirty years.  The genesis of this new or neo-
institutionalism comes from attempts to understand how and why organisations work 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.936).  Barnett and Finnamore (1999, pp.702-704) suggest 
that there are two strands of institutional theory; one seated in economics and the 
other in sociology.  The economic line is based on rationality and efficiency concerns 
whist the sociological strand focuses on issues of legitimacy and power (Powell & 
DiMaggio 1991, pp.6-8). 
 
Economic-based institutional theory assumes that the organisational 
environment lacks social rules, cultural content, or other actors beyond those 
constructing the organisation.  Efficiency concerns are the dominant characteristics 
driving the foundation and behaviour of institutions.  Sociologists, however, study 
organisations in non-market situations.  Organisations and institutions are seen to 
respond to other actors, who are in pursuit of their own interests, and to the normative 
and cultural forces that shape how they conceptualise their own undertakings.  When 
viewed in this way, organisations may be seen to exist for reasons of legitimacy and 
normative fit rather than efficiency (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991: Finnamore, 1996; 
Scott, 1992). 
 
The assumptions within each major tenet of institutionalist theory raise 
questions about organisations.  The economic approach is based on the enquiry into 
why business firms are created.  Theories have been developed to explain the 
existence of business organisations, which see their role as finding solutions to 
trading problems and other market imperfections (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Coase, 
1937).  These economic-based institutional theories also inform debate over 
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international organisations.  Neoliberals and neo-realists understand world politics to 
be equivalent to a market place filled with rivals (Waltz, 1979, p. 23).  Thus, like 
economists, some political theorists see organisations as solutions to problems of 
competition, incomplete information and high operational costs (Vaubel 1991, p.27; 
Dillon, Ilgen & Willett, 1991). 
 
Observers of international relations (IR) have, in recent years, become 
interested in the norms of behaviour, culture and identity of political life (Finnimore, 
1996, p. 325).  Sociologists working in the area of institutional theory have made 
assumptions about the role of norms and culture in IR that appear to challenge realist 
and liberal theories in political science.  Indeed, within the field of sociology, 
argument: 
“…locates casual force in expanding and deepening Western world 
culture that emphasises Weberian rationality as a means to both 
justice…and progress.  These world cultural rules constitute actors, 
including states, organisations and individuals, and define legitimate 
goals for them to pursue.  World cultural norms also produce 
organisational and behavioural similarities across the globe that is 
not easily explained by traditional paradigms in political science” 
(Finnamore, 1996, pp. 325-326). 
 
Although neoliberals and realists disagree about the degree to which anarchy, 
an interest in relative versus absolute gains and fears of deception undermine 
international institutional arrangements, both agree that organisations help states 
further their interests (Baldwin, 1993; Krasner, 1991, pp.341-344).  Organisations are 
deemed to be important because they are a focal point for political activity and 
because they provide incentives and constraints for political actors (Stienmo, 2001).  
However, organisations do not always act in the service of member state interests and 
this tends to weaken the hypothesis that organisations merely provide vehicles for 
discourse, goal achievement and information flows (Barnett & Finnamore, 1999, 
p.703).  There is confusion over what ‘institutionalism’ is and how it differs from the 
organisational-based theories that preceded it.   Hall and Taylor (1996, p.937) suggest 
that part of this uncertainty is based on the fact that institutionalism does not 
represent an integrated body of thought but rather consists of three ‘new’ schools: 
historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. 
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2.4.1. Historical Institutionalism  
 
Historical institutionalism has developed from group theories of politics and 
structural functionalism.  Structural functionalism and group conflict theories had 
pluralist and neo-Marxist variants, which were to influence the development of 
historical institutionalism (Blackburn, 1972; Block, 1987; Carnoy, 1984).  Historical 
institutionalists are primarily interested in understanding political outcomes.  
Building on the work of Katzenstein (1976), academics have studied specific 
historical events across time and space.  It became clear that there was no explanation 
for the inevitable variations without exploring the way in which institutions shape 
political processes and their outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen et al., 1992).  Hall and 
Taylor (1996, p.937) suggest that there are several features that separate historical 
institutionalism from the other schools of neo-institutionalism.  Firstly, in contrast to 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism, it rarely makes assumptions about 
the relationship between institutions and individuals.  Secondly, it emphasises the 
asymmetrical relations of power.  Thirdly, historical institutionalism is of the view 
that social causation “will be mediated by the contextual forces of a given situation, 
often inherited from the past” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.941).  Historical 
institutionalists do not argue that institutions are the only vehicle for understanding 
political outcomes; rather they see institutions as intervening variables through which 
disputes over interests and power are fought (Pearson & Skocpol, 2002, 693-721). 
 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 28) believe, however, that change is a product 
of external influences, not of the system or organisation itself.  Although historical 
institutionalists do not deny that outside influences can bring change, they argue that 
it is the product of a number of factors that come together at the same time.  They 
seek to explore these issues through analysis of the various factors that have common 
characteristics and affect each other over time (Orren and Skowronek 1994; Steinmo, 
Thelen & Longstreth, 1992; Whitehead, 2002).  
2.4.2. Rational Choice Theory 
 
Rational choice institutionalism grew from studies of economics and agency theory. 
Rational choice institutionalists broadly view organisations as being logically 
constructed by individuals who are acting from self-interest (Shepsle & Weingast, 
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1995; Moe, 1994, pp. 739-77).  Thus they seek to explore the principles of political 
behaviour and action and to construct models that will assist in understanding and 
predicting political activities (Weingast, 1996).   
 
Rational choice institutionalists view institutional equilibrium as the norm. 
They argue that self-interest is best served when the rules are stable and actors 
operate within the rules.  Although it is possible that not all the relevant actors are 
comfortable with a given institutional structure, it is typically seen to provide 
dependability (Shepsle, 1986). 
 
Rational choice theorists explain the existence of institutions by the value they 
have for the actors involved in the decision-making process (Simon, 1991, 125-134; 
Williamson, 1981, 548-577).  They view the relationship between institutions and 
actors as an approach in which the actor’s preferences are assumed to be outside 
institutional analysis.  This contrasts with sociological institutionalism, which is seen 
to have a cultural approach, implying that institutions influence preference formation 
(Thelen, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
 
Additionally, rational choice theorists assert that, as human beings are rational 
entities, policy is characterised by extended periods of stability.  Nevertheless, there 
are shifts in the institutional equilibrium, which may be the product of external 
influences on the system (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992).  This can be categorised as the 
punctuated equilibrium model of change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  This model 
suggests that changes occur only incrementally and are inextricably linked to the 
rationality of decision-makers.   
 
The rationality of individuals is guided by a mixture of the information they 
possess, their cognitive limitations, and the amount of time available for the decision-
making process (Simon, 1991, 125-134) and can be considered as part of bounded 
theory or rationality (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002).  This view of rationality is 
pertainent to the conduct of SSR in that, more often than not, many strands of 
information, direction and freedom of action are unavailable to the practitioners in the 
field.  Decision-makers seldom have the necessary capabilities and resources to arrive 
at the best solution to a problem.  They therefore tend to apply rationality only when 
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they have simplified the choices available to them.  Rational choice institutionalists 
see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas and emphasise the role of 
strategic interaction in the determination of outcomes.  However, rational choice 
theory is unable to explain why systems move from a particular symmetry to another 
(Bates, de Figueredo et al., 1998, pp.604-5). 
  
 For rationalist scholars, the central goal is to uncover the laws of political 
behaviour and action.  Academics in this tradition generally believe that once these 
laws are discovered, models can be constructed that will help understand and predict 
political behaviour. Rational choice scholars look to the real world to see if their 
model is right rather than looking at the real world and then searching for plausible 
explanations for the phenomenon they observe.   Understanding real outcomes is not 
the first point, creating, elaborating, refining a theory of politics is (Weingast, 1996, 
pp. 167-190).   This means that most rational choice academics are not as interested 
in a comprehensive understanding of real institutions or a historical phenomenon, so 
much as in comprehending a theoretical principle or logic.   
2.4.3. Sociological Institutionalism  
 
The third school of institutionalism asserts that actors face institutional pressures to 
conform to cultural norms and expectations, regardless of the implications to the 
efficiency.  The challenge of this school is the distinction between those parts of the 
social world reflecting means-ends rationality and those that represent culture.  
Sociological institutionalism argues that the procedures that drive institutions be seen 
as culturally specific practices (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.946).  These culturally based 
models seek to find an explanation for why organisations adopt certain beliefs and 
structures and how they spread, over time, so that different organisations have a 
propensity to adopt the same policies and practices (Meyer, 1994, pp. 56-57).   
 
Sociological institutionalists propose that organisations become alike because 
they adopt socially defined practices that are promoted by the wider institutional 
environment (Dacin, 1997, pp. 46-81).  The institutional environment encourages 
uniformity because it consists of paradigms and normative frameworks that limit the 
options that decision-makers see as legitimate (Campbell, 2002, pp. 21-38).  
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 “Organisations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because 
it advances the means-ends efficiency of the organisation, but 
because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organisation or its 
participants” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.946).    
 
 DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that organisations adopt similar 
composition and practices by mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism.  By 
“mimetic isomorphism”, organisations imitate other organisations that are seen as 
legitimate and successful.  By “normative isomorphism”, organisations comply with 
normative standards promoted by acknowledged authorities.  By “coercive 
isomorphism”, organisations comply with formal rules and informal pressures 
promulgated by acknowledged authorities.  Miller and Banaszak-Holl (2004, p.5) 
refer to DiMaggio and Powell’s mimetic and normative processes as “horizontal 
isomorphism,” and coercive processes as “vertical isomorphism.”  They suggest that 
organisations exercise horizontal isomorphism and governments contribute to vertical 
isomorphism.  
 
Both traditional emulation and isomorphic models suggest that policy 
adoption provides a means for overcoming uncertainty.  However, they differ in 
explaining what organisations are uncertain about.  Emulation models presuppose that 
organisations are undecided as to what is economically or politically efficient and, as 
a consequence, they look to others to provide them with guidance (Mizruchi & Fein, 
1999).  Nevertheless, Walker (1969, pp.880-889) suggests that legitimacy is an 
important factor when considering courses of action.  Once a policy has been adopted 
by a number of other organisations, it is legitimised and therefore becomes attractive.  
Institutional theorists argue that adopting a culturally accepted policy increases an 
organisation’s legitimacy.  Both isomorphic and emulation theorists suggest that the 
likelihood that an organisation will adopt a particular policy will rise as the number of 
other institutions adopting it grows.  
 
Sociological institutionalism perspective suggests that organisations may also 
look to the wider institutional environment for direction.  In addition to horizontal 
isomorphism, organisations are subject to both formal and informal pressures exerted 
by other organisations and by the cultural expectations of the society within which 
they operate.  This may be termed vertical isomorphism.  Sociological 
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institutionalism examines the informal, socio-cultural consequences of societal beliefs 
that:  
"construct and legitimate organisational forms, inspires and shapes 
organisational norms and ideals, and even helps to constitute the 
identities and capacities of organisational actors” (Edelman & Suchman, 
1997, 479-515).   
 
Faced with the dilemma of insufficient information, time and resources 
functionaries often undertake short-term activities to deal with pressing problems.  In 
doing so they are prone to mimic policies adopted by other organisations so that their 
activities are legitimised.  As a result, organisations often adopt policies that are not 
the most efficient (Meyer & Rowan. 1977, pp.340-363; Miller & Banaszak-Holl, 
2004).  Thus, other organisations may become models for what is acceptable and 
appropriate but not necessarily apposite and efficient. 
 
Sociological institutionalism places less emphasis on power or norms and 
more on the socio-cultural construction that guides individual behaviour within 
organisations.  Sociological institutionalism does not view social patterns as moving 
towards equilibrium, as rational choice theorists believe, nor does it see change as 
being constrained by norms and traditions as in historical institutionalism.  Themes in 
the sociological institutionalist school include the functions of institutional forms; the 
specificity of institutional performance; and the quest for organisational legitimacy 
(Brinton & Nee, 1998; Campbell & Pedesen, 2001; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Levi, 1990).  
  
Most pertinent to the thesis hypothesis is that many sociological 
institutionalists emphasise the interactive character of the relationship between 
organisations and individual action.  Individuals characterise themselves as social 
actors by engaging in behaviour that reinforce the network in which they are 
involved.  The institutional world provides a means of accomplishing this imperative.  
The relationship between the individual and the organisation is, therefore, built upon 
reasoning and the individual gains by working with institutional models to reach a 
desired course of action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, pp.1-40).  This does not, 
however, suggest that individuals are not rational or goal seeking.  Sociological 
institutionalists propose that what an individual sees as rational action is essentially 
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socially constructed.  Whilst rational choice theorists describe individuals or 
organisations as seeking to promote their own interests, sociological institutionalists 
describe them as wishing to define and express their identity in socially appropriate 
ways (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 949).  Because sociological institutional theory 
emphasises the role that collective processes of interpretation and legitimacy play in 
the creation and development of institutions, it can be said to better explain 
institutional inefficiencies than rational choice theory (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Hall & 
Taylor 1996, p. 953). 
 
However, Immergut (1998) argues that, despite their apparent differences, the 
institutionalist schools share the belief that individuals do not express preferences.  
Individual decisions do not equate to collective decisions because of the influence of 
institutions tends to be biased in particular directions.  Rational choice theory points 
to the equilibrium of preferences, whilst historical institutionalism favours the 
maintenance of the status quo and sociological institutionalism the consolidation of 
institutional authority in a changing environment. 
 
2.4.4. Western Culture, Institutionalism and Fragile States 
 
The Weberian view of bureaucratic organisations is that they represent the most 
efficient and effective way to coordinate complex issues and relationships.  However 
the difficulty with this theory is that bureaucratic organisations have spread more 
rapidly than the arenas that were deemed to have created them (Finnemore, 1996, 
p.329).  Meyer and Rowan (1977) contend that bureaucratic structures did not spread 
because they were needed, rather that they did so as a result of being seen as a social 
good.  They exist and proliferate not because they perform an essential function but 
because they are externally legitimised (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 340-363).  This 
external legitimisation, according to Finnemore (1996, p.331), is the product of 
Western culture, whose central feature is that rational action is both good and natural.  
However, this view of positive rationality is less obvious to non-Westerners who tend 
to structure social action in terms that do not coincide with the Western rational 
thinking (March & Olsen, 1989, Ch.2).  Nevertheless, as the modern bureaucratic 
state has become the most legitimate and, therefore, the most attractive form of 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER TWO   
 
60 
 
political organisation so there have been clear consequences.  With the perception 
that a territory is more acceptable if it is a state, many political contests have become 
more difficult to resolve.  Self – determination is often seen to equal the need for 
statehood and this escalation in the appeal of statehood has led to the creation of a 
number of ineffective and fragile states (Meyer, 1980, Strang, 1991, pp. 143-162; 
1990, pp. 846-860; Jackson, 1990).  
 
 Given the increased desire for statehood, practitioners have become aware that 
the primary agents of SSR are a democratic, well-functioning, bureaucratic state and 
an articulate civil society.  However, it is often overlooked that before 1900 there 
were no genuinely democratic countries in the world.  There was little expectation 
that democracy would spread across the globe and no great enthusiasm for it to do so 
(Portillo, 2010).  A nineteen-thirties newspaper editorial suggested, “…it may be that 
the system of parliamentary government which suits Great Britain suits few other 
countries besides” (Times, 1936, p.2).  As late as 1941 there were only 11 states in 
the world that could have been truly considered democratic (Keane, 2010).  Even 
today many states do not operate in the way that Western donor communities would 
prefer (Luckham, 1994).  States are not always functional or effective providers of 
security, economic growth or equal rights, yet many observers assert that sovereign 
states are robust organisational structures that have outlasted other forms of 
government.  Given the weakness of many less-developed states, this can only be 
explained by accepting the influence of external support for the notion of statehood 
(Boli, 1987; McNeely, 1989; Meyer, 1980; Ramirez & Thomas, 1987; Strang, 1991).    
 
 Sociological institutionalism’s interest in isomorphism is helpful when 
examining this viewpoint.  States with very different circumstances generally look 
much alike.  For example, Boli (1987) notes that declarations of citizen rights are 
similar across the international system but have little to do with the actual the rights 
prevailing in specific countries.  In the security sector, states tend to display a 
comparable form of isomorphism.  Most countries have a defence ministry, even if 
there is no external threat.  Virtually all states have an army, navy and air force, even 
if the need for them is not entirely clear.  Eyre and Suchman (1992) suggest that 
military expenditure is viewed as having a strong cultural and legitimising role and as 
a strong indicator of statehood, even if it makes little economic or security policy 
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sense.  Most recently, the spread of SSR departments across IGOs, including the UN, 
NATO and the EU, is an example of this form of isomorphism.  Thus sociological 
institutionalism’s proposal that organisations become analogous because they adopt 
others socially defined elements and practices is seen to work in the security sector 
just as much as it appears to guide the actions of organisations.  Institutional theories 
provide a complex view of organisations, in that they are seen to be influenced by 
normative pressures, sometimes arising from the state and sometimes from within the 
organisation itself.  Under certain conditions, these pressures lead an organisation to 
be guided by legitimising elements, which can deflect attention away from task 
performance and goal attainment.  However, adoption of these legitimising practices, 
leading to isomorphism within the institutional environment, does increase the 
likelihood of organisational survival (Zucker, 1987, pp 443-464).  As will be 
discussed in Chapter Three, it leads also to domain similarity and the resulting 
competition and rivalry.  
Conclusions  
 
The zeal for statehood, since the end of World War II, along with the events 
surrounding the end of the Cold War have created a difficult environment for IGOs 
wishing to bring stability and peace to post-conflict territories.  The enthusiasm for 
democratic statehood, and its sub-text of nationalism, has made the resolution of 
intra-state conflicts more difficult.  However, much of the literature concerning the 
nature of the democratic system ignores the potentially destabilising impact that the 
imposition of democracy by outside agents might engender.  The difficulties of 
stabilisation could be said to rest on errors in the application of state building theory 
to post-conflict situations.  Western European experience may not be applicable to 
non-Western stabilisation.  Ignoring the realities of contemporary intra-state conflicts, 
democratisation models tend to focus on inter-state relations and overlook the fact 
that establishing democracy can be a highly adversarial measure within states. 
Coupled with genuine concerns by some states that SSR is a tool of western neo-
colonialism, there are difficulties over the concept of local ownership and self-
determination in security sector management matters.  The dichotomies of local 
engagement and the effects of the developmental approach to stabilisation and SSR, 
favoured by the international community, often overlook the culture, sensitivities and 
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aspirations of the host nation.  This is coupled to the pressures that emanate from the 
donor states to conform to their understanding of the SSR requirement.  This can lead 
to difficulties associated with the measuring and evaluation of SSR programmes with 
both donors and host states requiring proof that the planning and conduct for SSR 
programmes meet their often conflicting needs. 
 
 It falls mainly to IGOs to initiate and deliver SSR and these organisations are 
subjected to pressures arising from both the wider environment, where events 
conspired to bring about the need for change, and from within the organisations 
themselves.  Within the security sector a combination of a lack of information, time 
and freedom of action affected the choices available for decision makers.  The end of 
the Cold War saw an increase in the IGO isomorphism, as will be described in 
Chapter Five.  This institutional survival mechanism creates domain similarity, which 
in turn leads to competition, rivalry and confusion.  This all has resonances with new 
institutionalist theory, where rational choice, historical institutionalism and the 
isomorphic consequences related to sociological institutionalism have some 
significance.  
 
 Nevertheless, although enthusiasm for neo-institutionalism has grown over the 
last twenty years so has scepticism.  It has been questioned if the new schools of 
institutionalism have presented anything innovative in the field of organisations and 
politics (Jordan, 1990, pp.470 -484; Peters, 1999, pp. 205-220).  The unravelling of 
institutionalism is also difficult “in multilevel and multicentred institutional settings, 
characterised by interactions among multiple autonomous processes” (March & 
Olsen, 2009, p. 8) as is the case in SSR programme delivery.  Some observers (Fehr 
& Gächter, 1998; Olsen, 2005) note that actors within organisations sometimes 
deviate from what institutional rules prescribe.  It is argued that it makes a difference 
how interaction, experience and memory are organised and to what degree goals are 
shared, and how the needs of the organisation are satisfied.  Actions are also affected 
by the ratio of long-term employees to newcomers or outsiders, opportunities for 
promotion and the prestige of different groups within organisations (Lǽgreid & 
Olsen, 1984, pp. 845-859).  These influences on the coherence of an organisation will 
be explored in Chapter Three.   
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 Nevertheless, Miles and Snow (1978, pp.21-32) argue that institutional 
effectiveness relies on the perception of the operating environment and decisions 
about coping with it.  They believe that this process can be broken into three areas for 
which management must seek to find solutions.  These areas are entrepreneurial, 
engineering and administrative and typically occur simultaneously.  Taken in the 
round, the principle objective is to reduce uncertainty within the organisational 
operation.  The ideal organisation will have systems that ensure efficiency and reduce 
uncertainty, while simultaneously allowing appropriate innovation (Brown and 
Iverson, 2004, pp.377-400).  This appreciation fits with the work of IGOs in the field 
of SSR.  There is a need for project planning and the selection of methodologies, 
effective communication and comprehension of the local environment coupled with 
clear management objectives and the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes.   
 There is, nonetheless, a danger in relying too heavily on just one set of theories 
when examining a subject as wide ranging as the reform and management of the 
security sector.  Understanding security sector issues requires that researchers consult 
a wider literature than they are perhaps accustomed to.  It is proposed that the external 
relationships and internal feuds associated with international post-conflict endeavours 
had a pronounced effect on intervention outcomes.  As an example, Shephard (2010, 
pp.21-30) notes that the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), set 
up after the end of World War II to deal with displaced persons, was constantly 
challenged by competing ministers, administrators and officials, and donor state 
dominated strategies.  Whilst Washington, London and Moscow argued over funds, 
manoeuvred for influence and debated priorities, practitioners in the field tried to deal 
with the daily problems of tending to displaced persons from all over Europe.  It is 
posited that little has changed in the last sixty-five years and modern IGOs still find it 
difficult to function harmoniously.  
 
 In March 2004 Kosovo erupted into a week of violence, which led to loss of 
lives, widespread destruction of homes, churches and businesses.  The casualty toll 
was 22 dead and 600 injured, including 11 peacekeepers and 61 police officers.  
Some 3,600 people were made homeless (UNMIK, 2004b).  In a report to the UN 
Secretary-General, Kai Eide (2004) concluded that the riots were a result of the fact 
that the efforts of the international community with regards to Kosovo had become 
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static and inward looking, without direction and internal cohesion.  The international 
institutions on the ground were victims of confusion and competition, stemming from 
a lack of coherence, direction and overall planning. 
 
 There may be a case for applying the theories of institutionalism when 
examining the pressures created on IGOs when engaged in SSR and security sector 
management activities.  However, it is argued that there is another layer of interaction 
that exists within organisations, which has a negative impact upon the practice of 
SSR.  Underlying the complexity of institutional interaction and germane to this 
discussion is the reaction of states and institutions to the issue of cooperation over 
matters of security.  It behoves those who wish to explore the application of SSR to 
take their investigation beyond the theories of institutionalism and examine the 
influence of confusion, competition and rivalry within and between organisations 
active in the security field.  It is submitted that it is these pressures that impact upon 
the outcome of SSR programmes rather than the more erudite theories of 
institutionalism in its various forms. 
 
The next Chapter will examine the theories of inter-organisational competition 
and rivalry.  It will examine the importance of human agency in decision-making and 
consider the causes of rivalry, competition and cooperation at the inter-personal level. 
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Chapter Three: Cooperation, Rivalry and Competition in 
International Organisations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The terms ‘competition’ and ‘rivalry’ often are used interchangeably but are distinct 
terms.  Competition is the act of seeking to gain what another is endeavouring to 
acquire; such as superiority, the means to gain advancement or when two or more 
persons are engaged in the same enterprise and each are seeking patronage or market 
share.  Although competition is often confused with conflict, there are important 
differences between the two concepts.  Modern society has a tradition of competition 
in both work and leisure activities.  Most competition however, contains the seed for 
potential conflict.  Conflict and competition have a common root because in each 
case individuals or groups are usually striving toward incompatible goals.  The major 
difference exists in the form of interference that blocks attainment of the goal.  In 
competition between groups working toward the same goal, the competitors have 
formal and informal guidelines that limit what they can do to each other in attempting 
to reach their goal.  Mack (1969, pp.327-337) illustrates the difference between 
competition and conflict by discussing a foot race: as long as the participants are 
running without interfering with each other, competition exists.  If one runner 
interferes with the progress of other, so long as the action is defined by both involved 
parties as interference and not as an acceptable act under the rules, the nature of the 
interaction has changed and conflict exists.  
Rivalry, on the other hand, can be characterised as an antagonistic situation 
that poses one actor or a group of actors against another and tends to drive behaviour 
towards recurring conflict over an extended period.  Unlike competition, which tends 
to have set parameters, rivalry will fluctuate over time but is likely to reoccur as 
incidents are presented as catalysts for the ongoing enmity (Thompson, 1978, pp. 
1231-1232). 
 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER THREE   
 
66 
 
It may be argued that not all competition and rivalry is detrimental; it can 
provide a reason to aspire to greater effort or provide a benchmark for activities.  
Indeed conflict theory suggests that individuals, society and organisations compete to 
maximise their benefits, which inevitably contributes to social change and therefore 
competition is a necessary force for progress (Collins, 1974, pp. 56-61).   Wolff 
(2001, p.103), for example, implies that, “NATO seemed to have lost its traditional 
purpose of a collective defence alliance with the collapse of communism in Central 
and Eastern Europe after 1989.”  This suggests that NATO needed Warsaw Pact 
competition in order to give it a purpose and an objective.  Indeed, it was only with 
the emergence of other threats and the creation of other roles that the Organisation 
retained its prime position in the security architecture of Europe.  Thus ‘constructive 
competition’, the type of contest that provides a reason for an institution, or indeed a 
person, to exist and to operate can act as a spur (Deutsch, 2006, pp. 23-43; Tjosvold 
et al, 2003, pp. 63-84).  The antithesis to ‘constructive competition’ is that which 
undermines and impedes work towards stated aims and objectives.  However 
competition and rivalry is actor specific and grounded in the agency of decision-
making bodies.  This Chapter will consider ‘destructive’ competition, which may 
include rivalry in its construction, and its effect on SSR. 
 
3.1. Human Agency in Decision­Making 
 
There has been a recent revival of interest in the self-referent experience of human 
agency, which argues that self-generated activities lie at the heart of causal processes. 
These activities contribute to the meaning of most external influences and also 
function as important determinants of motivation and subsequent action.  The 
capacity to exercise control over an individual’s own thought processes, motivation, 
and action is a distinct human characteristic.  Consequently, because judgments and 
actions are partly self-determined, individuals can effect change in themselves and 
their situations through their own efforts.   
 
 The manner in which human agency operates has been conceptualised in at 
least three ways: as autonomous agency, mechanical agency, or emergent interactive 
agency (Bandura, 1989, p.1185).  The suggestion that human beings serve as entirely 
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independent agents of their own actions has few advocates, however, environmental 
determinists occasionally promote the view of autonomous agency in arguments 
designed to repudiate any role of self-influence in causal processes (Barling & Abel, 
1983, pp. 265-272).  In terms of the advocates of mechanical agency, it is an internal 
instrumentality through which external influences operate mechanistically on action, 
but it does not itself have any motivative, creative, self-reflective or self-directive 
properties.  In this view, internal events are products of external ones devoid of any 
causal efficacy because the agency resides in environmental and action within a 
system.  In this model of reciprocal causation, action and environmental events all 
operate as interacting determinants.  Any account of the determinants of human 
action must, therefore, include self-generated influences as a contributing factor  
(Wood & Bandura, 1989, pp. 407-415). 
 
 Germane to the mechanisms of personal agency, is an individual's beliefs as to 
their capability to exercise control over events that affect their lives.  Self-efficacy 
beliefs function as an important set of proximal determinants of human motivation, 
affect, and action.  They operate on action through motivational, cognitive, and 
affective intervening processes.  Self-efficacy beliefs affect thought patterns that may 
be self-aiding or self-hindering.  These cognitive effects take various forms; much of 
human behaviour is regulated by forethought involving recognised goals with 
personal objective setting influenced by a self-appreciation of capabilities (Bandura 
& Adams, 1977, pp. 287-308; Locke, Lee & Bobko, 1984, pp. 241-251).  
 
 Thus, in the course of social interaction, humans mutually transform each 
other to produce a new level of reality and this social reality is the world that 
individuals inhabit.  As Durkheim (1976, p. 422) recognised, this social reality is 
depends upon the fact that humans acknowledge their relationships with each other.  
The importance with which social relations are invested is unique to the intercourse 
of human beings.  Weber was similarly impressed by the potency of human social 
relations and described sociology as “a science concerning itself with the interpretive 
understanding of social action” (Weber 1978, p.4,).  He explained “action is social in 
so far as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is 
thereby oriented in its course”(Weber 1978, p.4).   
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 For Weber, human social action was distinctive because it was directed 
towards others.  The mutual reaction of others was an intrinsic element of human 
interaction.  Moreover, these interactions were never independent of human 
consciousness.  Individuals came to a mutual understanding of what their interactions 
signified.  Human social relations were ultimately dependent on the shared meanings 
that the participants attached to their actions and relations. 
 Within political structures there is an ultimate decision-making unit that, 
although it may change with the nature of the problem and with time, shapes policy.  
Hudson (2002, pp.3-4; 2005, p.2) suggests that, while most contemporary IR theory 
places the state at the centre of policymaking, individuals, acting singly or in groups, 
are at the heart of the decision-making process.  She argues that few mainstream IR 
theories take note of the human agency and, this omission means that the essential 
media for change, creativity, persuasion and accountability, are missing.  Indeed, 
policymaking is actor-specific and as states are abstractions they cannot have agency.  
Nevertheless, if using a realist approach, a decision-making group can be regarded as 
a unitary rational actor and therefore equivalent to a state (Hudson, 2005, p.2).  This 
approach, however, denies the role of human agency in decision-making.  Stressing 
the role of decision-makers in IR makes it possible to look beyond the abstract state 
to consider the influence of the officials who act on behalf of the state and society 
(Snyder et al, 2002, p.31; 1954, p.54).   
 
 Once human agency is taken into account the decision-making process 
becomes far more complicated.  The roles of emotion, intellect and the health of 
individuals come into play.  Therefore political psychology, neuroscience and 
behavioural science can contribute to the exploration of these areas, including an 
analysis of the pressures that leaders and decision-making groups may endure at 
times of crisis (Bechara, 2004; Crawford, 2000; Gertner, 2003; Janis, 1982: L’Etang, 
1970; McDermott, 2008; Park, 1998; Post & Robins, 1990).  
 
Hermann and Hermann (1989, pp. 363-364) suggest that there are three types 
of decision-making units; single groups, multiple autonomous actors and predominant 
leaders, which may, rarely, include Weber’s charismatic authority (1947).  The single 
group consists of a body of individuals that make decisions collectively.  Multiple 
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autonomous actors are separate individuals or groups that, although not hierarchically 
related, can act in concert to solve a problem.  A predominant leader is an individual 
with the power to make unopposed choices.  Each unit is influenced by pre-existing 
knowledge, culture and values and by the character and history of those participating 
in the decision-making process. 
 
In the planning and execution of SSR all of these units may be deployed.  
During the Kosovo ISSR a single group, SSDAT, undertook the scoping and proposal 
stage of the planning cycle.  The various security committees of UNMIK and the 
ISSR Steering Committee were comprised of multiple autonomous actors and a 
predominant leader controlled UNOSEK. 
  
Schafer & Crichlow identify three significant control variables in the process 
of reaching decisions: the contextual sensitivity of the decision-makers, the difficulty 
in obtaining consensus in the group and the relationships among the actors (2002, 
pp.48-65).  A contextual sensitive decision-maker will be aware of the varying 
rationale and ambiguities related to a particular decision and will be generally flexible 
in reacting to alternatives and new ideas (Nydegger, 1975; Driver, 1977; Streufert & 
Streufert, 1978).  Nevertheless, even given a flexible decision-maker, group dynamics 
remain complicated.  When decision-making units are small, members have greater 
loyalty to the group and are more likely to share core beliefs.  Often members will 
support each other’s predispositions and feel comfortable with collective decisions. 
This will tend to harmonise their deliberations and consensus can be reached quickly. 
Although this will contribute to rapid problem solving, individual creativity and 
independent thinking may well be lost in the pursuit of group cohesiveness as 
‘groupthink’ takes over (Baron, 2005, pp. 219-253; Esser & Ahlfinger, 2001, pp. 31-39; 
Janis, 1972, p.9). 
 
Multiple autonomous actors act together to solve a problem.  However, 
because of the need to form coalitions, the decisions of multiple autonomous actors 
tend to be more measured than those of a single group or a predominant leader.  
Nevertheless, if group members have a greater diversity of values, positions and 
perceptions disagreement will prevail.  The most difficult of the variables to predict is 
the nature of the relationship between individual actors.  Often these relationships 
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will depend on past interactions and the presence of divergent core beliefs and they 
also can be influenced by wider issues, including the need to further personal 
ambitions or increase status within the group (Tetlock, 1979, pp. 1314-1324; 
McGrath, 1984; Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 383-385; Hermann, 1981, pp. 209-
232). 
 
Single group decision-making is most common in contemporary governments, 
typically consisting of, for example, National Security Councils, Cabinets or the UK 
civil contingencies committee (COBRA).  These groups will have the authority to 
take decisions without consulting other groups.  Prompt consensus on decisions to 
overcome problems is at the heart of single group decision-making.  Due to the 
urgency to act in a crisis, factors outside those already known to the group often have 
little bearing on their decisions.  Members of the group reinforce each other’s 
judgment and feel secure in their collective decisions (George, 1980; Hermann & 
Hermann, 1989; Janis, 1972). 
 
When considering the predominant leaders decision-making process it is the 
character of the individual that is of significant importance.  If the predominant leader 
is driven by conviction then he/she is likely to view information in a manner that 
confirms his/her beliefs.  This type of leadership has been styled as “autocratic” 
(Bass, 1981) or “crusading” (Stoessinger, 1979); such leaders tend to surround 
themselves with like-minded people who share their ideas and aspirations.  The more 
pragmatic leader is open to opinions and suggestions and views incoming information 
judiciously.  Such a leader strives to be flexible and will more readily adapt to 
changing situations.  However, it is a rare predominant leader that does not possess a 
strong belief in the validity of his/her judgement (Ziller et al, 1977: Stroessinger, 
1979, Gardiner, 1983).  
 
The multiple autonomous actors group is most susceptible to external 
influence.  It must seek information on both the environment in which it operates and 
on other actors in order to judge how it will be affected in its decisions.  Single 
groups and predominant leaders are less constrained by situational complexities and 
therefore are likely to follow more extreme courses of action.  In the case of multiple 
autonomous groups, each actor is likely to be convinced of the validity of his or her 
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own beliefs and distrust those of other parties; thus it is more likely that a higher 
degree of diplomacy and a lower level of resource commitment will be the outcome 
(Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 369). 
 
Alison and Halperin were early exponents of the crucial role of human agency 
and the decision-making environment in the formation of policy, suggesting that both 
shared values and the organisational process will affect the bargaining process and 
the outcome (1972, p. 43).  Thus an essential element in the consideration of 
decision-making is the forum in which the decisions are made, taking account of the 
personality, social and cultural dynamics of the decision-makers and the internal and 
external pressures they experience.  This mixture of the human component and the 
bargaining forum creates a predisposition for rivalry and competition.  
 
3.2. Considering Inter­Organisational Competition and Rivalry 
 
Rivalry and competition are prevalent within international relations and exist, often 
concurrently, at different levels.  Competition is most often found at the intra-
organisational and inter-personal levels when departments, institutions and 
individuals compete for influence or status.  Competition is typically short lived but 
may frequently recur, although not necessarily among the same actors.  Rivalry is 
more regularly found at the inter-organisational level and is exercised for very similar 
reasons as competition, which is to gain patronage or ascendancy.  Rivalry, however, 
is likely to recur over an extended period of time and is more prone to be acted out 
with the same protagonists (Wayman, 2000, p.228; Colaresi & Thompson, 2002, 
p.285).  Within the international system competition and rivalry can be witnessed on 
several levels of analysis:  
Competition and Rivalry Groups Examples 
System  East-West bloc rivalries. 
Regional  The Balkans or Middle East conflicts. 
Organisational  IGO /IO rivalries. 
State  Inter-state conflict. 
Bureaucratic  Rivalries among departments, services or sectors 
Group  Ethnic, class or religious conflicts. 
Interpersonal  Competition between individual people. 
Table 3.1: Competition and Rivalry Groups (adapted from Biermann, 2007, p.12). 
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All these stages of interaction, except for the systemic and inter-personal levels, 
include intra- and inter-level elements.  Most of the competition and rivalry groups 
feature prolonged interaction mainly because they all, with the exception of the inter-
personal plane, involve multi-level decision-making by a substantial number of 
actors.  Thus they evoke elements of both rivalry and competition. 
 
Within IGOs there are varying levels of competition and cooperation that 
affect the relationships between them.  Even when co-operating, organisations try to 
position themselves to best advantage over other organisations.  Law (2008, p.58) 
suggests three strategies that IGOs employ to leverage these relationships, as 
illustrated at Table 3.2 below: 
Strategy Tactics Examples 
Defensive a. Ignore other IGOs. 
b. Gather intelligence on 
other IGOs. 
c. Privilege declaratory 
cooperation with IGOs. 
 
NATO, EU and OSCE 
strategies during and just after 
the Cold War in relation to 
each other. 
 
 
Enhancive a. Compensate for a lack 
of policy tools, 
resources and 
relevance. 
b. Secure legitimacy for 
international 
interventions. 
c. Build alliances with 
like-minded actors. 
d. Create inter-
institutional synergies. 
e. Provide services for 
other IGOs 
a. All IGOs in relation 
to the UN. 
b. The OECD 
relationship with 
other IGOs through 
OECD-DAC. 
c. EU and NATO 
through Berlin Plus. 
d. The COE through 
support to EU 
enlargement 
strategies. 
Transformative a. Colonise other IGO 
functions. 
 
b. Merge with or absorb 
another IGO. 
a. The approach of 
some EU member 
states to NATO. 
b. EEC to EU. WEU to 
ESDP. 
 
Table 3.2:  IGO Strategies and Tactics (Adapted from Table 3.3 in Law, 2008, p.59). 
The organisational, bureaucratic and inter-personal levels of competition and 
rivalry are relevant to this thesis.  IGOs exist, in part, at the will of the core member 
states and so it is important to consider not only competition between IGOs but also 
between their member-states and within their administrative structures.  The problems 
of the OSCE and NATO, for example, cannot be appreciated without considering the 
underlying antipathy of their member states; between the USA and Russia, in the case 
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of the OSCE, and between the US and France, and Turkey and Greece, in the case of 
NATO.  Similarly, competition between the DPKO and UNDP within the UN system, 
as each manoeuvred for supremacy in the peacebuilding and SSR arena is relevant in 
this respect.  Elvemar, speaking on behalf of the EU, recognised these problems of 
antagonism and lack of coordination:   
“The EU supports all efforts to solve the problems of fragmentation within 
DPKO and … fully recognises the need to strengthen DPKO's links with 
other relevant parts of the UN system... the EU has repeatedly stressed the 
importance of co-ordination at every level, both at headquarters and 
equally important in the field. Co-ordination mechanisms within the [UN] 
Secretariat should be used to their fullest extent” (European Presidency, 
2001, pp.1-3). 
 
This fragmentation typifies the discord between the internal mechanisms of an 
IGO.  Dijkstra (2008, pp.5-10) suggests the relationship between the European 
Commission and the Council Secretariat results from the way in which member states 
have delegated tasks to each institution.  Since 1999, the Council Secretariat has tried 
to fill the political void left by the relative absence of the European Commission in 
political aspects of European foreign policy (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2006).  In 
attempting to do so it has come into competition with the European Commission, 
which has sought to maximise its competences beyond first pillar activities (Downs, 
1967; Majone, 1996).  Although both institutions have found ways of improving 
inter-institutional relations, structural problems remain.  Indeed, Dijkstra believes that 
increased competition occurs when the Commission and the Council’s roles overlap 
and the division of labour is unclear (2008, p.2). 
 
 Competition and rivalry likewise occur within both national government and 
business structures.  Examples of bureaucratic discord are numerous; it has been 
described by Halperin (1974), when analysing bureaucratic rivalry in US national 
security circles, as being the outcome of a mixture of objective interests (in this case 
National Security), organisational interests (Executive or Military) and personal 
interests.  Within industry, the effect of competition and rivalry has long been 
recognised.  Employees are prone to forming power bases of like-minded colleagues 
and withholding information from rivals.  It is not uncommon for differences of 
opinion over project deliverables, requirements, scope and risk perceptions, 
engendered by rivalry, to adversely impact on productivity (Mochal, 2005).  
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The need to track profit and loss means that monitoring and evaluation of 
industry’s efficiency is better developed than within IGOs.  This equally applies to 
the understanding of the effects of competition and rivalry.  A study for the 
Confederation of British Industry (CEDR, 2006) has concluded that, despite that fact 
that the private sector is alert to the problem, conflict resulting from internal and 
external rivalry and competition costs UK businesses circa £33 billion every year.  
One financial expert (Esson, 2009) suggests that, on average, this equates to each 
business losing approximately 4.3% of gross value added (GVA). 
 
The problem of competition and rivalry is present in relationships between the 
principal actors in peacemaking.  Within the British system many senior military 
officers consider that the military understands post-conflict situations, but DFID does 
not.  General Sir Michael Jackson believes that the British Army appreciates the need 
to become involved in simultaneous military and civilian post-conflict activities 
whilst DFID is “less than wholehearted about helping in the reconstruction efforts” 
(2007, pp. 213; 341).  His convictions are not completely accurate but are firmly held 
and occasionally have influenced his relationship with the Secretary of State for 
International Development. (1) The UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David 
Richards, is more forthright suggesting there is arrogance among civilian 
organisations about military involvement in post-conflict situations.  He believes that 
most civil servants consider that they understand SSR far better than the Armed 
Forces.  Furthermore, Richards sees institutional rivalry, organisational envy and 
personal ambition at the root of most problems confronting coordinated international 
response to post-conflict stabilisation (2008, pp.11; 17).  The civilian view is 
expressed by Fergusson (2008) who suggests that the military is driven by the need to 
find quick solutions to short term urgent problems and often loses sight of the long-
term objectives confronting development and political agencies.  Moller (2008, p.9) 
sees the difficulty as a lack of common ground between organisations when 
considering security and stabilisation problems.  He cites as an example the lack of 
cohesion between the UN DPKO, UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA) in their understanding of security reform.  Summing up the difficulties, 
Etherington (2008, p. 6) suggests that, in the post-conflict stabilisation process, “if 
there is no agreement on the problem, then it is very hard to find a solution.”  
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A neo-realist argument is that international organisations reflect the interests 
and concerns of the most powerful states (Krasner, 1991, pp.336-366; Mearsheimer, 
1995, pp. 5-49).  A related rational choice argument is that cooperation requires an 
abrogation of the status quo and that this step is typically avoided (Duffield, 2009, 
p.640).  Nevertheless, neo-realists may have overstated the prevalence and magnitude 
of these concerns.  Such worries are not always present in the conduct of inter-
institutional affairs and may not be sufficient to inhibit cooperation.  Concerns about 
relative gains should be less prominent between allied organisations than relations 
between adversaries.  Alignments may be highly stable in some situations, 
particularly when institutions are faced with a common rival.  
 
However, the root of the problem lies deeper than mere institutional 
protectionism and disagreement over objectives.  Underlying organisational rivalry is 
a strong element of individual ambition and competition in bureaucratic politics, “the 
personal is tightly interwoven with the institutional.  It is a rare player who can keep 
the two distinct, much less view the both apart from substance” (Neustadt, 1972, 
p.78).  
3.3. The Causes of Rivalry 
 
Competition and rivalry often are used as synonyms (2), both terms symbolising a 
contest between opponents for a prize or advantage.  Yet, as close as they are literally, 
the words rivalry and competition separately imply different attitudes and actions.  
Rivalry is used more often than its synonym to indicate aggressive action, overriding 
ambition and uninhibited emotions.  Competition can be as intense as rivalry but also 
can be viewed as a positive act.  Competition, not rivalry, allows a clearer view of an 
opponent because the competitor does not feel compelled to deny the skill or nobility 
of his opponent.  The opposite of competition is cooperation, whilst the antithesis of 
rivalry is partnership.  Rivalry and partnership can have behavioural consequences; 
rivalry tends to produce conflict, whilst partnership engenders cooperation.  
Competition tends to be short lived but rivalry and partnerships are more often 
longer-lasting events.  Thus, continuity and durability are the two main components 
of rivalry, provoking serial crises involving the same actors over extended timeframes 
(Colaresi & Thompson 2002, p. 285; Wayman, 2000, pp. 228).  
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Calculating the frequency of disputes occurring within a predetermined time 
typically identifies rivalry.  However, this approach produces analytical problems, 
including the possibility that rivalry analysis is restricted to a method for 
distinguishing between groups or states that engage in frequent and infrequent 
conflict.  Rivalry often is equated with military conflict but there are, in fact, 
profound differences in the levels of rivalry and competition.  This thesis concerns 
rivalry and competition well below the level of militarised dispute therefore neo-
liberal and sociological institutionalism approaches are more useful.  Organisational 
and social network theories are more appropriate for the examination of inter- and 
intra-organisational competition and rivalry (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger, 1996, 
2002; Gehring & Oberthür 2003, 2006; Verbeek, 1998, pp.11-26; March and Olsen, 
1989; Archer, 1993). 
 
Although the foundations of rivalry are often unclear, rivalries can be 
determined by structure and quickly accumulate and, over time, become set in 
intensity (Goertz & Diehl, 2000, pp. 202-205).  They can, however, also evolve 
gradually in response to interactions among competing groups, which display 
increasing distrust and hostility as the effects of past negative exchanges feed 
suspicion.  This suggests that both structural and relational perspectives are key 
components of rivalry and that it is initiated and maintained by both structural and 
actor-driven causes.  Indeed, it is arguable that presenting them as alternatives is 
misleading, as structure and activity are both essential in the concepts of competition 
and rivalry.  They both have a structural and a relational dimension and these 
dimensions interact with one other. 
 
The duration of rivalry produces its own outcome.  A consequence of duration 
is that ‘psychological baggage’ in the form of prejudice and negative opinions 
accumulate and lead to distorted information processing and biased group responses 
(Colaresi & Thompson, 2002, pp. 265, 269).  Unsympathetic images of the rival are 
formed and internal solidarity and external hostility emerge.  A variety of 
psychologically generated misconceptions, including stereotyping and the forming of 
definite, inflexible opinions accrue.  Suspicion becomes a major restraint to the 
development of trusting relations between opposing sides and, therefore, 
organisations involved in protracted rivalry increasingly distrust each other's motives 
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Over time suspicions of hypercritical behaviour, the spreading of disinformation and 
the fear of failure heighten the difficulties of seeking cooperation (Tetlock, 1998, 
pp.868-912; Vasquez, 1996, pp. 548-549).   Internally generated pressures also apply; 
neither side wishes to expose itself to the condemnation that would arise should 
negotiations with the rival have an unsatisfactory outcome.  
 
Rivalry presupposes a state of domain similarity, which implies a shared issue 
area with related overlaps of competency (Van de Ven & Walker, 1984, p. 601).  
Thus, two organisations take on increasing significance to one another once they 
begin to coincide in a substantial manner.  This phenomenon has echoes of the 
horizontal isomorphism explained in sociological institutional theory where 
institutions adopt socially defined practices that are promoted by the wider 
institutional environment.  
 
During the Cold War, domain similarity was limited among the Euro-Atlantic 
security institutions as each tended to have its own responsibilities and the divisions 
between them were clearly defined.  When the organisations started their internal 
transformation processes, in the early 1990s, domain similarity and isomorphism 
materialised and functional and regional overlap became a significant feature of the 
new security structure.  Thus it has been contended that institutional structure can 
affect inter-institutional relations (Waltz, 1979, p.65; Keohane, 1993, pp. 506-508).  
However, others suggest that individuals are able to transcend the constraints of 
structure, with structure and agency acting as complementary forces.  Although 
human behaviour and actions are influenced by structure, individuals can modify 
structure to suit their own purposes (Archer, 1996; Bourdieu, 1977; Khandwalla, 
1981, pp.411-412; Ritzer, 2000).   
 
Competition and rivalry are closely related to the pursuit of power.  The realist 
concept of power proposes that it can be structurally (Mearsheimer, 2001) or 
anthropologically (Morgenthau, 1948) motivated.  Anthropological study suggests 
that groups, tribes and packs are committed to survival and the struggle for power is 
one of their main collective instincts.  Organisational research (O’Brian & O’Neill, 
2000, p.6) has found that the same imperatives apply in both public and private 
institutions.  The primary institutional requirement for survival is the ability to 
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manage change pro-actively on a continuous basis.    Organisations must continually 
recreate themselves by being innovative or face elimination as their legacy becomes 
ineffective or uneconomic.  
 
Intergovernmental Organisations must likewise evolve or disband; indeed a 
substantial number have failed to survive, as witnessed by the closure of some 30 per 
cent of all international organisations between 1981 and 1992 (Borgatti & Everett, 
1992, pp.221-235).  The relationship between IGOs takes on a particular significance 
in the race to survive.  Indeed social network theory suggests that relative positioning 
is highly significant within international organisational systems and, of necessity, this 
means that survival mechanisms must come to the fore.  As networks emerge a 
process of demarcation takes place and each organisation assumes, for a period of 
time, a specific network position in order to protect itself.  In this manner, the profile 
of each organisation is relationally defined and therefore becomes part of its identity 
(Aldrich & Whetten, 1981, p. 399; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, pp. 1439-1493).   
 
Within Europe presently there are a large number of overlapping, closely 
linked institutions that serve to make the attributes of relativity an important feature 
of their interactions.  As an example, it is generally perceived that the EU and NATO 
are at the heart of the Euro-Atlantic security network, whilst the OSCE is on the 
periphery.  As the OSCE’s worth is perceived to be negative relative to that of the 
others, its protestations that it is being sidelined by NATO and EU tend to indicate a 
fear of becoming irrelevant (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006, pp. 6-7).  The negative 
image it portrays can adversely impact on its ability to draw the support needed to 
sustain itself.   
 
In times of budget restraint and with much duplication of membership (and 
therefore available funding sources) international bureaucracies have fertile ground 
for rivalry.  Member states allocate resources to IGOs based on that organisation’s 
relevance to their perceived national interests, thus institutional preferences drive 
resource allocation.  It is apparent therefore that those organisations that command 
the greatest prestige can draw the greater attention (Alvarez and Robin, 1992, p. 
1398).  This then impacts on their ability to attract funding support and thereby to 
function effectively in relation to other organisations and institutions.  To take again 
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the example of the OSCE; European Foreign Ministers meet monthly in the EU, but 
OSCE member state Ministers for Foreign Affairs meet only once a year.  Therefore, 
a weakened OSCE is further undermined in relation to its IGO rivals. 
 
Some theorists argue that positioning is a system-induced mechanism of rivalry.  
However, it does still allow actors to follow a range of options.  The application of 
these options are sometimes called ‘turf wars’ and can be illustrated by the desire of 
the OSCE not to lose further influence to the EU and by NATO’s wish to avoid 
losing ground in the security field.  Each organisation assumes a specific network 
position and the profile of each organisation is relationally defined and becomes part 
of its corporate identity (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999, p.1448; Aldrich & Whetten, 1981, 
pp. 385-408, Burt, 1976, pp. 93-122).   
 
However, the actions of organisations can create concern for other institutions.  
The post-Cold War transformation of NATO did not appear to some observers as an 
adjustment in order to remain relevant in a changing world; rather it was seen as 
“aggrandisement” designed to “achieve an improved position” and motivated by 
“ambition as well as fear” (Yost, 2007, p.103).  This is true also of NATO’s 
partnership mechanisms that are seen by some observers as an attempt to expand 
influence and power (Higate & Henry, 2009).  Nonetheless, positioning is essential if 
IGOs are to achieve even a modicum of autonomy within the systemic network. 
3.4. Autonomy, Authority and Competition 
 
The pursuit of autonomy by IGOs is widespread; an organisation that lacks freedom 
of action is neither a useful tool for its member states nor a competent partner for 
other international organisations (Donno, 2006).  The less restricted the capacity to 
act, the more autonomously an IGO can pursue its goals.  However, autonomy has 
negative as well as positive consequences; although it may increase the ability of an 
organisation to act it can also obstruct cooperation.  The search for autonomy tends to 
deter organisations from seeking to co-operate and hinders those organisations, which 
have achieved a measure of collaboration, from furthering their mutual aims (Barnett 
& Finnemore, 1999, pp.701-703). 
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The main challenge to IGOs is the need to remain relevant in a frequently 
changing environment.  Cooperation can detract from the relevance of an 
organisation as its skills and attributes can become diluted by the need to share 
knowledge, material and position.  If an organisation maintains its autonomy it is 
more able to maintain its relevance in relation to other organisations.  Isomorphism 
and domain similarity increases the need for this relevance.  Relevancy is therefore 
the outcome of increased stature, which, in itself, is generated by increasing 
institutional autonomy and authority (Aldrich & Whetten, 1981, p.399; Gulati & 
Garguilo 1999, p.1448). 
 
Neo-institutionalism suggests that organisations exist to improve cooperation 
and solve problems.  As attractive as the idea of cooperation might be in certain 
circumstances, cooperation means reducing autonomy and having to include the 
preferences of partners in the policy making process (van de Ven & Walker, 1984, p. 
601).  Thus, the sharing of security assignments, between IGOs, is often 
circumvented because to cede responsibility, in terms of operational tasking, tends to 
open an authority gap which can, and probably will, be filled by another organisation.  
In a situation of domain similarity, the division of assignments will always imply the 
ceding of authority and thus creates the conditions for rivalry.  Role sharing tends to 
sanction encroachment, with long-term implications for potential future mission 
assignments and, therefore, the stature and authority of an organisation.  The new UN 
integrated mission structure is aimed at generating, through role sharing, a 
mechanism by which all UN activities can be coordinated and controlled.  However, 
this initiative has caused competition within the UN system over matters that rely on 
cooperation and coordination to succeed.  Thus, as a result of the desire to protect 
organisational relevance, the guarding of autonomy has significant appeal to IGOs 
 
It is arguable that it is the probable cost of cooperation, in terms of conceding 
autonomy, which detracts from the act of collaboration in the first place.  It can be 
contended, however, that assignment sharing can serve to clearly define roles and 
responsibilities and consequently reduce rivalry.  However this action would 
undoubtedly place limits on how far an organisation could functionally expand and 
commit to a role that might become too restrictive at some future time.  This 
diminution in an organisations’ ability to evolve in times of crisis and change, thus 
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reducing its options for survival, is unattractive to an IGO that wishes to compete 
within the system network. 
 
On occasions, however, organisations have to cooperate.  This was the case in 
Kosovo where the UN, OSCE, and EU were allied within the pillar system of 
UNMIK.  Nevertheless, when cooperation among potential rivals takes place, there 
can be misunderstandings and misdirection brought about by the problems arising 
from domain overlap and the influences of durational rivalry.  Furthermore, the 
pursuit of autonomy does not abate because a form of cooperation has been entered 
into; indeed, the efforts to maximise autonomy can have the effect of reducing the 
will to collaborate, as will be discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
Cooperation is rarely symmetrical and, among the Euro-Atlantic security 
institutions, asymmetry seems to be the rule; asymmetry causes one-sided 
dependence and the resulting unevenness tends to exacerbate rivalry (Marsden, 1992, 
p. 1889).  Examples of this are numerous; for instance, NATO has needed UN 
mandates to sanction its operations but the UN needs no authorisation from NATO in 
order to act.  The EU needs NATO for military planning and manpower, not vice 
versa, and the OSCE relies, in part, on grants from the EU budget.  Nevertheless, 
IGOs place a strong emphasis on the principle of non-hierarchical equality when 
reviewing their relationships with each other, as witnessed by the pronouncements of 
equality and cooperation by de Hoop Scheffer when referring to the relationship 
between his organisation and the EU (2002, p.2).  Such pronouncements, however, 
may be rhetorical and hide the inequality among the organisations. Thus, as 
subordination is abhorrent, rivalry is accentuated.  This leads to struggles for 
autonomy that, in turn, mean that cooperation becomes problematic. 
 
Cooperation can increase the desire for autonomy, thus discouraging future 
collaboration. When the UN and NATO were working together during the Bosnian 
conflict in the early 1990s the technical relationship for determining NATO air 
operations was a system of ‘dual-key’ arrangements.  This meant that NATO could 
not initiate air operations over BiH until consent had been obtained from the UN 
Military Commander.  Additionally, permission for offensive action had to be 
countersigned by the SRSG of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
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Zagreb (Power, 2008, p.161).  Smith (2005, p. 342) suggests that the decision to have 
a NATO no fly zone (NFZ) over UN ground troops reflected the classic dichotomy of 
two military chains of command, in this case overlaid by a civilian authority in 
certain instances.  According to Shawcross (2000, p. 155) the heart of the problem lay 
with the UNSC that controlled the UN Secretariat, and therefore UNPROFOR, to the 
extent that there was little leeway for decisive action.  The UNSC had expected the 
opposing parties in BiH to respect UN authority and so initially believed that robust 
military action was unnecessary.  Thus UNPROFOR was not properly equipped for 
military action but NATO was.  However, to acknowledge this fact would undermine 
much of the UN’s autonomy and authority.  The ‘dual-key’ measure proved so 
restricting for NATO that it now insists on unified command and control of its 
deployed and support forces.  Leurdijk suggests that this demonstrates an “autonomy 
model”, as NATO “is not willing to subordinate itself to the UN under all conditions” 
(2004, pp. 26-27).  This in effect created, as will be described in Chapter Six, the 
dualism of military and civilian implementation that prevailed in Kosovo.  
  
Lessening dependency can become a principal aim of organisations having to 
commit to cooperation.  Eliminating the need for reliance on another organisation is 
an attractive proposition.  NATO took this step in 1999 when it conducted military 
operations against the Milošević regime without UNSC authorisation.  Likewise, the 
decision to create a mission support department within the DPKO, with the prospect 
of establishing a command centre for peacekeeping operations, can be perceived as a 
move by the UN to replicate NATO’s integrated military structure in order to reduce 
the UN’s dependence on that organisation.  However, removing or reducing 
dependency between organisations to nullify rivalry will not present a complete 
solution for, within the internal structures of IGOs, there is similar scope for 
antagonism. 
 
Decision-making in the EU takes place in a normative environment where 
compromise is part of the organisational culture; indeed Caroline Lucas MEP 
suggests that it is welcomed within the EU’s legislative bodies, unlike in many 
member state parliaments. (3) An example is the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), which has evolved a distinct style of decision-making, 
which includes mutual responsiveness, a consensus-making reflex, and a culture of 
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compromise.  However, there also exists a high level of administrative rivalry among 
the committees operating within the Council’s infrastructure, which negatively affect 
the decision-making process (Lewis, 2000, pp. 261-289).  Rivalry is especially 
pronounced over the competencies for Pillar Two (Common Foreign and Security 
Policy) and Three (Justice and Home Affairs), which serves to make decision 
formulation in the areas of security and peacebuilding problematic (van Eekelen, 
2002, pp. 23-38).  
 
Reference already has been made to the difficulties that have occurred 
between the UN DPKO and UNDP.  These problems are based on the need for the 
internal structures of the organisation to gain authority and autonomy within the 
confines that bind them.  This requirement is born of the need to gain ascendancy and 
keep open options for future negotiation and action.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
point to the primacy of organisational legitimacy over organisational efficiency. 
When forced to choose between efficiency and authority, organisations will select 
options, which preserve and enhance their standing in relation to other institutions.  
Legitimacy leads to the continuation of resource and finance streams upon which the 
organisation depends.  Reliance on maximising organisational legitimacy rather than 
growing internally generated efficiencies is a strategy by which organisations seek to 
reduce turbulence and maintain stability (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, pp. 348-349).  It is 
also the product of the pressures brought to bear on international bureaucracies by the 
principals that give them their existence; the member states. 
 
3.5. Member States and Intergovernmental Organisations: 
Partners or Rivals? 
 
Intergovernmental organisations are composed of member states and international 
bureaucracies, which can be further separated into intra-organisational groups.  Inter-
organisational cooperation and rivalry are the result of multifaceted intra-
organisational processes, whereby one actor frequently gains internal dominance 
when defining the relationship with other organisations.  This driving force can be a 
key member state or group of states, the vigour of the international bureaucracy or an 
intra-organisational group or key official (Biermann, 2007, p. 25). 
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Those who judge IGOs to be no more than devices of the member states believe 
that competition and rivalry is located at the member state level (Archer, 1993, pp. 
130-152; Rittberger & Zangl, 2006, p.6).  However, those who see IGOs as semi-
autonomous actors with their own influence and agency on international affairs, see 
international bureaucracies as contributors to competition and rivalry (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004, pp. 25-27).  Although in matters of security, member states have 
yet to significantly relinquish autonomy to international organisations nonetheless 
IGOs have the capacity to influence the opinions of security actors from member 
states through their military committees.  However, this influence is not as powerful 
as national political factors, which pose the most constraint on cooperation in matters 
of security (Yost, 2007, p. 140). 
 
Decision-making in security institutions is generally based on consensus and 
therefore inter-governmentalism dominates.  Each member state, regardless of size, 
has the potential to shape an inter-organisational relationship according to its own 
parochial interests.  This tendency has proved to be an enticement to misuse, 
especially among those member states represented in only one of the concerned 
organisations.  The Turkish-Greek-Cypriot dispute in NATO and the EU 
demonstrates how relatively easy it is for an individual state to block wider 
international decision processes in the furtherance of their national agendas.  Another 
example is the blocking by Greece of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s 
(FYROM) entry into NATO, at the April 2008 Bucharest summit, in a dispute over 
Macedonia’s name. By disrupting NATO and EU expansion, Greece appears to have 
contravened its undertaking in the 1995 Interim Accord between the two states not to 
let the name issue stand in the way of FYROM’s membership of international 
organisations.  Thus organisational frameworks can be undermined, as the institution 
becomes an instrument in the hands of member states in pursuance of inter-state 
rivalry.  Although the antagonistic role perception may not necessarily be shared by 
the membership of the organisation as a whole, it appears true that a small minority of 
its members can commandeer the institution.  Thus actor-driven special interests can 
override cooperation.  
 
It has been earlier suggested that institutions tend to be ranked in terms of 
relevance and authority and, as a consequence, resources are granted, tasks assigned 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER THREE   
 
85 
 
and attention paid accordingly.  However, as long as organisations do not overlap, it 
is difficult to shift resources, tasks and attention from one to another.  During the 
Cold War, only NATO was available to the western powers for collective defence so 
the extent to which members were satisfied with the organisation was of little 
consequence as it was not possible to shift support to another institution.  The only 
alternative was to leave all or part of the organisation, as France did in 1966 when it 
left the integrated military structure (Van Herpen, 2009).   
 
However, when alternatives become available and overlap comes into play, 
institutional preferences gain relevance.  There currently exists considerable overlap, 
especially in Europe, with numerous institutions attempting to coexist.  Within the 
system there is increasing duplication of competencies, which allows for choice 
among organisations and, as a consequence, the strategies of the member states as to 
institutional preference.  In effect, the availability of alternatives creates incentives 
for “the strategic selection of favourable venues from among a plural menu of 
alternatives” (Yupille, 2006, p. 1).  This strategic selection can affect both the intra- 
as well as the inter-organisational approach of member states.  For instance, France 
has stressed the primacy of the UNSC, not least to protect its own great power status.  
The US, conversely, has sometimes seen UNSC membership as a hindrance, as it has 
served to delay or block decision-making and interfere with the autonomy of action, 
which the US has become inclined to exercise.  The American decision to act without 
UNSC agreement in Kosovo and Iraq ably demonstrated their position on this matter.  
Nevertheless, the desire to be free of constraint or to act in a manner that favours 
perceived national interest or domestic political agendas produces dilemmas.  This is 
illustrated by recent actions in the Middle East where the policies of the US, 
undertaken without international agreement, have caused numerous states to express 
their deep concern.   
 
These contrary intra-organisational strategies are derived from the presence of 
choice.  The freedom of choice between international institutions has, therefore, 
become an additional source of rivalry and, thereby, has reduced the opportunities for 
cooperation.  However, although it can be seen that IGO structure provides the basis 
that can support rivalry it tends, in the main, to be actor-driven since member states 
are primarily interested in advancing their own authority and autonomy.  In some 
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instances, although not by any means exclusively, this interest is exercised through 
the influence that states can bring to bear through their own nationals working within 
IOs and IGOs. 
3.6. International Officials and Interpersonal Competition 
 
The UN has codified its principles of international service in a volume of Staff 
Regulations. When discussing individual involvement in rivalry and competition, 
Article 1, Regulation 1.1b, which contains the Oath of Office for its officials, is of 
relevance: 
 
“I solemnly declare and promise to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and 
conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant 
of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my 
conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to 
seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from 
any Government or other authority external to the Organisation” (UN, 
2003, p.1). 
 
Other international organisations have similar strictures on their staff to try to 
ensure that they work in a non-partisan manner for the good of the IGO and 
international community rather than for the parochial interests of their home state or 
another state or organisation.  In this manner IGOs attempt to limit the pressure that 
member states can bring to bear on their nationals serving within the international 
civil service.  However, a combination of concerns and inducements, along with 
sociological and physiological influences, rather than oaths of office determine the 
decisions of individuals on matters of loyalty.   
 
The basis for loyalty is assumed to be concerned with human need.  It is the 
promotion of a sense of belonging, security and prestige that upholds allegiance 
(Costa, 2003, pp. 519-548; Guetzkow, 1957, p.47; Druckman, 1964, p. 44).  It reflects 
the human need for attachment (Terhune, 1964, p.258; DeLamater et el., 1969).  
However, collectively social behaviour appears to be motivated by the requirement 
for a complex mixture of emotional association, the achievement of personal goals 
and the need for status (Meilaender, 2003; Druckman, 1994).  Individuals inevitably 
will seek out the best source of these stimuli and grant it their loyalty.  It was noted at 
Section 4.1 above that the smaller a group, the more its members support each other’s 
predispositions and feel comfortable with collective decisions (Baron, 2005, pp. 219-
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253).  Social research into the relationship between an individual’s positive feeling 
for a group and negative feelings towards others have found a strong relationship 
between in-group loyalties and the tendency to denigrate others (Feshbach, 1987; 
Berry, 1984; Kosterman and Fesbach, 1989).  Duckitt (1989), however, suggests that 
the more secure individuals feel within their group and the healthier their 
relationships are within it, the less likely their need to distance themselves from 
others outside the group.  Thus both inter- and intra-group dynamics are relevant to 
group behaviour and its outcomes. 
 
Within the administrative structure of IGOs there exists an arena for inter-
personal rivalry and competition based on the nature of the duties performed by 
functionaries outside their countries of origin.  A number of social research papers 
have presented theories on the dynamics of organisations with members of different 
nationalities (Adler, 2002; Jackson et al., 1997; Snow et al., 1996).  Much of this 
research focuses on the cultural differences of group members.  Some analysts have 
made the assumption that group members’ values directly relate to nationality and 
thus to their perceptions and behaviour (Cox, 1993, pp.82-89).  Others have examined 
the sources of diversity in multi-national teams that go beyond varying national 
attributes but include demographic diversity in terms of gender, race, age and 
education (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000, pp.26-49; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998, 
pp.77-140).  These studies, however, generally have ignored the differences in status 
attributed to group members based on the disparities in international experience and 
expertise.  
 
Haas (2003, pp.10-19) believes that there are two distinct platforms for the 
attribution of status in international organisations.  These relate to whether an official 
is a “cosmopolitan”, that is someone who has lived and worked in several countries, 
or a “local” who has lived and worked in the country wherein the organisation 
operates.  To establish that cosmopolitans and locals can be viewed as status 
categories, Haas (2007, pp.12-20) identifies status characteristics and the expectations 
that are associated with those characteristics.  While some status characteristics are 
seen as attributes from which wide assumptions of credibility and acceptance can be 
inferred, other assumptions of ability are specifically related to where the officials 
lived and worked.  
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Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch (1980, pp. 479-508) suggest that status diversity 
has implications for the dynamics of international groups and for the interaction 
between international and local institutions working closely together.  They propose 
that this occurs because status hierarchies in groups reflect expectations about the 
task-related competencies of group members.  This serves to categorise interactions 
within those groups, influencing how people behave toward one another and how 
group dynamics are governed.  Other researchers have shown that lower status group 
members feel compelled to conform to the demands of higher-status group members 
and, consequently, perform less effectively than these higher-status members (Alkire, 
Collum, & Kaswan, 1968, pp.301-308; Kirchmeyer, 1993, pp.127-148).  In contrast, 
individuals who have acquired status through the accumulation of expertise and 
experience display more confidence and are more willing to share information and to 
promote their own opinions.  In addition, these opinions are more likely to be sought 
if they are seen to be based on hard-earned experience.  Such status tends to increase 
an individual’s influence (Stewart & Stasser, 1995, pp.619-628; Wittenbaum, 1998, 
pp.57-84).  
 
Weber’s theories on social stratification reflected the interplay between 
wealth, prestige and power.  An individual’s position can be shown in the social order 
through their status (Weber, 1947).  Haas (2003, p.13-14) proposes that both 
cosmopolitans and locals have equal opportunities to establish high status within and 
between organisational groups because each category is expected to assist their group 
interpret knowledge, obtained from outside sources, accurately.  Merton (1957, 
pp.23-39), however, is more prescriptive in his evaluations of the different entities, 
suggesting that locals are individuals whose interests are confined to the community 
in which they exert influence, whilst cosmopolitans are individuals who are oriented 
to the world beyond the community in which they exert influence.  Gouldner (1957, 
pp. 282-386) has viewed this dissimilarity in an organisational context, defining 
locals as persons whose primary loyalty is to the employing organisation, and 
cosmopolitans as those who are oriented to a greater extent towards their professional 
community beyond the organisation.  The distinction between organisational and 
professional role orientation has a firm grounding in empirical research (Becker & 
Billings, 1993, pp.177-185; Cornwall & Grimes, 1987, pp. 281-298) but study of 
status diversity in groups usually focuses on the relationships between high and low 
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status members where the status hierarchy is clear.  The dynamics of participation 
and influence in multinational groups, where more than one member with high status 
exists, creates different dynamics but it is generally assumed that where there are 
several high status individuals in a group, these individuals will be similar in 
background to each other (Owens et al., 1997, pp.16-19).  Thus the differences 
between locals and cosmopolitans can become accentuated. 
 
Within organisations the criteria for status attributions are numerous and 
diverse; sometimes persons with different status characteristics, such as 
cosmopolitans and locals, can be considered to have high status.  Whilst 
cosmopolitans may be considered superior to locals in some settings and locals may 
be viewed as better in others, in ambiguous situations such as Kosovo where an 
international (cosmopolitan) administration was vying with an institution of self- 
government (local), status competition was likely to be more adversarial than current 
theories might suggest.  
 
Thus, within an IGO there exist a number of levels of competition that are 
more related to the structural and administrative aspects of the organisation than the 
inter-personal.  The nature of the international civil service raises questions of loyalty 
and status.  However, the influences on individuals can be complex as international 
functionaries will compete for position and influence on several levels; firstly within 
their home countries in order to secure recognition (emotional association) and then 
within the IGO to secure advancement and ensure continuing employment (personal 
goals and status).  This second challenge is made more difficult by the preference of 
many IGOs to make ‘Mission Appointments’ which tie human resource contracts to 
the mandate of a particular mission rather than assuring tenure.  These pressures serve 
to increase rivalry between the functionaries and can disrupt the important balance 
between individual cooperation and competition.   
3.7. Individual Cooperation and Competition 
 
Cooperation has been analysed in game theory by means of a non-zero-sum game 
called the "Prisoner's Dilemma".  This concept was originally conceived by Flood and 
Dresher and further developed by Axelrod (1984).  The two players in the game can 
choose between two moves, either "cooperate" or "defect".  The proposal is that each 
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player gains when both cooperate but, if only one of them cooperates, the player who 
betrays the other (or “defects”) will gain more.  If both defect, both lose but not as 
much as the co-operator whose cooperation is not returned. Axelrod explored the 
conditions under which essentially self-centred actors will spontaneously cooperate.  
He used, as an example of the benefits of this action, the spontaneous incidents of 
cooperation during the First World War when troops on one side would refrain from 
directly targeting the enemy in the opposing trenches.  This would allow the opposing 
side to minimise casualties.  The strategy would continue to work as long as they 
reciprocated in kind.  Thus cooperation was rewarded and proved that “cooperation 
based on reciprocity can develop even between antagonists” (Axelrod, 1984, pp.21-
22). 
However, it can be seen that there are numerous pressures that can be brought 
to bear on organisations to promote and maintain authority and autonomy when faced 
with overlap and domain similarities.  It is suggested that the rivalry and competition 
that arises in the various planes within the international system closely mimic the 
competition that occurs in nature.  Thus arguably these tendencies to promote the self, 
in relation to others, will exist in individuals working within international 
organisations and institutions.  These tendencies will operate just as strongly at an 
inter-personal level as within a group setting.  Indeed, personal relationships are 
largely founded, as with inter-organisational relations, on interaction and inter-
personal communication (Anderson and Neistadt, 2003, p.3).  
 
Generally, a deficiency of trust and the resultant breakdown in communication 
are at the heart of deteriorating inter-personal relations.  The lack of trust may be 
engendered by competition and the resulting emotional reaction to it.  It also can be 
provoked by a clash of personalities, which may result from a lack of effective 
communication between individuals.  Trust between individuals may take months to 
build but can be rapidly displaced by the loss of intercommunication or respect.  
Individuals typically wish to feel that they are valued (emotional association and the 
achievement of personal goals and status).  An individual who feels undervalued 
becomes anxious and can become alienated from his or her co-workers and 
interlocutors; this in turn can lead to inter-personal rivalry.  The situation becomes 
more complex when there is inter-personal competition at the intra-organisational 
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level.  As was witnessed in Kosovo, competition between UNMIK and UNDP was 
accentuated by inter-personal rivalry between officials within these organisations. 
 
 When such conflict occurs, the way in which it is managed can determine 
whether relationships will function effectively or if they will disintegrate.  Six inter-
personal conflict management styles have been identified by researchers and can be 
categorised as:  
 
Styles Action and Conclusion 
Avoiding Actions A retreat from the conflict but typically 
results in nothing being resolved. 
Smoothing Actions Focuses on accepting the situation as it 
stands and emphasising areas of 
agreement; this is likely to only provide a 
short-term solution. 
 
Compromising Actions Compromising is bargaining; if both sides 
agree a definitive solution can be 
achieved. 
Forcing Actions Forcing is an authoritarian style that 
results in the promotion of one viewpoint 
at the expense of all others and the lack of 
consensus will typically result in the 
prolonging of the dispute. 
Collaborating Actions Collaborating reflects a long-term 
strategy; once everyone comes to 
agreement, a long-term solution is 
possible. 
Confronting Actions The confronting mechanism seeks to 
define and addresses the core problem, 
looks for alternatives through dialogue 
and provides a solution. 
 
Table 3.3: Inter-personal conflict management styles. (Adapted from Burnette & Forsyth, 2003, pp. 7-
13; Forsyth, 2006, pp. 64-67). 
 
To properly apply conflict management actions time is needed but, in international 
interventions, time is not a readily available commodity.  In determining the best 
approach to ensuring inter-personal harmony it is therefore necessary to consider the 
relative importance of the inter-personal conflict, time pressures, the location of the 
actors, and how the approach relates to strategic goals.  Once again, using Kosovo as 
an example, the time pressure on the conduct of the ISSR was such that there was 
little time for establishing effective conflict management measures. 
 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER THREE   
 
92 
 
Notwithstanding these techniques for resolving inter-personal conflict, the 
condition remains one of the most potent drivers within inter- and intra-organisational 
relationships, particularly in testing field conditions.  Ichheiser believes that:  
“False images often come from genuine illusions, errors of judgment, or 
social defamation, and are not always a rationalisation of pre-existing 
feelings. Inter-personal misunderstandings do not automatically correct 
themselves but may become chronic and reciprocal, the persons 
adjusting their behaviour in various ways to the false images” (1943, 
p.302). 
 
  Contemporary managerial emphasis on collaboration overlooks these 
obstacles.  Organisational structures tend to encourage the build-up of negative 
perceptions.  This occurs because their ‘pyramidal values’ stress the importance of 
institutional goals, based on rational concepts, rather than acknowledging the 
emotional aspects of inter-personal relationships within and between organisations.  
Organisations are interested in power and those further up the hierarchy will react to 
inter-personal conflict below them by tightening controls rather than dealing with the 
root causes of the problem.  As a result, organisations tend to experience 
progressively deteriorating inter-personal relationships and, therefore, overall 
effectiveness (Argyris, 1965, pp. 102-110: Banner, 1994, pp. 250 -253; Daft, 2003, p. 
412-416; Schein, 2004, pp. 113). 
  
Thus inter-personal interactions, and the negative competition which can 
result from them, are a crucial part in determining organisational effectiveness in 
relation to other organisations and institutions.  Task oriented organisations value 
individual achievement and reward success proportionally according to the individual 
contribution to group objectives.  Whilst equitably rewarding performance can further 
goal attainment it also encourages inter-organisational competition (Forsyth & 
Kolenda, 1966, p.140).  Within groups the balance is equally delicate; when 
individuals believe that they are being afforded less status or reward than they deserve 
they become hostile to those who they perceive to be treating them unjustly and to 
those who are seen to have benefited unfairly.  However, when organisational or 
group success relies on the interdependence of individuals, then individual ambitions 
must be subjugated to group objectives.  This situation requires that individuals 
suppress intra-group hostility to avoid adversely affecting group cohesion (Rees & 
Segal, 1984, pp. 328-329).  
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Conclusions 
 
 Relations between and among governments and international organisations are based 
on human decision-makers, acting singly or in groups.  Few mainstream IR theories 
take a wider view of human agency.   They tend to have a rather fixed belief that self-
interest is the predominant driver and, therefore, the essential mediums for change, 
creativity, persuasion, accountability and rivalry, are missing.  Institutionalists see 
organisations as providers of platforms for cooperation and problem solving, which 
tend to replicate each other’s structures and rules in a form of isomorphism.  
However, rivalry between member states is a major source of inter-organisational 
discord.  States can use their intra-organisational veto power to disrupt relations with 
another organisation in pursuit of their own parochial interests.  They can, because of 
the freedom of choice now available in the international system, select the forum 
which best fits their purposes and have greater flexibility in their decisions as to 
which organisation is granted funding, resources, and authority.  
 
Rivalry and competition has behavioural consequences, and even the logic of 
‘less rivalry, more cooperation’ cannot be adequately proved.  It is possible therefore 
to envisage cooperation in the midst of rivalry, although it may only exist 
temporarily.  Rivalries evolve in phases, which are driven both by the concerns of 
actors or groups of actors about relative positions.  Inter-organisational rivalry 
intensifies in times of strong actor-driven, and fewer problem-driven, concerns.  
Domain similarity and the effects of mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism as 
described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) tends to deepen this rivalry.  Thus when 
uncertainty over relative positions increases, and external problems seem 
manageable, actor-driven concerns gain prominence and rivalry spreads.  The process 
of competition is more volatile than rivalry but is shorter lived.  It can be aimed at 
specific goals and perpetrated against specific actors or groups of actors.  It is more 
individualistic in nature and, although most commonly found at the intra-
organisational and inter-personal levels, it can equally exist on other planes.   
 
The search for organisational autonomy places a constraint on inter-
organisational collaboration; cooperation is about sharing assignments and 
responsibilities and thus leads to the reduction of autonomy.  There is a constant 
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struggle, especially in asymmetric relationships, between maximising autonomy and 
keeping control.  Therefore cooperation can have the effect of increasing rivalry as 
established positions are challenged and authority questioned. 
 
Sociological institutionalism suggests that individuals characterise themselves 
as social actors by engaging in acts that reinforce the network in which they are 
involved.  The institutional world provides a means of accomplishing this imperative.  
The relationship between the individual and the organisation is, therefore, built upon 
reasoning and the individual gains by working with institutional models to reach a 
desired course of action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, pp.1-40).  Inter-personal 
competition can result from group pressures or internal and external rivalries.  These 
experiences can interact and produce the mistrust and anxieties that fuel rivalry.  A 
fear of loss of personal status, position or authority can be seen as triggers to 
competition and rivalry.  Unequal status contributes to feelings of insecurity, as does 
equal but opposing status.  These negative stimuli can be prevalent in international 
and local organisations striving to work alongside each other in post conflict 
situations.  Persons valued within their own organisations can find that respect is less 
forthcoming outside their own group, which leads to the psychological state that fuels 
incidents of rivalry and competition.  Nevertheless, organisational accomplishment 
depends on the cooperation and coordination of individuals within the group.  
Therefore it is crucial to ensure that individual ambitions are subjugated to the 
achievement of objectives.  This, however, is a difficult goal to achieve, particularly 
in a post-conflict setting, which inter alia will already be burdened with suspicion 
and insecurity.  In many cases, time restraints will also preclude the deployment of 
effective conflict management techniques.  
 
The next chapter examines how IGOs developed their understanding of SSR 
and, as they did so, discovered that to be effective inter-organisational coordination 
and cooperation was necessary.  However, international and regional actors are 
numerous.  Each has different expectations, capacities and methodologies and many 
have no desire to be coordinated.  Thus, rather than cooperation, competition at both 
the executive and operational levels becomes problematic.  The chapter will examine 
the attempts by IGOs to define and refine their understanding of SSR and their 
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subsequent discovery that they had no adequate way of measuring the efficiency of 
their methodology or its impact on the host state. 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER FOUR   
 
96 
 
 
Chapter Four:  Peacebuilding, SSR, Local Ownership and 
Intergovernmental Organisations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Rather than bringing a time of global harmony and cooperation, the end of the Cold 
War heralded an era of multi-polarity generated by new variables, among them the 
difficulties unleashed by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the abrupt shift to an 
unregulated market economy and the struggle within former client states to rebuild 
governmental and other institutions on the basis of democracy and the rule of law 
(Burack, Lewis, Marks et al, 1999, pp.5-6).  These all created a climate of 
uncertainty at least as potent as that experienced during the Cold War. 
 
 Cold War realities had meant that international support for military or 
police reform was often used by donor states to advance their own national foreign 
policy and security goals. However, with the end of the Cold War, it became 
possible to see the concept of security reform as a tool for greater public wellbeing 
and an essential element of development (von Tangen Page & Hamill, 2006, p.4).  
The role of the state and its relationship with its security institutions were judged as 
directly influencing the conditions for sustainable development and for the 
promotion of human and physical security.  The impact of security actors on the 
wider conditions within a state became better recognised (Duffield, 2001: 2007; 
Kalder, 1999: 2003).   
 
 SSR may be considered to be a model that originated from debate within 
the development aid community concerning linkages between security and 
development. Hendrickson (1999, p.7), for example, suggested that security 
expenditure needed to be viewed not only from the perspective of protecting the state 
and its population, but also in terms of how excessive defence and internal security 
costs could detract from funding vital social services and requirements.  It was, 
therefore, necessary to understand the composition of the security sector, the 
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responsibilities of security actors and the relationship between these actors and other 
components of the governmental machinery.  Effective management, accountability 
and transparency in the security sector were deemed essential.  The need to develop 
democratic control mechanisms, to provide security that did not threaten democracy 
and human rights or undermine development goals, became the central principle for 
security studies academics. 
 
In order to understand the basis for SSR and its emerging role in the 
peacebuilding process, this chapter examines the reconceptualisation of sustainable 
peace, development and security.  It then discusses the role of institutionalism in 
governing the actions of IGOs involved in SSR, before examining the relationship of 
human security to SSR and finally considering the importance of local ownership to 
SSR programmes. 
 
4.1.  Intergovernmental  Organisations  in  the  Contemporary 
Security Era 
 
Intergovernmental first made an appearance in the nineteenth century and, since that 
time, have greatly increased in number with some 244 IGOs now in existence (Union 
of International Associations, 2009).  Originally, IGOs were seen as bodies through 
which states sought to pursue national interests in a regional or international arena 
States embraced the IGOs as an environment of enhanced predictability for 
consultations with other states and a valuable meeting place.  Such functions 
continue to be important in the self-understanding of most IGOs and their member 
states.  Increasingly, however, IGOs are seen as actors in their own right and 
purveyors of policies, which would possibly falter without their engagement and 
sponsorship (Law, 2007. p.4).  IGOs can furnish a in which all member states, 
regardless of size or influence, can be heard.  They can also provide the continuity 
and longevity that is often lacking in democratic states, which are subject to the 
vagaries of election cycles, and government reshuffles.  However, there are 
difficulties that confront IGOs. There is evidence that their importance has past its 
peak; the number of IGOs has declined since 1985, probably for growing economic 
instability and the unwillingness of richer states to shoulder the greater part of cost 
(Archer, 2001, pp. 31-36).  As discussed in Chapter Three, several IGOs have also 
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faced criticism from their member states, including the UN, which has had to 
contend with deep criticism of its management and policies, the OSCE, which has 
had the Russian Federation attempt to reorder its priorities and the EU and NATO, 
which experienced in-fighting between its member states.  
 
 However, security requires stability and this necessitates some cooperation 
between states and institutions.  Neoliberal institutionalists, whilst accepting the 
neorealist view of international politics, identify reasons why states may cooperate 
within international institutions (Keohane, 1984; Stein, 1990).  Whilst not directly 
addressing the question of whether institutions bring peace, they focus on the 
question of cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed 
(Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Martin, 1992; Oye, 1985).  Some proponents of this 
theory suggest that there is a correlation between cooperation and security stability. 
Glaser (1994) makes this linkage but the offensive realist, Mearsheimer (1998, 
pp.329-384), dismisses it, based on a belief that liberal institutionalist definitions of 
cooperation avoid military and security issues whilst engaging with economic and, 
occasionally, environmental issues (Haas, Keohane & Levy, 1993).  Mearsheimer’s 
position is one of pessimism:  
 
“The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and 
dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the 
intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each 
other and always compete with each other for power. . . . Why do great 
powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the 
international system forces states, which seek only to be secure 
nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. . . . This situation, 
which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic 
(2001, pp.2-3). 
  
 There is, however, a less fatalistic approach; contrary to the beliefs of 
exponents of neo-realism and neo-liberalism there is a body of theory that suggests 
that IR is primarily socially constructed and is given its form by processes of social 
practice and interaction.  Wendt (1991) posited that shared ideas, and the identities 
and interests of actors, inform the decision-making process; what applies at the 
individual level must apply at the collective level as it is human beings who 
constitute the state.  Thus human beings ensure that state behaviour will follow a 
particular pattern because they have appropriated ideas, which may include other 
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theories about the structure and relationship of behaviour.  McSweeney (1999, p. 
105) considers that “the social constructionist perspective is that IR encompasses the 
domestic sphere no less than the international, the inter-societal no less than 
societal”.  Finnemore (1996, p.2) believes that social interaction is at the heart of this 
process and that national interest is constructed through social interaction.  Many 
constructivists look at social reality in the international arena as the social constructs 
of the key actors.  Thus they challenge realist assumptions about how the 
international system operates, especially with regard to security issues (Biersteker & 
Weber, 1996; Gow, 2005).  
 
 Adherents to theories of functionalism have, however, approached the problem 
from the position that organisations operate in terms of their function and the way 
that individuals and groups interact.  Common interests and needs are seen to create 
connections and foster cooperation in a manner not dissimilar to constructivism.  
Functionalists believe that international cooperation fosters links that temper state 
sovereignty and that understanding arises from that cooperation.  The functionalist 
views international cooperation as growing from a technical base into socio-
economic spheres and then eventually into the political arena.  The neo-
functionalists, however, see the process more as cooperation growing from 
collaboration and interactions within IGOs (Mitrany, 1966; Haas, 1964).  To further 
explain the roots of this technical basis for cooperation, critical theorists seek to 
move the emphasis from an empiricist perspective to a view based on theories of 
transformation, including the various schools of institutionalism (Geuss, 1981; 
Willard, 1996).   
 
 Intergovernmental organisations concerned with security issues, those termed 
by Duffield (2009, p. 638) as “inclusive and exclusive contingent rules international 
security institutions”, constitute an important sub-set of international and political 
institutions more generally.  Little has been written about these organisations, 
although the subject of international institutions has received wide academic 
coverage.  With the exception of a few commentators (Duffield, 1991, pp. 379-406; 
Haftendorn, 1999, pp.3-17; Jervis, 1983, pp. 173-194; Keohane, 1999; Müller, 1993, 
pp. 361-388; Wallender, 1999) theoretical discourse is based mainly on research into 
political economics and environmental cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Young, 1999).  
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The majority of writers have made no attempt to distinguish between international 
institutions operating in different arenas.    
 
 Whilst institutionalism is pivotal to political analysis, there is wide diversity 
over what kinds of rules and relationships are construed as institutions (Goodin, 
1996, p.20).  Neo-institutionalism emphasises the internal structure and social 
assembly of organisations; it views them not solely depending on structures and rules 
but also as the forum for creating equilibrium among individual actors.  Neo- 
institutionalism may have different schools but they all relate to, and interact with, 
two perceptions of the political system.  The first is the rational actor perspective that 
sees political life as influenced by exchanges among self-serving and manipulative 
actors.  The second is a cultural community perspective, which sees political life 
based on shared values in a community of common culture, experience and vision 
(March & Olsen 2009, p.4). 
  
 Within institutionalism the building blocks are seen as rules and practice, 
connected and perpetuated through a sense of membership and recognition of shared 
roles (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 16; Dworkin, 1986, p. 29).  As noted in Chapter 
Two, sociological institutionalism places less emphasis on power or norms and more 
on the socio-cultural construction that guides individual behaviour within 
organisations. Themes in the sociological institutionalism include the functions of 
institutional forms; the specificity of institutional performance; and the quest for 
organisational legitimacy (Campbell & Pedesen, 2001; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  
Rules and practices specify what is normal, what is expected and what makes sense 
in a community (March & Olsen 2009, p.8).  However rules embody historical 
experience and stabilise norms, expectations and resources, whilst providing 
explanations and justifications for the way in which action is taken.  Regulations are 
shaped by an analysis that is built upon experience, memory and trust (March & 
Olsen, 1989, p. 21; Dworkin, 1986, p. 37).  Nevertheless, members of an 
organisation tend to become instilled with the various identities associated with the 
role of the organisation.  They tend, therefore, to define themselves in terms of these 
identities and act to accomplish them rather than determining expected consequences 
(Simon, 1995, pp. 115, 136).   
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 Schattschneider (1960) believes that, while institutions provide governance and 
create bias, they do not ordinarily determine outcomes.  The casual relationship 
between institutional arrangements and policy is complicated.  The casual chains can 
be said to be indirect and organisations can be seen to either constrain or enable 
situations without being the immediate and direct cause of policy (Orren & 
Skowronek, 2004. pp.43-46).  Indeed the very legitimacy of democratic 
organisations is based, in part, on the prospect that they will impart open-ended 
processes without determining outcomes (Pitkin, 1997. p. 79).  Whether institutions 
take the form of a set of rules or collective organisational actors, some 
institutionalists question how significant their effect actually is (Keohane & Martin, 
2003).  States create bodies, such as the UN Secretariat and the NATO International 
Staff to undertake executive functions.  These bodies are given responsibilities, 
resources and freedoms that enable them to act with considerable independence 
(Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).  Although they are not 
typically able to act in a way that contravenes the interests of the states that created 
them, their autonomy allows them to perform many functions more effectively than 
individual, or groups, of states.  Even when working on behalf of states, their 
perceived non-partisan nature will often make their activities more acceptable than 
similar actions undertaken by an individual state (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 13-18).  
In the security sector, the UN and NATO are often required to perform as mediators 
with their high officials’ perceived impartiality enabling them gain concessions on 
disputed issues.  An example is UN peacekeeping missions, which allow powerful 
states to support conflict resolution without becoming directly involved in the matter 
(Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 19; Tuschhoff, 1999, pp.140-161).  Thus as the end of the 
Cold War ushered in new era for IGOs, so those working within them found that they 
were faced with new and testing challenges.  
 
4.2.  Fostering Liberal Democratic Values 
 
As the Cold War drew to a close, a multi-polar structure replaced the bipolar world 
and international politics became more complicated (1).  Globalisation and economic 
interdependence had forged links and created rivalries that had been less apparent in 
bipolarity (Buzan, 1991, pp.434-447).  Economic and societal security became a 
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greater factor both in, and on the peripheries of, the ‘First’ and ‘Second Worlds’ and 
greater concern was raised over communal identity and culture.  It appeared that 
reconceptualisation of security based on international society, characterised by the 
development of shared norms, values and understandings, offered a method of 
coping with international anarchy.  The idea of ‘comprehensive security’ was a 
demonstration of this new agenda and took into consideration the wider issues of 
societal security, thereby deepening as well as widening security concepts.  This 
meant that particular social groups might see the need to protect themselves against a 
range of forces, some of which may be posed by the state wherein they dwelt 
(Waever, 1993, pp.21-24).  Security therefore became more than merely a by-product 
of either power or peace:   
“In the broad concept, security could be defined as the pursuit of freedom 
from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their 
independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of 
change that they see as hostile” (Buzan, 1991, pp.431).   
 
It was necessary however for this perception of security to take account of the 
rise of ethnic nationalism and conflict which both resulted from, and contributed to, 
the collapse of state structures.  When state structures weaken or new states are 
created out of the collapse of larger entities, distinctive groupings have a higher 
awareness of their individuality, which is likely to engender alarm in those outside 
their ethnic grouping (Doornbos, 2006, p.6).  The tensions caused by the breakdown 
of state structures can be mirrored in intra-state security dilemmas; insecurity occurs 
when conditions within a state are similar to those between states in the international 
system (Posen, 2001, p.14).  The absence of effective sovereignty means that sub-
state groups must provide their own security.  Rationalists suggest that a combination 
of external and internal pressures will set off conflict, including the political 
manipulation of ethnic fears and prejudices, as witnessed in the Balkans at the end of 
the last millennium.  Indeed, the instability brought about by the disintegration of a 
political regime is made more volatile as elites contrive to manipulate ethnic and 
nationalistic feelings for their own ends (Brown, 2001, p.12; 1993, p.27).  
 
It is posited that the problem that confronts all security referents today is 
‘insecurity’, rather than ‘security’.  This insecurity is rooted in the change in the 
systemic balance of power and the numerous pressures on individual states, multi-
national organisations and on groups and individuals within and across those states 
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and institutions.  Insecurity then embraces all levels of analysis from the individual 
to the systemic and crosses a wide range of areas, including cultural, economic, 
environmental, political and military affairs (Grenfell & James, 2008).  
 
 The end of the 20th century marked a rearticulation of sovereignty and 
security and saw increased humanitarian intervention both in sovereign issues and 
international judicial systems.  This development came at the price of lessening 
control over state sovereignty and independence.  The new pattern of conflict, 
prevalent in the 1990s, made third party intervention develop, broaden and adapt its 
approach to new challenges.  Higate & Henry (2009, p. 11) suggest that, with the 
success of liberal democracy, the maintaining of “liberal democratic institutional 
forms of state, through facilitating the emergence of liberal democratic institutions 
and values” was to become the aspiration of western powers.  They endorse the 
views of Paris (2001a, pp. 638-639) who suggests that, “peacebuilding operations 
embody...a globalisation of the very idea of what a state should look like and how it 
should act.”  With the complexities of these initiatives, fresh conflict resolution 
strategies and peacebuilding concepts were developed.  These approaches generally 
agreed that transformation must be undertaken simultaneously across several levels 
of society thus concentrating and coordinating conflict resolution efforts (Cooper, 
2004, pp.3-4; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2005, p.21; Lederach, 1997, p. 31-
39). 
 
Lederach (2003b, p.843) visualised a peacebuilding pyramid structure in 
which the process had to extend beyond elite political actors and the peace 
negotiations they undertake.  Within this structure there are three separate but 
interrelated processes: if one adds a political framework to one face of Lederach’s 
pyramid model and security, socio-economic situation and reconciliation and justice 
to the remaining three faces, it is possible to show that every aspect of peacebuilding 
has its own top, middle and grassroots levels within the overall process.  Whilst the 
top levels of leadership in post-conflict situations are high profile, addressing the 
middle and lower levels of society is crucial to peacebuilding.  Middle level actors 
have contacts both upwards and downwards within society and those on the 
grassroots level are connected to the general populace and, therefore, are often better 
attuned to its needs, as demonstrated at Table 4.1 below. 
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      FEW 
TOP LEADERS 
 
High Level Negotiations   
 
                 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACE                                                            SECURITY FACE  
 
 
 
   AFFECTED 
                                                                        
MIDDLE –RANGE     
LEADER                                                                             PEOPLE 
        
Problem Solving Workshops    
              
      POLITICAL FRAMEWORK 
          FACE 
 
 
 
 
 
GRASSROOTS LEADERS          
Local Peace Commissions 
                                                                                                                                                       MANY 
  SOCIETY                              
 
Table 4.1: Peacebuilding Model (Adapted from Lederach’s Model (2003b, p.843). 
 
 
The security sector lends itself to this approach in that engagement must be 
multi-layered; democratic oversight established (top level) institutions must be 
reformed (middle level), and the population reassured that the institutions of state 
security are established for their protection and not just for the state itself (grass roots 
level). 
 
 Post-settlement states offer distinct opportunities for grass-roots 
transformation in that the post-conflict period may present fertile conditions for 
political and thereby security reform.  The population has experienced upheaval and 
has come to expect change; vested interests may have been weakened and 
approaches previously rejected for political, legal, or administrative reasons now 
may be more openly received (Gupta et al., 2005, p.8).  Consequently, decisive 
multi-faceted reform may work better in SSR than in other development scenarios.  
RECONCILIATION/ 
JUSTICE FACE 
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However, the realisation of these wider goals is demanding. The UN claims, having 
engaged in frequent peacebuilding actions, to understand the difficulties: 
“No other operation must set and enforce the law, establish customs 
services and regulations, set and collect business and personal taxes, 
attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for 
war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking 
system, run schools and pay teachers and collect the garbage-in a war 
damaged society…In addition to such tasks, these missions must also try 
to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places 
where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep”(United Nations, 
2000, p.7).  
 
4.3. Sustainable Peace and Sustainable Development 
 
The long-term resolution of conflicts cannot be achieved whilst the more 
conspicuous sources of hostility remain unresolved.  Although it has been proposed 
that to allow conflict to reach its natural conclusion where all the protagonists 
become exhausted or one wins decisively thus resolving political arguments and 
leading to peace (Luttwak, 1999) there has been little acceptance of this course of 
inaction by the UN members states and great powers.  Typically, conflicts have been 
interrupted early on, before they reach a point where peace is more attractive than 
war.  However, political agreements and settlements rarely hold if the communities 
involved do not back them.  Many peace settlements founder because suspicion and 
hostility remain, dividing people along political, cultural or religious lines (Donini, 
Minear, Smillie et al, 2005, pp.52-55).   Creating the necessary conditions for 
sustainable peace and development requires wider efforts, aimed at generating trust 
among divided communities.  This can be achieved by fostering, in the community, 
the values of tolerance and respect. These values cannot be externally imposed, as 
they require the acceptance and involvement of the population. 
 
Endeavours to promote a more inclusive approach help pave the way toward 
successful political dialogue and, in post conflict situations, support the process of 
reconciliation.  When the peaceful coexistence of different communities is threatened 
by underlying tensions, these actions can help prevent overt conflict.  Progress must 
be achieved on multiple levels; government policies must be connected closely with 
civil-society initiatives aimed at reconciling divided societies.  The building blocks 
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of sustainable peace, therefore, are well-functioning systems of governance, which 
are responsive to basic human needs (Sampaio, 2008; Peck, 1998, p.45).   
 
Sustainable peace entails participatory processes aimed at providing, and then 
protecting, the civil and political rights of all citizens.  It requires the provision and 
maintenance of durable institutions, which ensure that citizens receive equal 
treatment under the law and that their human rights are guaranteed.  Sustainable 
peace also benefits from the establishment of equitable economic and social rights 
that respect the distinctive cultures and identities of all members of the population.  
Policies of cultural pluralism are necessary to allow groups to consolidate their own 
sense of identity and exercise their cultural rights.  In addition, sustainable peace may 
involve territorial boundary changes to satisfy demands from ethnic groups for 
greater autonomy and control.  Electoral reform also may be necessary to ensure 
greater access by the population to political decision-making.  Democratic transition 
requires the support and active participation of governments and must engage civil 
society.  In addition, more equitable distributive policies are required to provide 
economic opportunities for disadvantaged groups. 
 
However, in order to take root, sustainable peace also requires dominant 
groups to be convinced that their own interests lie in the development of a secure, 
just and stable society (Van der Stoel, 1994, pp.35-37; Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 
para.15).  Despite political rhetoric, international community efforts to secure peace 
are not entirely altruistic.  Failed states can provide havens for transnational threats, 
including organised crime, drug and human trafficking.  Thus, the driving force 
behind increasing international engagement in post-conflict countries is the desire to 
avoid the spill over effect of insecurity.  Although it is challenging to turn around a 
failed state, the cost of doing nothing is often greater (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 
p.3).   
 
Successful peacebuilding requires planning, coordination and sustained 
commitment by both local and donor partners.  It involves a range of approaches, 
processes and stages necessary for creating sustainable relationships and governance 
structures.  Sustainable peace also requires a policy approach tailored to the problems 
facing a post conflict society.  Those undertaking reforms must have a clear 
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understanding of the root causes of the conflict and an appreciation of the benefits 
and risks of the remedial methods chosen.  The UN, in December 2005, created a 
Peacebuilding Commission to address the gaps in peacebuilding strategy, within the 
UN and the global system, by providing a coordinated and rational approach to 
peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst the key actors.  It was designed to 
marshal resources and to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, 
focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building, and sustainable 
development (United Nations, 2007, pp.4-5).  However a High Level Panel, 
convened to examine the early work of the Commission, found that there was “little 
cooperation between groups within the UN family on peacebuilding and related 
activities” (Tanner, 2006).  This lack of cooperation and insufficient guidance and 
oversight by the UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council was cited 
as a contributory reason for the lack of progress by the Peacebuilding Commission 
(United Nations, 2006, pp. 5-7). 
 
Sustainable development is perceived as integral to sustainable peace.  The 
UN recognises that much must be achieved in the areas of poverty relief, education, 
economic development, health, gender equality and environmental sustainability if 
peace is to be assured.  These objectives have been acknowledged by the agreement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in September 2000.  The Goals were 
introduced as an attempt to encourage the international community to take collective 
action to improve conditions in the developing world and, thereby, help to avert the 
circumstances that often lead to conflict.   Whilst advances have been made towards 
meeting the targets, progress is slow.  This lack of success is engendered by the sheer 
size of the task and the inability of UN member states to agree a joint methodology 
to undertake the required action (DFID, 2007, p. 2).  Recognising these failures, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon requested the support of world business leaders for 
the MDG saying that: 
“This is the first time that the United Nations is reaching out to business 
...  you are here at a critical time, on the eve of our summit to step up 
efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Frankly, I 
am worried that we are going to miss this historic opportunity to reach the 
Goals.  The very grave fact is that many countries are not on track (UN, 
2008, p.1).  
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Faced with these very real difficulties, academic debate on peacebuilding 
interventions is extensive but often contradictory.  Many academics and practitioners 
disagree on how to deal with the realities of post conflict reform and reconstruction.  
Paris (2004, pp. 370-372) considers that intrusive operations, including those that 
temporarily take over a state's administration, are the way to assist post-conflict 
states.  Ashdown (2007, p.19) agrees that the international community must “accept 
the challenge of creating a broad framework of international law to govern the global 
space”.  However, he also notes (2007, p.126) that whilst the international 
community is “very good at military planning for war…it spends neither time, 
resources nor energy on the civilian planning for what will happen the moment after 
the war ends”.   These views, whilst accepting the limitations of recent international 
interventions, fail to acknowledge the need to engage the local community and its 
leadership in any security reform and development endeavour.  Kent (2005, p.10) 
points to the pivotal place of local ownership in successful peacebuilding and SSR 
activities but concedes that the international community’s ability to comprehend 
local aspirations and concerns is weak due to a lack of engagement with the 
population below the level of government officials.   
Zist Marten (2004, pp.32-58) claims it is a “flight of fancy” to think that 
international administrators can bring the values, structures and processes of liberal 
democracy to post conflict societies. She argues that international missions should 
confine themselves to maintaining security, whilst allowing local actors to devise 
their own political and economic systems.  In line with this argument, Mueller (2004, 
pp. 23-46) presents a new model for the future of post-conflict peacebuilding and 
development, which he terms ‘police-keeping’.  He believes that post conflict 
countries urgently need to develop functioning state institutions that can effectively 
regulate their own territories.  These views have merit in that the more holistic the 
intervention by the international community the more difficult it is to resolve the 
problems confronting the post- conflict state.  However, it must always be considered 
that the state itself may not have the resources and expertise to overcome the 
problems facing it.  From this reality has come the shift to the integrated UN mission 
where a wider engagement by more actors is envisaged. 
Thus there is contention over what peacebuilding consists of, how it should 
be applied, and over the level of intervention.  Experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
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BiH, Kosovo and East Timor would suggest, however, that ‘police-keeping’ is not 
enough.  Sustainable peace is based on sustainable political and economic 
development that requires much more than merely an international police or military 
presence.  The idea that security and development should be connected is intuitive 
(Ball, 2001, p.48); security and the performance of the security sector are closely tied 
to poverty reduction and development.  Development requires a secure environment 
in which to flourish and the transformation of the security sector is critical to the 
success of peace agreements and to implementing structural reforms.  This is the 
strength of SSR; a reformed security sector that takes careful note of local security 
aspirations and involves the local population and its leaders in the reform process 
provides the bedrock for sustainable peace and development. 
 
4.4. Security Sector Reform 
 
The concept of SSR was first articulated, to a wider audience, in 1998 during a 
speech by the then Secretary of State in the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for 
International Development (DFID).  The need for comprehensive reform of the 
sector had been earlier identified by Ball, Hendrickson and Woodward (1988, pp. 20-
34; 2001, pp. 3-11), but it was Short (1998; 1999; 2002) and the policy statements of 
her Department (1999; 2000) that made security sector reform prominent as a 
concept.  However, there is little agreement on the definition of SSR.  Edmunds 
(2002, p.1) believes that there are, “…no clear or agreed set of definitions for SSR.  
Present usage tends to be dictated by the concerns of particular academic or policy 
communities”  
 
The term ‘security sector reform’ is not universally accepted: some 
organisations prefer ‘system’ to ‘sector’ to stress the inclusion of local actors other 
than the armed forces.  Other variations have been coined such as ‘transition’ (Hills, 
2000, p.48) and ‘transformation’ (Cooper & Pugh, 2002).  The UNDP Bureau for 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) uses, ‘justice and security sector reform’ 
(UNDP, 2002) thus further complicating the debate.  There is an increasing 
recognition that solutions to complex security sector problems must involve the 
promotion of the rule of law and good governance, the protection of individuals and 
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address social and economic needs. In addition they must seek to uphold human 
rights and deal with a broad range of security actors and threats. 
 
The OECD-DAC views SSR as more than relating only to the traditional 
areas of the military, police and justice and brings in such entities as government 
departments, private companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
paramilitary forces.  To mark this wider engagement, OECD-DAC use the term 
“security system reform” and cites the overarching objectives for international actors 
engaged in supporting post-conflict or developing states as: 
• The establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability 
in the security system; 
• The improved delivery of security and justice services; 
• The development of local leadership and ownership of the reform 
process; 
• Sustainability of justice and security service delivery (OECD-DAC, 2007, 
p.21). 
 
Consequently, although the term ‘security sector’ can be used to describe 
institutions legitimately entitled to intervene by using force to protect citizens, 
uphold law and order and state institutions, and safeguard the borders of the state, 
this definition could be considered to be too narrow.  In some cases, especially in the 
aftermath of internal conflict, peace agreements may allocate legitimate roles to 
some non-state security actors as was envisaged in Southern Sudan (Baranyi, 
Salahub & Abatneh, 2006).   
 
The concept of security and the reform of the security sector, therefore, can 
be viewed in many forms.  They may be confined to purely issues pertaining to the 
defence of the state from external threats or broadened to envelop wider development 
agendas, including economic issues, health and human rights.  Nevertheless, 
although the definition of SSR has evolved considerably it must always embody 
values of pluralistic democracy, democratic control, transparency, honesty and 
humanity.  The diversity of these views has caused problems for academics and 
practitioners who continue to look for workable definitions for both the security 
sector and security reform (Edmunds, 2007, p.23; Bailes, 2008, p.xv).   
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A major issue in agreeing a definition of SSR is what security, in a post-
conflict environment, actually means.  It is clear that security represents different 
things to different people; it varies depending on whether it is being defined by the 
armed forces, aid workers, politicians or local populations (Donini, Minear, Smillie 
et al, 2005, p.v).  The premise of ‘negative peace’ versus ‘positive peace’ and of 
security in military terms, as opposed to security in human terms is significant:  
“The absence of fighting (negative peace) can be seen as an end state 
sought for some, while others would have a much broader approach to 
security, encompassing political, as well as economic and social, 
aspects (positive peace)” (Tardy & Mani, 2005, pp. 3-4). 
 
In addition, often security institutions are less guarantors of security than 
agents of insecurity.  Finer (1962, p.5) believes that armed forces and militia can 
have an overwhelming political advantage over civilian organisations in terms of 
organisation, symbolic status and the force of arms.  In order to address this 
imbalance emphasis, in the application of SSR, has been placed on the need to 
achieve democratic civilian oversight of the armed organisations and the reform of 
civil-military relations.  At its most rudimentary level, therefore, SSR seeks to 
improve the professional capacity of the security sector whilst endeavouring to 
ensure that security actors are free from corruption, are democratically accountable 
and that human rights are respected (von Tangen Page & Hamill, 2006, pp.2-3).   
Cooper and Pugh suggest that:  
“…A prerequisite for social development and human rights protection is 
the security and stability that comes through an effective, impartial and 
humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound 
governance to the military sector itself” (2002, p.14). 
 
As SSR has evolved so the scope of the concept has increased; however, this 
evolution has not been uniform within and between IOs and IGOs.  Each has tended 
to adopted SSR strategies to suit their particular areas of interest and legitimise their 
position in a changing world.  The OSCE has advanced a concept that addresses 
economic, environmental and humanitarian dimensions, as well as military reform 
issues.  NATO has developed its own approach to SSR, which is more concerned 
with the governmental/military interface, whilst the UN has sought to deal with a 
wider range of security threats embracing policing and the rule of law (Law & 
Myshlovska, 2008, pp.11-12; Myshlovska, 2007, pp. 27-30; UN, 2005, p.4).  This 
interest in SSR, following on from its adoption by other IGOs, provided an additional 
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raison d’être for NATOs continuing relevance in the international security arena and 
also followed the tenets of institutional isomorphism. 
 
Individual states also have been active in development and peacebuilding and 
have tailored their SSR agendas to suit their requirements.  France, for instance, has 
adopted a comprehensive approach to SSR that sees the reform process taking 
account of all security actors including private security companies, judicial 
institutions and the mechanisms of democratic oversight by relevant government 
ministries (Ministére des Affaires Étrangéres et Européennes, 2008, pp.4-6).   
 
The US is less advanced in its development of a SSR concept than many of its 
European allies.  The main advocate for security reform is the Department of 
Defense (DoD) but the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the State Department also have input into the process (Ball, 2005, pp. 
16-18).  The main driver for the US concept of SSR is the International Military 
Education and Training Programme which schools US allies and other nations in the 
management of defence resources, improvement of military justice and the fostering 
of an understanding of the principles of civilian control of the military (US Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency, 2008).  It is, however, not enough to merely reform 
the armed forces, police and justice sector.   
 
If SSR is a vital requirement for the creation of sustainable peace and 
development then it cannot be confined to matters of civilian control of the armed 
forces.  More must be done to introduce security, human rights and good governance 
to a post-conflict scenario and this requirement brings with it difficulties of scale.  A 
decision has to be made on how far the SSR process should involve itself in areas 
beyond the relationship of a civilian government with its agencies of enforcement.   
 
A wider, more holistic, approach to SSR is apt to use a broad comprehension of 
security and will be faced with making decisions on which areas of governance and 
the wider social needs of the population should fall within its orbit (von Tangen Page 
& Hamill, 2006, pp.2-3; Edmunds, 2002, pp.1-3).  With the development of thinking 
on the practice of SSR it is increasingly accepted that a narrow definition risks 
underestimating the importance of CSOs as core SSR actors and stakeholders and of 
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the role of private (or non-state) security entities.  With these imperatives in mind, 
the table below demonstrates the possible range of actors associated with SSR. 
 
Core 
security 
actors 
Armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, 
intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border 
guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, 
national guards, militias). 
Security 
management 
and 
oversight 
bodies 
The Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select 
committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and 
traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget 
offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civil 
review boards and public complaints commissions). 
Justice and 
law 
enforcement 
institutions 
Judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution 
services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional 
justice systems. 
Non-
statutory 
security 
forces 
Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security 
companies; political party militias. 
Other 
Departments 
identified by 
the 
population 
as relevant 
to security 
Ministries of Health, Education, Social Welfare, Trade and Industry, Minority 
Affairs; Civil Service; Municipal Authorities; Non-Governmental Organisations. 
 
Table 4.2: Possible Security Sector Actors (Adapted from OECD-DAC, 2007). 
 
In Kosovo, the ISSR programme remit included those local institutions and 
organisations to which the UN Administering Authority (UNMIK) had allocated a 
legitimate role in the internal security of the province and its citizens.  It further 
included the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee these agencies.  These 
encompassed interior and finance ministries, national security agencies and the 
judiciary, and relevant functions and institutions of the legislature (or, in the case of 
the Administering Authority, those departments which dealt with the matters that 
ministries within a state would normally handle).  In addition, the security sector was 
taken to cover non-statutory security forces, such as private security companies and 
politically funded intelligence agencies, where they existed and impacted upon 
security.  The entities to be included in this holistic approach depended on the 
perceived threats to security as determined by the citizens of the province rather than 
by the intervening international organisations.  Thus the OECD-DAC wider security 
system approach was embraced and, indeed, enhanced.   
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However, Germann (2002, p.16) believes that SSR is rarely engendered by 
the state itself as such fundamental reform is seldom seen to be in the interests of the 
dominant group.  Thus the issue of local ownership comes to the fore; SSR is far 
more likely to be effective if the donor and recipient state governments have 
compatible objectives.  It has therefore been mooted by some commentators that, 
despite the possibility of increasing discord over SSR theories and practice, a broader 
focus is required on the nature of sustainable peace and its building blocks (Annan, 
2001, pp. 2-3; Ebnöther & Fluri, 2005, pp. 10-17).  Indeed, the scope of activities 
that may occur during a SSR programme can, itself lead those involved to widen 
their engagement and give rise to ‘generational evolution’. 
 
4.5. Generational Security Sector Reform  
 
SSR has evolved to be more than simply the democratisation and professionalisation 
of the forces of security and justice within a state.  Edmunds (2002, pp.7- 16) 
believes that there have been two generations of evolving SSR methodology, which 
has moved the process from the reform of traditional civil-military institutions to 
dealing with wider issues of democratic oversight and transparency.  Borchert (2003, 
pp.5-10) goes further, suggesting that there is a third generation of SSR that provides 
capacity building and improved cooperation among security sector actors (See Table 
4.3 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
             Table 4.3: Generations of SSR Methodology (Borchert, 2001b, p. 4). 
First generation SSR is concerned with the establishment of arrangements for 
democratic civilian control over the security sector and the de-politicisation of its 
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actors.  This involves the establishment of clear structures for civilian control 
through distinct lines of responsibility laid down for the military leadership, the 
Defence Ministry and Parliament, and a delineation of responsibilities between 
various levels of government.  Civilian-dominated chains of command are created to 
ensure that control of the security sector remains in civilian hands and that the 
security sector actors’ roles are limited by legislation.  First generation SSR also is 
designed to aid the professionalisation of security sector structures.  This entails 
defining tasks and organisations in line with democratically agreed national security 
policy and legislation. 
 
Second generation SSR evolved to bring about the consolidation of the 
procedures of civilian oversight of the security sector and its attendant actors.  It 
deals with the way institutions implement policy and improve effectiveness and 
efficiency.  It seeks to negate the disproportionate influence the military may have on 
defence policy, which may have been brought about by an absence of civilian 
expertise and interest in defence issues.  The enhancement of a knowledgeable 
civilian core group that has the experience to provide effective oversight of the more 
technical aspects of defence policy is a fundamental second generation SSR concern.  
A related issue is the development of the capacity of security sector administrators 
and officials to implement security policy and to effectively support oversight and 
transparency.  
 
Third generation SSR involves civil society in security sector issues.  Societal 
legitimisation of the security sector’s functions is regarded as vital to wider security 
roles, such as humanitarian intervention, which are more complex than the 
conventional defence of national interests.  In addition, civil society has a part to play 
in the strengthening of democratic control of the security sector.  It provides, through 
the media, NGOs, academics and other organisations, an alternative, non-
governmental source of information on security issues for both policy makers and the 
public.  
 
There was a tendency for international bodies to approach SSR in a 
compartmentalised manner, with different aims and objectives, and without 
necessarily linking the processes together in an overarching strategy.  However, as 
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thinking on the composition and methodology of SSR evolved, there was recognition 
that effective and enduring reform was possible only if the process embraced a more 
inclusive definition.  There was, nevertheless, a danger that too broad a definition 
could cause a loss of focus and make the process unmanageable.  Notwithstanding 
such difficulties, account had to be taken of parallel reform efforts in areas such as 
electoral systems, justice and the rule of law.  Third generation SSR takes this wider 
approach and moves towards the concepts of democratic governance, building 
capacity and international / national cooperation (Borchert, 2001b, pp. 5-10).   
 
Edmunds (2007, p.25: 2003, p.16) considers SSR as a process through which 
security sector actors adapt to the political and organisational demands of 
transformation. Therefore SSR is a normative-driven process of change that 
considers how the security sector, within a framework of civilian control, can 
contribute to the security of the community.  However, SSR has consequences that 
are based on considerations of value and to decisions based on the interests of the 
actors involved at both international and local levels (Luckham, 2003, p.12). 
 
The EU saw SSR as a process that should be applied in countries where 
development was hampered by structural weaknesses in the security and justice 
sectors.  The EU approach encompassed a broad variety of assistance programmes, 
such as the development of norms of ‘good practice’ in the security sector, enhancing 
civilian control over the military, community-based policing and justice reform and 
the control, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons.   In 2005, the 
European Council adopted an SSR concept in relation to the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Union, 2005d) and, the following year, the 
European Commission produced a communication relating to Community SSR 
activities (European Commission, 2006).  This third generation SSR approach came 
about, in part, because of the requirements imposed by the conditionality of 
membership of the Euro-Atlantic structures, which required reform and 
democratisation of the security sector in states aspiring to EU membership (Borchert, 
2003, p.4). 
 
A linear theory of generational evolution is a tidy but inaccurate way of 
explaining the generational progression of SSR.  In reality, the migration from one 
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level to the next has been spasmodic and experimental.  First and third generation 
SSR may exist alongside each other, undertaken by different IGOs.  In Kosovo, the 
UNDP were assisting the PISG in the restructuring and democratisation of the KPC, 
whilst, at the same time, the OSCE were conducting programmes to educate civil 
society and the media in policing and justice matters. 
 
The decision to widen the scope of a SSR programme is frequently taken in 
an ad hoc manner by practitioners in the field rather than by policy makers or 
theorists.  This indicates that often pragmatism, based on local conditions, rather than 
overarching strategy has widened the scope of the SSR process. Although 
acknowledging the need to take account of local conditions, Edmunds (2002, p.9) 
observes that connecting with local actors and creating local oversight structures is 
difficult to achieve in the context of international intervention.  Notwithstanding the 
difficulties of engaging in a ‘local’ approach, once SSR practitioners move away 
from their own perceptions of security to the realities, as perceived by the local 
population, they find that what is viewed as state, community and personal safety is 
closely linked to concepts of human security (Shaw, MacClean & Black, 2006, pp.3-
19).  
4.6.   Human Security 
 
 
 Research in the security field has raised the question of what actually constitutes 
‘security’.  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Report (1994) pointed to the difficulties that arise: 
 
“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly... It 
has been related more to nation states than to people…Forgotten were 
the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their 
daily lives” (UNDP, 1994, p.22). 
 
This Report often is credited with the first use of the phrase ‘human security’ 
but the implications of the term were recognised much earlier and the links between 
military victory and the security of the population were made.  In 1945 the US 
Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Jr., commenting on the formation of the UN 
said: 
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“The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is ... where 
victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social 
front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both 
fronts can assure ...an enduring peace” (Alkire, 2001, p.13).  
 
 In 2003 the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Ogata and Sen, 
presented the then UN Secretary-General, Annan, with a list of policy conclusions 
based on a definition of human security agreed by the Commissioners, “freedom from 
want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf” 
(Commission on Human Security, 2003, p.1).  Annan (2000, p.1), in his turn, 
believed that human security was greater than merely the lack of violent conflict for it 
must embrace all the elements of human rights, good governance, access to education 
and health care.  Booth (1991; 1999; 2007) endorsed this emancipatory approach, 
arguing that, in order to allow all citizens to fulfil their potential, they must be freed 
from the constraints that would otherwise restrict their growth as human beings. 
 
Building on this theme, the UNDP suggested that food security, health 
security and environmental security should be seen as vital to overall human security 
(1994, p.23).  The intent of human security was to act as a bridge between the 
concepts of the freedom from fear and the freedom from want.  However, the UNDP 
Report went further than simply providing the connection between overcoming fear 
and want by emphasising that the central referent of security was the individual, 
stressing that it was concerned with human life and dignity (UNDP, 1994, p.22). 
 
Academics too have sought to define the constituent parts of human security. 
Thomas believed that: 
 
“Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic 
material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful 
participation in the life of the community, can be met” (2000, p.37). 
 
Others attempted to determine the components of human security.  Cockrell (2000, 
pp. 24-26) suggested that threats to human security might be classified into four 
broad categories: economic, personal, community and political security.  
Nevertheless, the definitions of human security remain numerous and often 
contradictory.  Although such broad definitions are largely accepted in the realm of 
practitioners, the concept in the academic world “has often been greeted with 
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scepticism or worse, silence” (Paris, 2004, p.370).  Paris suggests that definitions of 
human security are extensive and indistinct (2001, p.88) but acknowledges that the 
language of human security has served to unite a wide spectrum of actors around the 
concept that foreign policy should give prominence to the welfare of individuals.  
However, he emphasises the problems arising from the lack of definitional 
boundaries: 
 
“…because the concept encompasses both physical security and more 
general notions of economic and social well-being, it is impractical to talk 
about certain socioeconomic factors causing an increase or decline in 
human security, given that these factors are themselves part of the 
definition of human security” (2004, p.371). 
 
Nonetheless, the quandary is that the widening of the definition of human 
security makes the establishment of its priorities more complicated.  Narrowing the 
definition tends to reduce its political prominence but the wider the definition of 
human security the less likely its objectives will be achieved (Macfarlane, 2004, pp. 
368-369).  King and Murray are conservative in their definition, suggesting that 
human security refers only to that which gives an expectation of life without 
generalised poverty (2000, p.15).  Buzan (2004, p. 369) also is sceptical, believing 
that, if the referent of human security is the individual, then little differentiates its 
agenda from that of human rights and therefore the effectiveness of the concept is 
undermined.  Rummel (2003, p.3), on the other hand, proposes that consideration 
must be given to a broader approach to human security as the trademark of future 
security reform policy. 
 
 The definition of human security becomes more complicated when national 
governments, international institutions and NGOs become involved.   Annex D lists 
some of the descriptions used by Governments, NGOs and institutions.  The range is 
wide; from ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions’ to ‘threats to human 
survival, daily life and dignity’.  Rothschild (1995, pp.55-56) has placed human 
security squarely in the centre of the concept of the security of nations.  She suggests 
that national security must extend downwards to individuals and that the security of 
nations must extend upwards to the security of the international system.  The overall 
concept of security also must extend horizontally from military to political, 
economic, social, and environmental or, in other words, ‘human security’.  
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  In cases where governments listen to the fears and aspirations of their 
populace, injustices are likely to be lessened or resolved whilst complications will 
arise when governments ignore or repress the concerns of their population (Gurr, 
1993, p. 12).  In response to this, the concept of human security has been presented 
as a basis upon which state security can be built.  Indeed, those states that are 
generally secure tend to be those that provide the most human security to their 
populations.  Furthermore, the dynamics of weak or malfunctioning states tend to 
force their political elites to further reduce their security and that of their people.  In 
order to enhance their own security, governing elites are tempted to accumulate 
power by investing in the military and internal security apparatus and by using 
repressive policies.  This tends to lower human security by subjugating the populace 
and drawing away funding that could be used to improve the human condition 
(Peck, 1998, p. 16).  Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that, by working to 
enhance human security within the state, it is probable that the climate for conflict 
prevention can be enhanced. 
 
The EU already adheres to most of the general principles of human security, 
even if it does not always articulate them as such.  In December 2003, the European 
Council approved the European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council of 
Ministers, 2003).   Although the ESS does not explicitly outline a EU human security 
agenda, a Report (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004) 
encompassed a set of principles for human security.  These included the primacy of 
human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, regional focus, the use of 
legal instruments and the appropriate use of force.  The report called for a Human 
Security Response Force comprising of 15,000 members, of which at least one-third 
was to be civilians, with a legal framework to oversee decisions on intervention and 
to direct operations on the ground.  The Report suggested that the Force should 
operate in an area between military intervention and peacekeeping in order to uphold 
human rights and support law and order reform.   
 
However, the Report’s recommendations remain largely unimplemented. 
Current indecision over the future of EU expansion has undermined the EU’s most 
effective tool for the promotion of human security.  If it can no longer hold out the 
hope of eventual EU membership to those in its regional backyard, it will be difficult 
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to ensure progress towards human rights and security in those states aspiring to EU 
membership.  As well as these implementation difficulties, the Study Group largely 
ignored the political and administrative obstacles to EU-wide foreign policymaking.  
This particularly applied to the proposal for a Human Security Response Force, 
which would have needed the support of all EU member states, including the 
acceptance of the principle that internal and external security are inseparable, which 
is still not accepted by some member states (Kotsopoulos, 2006, pp.12-13).  
 
The lack of a universally accepted definition of human security creates barriers 
to framing coherent policy.  In addition, the political and practical difficulties of 
implementation on the ground have led to a dilemma for practitioners wishing to 
translate theory into SSR practice.  There is a need to ensure that SSR processes, 
arising from outside intervention, are accepted by the civil society and population as 
well as the implementing partners.  Thus, to ensure that human security is a principal 
underpinning of the SSR process it is necessary that the local population be included 
in the shaping of the security environment. 
4.7. Local Ownership 
 
The term ‘local ownership’ has been commonly used in the development community 
for some time but its precise meaning, in the context of conflict transformation 
processes, is unclear (Aga Khan Foundation, 2005).  Literature addressing the 
concepts of local ownership and its implementation rarely signifies direction by local 
actors.  Rather it refers to the respective capacities of mainly international 
stakeholders, including their ability to set, and take responsibility for, a development 
agenda and to attract and sustain support for it (Saxby, 2003, p.7).   
 
  The same lack of definition occurs when theorists attempt to focus on local 
stakeholders.  Here the term ‘local security actors’ may be used but there is rarely 
any consideration of who these actors are (Diamond, 1999, pp. 77-86; Peck, 1999, 
pp. 39-45; van Tongeren, 1998, pp. 21-26; van Tongeren, 1999, pp.124-133).  Such 
discussion that has taken place typically focuses on the role of external actors within 
the host state, all the while suggesting that local actors need be involved in the 
process (perhaps in a ‘supporting role’).  This highlights the difficulty of identifying 
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local SSR partners; a requirement that is crucial for the planning of projects wishing 
to engender local input and involvement.  Current SSR interventions seem to suggest 
that it would be more accurate to use the term ‘local inclusion’ rather than local 
ownership as this more accurately denotes local involvement that falls short of 
ownership. 
 
However, despite the lack of consensus over the term, the emphasis on the 
role of local actors has, since the mid 1990s, been a common component of the 
literature on conflict transformation.  As conflicts take place within societies, it is 
within these societies that SSR measures must be rooted.  Acknowledging the 
importance of nurturing civil society, theoretical literature encourages local actors to 
manage security transformation processes.  Indeed, fostering and supporting local 
actors with an active interest in building peace are seen as key principles of post 
conflict development management despite the ongoing confusion over who such 
local actors really are (Ropers, 2000, p. 35).  
 
Woodward (2003, p.300) suggests that “ the dominance of Western interests 
over local interests in shaping the demands for security sector reform in south-
eastern Europe goes so far as to deny the declared interests of the region’s citizens”.  
Field experience has shown that SSR activities are often unsustainable if they are 
interpreted and designed wholly by outsiders and merely implemented locally 
(Edomwonyi, 2003, p.43).  Post conflict management initiatives require local 
ownership of the security reform process, in order to guarantee its effectiveness and 
sustainability.  The population and its leaders have a pivotal role in the formation of 
peacebuilding processes as they are the primary source of legitimacy, local 
ownership and sustainability, with such involvement being essential to the long term 
effectiveness of democratic reform efforts (Caparini, 2005, p.69; Ball, 2000, pp.16-
17). 
 
The involvement of local actors in the SSR process has consequences for the 
conceptualisation of activities and interventions by third parties. While most 
international actors agree on the merits of local ownership, there are differing 
perceptions of the implications of participation by local actors and the resultant 
repercussions for third parties.  Involvement by local actors in the SSR process may 
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be desirable, but the reality of such participation carries with it difficulties both for 
the intervening parties and the local participants in terms of control and design.  
Bryden observes that a flaw in SSR practice lies in the fact that it is, “externally 
induced, funded and driven, creating an inherent tension between local ownership 
and external assistance” (2006, p.23).  He believes that donors, multilateral 
organisations, NGOs and commercial companies involved in peacebuilding activities 
have displayed little appreciation of local culture and circumstance, resulting in 
unfulfilled prospects and disenchanted local actors (2006, p.23).  Scheye, 
commenting on Kosovo, believes that in dealing with internal security there was a 
lack of dialogue between the local population and the central security institutions, 
including UNMIK (2007, pp.27-28).   Others note that the role and influence of civil 
society in the post-conflict reconstruction of security institutions has received little 
systematic analysis and that there is very little engagement with the local population, 
by peacebuilding missions, below the level of senior government officials (Caparini, 
2005, p.69; Kent, 2005, p.40; Law, 2007, pp.12- 17).  Abdela (2000, p.3) shares this 
view suggesting that in Kosovo “…the population and community leaders felt 
completely excluded from the process of trying to find new solutions”  
 
Thus an environment is created where the local population sees the 
international community as imposing its norms with little regard to the wishes, 
aspirations and culture of civil society and its leaders.  Local populations and their 
leaders frequently are asked to comply with norms imposed by the international 
community.  However much these norms may be welcomed within the population 
there remains a bias towards the wishes of the norm-setters, which can become an 
irritant.  They become an obligation rather than something readily and easily 
accepted (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 887-917).  Compliance works best in a 
climate of shared norms; however in order to achieve this, persuasion and 
socialisation into particular behavioural patterns is required. Wiener (2002, p.8) 
suggests that such forced acceptance of norm-construction is likely to impede norm 
resonance.  Cortell and Davis (2005) believe that only by ensuring international 
norms are tailored to local conditions can they be successfully transmitted, whilst 
Schwellnus (2005, pp. 65-70) believes that norm setting processes instigated by 
domestic actors rather than IOs or IGOs are more effective.   
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Thus the imposition of norms, despite the expectation of being accepted by 
the norm-followers because of the perceived benefits, can lead to rejection and the 
undermining of the overall reform process.  Even though this difficulty can be 
overcome by promoting local ownership, the reality is that often other priorities get 
in the way.  Grazhdani (2) commenting on peacebuilding and SSR in Kosovo 
suggests that the international community was so immersed in international issues 
that it had no time to build local ownership.    
 
Even when efforts are made to secure local ownership, the choice of local 
partners typically reflects the principles, values and interests of the intervener.  The 
choice of local associates entails a decision, most likely taken abroad, as to who 
might be of most benefit to the intervening body in terms of acceptance of its views 
and agendas.  This can have the effect of creating the possibility of local power 
shifts, as one group is favoured over another.  However, if the local populace is 
engaged in the design of an SSR intervention then the security fears and aspirations 
of those at the grass-roots (or the ‘many’ as illustrated in Table 2.1) can be used as a 
guide to what should be considered in a SSR project.  Yet engaging the local 
population in dialogue appears to create difficulties for the international community.  
Christian Action Research and Education (CARE) notes that, during the period 2004-
2006 in Kosovo, IGOs and NGOs were “biased towards working with people who 
were easier to reach and… easier to work with.”  Often they selected participants 
from programmes run by other agencies doing similar work in the same geographical 
area. This tended to create educational, class and urban predispositions (2006, pp.60-
61).   
 
Despite all these shortcomings, at the core of SSR philosophy is the ideal of a 
security reform objective, which has been achieved in cooperation with the host state 
and its population.  If achieved, this will be beneficial for the host state and for the 
wider international community. Thus an “end-state, free of conflict and rooted in 
democratic principle that can attract foreign investment and contribute to regional 
stability” can be achieved (Ferguson, 2004, p. 4).   
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Conclusions 
 
Kagan (2002, p.12) suggests that, “the transmission of the European miracle to the 
rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice…the Europeans have 
a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace”.  Paris (2002, p.637) 
sees the mission to export principles for the culture and structure of a state as another 
form of modern imperialism.  However, the success of this mission involves more 
than simply the absence of war; it requires the provision of security across a broad 
spectrum.  A set of liberal beliefs, which fit into the European model of conflict 
management and normative views have been, adopted for its peacebuilding activities.   
 
The decision-making processes within peacebuilding and security sector 
governance are typically, but not always, associated with IGOs (Young, 1989).  From 
this point of view, IGOs have become the tools used by member states to pursue their 
collective or individual interests, although over time IGOs have been granted 
freedoms that have allowed them to act more autonomously.  In the security arena, 
these IGOs have often performed many functions more effectively and economically 
than ad hoc groupings of states or bilateral intervention (Duffield, 1999, p. 644).   
However, although sociological institutionalist theory suggests that international 
institutions take the form of sets of rules or collective organisational actors, reflecting 
isomorphism with the institutional environment, in reality IGO approaches to the 
reform of the security sector often differ widely one from another.  These differences 
highlight an institutional bias towards areas in which the IGOs feels most 
comfortable.  
 
 Notwithstanding this bias, to judge how deeply SSR should be involved, 
beyond the democratisation of the forces of security and justice, raises problems of 
definition and the design of SSR methodology.  Security sector reform is a youthful 
concept, which is still evolving.  It does not appear to adhere to any one theory or 
group of theories.  However, because it is rooted in the work of IGOs and is strongly 
influenced by the national interests of mainly Western member states, that have 
begun to coalesce around the promotion and practice of SSR, it may be said that it is 
grounded in the broader tenets of sociological institutionalism.  Indeed, the growing 
political and organisational demands for SSR outcomes to conform to and extend the 
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growth of Western ideals of democratic governance and human rights lend weight to 
the belief that the theories of sociological institutionalism are at play.  
 
Nevertheless there remains a lack of coherence over the constituents of the 
security sector and its reform.  Although there has been three accepted ‘generations’ 
of SSR, difficulties remain in creating an effective process through which security 
sector actors can adapt to the political and organisational demands of post conflict 
transformation.  These deficiencies are based on the lack of agreed designations and 
strategies for security reform and a lack of consensus over how deeply and widely the 
security sector should be perceived.   
 
The definition of local ownership and how far the concepts of human security 
should be included in the SSR process also pose challenging questions.   Although 
local ownership is generally accepted as a crucial component of SSR there is little 
agreement over what the term means in practice and what or who constitutes a local 
actor.  In addition, there is evident tension between local ownership and external 
security reform assistance.  In a number of SSR missions there has been a marked 
lack of dialogue between the local population and its leaders and the external 
organisations executing the reform process.  A more accurate term to describe the 
current involvement of the domestic population and its leaders in SSR is ‘local 
inclusion’. 
 
Coupled with this disjuncture between external providers and local actors is 
the issue of human security.  Academics and practitioners are unable to agree on 
what constitutes human security and how far it should be included in SSR.  Debate 
over the precise meaning of human security is ongoing but it has become more 
relevant with the rise of low intensity conflict and intra-state violence.  Concepts of 
human security and the degree of protection and assistance required differ from 
situation to situation, state to state, and even from individual to individual.  Darby 
and MacGinty (2003, p 273) believe that: 
“There will be a broadening of the remit for peace, with a new emphasis 
on human rights, economic reconstruction and democratisation, as well as 
the traditional concern with political and constitutional matters. The 
business of making peace will continue, but will change”.  
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 Chapter Five:  Intergovernmental Organisations and 
SSR  
 
 
Introduction   
To explain the performance of IGOs in SSR it is necessary to examine the 
development of the understanding of SSR and its application by IGOs and their 
member states.  This chapter discusses the uneven conceptualisation of SSR which 
has adversely affected both the SSR efforts of IGO actors and their interaction.  
Just as security is a field within politics, IGOs constitute an important subset 
within international institutions and political institutions more generally. However, 
little has been written about the role of IGOs in security sector reform.  Most scholars 
have concentrated on other realms such as international political econony (e.g. 
Keohane, 1984) or international environmental cooperation (Young, 1999).  There 
has been, however, a great deal of literature dealing with the work of NATO, the 
OSCE and the UN but is has not focussed on the relitively new field of SSR. 
An assessment of IGO performance in SSR must take into account three 
factors.  Firstly, security concerns are not new, the terminology and formal 
application of SSR is less than twenty years old.  Secondly, there is considerable 
diversity amongst IGOs, in terms of focus, the extent of SSR mainstreaming and 
geographical scope.  Thirdly, the objectives of SSR interventions are often vague, 
thereby complicating evaluation of the process.  This is further exacerbated by the 
fact that currently there are no overarching systems of performance measurement for 
SSR.  Monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes increasingly is required by 
donor states, which base their funding on evidence that their desired outcomes are 
achieved. 
The success of SSR initiatives depend on IGOs and member states having the 
political will to ensure a comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable approach to its 
application in the field.  An SSR strategic concept is the precondition for ensuring an 
IGO can effectively mobilise its resources and work effectively with other SSR 
actors.  This objective, however, is yet to be achieved in a comprehensive and 
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effective manner.  The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that, “security 
sector reform continues to be a neglected stepchild both financially and in terms of 
strategic planning” (2006c, p.3).  
 
5.1. Intergovernmental Organisations:  Developing a SSR Concept  
 
Intergovernmental organisations play a pivotal role in determining the outcome of the 
SSR process; indeed, in almost all recent SSR programme deliveries, they have either 
led the project or have closely supported other actors in its provision.  The manner in 
which this responsibility is planned and executed is fundamental to the success of 
security reform and to other parallel processes designed to deliver peace and security 
in a post-conflict environment. 
 
  The principal organisations concerned with peacebuilding and SSR activities 
are the EU including the Council of the European Union (European Council), NATO, 
UN, and the OSCE.  However, these bodies have reached their understanding of SSR 
by different routes.  They all have approached the concept from their own unique 
appreciation of what SSR means for them rather than developing strategies based on 
engaging with the recipient state and cooperating with other IOs and IGOs. 
 
 The EU’s role in SSR has progressed along two distinct paths; the first was the 
Union’s emergence, following the end of the Cold War, as among the largest of all 
the international development donors.  In this role, the EU when considering SSR has 
been principally motivated by concerns related to aid and development.  The second 
driver has been the EU’s role as a global security player, through the development of 
its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and its engagement in an increasing number of PSOs.  It was 
not until 2003 that the EU produced the European Security Strategy (ESS), which 
stressed the requirement for the EU to consider a wider range of missions, including 
undertaking SSR as part of its institution- building activities (European Union, 2003, 
p.2).  In 2005-2006, the European Council and Commission adopted their respective 
SSR concepts, which affirmed the EU role in SSR and specified various ways in 
which it could contribute to security transformation activities. 
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 The EU came to consider security sector reform issues later than many of its 
member states. This was, in part, because of Commission and the European Council 
divergence on their respective understandings of SSR.  The Commission saw SSR as 
a function of its good governance agenda and favoured a “broad security concept, 
which focuses not only on the external security … but increasingly on … human 
security, both in terms of individuals’ physical security [and] the protection of their 
rights” (European Commission, 2006, p.2).  The European Council had a narrower 
focus that was rooted in its mandate.  It was founded to promote the development of 
common democratic principals throughout Europe, thus its approach to SSR has been 
conditioned almost exclusively by governance concerns.  The European Council 
focuses on human rights and the rule of law, coupled with the requirement of 
governmental accountability in these areas.  It emphasises the belief that without 
democracy there can be no security.   
 
 Although the European Council appears to have a narrower understanding of its 
security mandate it does recognise that most EU interventions in the security field 
require a mix of civilian and military expertise.  This has led to the creation of a 
Civilian-Military Cell in its Secretariat (Council of the European Union, 2005, para. 
22-23).  Indeed, although EU divergence on SSR reflected the make-up of the EU 
itself, as its understanding of SSR increases so security is becoming, “a cross-cutting 
issue for all EU institutions…and provides a unique opportunity to develop a unified 
EU approach to security” (Law & Myshlovska, 2008, p.4). 
 
In July 2005 the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) mandated 
the Council Secretariat to develop, in cooperation with the Commission, a draft EU 
concept for SSR for ESDP missions.  In parallel, the Commission developed, in 
collaboration with the Council Secretariat, an SSR concept of its own that focused on 
its responsibilities in the developing world.  These initiatives were designed to bring 
the work of the Commission and the European Council together by setting out the 
respective responsibilities of the two pillars as well as the modalities for joint action 
(Law & Myshlovska, 2008, pp.19-31).  
 
 Nevertheless, although the EU has committed itself to contributing to security 
and stability through the ESS and subsequent policy statements have specifically 
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mentioned SSR as a key element of this strategy, the EU still lacks a comprehensive 
SSR policy framework.  SSR spans a range of issues and activities within the 
European Community and Council and there is a risk that individual ad hoc 
interventions will fail to maximise their potential without an overarching strategy 
(Helly, 2006, p.7). 
 
The United Nations has approached SSR by an entirely different route. The 
prominence of SSR in the UN follows decades of UN Security Council (UNSC) and 
UN agencies’ involvement in SSR in practice if not in name.   However, only in the 
last seven years has the UN begun to utilise SSR as an all-embracing term for those 
activities.  The expansion in UN SSR philosophy was related to the growing 
recognition of the linkages between security and development.  This was 
acknowledged in the 2005 World Summit statement (United Nations, 2005b, pp. 20-
21), which noted the importance of SSR as an essential element of any stabilisation 
process in post-conflict environments.  However, expectations for an expanded UN 
role in SSR have been hampered by a continued lack of both a common 
understanding of the basic concepts and a comprehensive policy framework across 
the UN system.  Additionally inter-departmental competition over the ownership of 
SSR practice within the UN has discouraged cooperation in the field.  
 
The lack of a comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR in post-
conflict environments has degraded the ability of UN missions to assist national 
transitional authorities in the early restoration of effective, democratically controlled 
and sustainable security institutions and processes.  Banal and Scherrer (2008, p. 47) 
note that in Burundi (ONUB), the UN functionaries had to establish a mission-
specific understanding of SSR because there were no guidelines from DPKO in New 
York.  Consequently those field staff engaged in SSR tended to interpret what was 
important to the reform process in different ways.  However increased interest within 
the UN Headquarters in New York (UNNY) and field missions for a more strategic 
and coordinated approach to post-conflict SSR led to the creation, in 2007, of a 
Security Sector Reform Team within the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security 
Institutions.  The aim of this new team is to determine common principles and 
objectives for the development and implementation of UN assistance to SSR and to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities for SSR across the UN system.  At the time of 
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writing, the SSR Team had participated in the UN technical assessment missions in 
East Timor, Somalia and Burundi and provided a small inter-agency team to Southern 
Sudan to assess UN coordination challenges (Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, 2010, p.2). 
 
NATO has long been involved in facilitating defence reform in its member and 
aspirant member states.  It has made democratic governance of the security sector, 
and the ability to contribute to the Alliance's capacities, central to its criteria for 
enlargement (NATO, 1995, p.4).  The nucleus of NATO’s current SSR programmes 
lies in its Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Membership Action Plan (MAP) processes.    
NATO has developed measures designed to strengthen the effectiveness and 
accountability of institutions concerned with defence.  Programmes such as the 
Partnership for Peace-Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) have explored issues 
relating to the security sector beyond purely defence and military matters (Geneva 
Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, pp. 5-13) as accountability 
and democratic oversight of the security sector have often been inadequate in the 
subject states.  However, NATO involvement is this area is strongly weighted 
towards capacity building activities.  
 
Whilst NATO’s contributions to SSR, particularly within the Balkans region, 
have been significant they have also tended to evolve in an eclectic fashion.   There 
has been reluctance in NATO, because of perceived political sensitivities, to grasp the 
tenets of third generation SSR.  However, there has been some movement to rectify 
this situation; at the 2006 Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government, the final 
communiqué contained declarations that indicated a measured shift in the NATO’s 
position on SSR.   The document articulated the direct linkage between security and 
development and stated that: “…there can be no security … without development and 
no development without security” (NATO, 2006, para. 12).  It highlighted the need to 
coordinate with other actors, especially the UN, EU and the OSCE (NATO, 2006, 
para. 9), and directed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to develop a policy to: 
 
 “…increase NATO’s ability to provide practical advice on, and 
assistance in, the defence and security-related aspects of reform in 
countries and regions where NATO is engaged” (NATO, 2006, para. 
12).  
 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                                CHAPTER FIVE   
 
132 
 
The OSCE does not have a mandate to undertake SSR per se but the Code of 
Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (OSCE, 1994) is the main OSCE 
statement on security reform.  The Code calls for the democratic control not only of 
the military but also paramilitary, internal security forces and intelligence services, 
and of the police.  It links the behaviour of security actors within a country to its 
external security relationships and considers their effective oversight and democratic 
control to be an indispensable element of stability and security.  The Code and SSR, 
while differing in terms of status, content and objectives, have several common and 
complementary elements.  The OSCE has a strong conflict prevention dimension and, 
in addition, has governance and human rights credentials through its Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).  The OSCE also conducts other 
SSR-related activities in the field, including disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR), small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, border 
management and rule of law activities. 
 
The OSCE has evolved to meet the challenges of internal conflict in the states 
that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.  More recently, 
the OSCE’s centre of attention has moved eastward as concern over conflict in the 
Balkans gave way to conflict prevention in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe.  Despite some difficulties over contradictory agendas and mission overlap, 
OSCE field missions have been seen as generally effective tools for managing post 
conflict situations.  The practice of putting international officials on the ground for 
the long term, so that they can develop an understanding of local dynamics and build 
relationships with local officials, has assisted in this regard.  The OSCE’s role in SSR 
is concentrated mainly on discrete areas such as police reform, action against human 
trafficking (undertaken by ODIHR) and democratic oversight of armed forces.  It has 
yet to develop a holistic approach to SSR although, as will be described in Chapter 
Five, it was instrumental in assisting the Kosovo ISSR with its endeavours to include 
the Kosovo population in its examination of the province’s security sector. 
 
 The development of a common SSR concept for all the main IGOs and IOs has 
not been without its problems.  The main impediment has been a lack of consensus on 
how best to proceed with the practical aspects of SSR.  The EU has adopted a Policy 
Framework of SSR (General Affairs Council, 2006) which provides it with a common 
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conceptual guide for SSR based on the 2005 EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR 
(Council of the European Union, 2005) and the May 2006 Concept for European 
Community Support for SSR (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b).  
The difficulty remains however that this policy framework, although a foundation for 
improved coordination in the EU, does not address the challenges of implementing 
SSR in practice (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven, p.52).  When considering the 
development of the EU’s strategies for SSR the EU High Representative Javier Solana 
believes that: 
 
 “…civil and military initiatives need to be better linked to the EU’s 
longer term conflict prevention and development programmes... we 
should develop integrated military and civilian…teams, including the full 
spectrum of necessary competencies” (Council of the European Union, 
2005, p.3). 
 
 Likewise the lack of a framework for SSR within the UN has led to a diversity 
of explicit or implicit SSR mandates, inadequately funded and ad hoc implementation 
and confusion about leadership and the division of tasks within the UN system.  
However, in 2007 the UNSC requested a comprehensive report on the UN approach to 
SSR (UNSC, 2007).  Subsequently, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations noted the need for a more holistic and coherent approach to SSR within 
the UN system (2007, part II, para 142) and asked the Secretary-General to submit a 
report on SSR methodology.  The Report (UN, 2008) whilst acknowledging that there 
was no single model describing the security sector, suggested that the UN understood 
it to include: 
 
“…defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and 
institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil 
emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector are…also included. 
Furthermore, [it] includes actors that play a role in managing and 
overseeing the design and implementation of security [and] other non-
state actors … include customary or informal authorities and private 
security services” (UN, 2008, para. 14). 
 
The Secretary-General’s Report goes on to refer to SSR as: 
 
“… a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as 
monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal 
the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and 
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its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights 
and the rule of law” (UN, 2008, para. 17).  
 
These wide definitions must, however, be considered in the context of the 
growth in complexity of UN peacekeeping missions.  There is a shortage of SSR 
capacity and expertise within the UN in both the UNNY and in field missions.  
Implementing SSR mandates requires specialists not commonly found amongst UN 
and other IGO staff and consequently the competition for ‘mission appointed’ short- 
term SSR experts is fierce.  The UN DPKO has addressed this problem; the Security 
Sector Reform Team has formed an SSR Expert Consultants Register to overcome 
the fact that the demand for personnel skilled in SSR currently far outstrips UN 
capacity (Rigg, 2008).  
 
In recent years, mission integration has become the guiding principle for the 
design and implementation of UN operations in post-conflict situations.  Integrated 
missions are generally understood to be multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations 
led by an SRSG.  Integration is viewed by the DPKO as a way to improve the 
management and impact of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (Campbell, 
Kaspersen & Weir, 2007, p.4).  Hierarchical management is a key aspect of integrated 
missions as it generates a mechanism for central decision-making by which all UN 
activities can be coordinated and controlled (Eide, Kaspersen, Kent et al, 2005, p. 9).  
The evolution of the integrated mission has highlighted the fact that UN 
peacebuilding operations are increasingly engaged in SSR activities.  In addition, the 
UNSC has acknowledged the need to consider SSR priorities when mandating a UN 
operation.  It also has noted the importance of communication among the different 
UN entities and other relevant actors, in order to ensure that SSR considerations are 
adequately addressed during the implementation of UNSC mandates (United Nations 
Security Council, 2007, p.1). 
 
There is however a tendency for UN missions, due to the interim mandates 
granted by the UNSC, to concentrate on immediate capacity building needs for 
security and justice institutions rather than wider SSR.  As the integrated mission 
concept develops this should improve, but changing the short-term focus of SSR 
concepts within the UN structure, particularly in the DPKO, could prove challenging 
(Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007, p. 11).   
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 NATO see itself as part of a broader grouping of IGOs and IOs delivering SSR 
but feels that, given of its extensive experience of defence reform issues, it should be 
closely involved in coordinating SSR efforts in the field.  Not all organisations are 
comfortable with NATO’s position on SSR coordination.  The NATO General 
Secretary seemed aware of these sensitivities and, at an inter-organisational 
conference in Munich, assured the audience that his call for better coordination was 
“not because NATO wants to co-ordinate all those international organisations, but 
because NATO wants to co-ordinate with them and that is … fundamentally different 
than the co-ordination of them” (de Hoop Scheffer, 2007c).  Notwithstanding the 
sensitivities of coordination and cooperation, in view of the importance of SSR to a 
number of NATO’s current missions, it would seem prudent for NATO to develop a 
policy framework and key guidelines on SSR in order to achieve a more coherent 
approach.  
 
5.2. Intergovernmental Organisations:  Internal Considerations 
and Dissension    
 
Achieving agreement between the numerous stakeholders and actors involved in the 
conceptual development process of SSR is a challenge.  Some theorists question if 
SSR is a useful instrument in post-conflict development policy.  Concerns range from 
the suggestion that SSR constitutes a European centre-left project, seeking to impose 
liberal ideals on transitional and post-conflict states, to claims that it is devoid of 
significant meaning as it pays no attention to the underlying causes of insecurity in 
developing countries.  SSR theory has been criticised for being overly confident 
about the possibilities for external manipulation of internal political and social 
structures and, thereby, underestimating problems related to local acceptance and 
ownership (Chanaa, 2002; Fayemi, 2001; Luckham, 2003, p.11; Williams, 2000; 
Wulf, 2000). 
 
Practical details, such as who pays for an SSR intervention, also are germane 
to the challenge of launching the SSR process.  The willingness of donors to engage 
in SSR support is not assured.  Development donors first became collectively 
engaged in security-related issues towards the end of the Cold War but, for a number 
of development agencies as well as international financial institutions, legal restraints 
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on their ability to fund security reform measures limited the span of programmes that 
could be undertaken (OECD, 2001; Ball, 2001).  In addition, many states are sceptical 
about the desirability of investing in costly and often inconclusive SSR processes.  In 
several donor countries, defence ministries are responsible for security-related 
assistance projects in the developing world and mistrust development donor 
motivation (Brzoska, 2003, p.4).  Thus it has become necessary for IGOs to progress 
SSR often without the assured support of many of their member states. 
 
Within the EU, the Petersberg Declaration (1992) foresaw EU military 
intervention in humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions.  
However, until recently there was very little coordination between member states on 
matters of security. In March 2003, the EU launched the Concordia mission in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), its first military operation. In 
2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and handed over peace stabilisation duties to a European Union 
force (EUFOR).  These events indicate improvement in EU cooperation on military 
matters but much remains to be achieved in terms of wider coordination and 
cooperation.   
 
Institutions are more than simple agents of their creators and often produce 
results by means of autonomous action.  In the context of the EU, supranational 
institutions, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European 
Commission produce such consequences, even in areas where no direct or overt 
transfer of powers has taken place.  Dimitrakopoulos (2001, pp.107-131) argues that 
supranational institutions circumscribe the use of executive discretion by national 
governments by blurring the line that distinguishes between the ‘two faces of power’.  
However, where security and the commitment of national security resources are 
concerned, member states seem reluctant to accept the supranational ideal and 
therefore the strategic-political capacities of the EU remain relatively weak 
(Ekengren, 2007, pp 47-52).  Although there is currently a growing awareness that 
Europeans are facing security challenges which can best be handled collectively, 
there is no indication that member states are prepared to commit to a common 
approach which would require them to give up a proportion of their sovereignty over 
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security assets and strategies for the sake of collective EU efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
Some members of the European Parliament are concerned that action to 
resolve this dilemma is not progressing fast enough.  Baroness Sarah Ludford MEP 
(1) believes that the EU must face up to the contradiction of wanting the EU 
collectively to be both capable and effective in the projection of SSR matters and the 
fact that member states have not endowed the EU with the competence to ensure that 
that security sector effectiveness runs through all the 27 member states.  There is very 
little coordination between member states on matters of general security; Shepherd 
(2007, pp. 20-24) believes that enlargement has moved the EU’s political balance 
away from a European-led approach to security as new member states seem to prefer 
NATO pre-eminence, thus keeping the USA engaged in European security matters.   
 
This is not to say that the new member states are opposed to ESDP, indeed as 
it has developed so their support for it has increased but undoubtedly some prefer a 
view of European security which keeps the US involved in the planning and 
execution of security initiatives.  Many European capitals still focus almost 
exclusively on NATO as the fulcrum of the transatlantic relationship, ignoring the 
central role of the EU (Kay, 1999, pp. 149-185).  However security threats and risks 
are no longer clear issues of war and peace but rather posed in the areas of terrorism, 
trade and energy.  The institutions of the EU, whose leverage ranges from financial 
and economic policies through humanitarian aid to military intervention, are 
increasingly as well placed as those of the US to face modern security challenges, 
including the promotion of SSR (Bet-El, 2008, 13-17).  
 
Baroness Ludford (2) is concerned that, “there is a sort of turf war between the 
EU and NATO over security sector information and, as responsibility is power, 
neither organisation wants to give anything up”.  Although some progress is being 
made to provide for better coordination on security matters within the EU, its member 
states and in its relationships with other IGOs, there is still much work to be done to 
improve internal and external cooperation.  
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 In 2006 the UN realised that it needed greater synergy between its security, aid 
and development activities coupled with improved coordination between the 
departments working in these areas.  This insight led the Secretary-General to form a 
Working Group on Security Sector Reform, which includes representatives of the 
DPKO and the UNDP.   In 2006 Slovakia facilitated a series of workshops to 
examine the lessons learned from recent peacekeeping operations.  These focussed on 
reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments, promoting the rule of law 
and good governance and on measures for preventing countries relapsing into conflict 
(United Nations Press Office, 2007, p.1).  
 
 Although the UN is involved in both security and development activities, it has 
failed to build effective links between the two.  The lead agency for development is 
the UNDP, which has SSR-related programmes in areas such as democratic 
governance, the rule of law, crisis prevention and poverty reduction.  In security 
matters, the principal actor is the DPKO which leads on peacekeeping and PSOs.  
Significantly the DPKO becomes operational only in a conflict or immediate post-
conflict setting whilst the UNDP typically has a long-term development presence.  
However, the fact that the two UN organisations often find themselves working in the 
same SSR framework brings difficulties of coordination and programme uniformity. 
 
In September 2007, DPKO established a division for Rule of Law and Security 
Institutions. The new division covered SSR, DDR, Police, Judiciary, Corrections 
Services, Mine Action and the new SSR Team.  Under instructions from the UN 
Secretary-General’s Policy Committee on Rule of Law, (Annan, 2006, Annex 1, 
pp.1-2) DPKO claimed a lead role on all major Rule of Law and related SSR 
activities.  Paragraph 3 of the Policy Committee decision directed that ‘lead role’ 
implied:  
• Primary Counterpart of the Government; 
• Identification of Key Partners; 
• Strategy Development; 
• Resource Mobilisation. 
 
Significantly, the lead role was not based on capacity or programme related expertise, 
but rather on whether DPKO was present or not.  This provided DPKO with a generic 
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lead role on substantive matters in all of its mission areas.  If capacity was lacking, 
the lead role remained with DPKO but it could draw on UNDP and the capacity and 
resources of other agencies.  
 
However, since the promulgation of this directive, the proposed task 
allocation has been increasingly viewed with scepticism within the UN.  The new 
division of responsibility was seen as straying into the mandates and programming 
modalities of the UN agencies.  The one-size fits-all decision at UNNY was 
perceived to contravene the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which rests 
on the principle of country-specific assessments and consultations prior to each 
DPKO deployment.  The majority of the current or forthcoming DPKO mission areas 
in conflict/post-conflict countries also were UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR) priority countries, in which UNDP was running or building SSR 
and Rule of Law programmes.   
 
In mid 2007, the UNDP sought to reposition itself on SSR and Rule of Law 
and to encourage collaboration with DPKO based on the UN’s Integrated Mission 
strategy.  In September 2007, a UNNY Code Cable was sent to all DPKO field 
missions (Guéhenno, 2007, pp.1-9).  Outlining the chain of command modifications, 
it urged closer collaboration in matters pertaining to SSR.  Whilst the Code Cable 
acknowledged a coordination role for DPKO, it was less explicit on ‘lead roles’.  It 
suggested that wherever a DPKO mission was deployed the SRSG would have the 
overall coordination responsibility.  However, it did not exclude the UNDP from 
coordinating alone or co-coordinating with DPKO in areas, such as SSR, that clearly 
fell within UNDP’s mandate.  
 
Notwithstanding this measured approach to DPKO primacy, the UNDP’s 
belief was that the Strategic Plan for SSR and Rule of Law in the years 2008-2011 
(UNDP, 2000a) could not be adequately applied in post-conflict situations as 
community security and transitional governance outputs would fall largely outside 
UNDP lead responsibilities.  In addition, the UNSC Executive Board decision on the 
role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations, which had determined that UNDP 
had a substantive security role in post-conflict countries, (UNSC, 2000, pp.6-8) could 
not be satisfactorily applied.  Thus a rift had been created within the UN system on 
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matters that relied heavily on cooperation and coordination to succeed.  Although, at 
face value, the decision to “urge closer collaboration” (Guéhenno, 2007, p.1) in 
matters of security institutional reform was well-advised, the manner in which it was 
presented was always likely to exacerbate tensions between UN departments and 
agencies. 
 
The DPKO faced an additional difficulty in that the G77 states are sceptical of 
the motives behind the increased UN enthusiasm for SSR.  Many of the non-aligned 
states suspect that SSR is a western power manoeuvre to legitimise intervention in the 
sovereign interests of developing states.  This attitude has brought dissension within 
the UN membership, which has slowed progress towards evolving a coherent policy 
for dealing with security reform.  Strategies to deal with the G77 position on SSR had 
to be devised; a senior UN official stated that, “It is no secret that the G77 is negative 
so we have had to package SSR as part of nationally driven capacity building 
programmes rather than present them as UN initiatives.” (3) 
 
NATO’s International Staff likewise has experienced difficulties with their 
attempt to develop a collaborative policy concept for SSR.  In 2005 an unpublished 
paper on SSR policy formation, by the Defence Planning and Policy division of 
NATO’s International Staff, highlighted inconsistencies in NATO’s position on the 
conduct of SSR activities. (4)  In addition, some member states believe that SSR 
should be in the remit of the EU and that NATO should restrict its activities to 
defence reform. (5)  These difficulties serve to accentuate the problems of SSR policy 
planning which requires consensus to move forward.  Much of the problem with the 
NATO approach to SSR is based on their view that ‘security’ means ‘military 
security’ and not the more holistic approach undertaken by the UN and EU.  
Although it might be argued that NATOs interest in SSR is another way to legitimise 
the organisation post-Cold War, the reality is that NATO would rather confine its 
security reform involvement to purely military matters.  Nevertheless, NATO has had 
several SSR-related involvements that point towards a more expansive SSR role in 
the future.  These include the creation, at its Joint Force Headquarters in Naples, of a 
department dedicated to developing NATO’s position on SSR.  
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The OSCE also suffers from member state discord. Some Eastern-bloc 
members think that the OSCE still spends the larger share of its resources in 
Southeast Europe, despite what are seen as more pressing needs in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus.  Additionally, Russia’s enthusiasm for OSCE has declined as the 
organisation assumed missions that involved Moscow’s national interests, such as in 
Georgia and Kosovo.  Russia is particularly critical of ODIHR, which is responsible 
for election monitoring, accusing it of bias and remains hostile to its practice of 
issuing comment on elections soon after the polls close.  Adding to the difficulties 
facing OSCE there has been discussion about its legal status; as the Organisation has 
no founding treaty that may act as a basis for its existence it lacks a ‘legal 
personality’ under international law, which creates problems in contracting and 
procurement.  However, the United States has strongly resisted giving this legal 
status, fearing a loss of US influence over the Organisation (Brander & Estébanez, 
2007, pp.2-5). 
 
Despite having 90% of its staff deployed in operational field missions, there 
has been criticism of OSCE’s methods and objectivity.  Bernabéu (2007, pp.83-89) 
has reviewed the ways in which security, the rule of law and democracy have been 
interwoven in the context of the OSCE component of the UN mission in Kosovo.  
She considers that the conflicting objectives and the needs and constraints of different 
actors have adversely influenced the reform of the security institutions and the 
democratisation process.  Bernabéu believes that not only are SSR and the OSCE’s 
democratisation agendas often incompatible, but also that measures adopted by the 
Organisation to cope with post-conflict security challenges affects both these 
agendas.  There is, she contends, considerable overlap in purpose between the varying 
elements of the OSCE and mission programmes are often uncoordinated.  
Furthermore, she suggests that the OSCE’s theoretical discourse on SSR is not 
matched by practices in the field.   
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5.3. Intergovernmental Organisations: Competition and 
Competency 
 
 The most critical component for the involvement of international organisations 
in the fields of peacebuilding and SSR is the ability to coordinate and cooperate.  
IGOs traditionally have been seen as instruments through which states pursued 
national interests in the regional or international arena, “states saw IGOs as providing 
an environment of enhanced predictability for consultations with other states and as a 
ready meeting place” (Law, 2007, p. 4).  Increasingly, however, IGOs have evolved 
to become crucial elements in the spread of ideas and the promotion of policies that 
could possibly fail without their engagement and sponsorship.  Therefore IGOs have 
had a key role in developing norms for SSR and in spreading an embryonic 
understanding of the relationship between the condition of the security sector, 
sustainable social development and economic viability.  However, despite this 
advance in understanding, divergence still exists between, and within, many IGOs on 
how best to progress SSR in post conflict situations (Scherrer, 2007, pp. 181-195; 
Law, 2007, pp.7-17). 
 
There remains a lack of coherence within IGOs over the understanding of the 
‘security sector’ and its ‘reform’.  Different organisations use different definitions of 
the security sector, the EU favours the OECD DAC definition, whilst the UN has 
created its own understanding of the security sector.  This divergence in definitions 
leads to varying approached to reform.  Although there have now been three accepted 
generations of security sector reform, the evolution in thinking has not overcome the 
difficulties facing security sector actors when responding to the political and 
organisational demands of post conflict transformation.  This failure is based on the 
lack of agreed definitions and strategies for SSR, coupled with a lack of academic and 
practitioner consensus on how deeply and widely the security sector should be 
viewed.  Arising from this debate is the dilemma of what constitutes ‘local ownership’ 
and how far the myriad concepts of human security should be included in the reform 
process.  
Notwithstanding the recognised need for coordination and cooperation between 
the various actors in SSR, international engagement has shown a marked lack of 
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synchronisation.  One reason for this failure is the lack of coordination among the 
international groups:  
"Many of the organisations that intervene [in post-conflict situations] 
often do so with a strategy and presence that is ignorant of what has gone 
before them, and unaware [of] how their efforts might be consistent and 
supportive of the efforts of others, rather than independent or in 
competition with them" (Chayes & Chayes, 1998, p. 281).  
Organisations involved in SSR seldom have the time or resources for research 
and contingency planning.  SSR interventions more often than not are launched 
without recourse to earlier missions or to initiatives taken by other international 
bodies.  In addition, despite the growth in the clearinghouse concept (6) for discrete 
areas of technical involvement, there is no single overarching body that can initiate or 
coordinate the diverse groups working in a post-conflict environment.  Attempts have 
been made to introduce such a coordinating body into intervention mechanisms but 
the results have yet to make a significant impact.  As an example, an attempt by the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to harmonise the activities 
of the UN, NATO and NGOs through a Coordination Centre established in Pristina, 
directly after the end of the conflict in Kosovo in June 1999, was a failure.  Each 
organisation preferred to make its own arrangements and to direct its efforts as it 
chose.  This led to some areas being over subscribed with international assistance and 
advice, whilst others received no support or guidance whatsoever.  It appeared that 
most IGOs and NGOs focused on their own perception of what was required and 
pursued that aim without regard for the work being undertaken by others. (7)  
In traditional SSR, objectives have tended to be set by whichever organisation 
or state was prepared to intervene.  Consequently, the need for adherence to national 
interest goals and for political compromise often has led to indistinct and incoherent 
aspirations and a lack of clarity in the objectives.  These problems are compounded if 
the mission is hastily mounted with little or no forward planning.  Some actors now 
recognise the need for strategic operational planning in readiness for possible 
interventions.  The military have customarily made generic plans for a variety of 
situations but, until recently, forward planning has been lacking in the principal IGOs 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1998, p.302).  This lack often stems from a deficiency in 
cohesion between the members of the organisation.  Law, (2007, p.3) notes that many 
IGOs have found that disagreements between their members have led to a lack of 
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consensus on major decisions.  Mobekk (2008, pp 124-125) observes that an absence 
of an integrated vision on SSR in the organisation’s headquarters will undermine the 
work carried out in the field.  Without agreement on strategy by the headquarters and 
the team undertaking SSR activities there is little chance of success.  This was the 
case in the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) where the only agreement was that 
there was no established concept for the SSR process.  
Inter-organisational competition and overlap also can cause disruption in both 
the planning and execution of SSR programmes.  Khandwalla (1981, p. 411) argues 
that, “an organisation creates part of the competition it confronts”.  The decision of 
the Euro-Atlantic security institutions to duplicate one another was as much a 
conscious choice as was the EU decision in 1999 to undertake a role in military crisis 
management, thus duplicating NATO’s decision-making bodies and capabilities.  The 
EU created a number of committees similar to the corresponding NATO bodies: the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) bears a resemblance to the NATO Council, 
the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to NATO’s Military Committee and the EU 
Military Staff (EUMS) to NATO’s Military Staff. Whilst displaying the tendencies 
described in sociological institutionalism theory these overlaps nevertheless lead to 
competition; organisations offering similar competencies compete for their place on 
the international stage. 
 
Determining which competencies have true strategic value to an organisation 
requires a different perspective.  In recent years, the concept of core competencies has 
been added to the debate (Prahalad and Hamel 1990).  Core organisational 
competencies refer to skill sets and technologies that enable an organisation to 
provide particular benefit and hence to compete more effectively.  Organisations will 
have necessary competencies and differentiating competencies.  Necessary 
competencies are those that create value, whilst differentiating competencies are 
those that give an organisation a competitive position.  These differentiating 
competencies are what Itami (1987) refers to as the organisation’s competitive 
weapons, and Stalk (1992) and Lawler (2001) consider as the basis for competition.  
Hamel & Prahalad (1994) argue that it is crucial for an organisation concerned about 
its future success to be pre-emptive in its development of competencies in order to 
maintain a competitive edge.  Thus, a strategy for future competitiveness necessitates 
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that organisation leaders concern themselves with enhancing core competencies 
whilst avoiding cooperation with other organisations possessing similar abilities 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Collis & Montgomery, 1998).  This predisposition runs 
contrary to the most effective method of achieving the objectives of SSR operations.  
 
Given that cooperation between the various actors is best practice in SSR then 
the public statements of the involved organisations have generally been helpful.  
Solana, for instance, has stated that “…as far as NATO is concerned, we will in the 
coming years be literally working side by side in the security field” (2004, p.9) and 
de Hoop Scheffer has said that “…NATO and the EU have worked together very 
effectively, and I am optimistic about our ability to do so again …” (2007, p.2).  It 
should be acknowledged, however, that there could be a gap between public rhetoric 
and reality.  Frequent references to difficulties at the strategic level of the EU and 
NATO suggest that there are a number of obstacles to cooperation, many of which 
are political in nature.  Indeed De Hoop Scheffer (2006, pp.16-17) devoted part of his 
speech, at the Security and Defence Agenda Conference, to the need to break the 
deadlock in the NATO-EU relationship.  Nevertheless, some European nations who 
are members of both NATO and the EU seem concerned that a deeper relationship 
between the two organisations could provide the US with undue influence over 
European affairs, which might prove detrimental to ongoing European integration.  
De Hoop Scheffer, referring to this dilemma, suggests “…some [member states] 
deliberately want to keep NATO and the EU at a distance from one another” (2007, 
p.9).  IGOs have both strengths and weaknesses in the area of cooperation and 
coordination, which impact on their ability to react to, and perform in, the post-
conflict arena.  Despite attempts to harmonise both internal and external action, only 
in the realm of discreet technical functions has some success been achieved.  The 
multiplicity of tasks required for even a limited SSR programme makes it difficult for 
individual IGOs to successfully engage.  However, international organisations have 
both strengths and weaknesses in the SSR field; Table 5.1 below gives a summary of 
each for the subject organisations: 
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Organisation Strengths Weaknesses 
 
European Union  
A prominent international 
development donor with an 
emerging security capacity, 
which is developing its own 
SSR concepts. Has the Stability 
Pact as a platform for SSR 
work, along with the criteria for 
security reform for states 
desirous of accession status.  
Lack of coherence between SSR 
activities of Council of 
European Union (mainly ESDP) 
and Commission (mainly 
development); lack of resources 
for more widespread and 
challenging security 
contingencies. A perceived 
withdrawal from the aspirations 
of further EU enlargement, 
which has been a useful tool for 
setting SSR norms in aspirant 
countries. 
 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation 
Only multilateral organisation 
capable of protecting actors 
delivering SSR in hostile 
environments; experience in 
successive generations of 
defence reform. It is currently 
developing its own SSR 
strategies. 
 
Some member states are 
resistant to developing concept 
for SSR (i.e., for defence reform 
and its implications for the rest 
of the security sector); 
weakening transatlantic 
solidarity in sharing the security 
burden and the weakening 
appetite for, and capacity of, 
many member states for SSR 
activities. 
 
 
United Nations 
A relatively well developed 
organisation in SSR terms, 
which possesses global 
authority, albeit sometimes 
questioned, for third-party 
interventions, decisive for SSR 
in post-conflict environments. 
Is moving towards a more 
active role in SSR. 
Lack of coherence between the  
UNDP and UNDPKO who are 
its main SSR actors; lack of 
support for SSR among 
permanent UNSC members; 
questionable prospects for 
developing SSR concept 
acceptable to all members  
 
Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
First comprehensive approach 
to security sector, developed by 
both transitioning and 
developed democracies; 
comprehensive approach to 
security; almost one-third of 
world’s states are members. 
No consensus to update Code of 
Conduct norms to correct 
shortcomings and integrate 
innovations provided by SSR. 
Challenges from within its ranks 
to OSCE acquis and questioning 
of the organisation’s relevance 
by some members has led to 
growing dissension within the 
organisation which may 
undermine its authority and 
ability to act. 
Table 5.1: Summary of IGO Strengths and Weaknesses in the SSR Field. (Adapted from Table 1:2 in 
Law, 2007, p.18). 
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5.4. Measuring Security Sector Reform 
 
A further factor that adversely affects the successful implementation of SSR is the 
lack of a universally recognised measurement tool for SSR outcomes.  Analysis of 
how SSR programmes are managed on the ground and how outcomes are monitored 
and measured is spasmodic. There is a significant gap in research exploring the 
management challenges of SSR interventions. One reason for this gap is: 
“…because the mainstay of research supporting SSR is undertaken 
primarily by specialists in the fields of conflict, development, political 
and global security studies, …management-related dilemmas for SSR 
specialists have not enjoyed deep investigation” (Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 
2008, p.1) . 
 
 Many management approaches do not survive long in the public sector, being 
quickly overtaken by new ideas (Poister, 2003, p. xvi) however, performance 
management has become an essential part of the oversight mechanisms of modern 
states.  Monitoring and evaluation are seen to provide the tools necessary for the 
maintenance of control over organisations, projects and programmes.  Additionally, 
they provide financial bodies and donors with a way to hold organisations and 
practitioners to account and are a critical part of result–oriented management.  
 
Many SSR guidelines stress the need for monitoring and analysing the 
institutions and stakeholders of a host nation security sector.  Within the SSR 
community there is the US Government’s Interagency Security Sector Assessment 
Framework (2009) and the OECD-DAC Handbook (2007).  Additionally, there are 
DFID instructions (2003) for the monitoring and evaluation (M & E) of its field 
programmes, which have on a number of occasions been used to evaluate SSR 
projects.  The UNDP capacity assessment methodology (2000), and the European 
Commission guide on analysing and addressing governance in sector operations 
(2008) have also been used as SSR M & E aids.  There also exist thematic assessment 
aids that can be adapted to measure SSR activities and their outcomes. 
 
These guides and assessment aids all make implicit the need to assess relevant 
sectoral actors and the impact of security development programmes.  When analysing 
local actors the legitimacy and capacity of an institution to carry out its mandate are 
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of primary importance (Clingendael, 2005, p.36).  In addition, both the formal law, 
and the informal ‘rules of the game’, institutionalisation, distribution of power, and 
state-society relations are recommended for consideration (Clingendael, 2007, p.10). 
However, there is often no structured way of observing institutions and outcomes; 
rather questions that give an overview of institutional arrangements are utilised.  
There is currently no universally approved method of measuring the impact of SSR 
projects on local institutions and their capacity to manage the security sector.  
 
There are commentators who suggest that attempting to measure security 
sector management and reform is a subjective enterprise and there can never be 
agreement on what exactly should be measured.  These commentators go to the heart 
of the present problem with SSR M&E.  However, it would be naïve in the extreme to 
imagine that donor states and IGOs will continue to grant the funds required to run an 
expensive SSR programme without some attempt to measure the outcomes and 
effectiveness of the endeavour.  Indeed, increasing pressure of public funds will only 
make the requirement more urgent.  Imprecise as it undoubtedly is, the measurement 
and evaluation of SSR programmes is here to stay.  
 
Various organisations have attempted to overcome this vexing problem.  
Within the UNDP’s assessment methodology, capacity is addressed by examining 
‘how’ development can work better” (UNDP, 2008, p.4).  There are five functional 
and technical capacities which UNDP identifies: capacity to engage stakeholders; 
capacity to assess a situation and define a vision and mandate; capacity to formulate 
policies and strategies; capacity to budget, manage and implement, and capacity to 
evaluate (UNDP, 2008, p.13). 
 
   The OECD-DAC has developed an Implementation Framework for SSR (IF-
SSR) (OECD, 2007) designed to close the gap between policy and practice and 
provide guidance on evaluation and monitoring of SSR in the field.  Prior to the 
publication of the IF-SSR, organisations employed a wide variety of results-based 
management measurement models to evaluate the results of SSR interventions.  The 
logical framework (Cordingley, 1995; DFID, 2003, Chap. 5) has become generally 
accepted as a tool for reporting against a series of SSR project benchmarks.  It was 
designed to ensure that realistic, actionable and achievable indicators were used for 
measurement purposes and, therefore, was adopted by the UNDP and the World Bank 
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for measuring the effectiveness of their field programmes (UNDP, 2002; World 
Bank, 1996).  
 
Despite the acceptance of the ‘logframe’ approach, Banal and Scherrer (2008, 
p.46) note that there remains a lack of adequate performance indicators for SSR. 
Furthermore, a study analysing SSR logical frameworks questioned the applicability 
of the objectives used.  It was suggested that they tend to reflect the core 
competencies of the initiating institutions rather than the programmes’ strategic 
objectives (Fitz-Gerald, Molinaro & Neal, 2001).  Thus more work is needed to 
design a measurement technique, which is robust enough to accurately reflect the 
aims, objectives and expected outputs of the SSR programme and its effectiveness in 
terms of impacting on the particular security sector under reform.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The inherently political nature of SSR requires a nuanced analysis of the security 
threats, of potential national security strategies, the feasibility of sustainable security 
architecture and the viability of civilian oversight.  In addition, civil society and local 
communities should be involved in such assessment.  SSR programmes require 
proficient coordination which is a challenging goal given the multitude of 
international and local institutions involved.  An SSR strategy in a post-conflict 
setting will have extensive scale and scope.  International and regional actors will be 
numerous and each will have different expectations, capacities and methodologies 
and many will have no desire to be coordinated.  Cooperation can give way to 
competition, with attendant rivalries at both the inter-organisational and inter-
personal levels.  Thus SSR becomes a complicated and politically charged 
undertaking grounded on conflicting understandings and diverging attitudes over the 
structure and scope of the process. 
 
Any SSR activity must be accurately measured, for the reassurance of 
practitioners, donors and recipient states alike.  There is little evidence that effective 
measurement is being undertaken.  Evaluating the performance of an SSR programme 
is critical to assessing its sustainability and therefore requires an approach that takes 
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note of wider strategic perspectives.  A SSR programme that cannot detail its 
achievements with any quantifiable accuracy undermines the benefits accruing to the 
host state and lessens the validity of external interventions.  SSR must be approached 
with a high degree of planning and coordination.  However, the difficulties of 
launching and successfully completing a SSR programme often are further 
complicated by interactions among and between the actors undertaking the process.  
These interactions can influence and distort security reform efforts as much as any 
lack of strategy, definition or resources.   
 
In the next section of this thesis the influence of competition and rivalry on 
the 2006 Kosovo ISSR will be examined.  Starting this section, Chapter Six will 
examine the political and domestic situation in Kosovo leading up to the 1999 
conflict and after the entry of NATO and UNMIK into the province.  It will then trace 
the inception of the Kosovo ISSR and how it was influenced by competing national, 
organisational and personal agendas.  
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SECTION TWO  
 
Chapter Six: Kosovo’s Internal Security Sector Review 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The most effective way to test the reliability of theoretical work is to subject it to the 
rigors of implementation in the field.  The theories of SSR were so tested in Kosovo 
in 2006.  This Chapter focuses on the security sector review process undertaken there: 
the Kosovo ISSR.  The name of the programme was indicative of the debate which 
took place during its inception; it was not to be a Security Sector Reform programme 
in name, it was not to encompass the whole spectrum of the Kosovo security sector 
(NATO forces in Kosovo were excluded from the outset) and there was dispute, at 
international level, over the inclusion of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in the 
Review.  Despite these restrictions, however, the ISSR programme was designed to 
indicate the way forward for the future of the security sector in the UN administered 
province.  
 
 This Chapter sets the context in Kosovo and then summarises the 
methodology for the Review.  It assesses the development of the ISSR process and 
the decisions that led to the way it was structured.   However, as further Chapters 
explain, the programme was subject to acute challenges as international and local 
competition and rivalry moved the process away from the model originally 
envisioned by its creators. 
 
6.1. The Background to the ISSR Programme 
 
In 2006, on the instructions of SRSG Søren Jessen-Peterson, a review of the internal 
security sector in Kosovo was undertaken with the purpose of identifying the internal 
security threats, based on a survey of local population perceptions, and determining 
how well the PISG was equipped to handle these threats.  It also was charged with 
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identifying which, if any, additional measures were needed by the PISG to ensure 
stability and security.  This was particularly relevant to a post-status agreement 
Kosovo that would, most likely, not have the benefit of international security sector 
support.  The work was, although not by design, to take place alongside the Kosovo 
Final Status Talks in Vienna.  These negotiations sought to determine if the major 
international powers, along with the Republic of Serbia and the wider Balkans region, 
would agree to an independent Kosovo.  
 
The events, which were to shape Kosovo in 2006, began before the 1995 Dayton 
Agreement that ended the war in BiH.  In 1991, the Badinter Commission sought to 
resolve the differences between the states of the former Yugoslavia and establish their 
legal status.  The Commission determined that Yugoslavia was disintegrating and that 
the republics seeking independence were new states and entitled to international 
protection.  Kosovo, however, was unable to make a case for inclusion in this 
agreement as, in 1989, Serbia had revoked the province’s autonomy and removed its 
“…prerogatives of a republic, including its own constitution, government, and an 
equal voice within the collective federal presidency” (Caplan, 1998, p.748). 
 
Kosovo was marginalised again when the EU decided against insisting that 
President Slobodan Milošević comply with the requirement that the privileges 
afforded the autonomous regions, prior to 1990, be restored to the province on the 
creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  In 1996, the EU recognised 
the FRY but decided not to press for special status for the Kosovar Albanians.  The 
EU merely observed “… that it considered that improved relations between the FRY 
and the international community will depend, inter alia, on a constructive approach 
by the FRY to the granting of autonomy to Kosovo” (Bulletin of the European Union, 
4-1996, p.58).  The General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH did not include 
Kosovo as international mediators believed that the talks had reached a critical phase 
and it would be unwise to alienate President Milošević, who was seen by the 
international community to be the ‘honest broker’ in the negotiations, having brought 
the Bosnian Serbs to accept many of the issues under discussion.  Thus, by failing to 
press the Serbian leadership on the matter of Kosovo, the international community 
helped to create the environment for a rise in militancy in the province that would 
lead to the conflict of 1999.   
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Once agreement had been reached over BiH, events in Kosovo took on more 
urgency with the rise in Albanian militancy against the Serb authorities in the 
province.  The international community quickly recognised the increasing danger of 
the situation.  It was evident that unrest in Kosovo could quickly turn to violence and 
its effects, in terms of refugee flows and spreading inter-ethnic aggression, could 
destabilise the surrounding region. Indeed, given the sizable ethnic Albanian 
populations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the then 
province of Montenegro their respective Governments were particularly 
apprehensive.  In 1997, NATO’s Foreign Ministers confirmed that the Alliance’s 
“interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region, and 
expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo” (MOD, 2000, p.6).  
 
Recognising the hesitant way that it had dealt with the conflict in BiH, the 
international community’s reaction to the rapidly increasing violence in Kosovo was 
to be more certain.  Indeed, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said at the 
time, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo 
what they can longer get away with doing in Bosnia” (Caplan, 1998, p.745).  United 
States Envoy Richard Holbrooke worked to achieve agreement from Serbia to the 
requirements of UNSCR 1199 which demanded a ceasefire and withdrawal of 
Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosovo (UNSC, 1998, Art. 1, 4a).   
 
However, the violence in Kosovo continued to escalate and, as the end of 1998 
approached, Belgrade refused access to the International Criminal Tribunal to a site 
of alleged atrocities at Račak, in the Štimlje Municipality of southern Kosovo.  The 
Serbian authorities ordered an OSCE Verification Mission (KVM), sent to the 
province to monitor human rights violations, out of the province.  The KVM 
remained, after intense international pressure on the Yugoslav leadership, but the 
situation was deteriorating quickly: 
 
“On 28 January 1999, NATO issues a ‘solemn warning’ to Milošević 
and the Kosovo Albanian leadership.  On 29 January, the Contact Group 
summoned the Yugoslav/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership to 
talks at Rambouillet in France.  Greater emphasis was added to the 
summons the next day when NATO issued a statement reaffirming its 
demands and delegating to the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, 
authority to commence air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory, 
should such action become necessary” (MOD, 2000, pp, 8-9). 
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Nevertheless President Milošević, believing that he could split the NATO 
coalition and achieve victory or at least partial success, showed little indication of 
complying with the UN Resolutions (Posen, 2000, p.39).  Despite last minute shuttle 
diplomacy by Holbrooke, NATO air operations against Yugoslav forces began on the 
24th March 1999.  The seventy-nine days of conflict in the province and the NATO 
bombing of targets in Kosovo resulted in mass refugees flows into the surrounding 
countries.  Some 109,000 persons, mainly ethnic Albanians, were forced to leave 
Kosovo between March and June 1999 and many thousands more were internally 
displaced (Ball, Betts, Scheuren et al, 2002, p.5).  
The legitimacy of NATO's actions in Kosovo was, from the outset of the 
crisis, unclear.  NATO did not have the backing of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) to use force but justified its actions on the basis of acting in an 
international humanitarian emergency.  Criticism was drawn also by the fact that the 
NATO Charter specifies that NATO is an organisation created for defence of its 
members, but in this case it was used to attack a non-NATO country that was not 
directly threatening any NATO member.  NATO countered this argument by 
claiming that instability in the Balkans was a direct threat to the security interests of 
NATO members, and therefore under the terms of the NATO Charter military action 
was justified. 
 
NATO engaged the Serbs with no clear idea of how it was to conclude the 
conflict and eventually extract itself from the province.  This has led to an 
international involvement in the province that remains largely open-ended.  The 
aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, for many Albanians, Roma, Ashkali and Serbs in 
the province, was to present a bleak existence.  A combination of years of Serbian 
neglect and NATO bombing had left the province without regular electricity or water 
supplies.  In June 1999, as NATO troops entered the province, banks, schools, 
hospitals and clinics no longer operated and shops and factories were abandoned; 
many looted and burned by the Serbs. 
 
At the termination of the NATO’s Operation Allied Force, the UN Security 
Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999) 
(UNSC, 1999a).  It established: 
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“an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo 
can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal republic of 
Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of a provisional 
democratic self governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all the inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNSC, 
1999a, p.3). 
 
The situation in Kosovo facing the UN Interim Administration was far from 
encouraging.  A month after NATO and the UN had taken over the administration of 
Kosovo some 650,000, mainly ethnic Albanian, refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) returned to their homes; 250,000 in the first nine days.  At the same 
time, 200,000 Serb and Roma refugees left, after many had witnessed their homes 
and businesses destroyed by the returning Kosovar Albanians (NAO, 2000.p.14).  Del 
Pointe observed that this ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’ was “as serious as what happened 
there before [NATOs intervention] (Bardos, 2003, p.150).   
 
Internal displacement was to continue to be a problem long after the conflict.  
It is estimated that some 230,000 Serbs were internally displaced between 1999 and 
2004 (OMPF, 2004, p.1) and, according to UNHCR statistics (2007, p.4), 257,000 
non-Albanians remained registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in July 
2007.  Of these, some 206,500 persons were displaced in Serbia, of which 21,000 
were within the province of Kosovo.  Most of IDPs were Kosovo Serbs who had fled 
their homes at the end of the conflict in 1999, either leaving the province or taking 
shelter in one of the Serbian enclaves. 
 
Since June 1999, migration from the undeveloped countryside filled the 
towns; unemployment soared to 57.1%, with 70% of 16-24 year olds out of work.   In 
April 2009 the World Bank (2009, p. 2) reported that 45% of Kosovo’s population 
lived in poverty, defined as subsisting on €1.42 (£1.00) a day, whilst 15% lived in 
extreme poverty living on less that €0.93 (£0.66p) a day.  Children, young people less 
than 24 years of age and elderly female-headed households disproportionally lived in 
extreme poverty.  Those younger that 24 years of age made up about 54% of people 
facing extreme poverty, while those aged 15 to 24 made up 22.4%.  In addition, 
Kosovo's social services deficits, particularly in education and health provision, had 
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not been remedied (UNDP, 2006, pp.29-30; pp.39-45).  The infrastructure remains 
fragile; as late as November 2010, power cuts occurred daily throughout Kosovo. 
 
In this unstable environment UNMIK and KFOR attempted to administer and 
reconstruct a society.  Kosovo was to be an entirely new style of UN mission. 
International organisations, under a UN mandate, would take responsibility for 
administering the province.  Nation states would only be responsible for security 
through the NATO led KFOR.  Under the authority of UNSCR 1244 (1999), the UN 
took responsibility for the province with the task of establishing a secure environment 
in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety.  The UNSCR 
1244 (1999) emphasised the temporary nature of the UN presence, noting that the 
powers of the administration were undertaken pending a final settlement and that 
UNMIK’s role was to “oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement” (UNSC, 1999a, 
para 11f).   
 
UNMIK was also a new departure for the UN in terms of its operational power 
and authority (Matheson, 2001, p.76).  In Kosovo UNMIK faced the difficulty that 
Kosovo was not a state so that, in addition to administering the province, they were 
tasked with guiding Kosovo towards an undefined ‘final status’.  UNMIK’s mandate 
from the Security Council included “the establishment, pending a final settlement, of 
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, and facilitating a political 
process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking full account of the 
Rambouillet accords” (UNSC, 1999, supra note 20, papa 11(a), (c)).  UNMIK was 
tasked with acting as a transitional administration and with organising and overseeing 
the development of provisional institutions to which it could transfer administrative 
responsibly, including responsibility for the Kosovo security sector.  “While the 
roadmap and timetable for achieving these goals is largely left unspecified in the UN 
Resolution, its clear intent is to promote a high degree of democratic self-
governance” (ICG, 2000, p.95).  Self-governance for Kosovo was planned from the 
outset and was rooted in UNSCR 1244 (1999). One of the guiding principles 
espoused by UNMIK Civil Affairs Department was the integration of local capacity.  
Instructions to UNMIK Municipal Administrators read, “As integration proceeds, the 
level of day-today executive control exercised by the interim administration should 
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diminish, although the ability to intervene when needed will be retained (UNMIK, 
2000).  However, there was no elaboration as to how this was to be achieved in 
practice or how the capacity of the local administrators was to be measured.  The 
instructions to the UNMIK staff assumed both that capacity existed and that there was 
a willingness, by the local administrators, to cooperate.  The fact that both were 
lacking, coupled with the ambiguity of UNSCR 1244 (1999), was to lead to 
conflicting interpretations as to the way forward by Kosovo’s political 
representatives, UNMIK and the representatives of the Kosovo Serbian population 
(Muharremi et al, 2003, p.1)   
   
In this uncertain atmosphere, the UN feared that any decision about Kosovo’s 
end-state would be destabilising, given the complete rejection of the idea of a 
separate Kosovar state by the Serbs.  Instead of focusing on Kosovo’s future status 
UNMIK proposed the idea of ‘standards before status’, whereby the achievement of 
certain administrative, social and political goals were made the prerequisite to a 
decision on status.  As the majority Kosovar Albanian population were intent on 
independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this policy was not well 
received by the Kosovar leadership and, as a consequence, UNMIK began to see the 
Kosovar Albanian community as an obstacle (Lovelock, 2005, p.121).    
 
From the beginning of its mandate UNMIK was to face a rival for political 
power in Kosovo.  The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), under the leadership of 
Hashim Thaçi, began organising a provisional government even before UNSCR 1244 
(1999) was signed.  By June 1999 the KLA leadership was able to deploy civil 
administrators to 27 of the 29 municipalities in Kosovo where the Kosovar Albanians 
were in the majority.  At the head of each municipal administration was a Mayor, 
appointed by Thaçi, who was typically a former KLA member.  Each municipal 
administration was divided into departments dealing with health, economic planning, 
judiciary, public order and defence.  A local Albanian who had some knowledge of 
the area of responsibility headed each department.  Meanwhile, Ibrahim Rugova and 
Bujar Bukoshi, the President and Prime Minister of the pre-conflict parallel 
government, continued to claim that they represented Kosovo in the wider political 
arena.  
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The UNMIK was formed on 13 June 1999 with just eight officials under the 
leadership of Sergio Vieira de Mello.  The UN administrators had no accommodation, 
vehicles, communication equipment or funding.  The UK Government DFID had to 
provide communications and a one million Deutschemark trust fund to get UNMIK 
operational (DFID, 2000b, p.3).  By the end of June 1999 the number of UN officials 
had grown to 24 and by September to several hundred.  Few of the officials had any 
knowledge of Kosovo and it was to be a year before any appreciable numbers of 
professionals were deployed.  Kosovo was not, at this stage, a popular mission.  The 
lack of electricity, heating, water, food and fuel made Kosovo an unattractive place 
for UN functionaries.  By June 2000 UNMIK had only 292 professional staff against 
an authorised strength of 435.  Recruitment of UN staff in the municipalities was at 
just 42 percent of the requirement (Independent International Commission Report on 
Kosovo, 2000, p. 17).   
 
The KLA took advantage of this slow build-up and consolidated their hold on 
both the cities and the villages.  They patrolled the streets and issued bulletins on 
safety, security and public behaviour. Their confidence was such that women 
members of the locally employed staff at the DFID headquarters in Pristina reported 
that they were being stopped in the street and told that they must cover their hair, “on 
orders of the KLA command” (Jaka, 1999).  The ICG commented that, “a painless 
takeover [by the UN and NATO], which might have been possible in mid-June 
without opposition, is no longer possible now that the UĊK [KLA] structures have 
gained strength and confidence” (ICG, 1999, p.7).  The situation was further 
complicated for the UNMIK as many of the international officials had formed the 
opinion that Bernard Kouchner, who has succeeded Vieira de Mello as SRSG, had 
been advised by the US State Department not to quarrel with Thaçi (King & Mason, 
2006, p. 76).  
 
The KLA asserted that they were co-equals with the UNMIK administration 
but, in reality, tended to rival the international administration.  Whilst UNHCR were 
struggling to find and transport materials to assist in the reconstruction of destroyed 
houses before the onset of winter 1999, the KLA mobilised their connections in 
Albania and FYROM to procure building supplies and then deployed ex-KLA 
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personnel to help villagers repair their houses.  By winter much of the reconstruction 
was completed with little assistance from UNHCR and the donor community.  
 
The UNMIK administration continued to be hampered by a lack of staff, 
resources and leadership from New York.  King and Mason, (2006, p. 79) note that 
UNSCR 1244 (1999) left unresolved “the underlying cause of the conflict; who was 
to rule Kosovo”.  Rather than working to facilitate a resolution of the dispute between 
ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the province and settle the matter of the future of 
Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR strived to engage with the former leaders of the KLA in 
order to achieve some level of security, administrative and political leadership.  This 
meant that both UNMIK and KFOR were more concerned with placating those who 
opposed inter-ethnic tolerance than seeking ways to promote a multi-ethnic society.  
On 21 June 1999, Hashim Thaçi, the KLA Commander, signed an undertaking with 
the Commander KFOR that the KLA would demilitarise within ninety days, in line 
with the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999).  Although many thousands of weapons 
were surrendered, the KLA effectively continued to exist as a quasi-military 
organisation.  KFOR found it necessary to conduct cordon and search operations to 
recover illegal arms from KLA caches.  In mid- 2000, a British Army patrol, having 
observed suspicious activity near an Albanian village, recovered a significant number 
of weapons and ammunition.  The political effect of this seizure forced the former 
KLA Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Agim Çeku, to take action to rid Kosovo of 
illegal weapons, lest he be accused of allowing the peace process to be obstructed by 
supporting a continuing armed KLA presence in Kosovo (Lovelock, 2005, p.145). 
 
In almost every aspect of Kosovo’s reconstitution, KFOR supported UNMIK’s 
political strategies but, when dealing with the KLA, there was no military option and 
it was necessary to develop a political framework within which the KLA could be 
contained.  To achieve this aim, the idea of the KLA being transformed into a 
uniformed, unarmed non-military organisation, to be called the Kosovo Protection 
Corps (KPC), was conceived (Covey, 2005, p.106).  The most militant of the KLA 
leadership were uninterested in performing civilian activities, seeing their 
organisation as the genesis of a Kosovo army to be deployed once KFOR withdrew.  
The political wing of the KLA, led by Thaçi, therefore focused on how to use the 
threat of an uncontrolled KLA to strengthen its negotiating position.  Thaçi and his 
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KLA colleagues did not see a demilitarised KLA as the end of their aspirations for a 
Kosovo army or as undermining their political power, rather the formation of the 
KPC would buy time for the KLA political leadership and provide work for many of 
the ex-fighters, who were otherwise untrained for civilian life (Covey, 2005, p.106).   
SRSG Kouchner was able, under the terms of UNSCR 1244 (1999), to disband the 
KLA and mobilise the KPC but, although the new entity was styled a Civilian 
Emergency Response Organisation, in reality it was the KLA under another name  
(Colletta et al, 2008, pp. 33-36). 
 
Five thousand ex- KLA fighters joined the KPC and 2,500 the Kosovo Police 
Service (Hienemann-Grüder & Grebenschikov, 2007, pp.34-35).  In September 1999 
the formation of the KPC began and three weeks later the Democratic Progress of 
Kosovo (PDK) Party was formed with Thaçi as its leader.  Most of the regional 
groupings that had served as the KLA’s political network were consolidated into the 
PDK, with the remainder forming the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Party 
under Ramush Haradinaj, another senior KLA leader (Covey, 2005, p. 107). 
 
Despite the substantial powers given to UNMIK and KFOR in 1999, there 
was, nevertheless, a security vacuum in the aftermath of NATO’s intervention.  
UNMIK were slow to take over security coordination and Bono (2010, p.134) 
suggests that KFOR were unwilling to take on this role because of a ‘turf-war’ with 
UNMIK over the nature of its responsibilities.  The delay in the deployment of 
UNMIK and the failure of KFOR to act meant that local institutions representing the 
Kosovar Albanian and Kosovo Serb communities took root and organised security 
and justice structures themselves (Bono, 2010, p.34; ICG, 2006, p.17).  The former 
KLA fighters continued to murder and harass their political opponents and support 
insurgencies on Kosovo’s borders and in neighbouring FYROM (ICG, 1999b, pp.12-
17, 2006, pp. 20-21; Human Rights Watch, 2008, p.10).  
 
The international handling of the situation was not helpful.  It was noted by 
the Serbs that when US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pristina, on 15 
July 1999, she kissed Hashim Thaçi in full view of the world media.  Thaçi had been 
declared a war criminal by Belgrade and was seen to be vigorously asserting the 
legitimacy of his provisional government in the province.  This very public act by 
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Albright sent a message to the Kosovo Serbian population that the US approved of 
Thaçi and the supremacy of the Kosovar Albanian cause.  Thaçi also was aware of the 
signal and renewed his efforts to consolidate power in the hands of his new political 
party (Vaknin, 2004, p.27).  
 
Thus the international administration in Kosovo got off to a less than 
auspicious start.  The inability to match the clarity of purpose and resources of the 
local Kosovar Albanian leadership was to place UNMIK in a difficult position which 
was not to improve over the next ten years.  The stated aims of UNSCR 1244 (1999) 
were to deter renewed hostilities in the province and establish a secure environment.  
It also called for the demobilisation of the KLA and the establishment of provisional 
institutions of self-government.  These aims had the backing of the UN Security 
Council and major nations in EU.  However, it was the interpretation of how these 
aims were to be achieved and how the final status of the province was to be 
determined which was to cause the difficulties that arose in the first half of the new 
decade. 
 
Whilst UNMIK struggled to deal with local realities, at the international level 
the troop contributing states was consolidating their own positions.  The French 
sought control of the north of Kosovo, where the territory abuts the demarcation line 
between Serbia proper, Montenegro and Kosovo.  Perhaps reflecting the French 
relationship with Serbia, France saw advantage in stationing its troops in the 
Mitrovica region; a situation that remains extant today, despite the 2001 and 2004 
riots, which clearly indicted the Kosovar Albanian dislike of the French Brigade in 
Mitrovica city.  The US and Germany also ensured that their KFOR troops were 
positioned in areas which most suited their national interest.  The US military took 
the Municipalities in the south of the province, which has seen the least fighting and 
disruption during the conflict.  This allowed US troops to consolidate their wider geo-
political interests by the construction, at Ferizaj/Urosevac, of the largest US Military 
installation outside the US at that time, (Global Security, 2007, p.1).  Germany took 
military control of Prizren, a town close to the Kosovo/Albanian/ FYROM border.  
This again reflected a political decision to place troops in a less volatile area where 
German influence could be gained whilst ensuring force security (Cleland Welch, 
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2006, pp. 221-239).  However, German KFOR was to soon realise that Prizren was 
the centre of KLA influence and organised crime interests. 
 
Intra-state conflicts create difficulties for international institutions, particularly 
in terms of accountability and responsibility.  The decentralised nature of authority 
means that the mission undertaken by the intervening institutions can drift 
dangerously as they attempt to regulate the behaviour of the factions within the state 
(Carr & Callan, 2002. p.195).  This occurred in Kosovo; UNMIK sought to build a 
multi-ethnic culture, however this objective proved contrary to the wishes of the 
ethnic Albanian majority population in the province.  Severe ‘reverse ethnic 
cleansing’ targeting the Serbian population continued in the years after the conflict. 
The Kosovo Serbian leadership, encouraged by Belgrade, refused to accept the 
authority of the Albanian dominated PISG and declined to take part in the democratic 
processes that had been put in place by the UN and the OSCE (ICG, 2008, p.3).  
 
UNMIK and KFOR’s efforts to protect the minority population were largely 
inadequate and in some instances they stopped trying.  A Tufts University study 
(Donini & Minear et al, 2005, p.4) into security in Kosovo concluded that minority 
communities believed neither KFOR nor other international organisations were 
considering their security a priority.  Rather, the international community in Kosovo 
seemed more concerned with their own protection.  Another study (Cleland Welch, 
2006, pp.233-234) suggests that incidences of KFOR troops failing to engage in 
situations that required the defence of the population and their property were born of 
caution engendered by military doctrine and reinforced by domestic political pressure.  
The military chain of command sought to reduce the possibility of troop casualties by, 
whenever feasible, avoiding involvements in dangerous situations.  This was not 
unusual; for example, in Somalia preservation of soldier’s lives had become the most 
important criteria after attacks on US forces (Lancaster, 1993, p.A1).  Thus, force 
protection appeared to override concern for the security of the local population. 
Kosovo has suffered since 1999 in ways other than human and physical security; 
the economy, which was not strong before the break-up of Yugoslavia, was badly 
disrupted by the conflict.  Since 1999, to boost the economic system, UNMIK and the 
EU have tried to attract foreign investment to the province.  However, there are 
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significant areas where inefficiency, excessive bureaucracy, low business acumen, 
institutional greed, corruption and a lack of professionalism contribute to a negative 
impression of Kosovo as a venue for investment (Cleland Welch, 2009, pp. 45-48).  
The inability of the international organisations in Kosovo to solve the problem of 
inadequate electricity supplies and attendant public utility provision was seen as a 
serious de-motivator to inward foreign investment.  Economic growth therefore was 
slow and, because of a decline in support by foreign humanitarian aid donors and a 
lack of dynamism in the economy, unemployment remains among the highest in the 
world.  National statistics place unemployment among people aged 15 to 24 at 70 per 
cent, unemployment of women at 60 per cent, and total unemployment at 41 per cent; 
above 50% for the majority population and up to 90% for the minorities (Alexander, 
2008, p.13). 
Shortcomings with respect to the competitiveness of the economy, the need for 
continuing structural reforms and a high unemployment rate were considered by the 
EU as pressing challenges to investment, trade, employment and economic growth.  
The UNDP and the World Bank concurred with this view suggesting that the lack of a 
skills base to meet the demands of the labour market, stemming from the poor quality 
of the education system, was a significant contributory factor to the high level of 
unemployment in the province (World Bank, 2008, p. 6; UNDP, 2006, p.58). 
In 2003, UNMIK introduced a mechanism by which, they believed, growth 
towards a stable and secure society could be achieved.  The Kosovo Standards 
Implementation Plan (KSIP) constituted a comprehensive approach to addressing the 
main challenges facing the province.  The Standards consisted of a list of eight areas 
in which Kosovo needed to make progress in order to become a functioning society.  
It also was designed to act as a benchmark for the development of Kosovo’s 
institutions thereby giving the basis for the opening of Final Status talks.  The eight 
standards were: (1) the creation of functioning democratic institutions; (2) a 
functioning rule of law; (3) freedom of movement for all citizens; (4) sustainable 
returns and the rights of communities and their members; (5) a legal framework for a 
sustainable, competitive market economy in place and implemented; (6) the fair 
enforcement of property rights to allow all people to own and live in their homes 
anywhere in Kosovo; (7) constructive and continuing dialogue between the PISG and 
their counterparts in Belgrade over practical issues such as energy, transport, 
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communications and  missing persons  and (8) that the KPC fully complied with its 
mandate as a civilian emergency organisation, operating in a transparent and 
accountable manner and representing all communities of Kosovo.  The Standards for 
Kosovo document, which had been approved by the UN Security Council in 
December 2003, had the objective of creating a province where all its citizens, 
regardless of ethnic background, race or religion, were able to live, work and travel 
without fear (UNMIK, 2004, p.2).  
Despite these efforts to create a rapid return to ‘normalcy,’ UNMIK and KFOR 
soon lost the support and trust of both the majority Albanian and minority Serb 
population of Kosovo.  This loss of faith was engendered by dissatisfaction within 
Kosovo society over the palpable lack of progress in resolving the final political 
status of the province, the continuing economic stagnation, and deepening concerns 
among ethnic Albanians over Belgrade’s attempts to consolidate political control in 
some parts of the province (ICG, 2004, pp. I;2).  It was, however, the lack of a 
resolution of the status question that increasingly was to become the dominant issue.  
Kupchan (2005, p.36) suggests that the political, economic and ethnic realities on the 
ground made independence for Kosovo the only viable option.  Kosovo’s state of 
political limbo, coupled with the deteriorating relations between the Albanian 
majority and the Serbian minority populations had left the province in a position 
where nothing could be planned with certainty and where the economy and inter-
ethnic relations were moribund.  Throughout the province, hostility divided 
Albanians and Serbs and the multiethnic society desired by the international 
community had failed to materialise.   
In concert with the lack of progress on final status for province, the slow 
movement towards establishing a self-governing multi-ethnic state was to become a 
characteristic of UNMIK’s administration of Kosovo.  Although UNMIK Regulations 
2001/9 and 2001/19 created the PISG, initially only the areas of administrative and 
legislative authority over the judiciary were transferred to Kosovo institutions.  Other 
competencies were transferred in 2002 but these did not include political oversight or 
control of internal and external security matters.  These were to remain the 
responsibility of UNMIK.  This lack of local institutional authority over Kosovo’s 
security sector reflected the perceived need to control the security situation with the 
international community remaining the principal authority in the province.  By 2004, 
  SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO        CHAPTER SIX   
 
 163 
the wish to maintain the status quo had become so ingrained within the UN 
Administration in Kosovo that Kai Eide, the Permanent Representative of Norway to 
NATO, noted that:  
“…with few exceptions, the efforts of the international community had 
become a static, inward-looking, fragmented and routine operation.  The 
international community, therefore, gave the impression of being in 
disarray, without direction and internal cohesion.  The international 
organisations on the ground - and in particular UNMIK - have also been 
victims, stemming from a lack of direction and overall plan provided by 
the international community.  For UNMIK, this has been an untenable 
situation.  In the absence of a strategy with any sense of direction, they 
have been used to keep the lid on” (2004, pp. 4-5).  
 
The tensions within the Kosovo community broke out into major riots in 2001 
and 2004.  At the same time, the much-diminished Serb population withdrew its 
support for the international community’s democratic processes.  In the 2004 and 
2007 Assembly and Municipal Authority elections less than one percent of the Serbs 
eligible to vote did so (UNMIK, 2004, p.2; Komisioni Qendrori Zgjedhjeve, 2007, 
pp.1-2).  Constantly underlying these problems was the impasse over Kosovo’s 
independence, desired by the Kosovar Albanians and rejected by the Kosovo Serbs.  
This combination of problems was not helpful: 
 
“UNMIK's structure and mandate are now exposed as inappropriate to 
prepare Kosovo for the transition from war to peace … and from 
international political limbo to final status.  The international 
community had beguiled itself into believing that the patchy half-
promises of its undertaking to begin reviewing Kosovo's final status by 
mid-2005 represented a complete policy.  Unable to agree on what that 
final status should be, it relied on the naïve assumption that delaying the 
decision would allow passions to cool” (ICG, 2004, p.i). 
 
The effect of UNMIK’s position on the Kosovo populace was illustrated by 
surveys conducted among the local community.  Tufts University researchers found 
that the UN administration was seen by the majority of Kosovo citizens of all 
ethnicities as “an arrogant bureaucracy …feeding on itself” and as “getting in the way 
[of progress]” (Donini, Minear et al, 2005, p.31).  Lesley Abdela, Deputy-Director 
Democratisation for the OSCE, stated that the local population felt impeded rather 
than liberated by UNMIK.  Part of the problem was the Kosovo people and their 
community leaders felt excluded from the process of trying to find new solutions.  
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They were neither employed, apart from in menial positions, nor were consulted by 
the international elite (Abdela, 2000, p.3).  This ran in direct contradiction to Evan’s 
assertion that: 
“…the responsibility to rebuild …must be directed towards returning the 
society in question to those who live in it and who, in the last instance, 
must take responsibility together for its future destiny” (2001, p. 45). 
 
However, it also was true that the problems of Kosovo’s economy and social 
structures were too large for the newly created and very inexperienced PISG to 
handle alone.  The Serbs had excluded the Albanian leadership from all forms of 
public office, for over ten years.  In addition, the post-1999 Kosovo leadership had 
been largely drawn from the upper ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and 
had little or no civil administration or political experience. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the UNMIK administration, by not allowing 
those in political office to make their own mistakes and learn from them, slowed the 
transfer of competencies from the international community to local control.  This 
failing was based on the belief that keeping authority in the hands of the IOs and 
IGOs in the province would contain the situation.  The dysfunctional state of affairs 
was, however, taking place in a province that was economically distressed.  The 
population was struggling to maintain the semblance of a working society whilst, all 
the while, becoming aggrieved over the lack of progress by the UNMIK and 
international community alike towards creating workable solutions for Kosovo’s 
future. 
In March 2004 riots on a scale not seen in Kosovo since before 1999 broke 
out in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica.  According to the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) they were provoked by dissatisfaction over the international 
community's lack of purpose over the future of the province, UNMIK's inability to 
solve the problems of unemployment and the economy and Belgrade's continuing 
capacity to annoy and frustrate the Kosovar Albanians (2004, pp. 4-5).  The riots 
unnerved both local politicians and the international organisations in the province; 
they were a clear indicator that the province was not as contained as many had 
thought.  Eide (2004, pp.2-3) asserted the events of March 2004 demonstrated that 
Albanian extremists were ready to ignite inter-ethnic tensions and seek to further 
reduce the Serb population in Kosovo.  A feeling that Serb leaders, both in Belgrade 
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and Kosovo, were delaying the process of defining future status for the province, he 
believed, fuelled support for such extremists.  In the more nationalistic political 
circles in Belgrade, however, the violence in Kosovo provided “domestic justification 
to consolidate …[action] to protect co-nationals, even at the risk of renewed 
international isolation” (ICG, 2005, p.8). 
 
In 2005, UNMIK decided that a security review was necessary to lay the 
foundation for the eventual handover of competencies to the PISG, particularly in the 
light of possible status clarification in the months to come.  The initial requirement 
was to review the whole spectrum of security in Kosovo but the Kosovo Contact 
Group was uncomfortable with the idea that KFOR would fall within the remit of the 
ISSR.  The Kosovo Contact Group comprised of representatives of the USA, UK, 
France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation.  It was first created in response to 
the conflict in BiH at the beginning of the 1990s with a composition that included 
four of the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the countries that contribute 
the majority of the troops to peacebuilding missions in the Balkans.  In addition, 
representatives of the EU Council, EU Presidency, European Commission and NATO 
commonly attended Contact Group meetings.   
 
The Kosovo Contact Group requested that there should be no review of the 
KPC, as it considered that it was a civilian emergency response organisation and not a 
security force.  This immediately led to Kosovar Albanian suspicion that the 
international community was trying to exclude the possibility of the KPC becoming a 
national Army after independence, something almost universally desired by the ethnic 
Albanian population as they saw the KLA (now making up a sizable part of the KPC 
membership) as their saviours in 1999 (1). 
 
However, the initiative of a security review, leading to security sector reform, 
was not before its time for in the minds of many working in Kosovo:  
 
“…a sound and holistic security sector reform programme, initiated 
early after the end of the open conflict in 1999, could have led to the 
development of a more stable, predictable and sustainable security 
sector in Kosovo. Instead, and in part due to the unresolved issue of 
Kosovo’s final status, a hotchpotch of projects and initiatives came and 
went, filling some gaps within the security sector but without an all-
encompassing and long-term approach” (Mellon, 2006, p.8). 
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6.2. Kosovo’s Security Sector Review  
 
A UK Army Major General, Adrian Freer, who was the Coordinator of the KPC in 
2004-5, originally suggested the creation of a Kosovo Security Sector Review.  
General Freer had served in Sierra Leone, where he witnessed the involvement of the 
British Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) in the Sierra Leone 
Security Sector Reform Project (SILSEP).  He persuaded the Kosovo SRSG, Søren 
Jessen-Peterson that such a review was well overdue in the province and should be 
undertaken before the final status talks began.  Jessen-Peterson was well aware that 
the viability of Kosovo as a state would depend on the peaceful co-existence of all 
ethic groups within the territory and its acceptance within the region.  To achieve this 
end, an established security and justice sector, overseen by impartial institutional 
structures that were subject to the rule of law, were a necessary element for moving 
the status issue forward.  Consequently, he requested the assistance of the UK’s 
SSDAT to assess the current security situation in the province and determine whether 
a security sector review process could be utilised to deal with the specific 
circumstances of Kosovo.  
 
The UK Government supported a SSDAT survey in Kosovo that would be 
used to design the methodology for the Review.  The survey was to take account of 
the expected United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) 
negotiations on the future status of the province.  A Scoping Mission was undertaken 
by the SSDAT in March 2005 (Security Sector Development Advisory Team, 2005b, 
pp. 2-5).  SSDAT advised that Kosovo would benefit from a security sector review; 
their Study had found that there was a need to establish commitment and ownership 
for implementing and sustaining the underlying principles of SSR.  The SRSG, the 
Prime Minister and the President of Kosovo and senior officials in the UNMIK Pillars 
endorsed this advice and the PISG indicated that they favoured the proposed Review 
and were willing to support it (SSDAT, 2005, pp. 2-6).  It was determined that the 
ISSR would be a staged process, with each stage being completed in turn and the 
information gained fed into the succeeding stages of the process (see Table 6.1 
below).  The programme was to be funded by international donations, at an estimated 
overall cost of US$2.3million (£1.15million), and was to be managed by the UNDP.  
The whole Review was to be completed within a period of twelve months.   
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Table 6.1: ISSR Stages as envisaged by SSDAT. 
Each stage of the ISSR was to be overseen by a Steering Committee consisting of 
international and local leaders and further validated by a Core Consultative Group 
(CCG), consisting of designated local civil society leaders. It also would include an 
extensive community consultation programme.  This approach was designed to 
provide local ownership of the process, address the concerns of ordinary people, and 
give a voice to local NGOs and security sector management officials.   The SRSG 
emphasised that the ISSR was:  
“…essentially a review by Kosovans for Kosovo; I encourage all 
individuals and communities to participate in the process; the review 
needs constructive participation from everyone; at every stage it will be 
open and transparent to all” (Jessen-Peterson, 2005, p.1).   
 
Jessen-Peterson (2006, p.10) was keen, in the light of criticisms by Eide and 
others of UNMIK’s lack of commitment to local participation, to acknowledge the 
need for local ownership.  He also wanted a stocktaking exercise to take place, which 
would determine the policies and structures best suited to the development of a 
democratically controlled and affordable security sector.  Jessen-Peterson was 
determined that such an exercise should be transparent and that the results would be 
publicly available so that any lessons learned could be put to good use.  He 
emphasised that the ISSR was an instrument for the future of Kosovo, explaining that 
it was “…a process that will produce an improved security environment for all and 
create the conditions conductive for economic investment, peace and justice, and 
participation in the international community” (UNMIK Press Office, 2006, p.1). 
 
The Kosovo ISSR was to be a consultative process designed to give the 
leaders and people of Kosovo an opportunity to consider issues that would provide a 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Stage 7 Stage 8 
 
Security 
Environmenta
l Review to 
set the stage 
for the 
Review, by 
identifying 
the external 
threats to 
Kosovo and 
the 
perceptions of 
internal 
security 
threats. 
  
To conduct a 
Threat Analysis 
based on the 
findings of 
Stage 1, 
including a 
public outreach 
programme to 
ascertain local 
perceptions of 
security.   
  
To conduct 
an analysis of 
the   
roles and 
capabilities 
of security 
institutions 
needed by 
the PISG to 
meet the 
threats 
identified in 
Stage 2. 
 
 
To conduct 
a functional 
analysis of 
the existing 
PISG 
institutions 
identified at 
Stage 3 as 
germane to 
combating 
the threats 
identified at 
Stage 2. 
 
 
To conduct a 
Gap Analysis 
of the 
Institutions 
functionally 
analysed at 
Stage 4 to 
determine the 
capacity 
building 
measures 
required. 
 
To conduct 
a Review 
of 
proposed 
capacity 
building 
Projects 
identified 
at Stage 5.  
 
 
To conduct 
a Budget 
Analysis of 
the cost of 
the projects 
identified 
at Stages 5 
and 6 and 
to seek 
funding 
streams. 
 
To prepare the 
SSR strategies 
report for 
donors  
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definition of security concerns, interests and the future security architecture in 
readiness for the process of determining final status.  The ISSR would be structured 
to analyse the existing security capabilities, and identify any new institutional 
capacities required to address the threats identified through the consultative 
processes.  In addition, it would identify policymaking development requirements and 
the structures necessary to support internal and external security needs following a 
determination of Kosovo’s final status. 
 
Security sector review processes are an essential part of understanding the 
impact of changes in the security sector and for establishing the overall reform of 
governing institutions.  These initiatives are often limited, either by scope or 
methodology, to internal institutional reviews with limited public consultation.  
Sometimes SSR programmes focus on single security issues, such as policing or 
strengthening civil-military oversight.  In the case of Kosovo, the process of 
reviewing the security sector, either as discreet issues or in a holistic manner, was to 
be extremely challenging given that the internal security of the province remained an 
UNMIK reserved competency.  Additionally, the Kosovo Contact Group had 
excluded KFOR, which had responsibility for border and external defence issues as 
well as aid to the civil power (currently UNMIK), from the Review. 
 
SSDAT decided that the Kosovo’s ISSR process should examine not only 
those existing institutions which were judged to impact on internal security (except 
KFOR or UNMIK) but also to envisage which security institutions would be required 
in an independent Kosovo.  This meant that many of the Review’s recommendations 
would be dependent on the resolution of the province’s final status. Therefore, the 
ISSR faced two significant gaps; firstly, Kosovo had no existing local internal 
security institutions or policies, beyond the police and judicial structures that had 
been developed by the international community with minimal local input.  Secondly, 
the ISSR team had to make recommendations for security institutions prior to the 
determination of the province’s status, including what international security and 
oversight mechanisms would remain in place after final status had been agreed. 
 
The support of key international actors was essential to the success of the 
ISSR programme.  The lead in securing this support was taken by an ad hoc ISSR 
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Preparatory Working Group set up by SRSG Jessen-Peterson.  The Working Group 
was led by the Head of the UNMIK Advisory Unit on Security (AUS) and consisted 
of an UNMIK Political Affairs Officer, a representative of the UNMIK Office of the 
Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator (KPCC), two advisors from the Office of 
Public Safety in the Kosovo Prime Minister’s Office (OPS), and the UNDP Kosovo 
Programme Analyst for the Security Sector Portfolio who explained that: 
“… foreign governments were asked to provide diplomatic support and 
public endorsement to enhance the credibility and visibility of the 
process; the UN, UNMIK and NATO were asked to provide political 
support, to lobby and promote the ISSR in various fora, and to share 
information relevant to the ISSR; and the PISG was asked to endorse the 
process and to commit to the full cooperation of its officials. The full 
involvement of local authorities was crucial since the ISSR could only 
be successful if the PISG believed in the benefits of the process and its 
end-result” (Mellon, 2006, p.12-13). 
 
However, this important part of the preparatory process was delayed because 
the DPKO, which was responsible within the United Nations Secretariat in New York 
for the UNMIK mission, took several weeks to review and approve the ISSR process.  
This delay was engendered by internal UN rivalry, which will be explored in detail 
later in the thesis.  Without DPKO approval, the SRSG in Kosovo could not publicly 
endorse the ISSR programme.  The delay in receiving approval from DPKO affected 
the other preparatory tasks and significantly delayed discussions on the ISSR 
procedures with other governmental and political bodies.   
 
Despite Jessen-Peterson’s personal support for the concept of a security sector 
review in the province and his emphasis that the ISSR was essentially a review by 
and for the people of Kosovo, it soon became evident that not all the members of the 
local and international communities agreed with him.  The SSDAT Scoping Study 
had recommended that the ISSR working structure should consist of a Steering 
Committee (ISC) with high-level representatives from UNMIK, the PISG, political 
and religious leaders, and minority community representatives.  The Steering 
Committee comprised of the following members:   
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Table 6.2: Membership of the ISSR Steering Committee. 
 
The Steering Committee would be supported by a Secretariat located in the Office for 
Public Safety, within the Office of the Prime Minister.  A Research Team, consisting 
of ten persons and located within the ISSR Secretariat, would coordinate the ISSR 
consultative work, along with the Steering Committee review process.  The flow of 
information from the local consultative groups, through the Secretariat to the Steering 
Committee, whilst keeping the Kosovo assembly informed, is illustrated below:  
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                                  Table 6.3: Illustration of the ISSR Consultative Process. 
 
However, from the outset, there was resistance to the Steering Committee 
both from within the Kosovo Serb political structure and from some of the Albanian 
political parties.  The Serbs did not wish to be associated with a body that was 
predominantly Albanian and international community based.  Their ongoing boycott 
of the PISG structures and Albanian political institutions made it impossible for them 
to sit on a Committee that had the Kosovar President and Prime Minister as members.  
Additionally, some Kosovar political party members were uncomfortable with the 
structure of the Committee, seeing it as biased towards the Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo (AAK) Party, which held the majority of the Ministries with responsibilities 
related to security sector.  Although the Albanian political representatives were, on 
occasions, persuaded to be present at Steering Committee meetings, the Serb 
politicians never attended. 
 
The first Stage of the ISSR process was completed in April 2006.  The 
findings from this Stage became the basis for a wide-scale public outreach 
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programme conducted in Stage 2.   It was during this part of the Review that the 
perceptions of the people of Kosovo on what affected their personal and community 
security were obtained by a series of public consultation initiatives.  Stage 3 then took 
the findings of the public consultations; together with the external threat review 
conducted in Stage 1 and related these findings to the existing PISG institutions with 
responsibility for overcoming the identified threats.  This stage was designed to 
determine if these institutions had the capacity to deal with the identified threats.  
Stages 4 and 5 were based on the findings of the review of capabilities at Stage 3.  
During these two Stages, the ISSR researchers identified where capacity-building 
measures would be required.  Stages 6 and 7 then began the process of identifying 
what would be needed to make the PISG capable of managing the security sector in 
Kosovo without international community assistance, including the creation of new 
Ministries and Departments.   
 
This work led to the designing of a Security Sector strategy, including 
identifying the new institutions and oversight mechanisms required in the event of 
Kosovo gaining independence.  Finally, the ISSR was charged with preparing 
strategies that could be presented to potential donors in order to obtain funding for 
projects to carry out the capacity building initiatives identified during the ISSR 
process.  This information was encapsulated in the ISSR Final Report and led to the 
creation of a follow on UNDP programme called the Support to Security Sector 
Development project (3SD). 
 
6.3. Public Awareness and Consultation 
 
A core objective of the ISSR was to expand public awareness and dialogue on issues 
of security in Kosovo. In addition to the municipal consultative meetings conducted 
in Stages 1 and 2 of the process, a public outreach strategy was developed.  The 
outreach campaign had several phases: 
  
a. Awareness Raising through consultative town hall meetings and media tools 
such as TV and radio spots, billboards, press conferences and interviews with 
members of the ISSR Secretariat and members of the PISG.  These were used 
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to explain the ISSR programme to the population, with the aim of encouraging 
participation in the public consultation process.  
 
b. Deepening Understanding and Encouraging Public Ownership of ISSR 
process and security issues through use of direct outreach tools such as 
publications and TV advertising.  This included a series of debates on 
UNMIK public service television (RTK) and local radio stations. 
 
c. Collection of Public Input  through a “Have Your Say” Bus travelling in urban 
and rural areas of Kosovo distributing information material and taking direct 
comment from the public.  The interviews with ISSR members on Kosovo 
radio and TV stations all had a ‘phone-in’ option allowing the listeners to 
make their comments.  Suggestion boxes were placed in public buildings 
across Kosovo to allow citizens to drop off their comments on security.  
Finally an “ISSR hotline” allowed the public to express their opinions either 
via telephone or via email. 
 
d. Verification of Initial Findings was undertaken by relating the threat analysis 
to public opinion in order to verify the findings.  These findings were further 
verified through consultative town hall meetings, public debates, discussions 
and opinion-editorials.  
  
The goal of the public outreach strategy was to ensure that all of Kosovo’s 
communities were not only aware of, but had the opportunity to be engaged in, the 
ISSR process.  Furthermore, the campaign sought to enhance the level of public 
dialogue about security and encourage transparency among Kosovo’s security 
institutions. Bringing members of the public together in a debate enhanced this aspect 
with those PISG officials involved in security matters.  Illustrations of the public 
outreach programme are at Annex E. 
 
6.4. The ISSR Threat Analysis 
 
The internal security threat analysis stage of the ISSR process was completed in 
partnership with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
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(DCAF) and the Kosova Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED).  
In concert with this internal study, the Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations, Clingendael, undertook a wider regional analysis of the security threats.  
The objective of this work was to identify key drivers that were likely to shape 
Kosovo’s security environment.  In order to verify the findings of the DCAF and 
KIPRED research, the OSCE organised 32 Municipal Consultations across Kosovo 
where over 800 people participated in discussions covering the issues that most 
concerned them in terms of Kosovo’s security.  As an example of the feedback 
obtained from these consultation meetings, Table 6.4 below illustrates the security-
related concerns most frequently mentioned by all participants, regardless of 
ethnicity.  Poverty shared the highest percentage along with unemployment (18%) 
followed by corruption among officials (16%). 
Table 6.4: Responses of Kosovo Citizens of all ethnicities in relation to perceived threat. 
 
The next chart (Table 6.5) indicates the three types of threats that the participants in 
the Municipal Consultations considered as most significant.  The numbers illustrate 
the frequency with which each threat was assigned the highest category of 
importance. 
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Table 6.5: Number of responses indicating the most significant security threats as 
perceived by participants in the ISSR Municipal Consultations. From data making 
up the conclusions in the ISSR Final Report. (Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al, 2006). 
 
The public consultation data showed that Albanian citizens put unemployment 
and the moribund economic situation in Kosovo high among the security threats, at 
37% of all threats identified by those consulted (Table 6.6 below).  The Serbian 
population, the largest minority community, largely concurred by rating 
unemployment and the economy at 30% of all threats identified by those who 
responded (Table 6.7 below).  The economic situation not only produced major 
concerns about job security, lack of job prospects and general poverty, but also the 
indirect consequences stemming from these difficulties, such as increased crime and 
corruption.  
 
Table 6.6: Threats perceived to be significant by the ethnic Albanians consulted during the ISSR.  
(Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al, 2006, p.22). 
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Table 6.7: Threats perceived to be significant by the ethnic Serbians consulted during the ISSR.  
(Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al, 2006, p.23). 
 
In addition to the public consultations, 100 Kosovo professionals from academia, 
non-government organisations (NGOs), gender issues groups and the existing 
security institutions, KPS, UNMIK Police and KFOR formed a Core Consultation 
Group.  This Group was designed to further enhance the dialogue and discussion 
related to threats and security needs. 
 
Saferworld then correlated the findings of all these consultations including 
data from a household survey of 12,000 homes, conducted by the Gani Bobi Institute 
at the University of Pristina, and from the UNDP’s South Eastern Europe Clearing 
House for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC, 2006).  This 
method of data collection involved adding the questions used in the Municipal 
Consultation Meetings to the Gani Bobi Institute questionnaire.  Although not an 
ideal method of data collection it had the advantages of being free and available 
within the required timeframe. 
 
These activities helped to ground the findings of the two research institutes, 
DCAF and KIPRED, and verify information gathered from the UNDP Early Warning 
Reporting system and KPS crime statistics.  The findings then were outlined in a 
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threat matrix.  Table 6.8 demonstrates the interlocking nature of the threats identified 
by the Kosovo participants. 
 
 
 Table 6.8: Interrelationships between identified threats. (Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al, 2006, p.6). 
 
The Kosovo ISSR also examined the more traditional aspects of the security 
sector.  It reviewed the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), the Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC), the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS), the Ministries of Justice and Internal 
Affairs, the Security Services and Border and Customs Services.  It then made 
recommendations for the future security architecture of an independent Kosovo. 
These included the creation of a National Security Council, Assembly Select 
Committees on Security, Policing and Intelligence and suggested mechanisms for the 
creation of a Kosovo Defence Force.  An obstacle encountered by the Review team 
was the lack of any authorised defence force and intelligence service, over and above 
those provided by the international community through NATO and the UN.  
‘Intelligence Services’ existed in Kosovo but were firmly linked to political 
organisations and were outside the democratic control of either the international 
community or the PISG. 
 
 The ISSR Secretariat had to consider whether it should make 
recommendations on the creation of a defence force given the uncertain future of the 
province.  The majority population in Kosovo believed that the KPC, which had been 
born out of the KLA, was a Kosovo National Army in waiting.  This was anathema to 
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the minority Kosovo Serb population and to the authorities in Belgrade, who saw the 
members of the KLA, and the KPC, as outlawed guerrilla fighters and therefore 
inappropriate as the basis of a future Defence Force.  Some members of the Kosovo 
Contact Group also held this view.  However, the SRSG, SSDAT and the 
membership of the Steering Committee decided that the KPC had to be included in 
the Review otherwise the will of the majority community on this issue would prevail 
without input from the minority population.  It was therefore necessary for the ISSR 
to project its recommendations into the future, beyond the life of UNSCR 1244 
(1999).  The ISSR Secretariat decided that it must consider a form of security 
architecture for Kosovo that could be applied only if independence, however 
conditional or limited, was granted to the province.  At the same time, it had to be 
careful not to stray into the bailiwick of the UNOSEK, which was considering the 
matter of Kosovo’s final status.   
 
UNMIK had almost completed the transfer of competencies to the PISG for 
the KPS, Border and Customs Services and KCS, by the time the ISSR process had 
started, and therefore they presented a reasonably coherent structure for review.  The 
Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs were created during 2006 and offered a far 
more difficult area for appraisal.  The judiciary had struggled for some time, even 
under UNMIK control, to gain the confidence and support of the population and it 
was recognised, by the PISG and the ISSR Secretariat, that improvements were very 
likely to be necessary (Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al, 2006, pp. 30-31, 62-69). 
 
To complete the review of the capabilities and capacity building needs of the 
PISG security related institutions, the ISSR Secretariat began work on identifying 
relevant institutions across Kosovo at the local, regional, and province-wide levels to 
be targeted for interviews and more detailed study.  The institutions were selected for 
their responsibilities in relation to the perceived threats identified in the earlier work 
of the ISSR researchers.  As well as the traditional security institutions, the Ministries 
of Employment & Economy, Trade & Industry and Education and Health were all 
selected for review (Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2006, pp. xiv-xv).  The ISSR 
researchers designed a set of questions to serve as a basis for interviews and data 
collection with Ministry officials and also conducted a review of primary sources, 
which included Kosovar and International institutional reports and official 
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documents.  Overall, the ISSR team completed more than seventy interviews with a 
variety of regional and local officials and their international advisers.  The ISSR Gap 
Analysis, which was to determine what additional capacity building measures were 
necessary to allow the Ministries and Departments fulfil their roles more effectively, 
was based on OECD’s “DAC Development Partnership Forum: Managing for 
Development Results and Aid Effectiveness (OECD-DAC, 2002).  The rationale 
behind the use of this methodology was that the ISSR programme took place in the 
context, and bore many of the characteristics, of a development programme rather 
than simply a review of technical assistance measures.  
 
As the ISSR methodology evolved it became apparent that an Interim Report 
would be required to allow the Steering Committee to judge the progress of the 
programme.  In addition, Maarti Artisaari, the head of UNOSEK, requested regular 
briefings on the progress of the ISSR.  The Interim Report, based on the first four 
stages of the ISSR programme and the initial institutional reviews, was produced in 
June 2006.  The report was taken and approved by the Steering Committee and then 
briefed to UNOSEK in Vienna. 
 
6.5. The ISSR Report 
 
The ISSR Final Report consisted of a discussion of the threats to security, as 
perceived by the people of Kosovo, and an analysis of existing PISG institutions that 
had an impact on, or oversight of, the measures to deal with the perceived threats 
identified through the ISSR process. 
 
The ISSR process used two key concepts to underpin the programme.  The 
ISSR threat analysis provided a platform for consultation across the PISG and the 
general public, as well as for the functional analysis and recommendations contained 
in the ISSR Final Report. However, the Copenhagen Criteria were also used for 
gauging the success of the PISG institutions.  In June 1993, the Copenhagen 
European Council recognised the right of the countries of central and Eastern Europe 
to join the European Union, once they had satisfied conditionality criteria.  This 
consisted of three norms: firstly, there a political condition: the development of stable 
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institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
minorities; secondly, an economic standard: a functioning market economy; and, 
thirdly, the incorporation of the Community acquis: adherence to the various 
political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union (Europa, 2007, p.3). 
 
Given the local leadership of Kosovo’s aspirations that the province, at some 
future date, would become part of the wider European community, the ISSR utilised 
the Copenhagen Criteria as a widely acceptable benchmark for their process.  This 
acceptability was enhanced by the fact that the Copenhagen Criteria were already 
linked to the Kosovo Standards laid down by UNMIK in 2003.  The approach was 
reinforced, in July 2006, by statements by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for 
the CFSP in a joint report with the Commissioner for EU Enlargement.  The report 
noted that:  
“…the EU has sent a clear message to Kosovo’s authorities that 
fulfilment of the UN standards is not only needed to pave the way for a 
status settlement, but also for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political 
criteria in the longer term”(EU Press Office, 2006, p. 2). 
 
The Final Report was prepared, in October and November 2006, for 
publication in December 2006.  However, there was reluctance within the ISSR 
Steering Committee to publish it as the UNOSEK Final Status recommendations, due 
in October 2006, had been delayed to allow further negotiations between the 
Albanian and Serbian delegations.  Some Steering Committee members, principally 
from the international community, feared that publication of the ISSR Report might 
detract from the work being undertaken to find a basis for agreement between the 
Serbian and Kosovar Albanian negotiators.  This position was based on the fact that 
the ISSR Final Report made recommendations for security institutions in a future 
independent Kosovo. It was considered by some Steering Committee members that 
ISSR was pre-judging the final status outcome.  By contrast, Artisaari was keen to see 
the document published as a precursor to his own report to the UNSC, which would 
include recommendations on security in an independent Kosovo. 
Conclusions 
 
The requirement for a review of the Kosovo security sector arose from the need to 
rationalise administration in the province following the conflict of 1999. Although the 
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arrival of the UN in June 1999 brought a measure of administrative oversight and 
internal security, the UNMIK engagement was an interim measure mandated by 
UNSCR1244 (1999).  Under this Resolution and the Rambouillet Accords, it was 
envisaged that there would be an elected domestic administration, which eventually 
would become the Government of Kosovo after the dissolution of the Resolution.   
 
Over time the people of Kosovo, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, became 
impatient with the UNMIK failure to create a viable economy and with the lack of 
progress on determining the final status of the province.  The UNMIK recognised that 
it needed to demonstrate that advances were being made to ensure an orderly transfer 
of competences, including those in the security sector, from international jurisdiction 
to the PISG.  At this point the methodology for the ISSR was suggested to, and 
accepted by, the SRSG and the principal local leadership. 
  
The SSDAT methodology for the ISSR was based on a high degree of local 
ownership of the review process and on ensuring that both the population and their 
leaders were informed and consulted throughout the programme. At the same time, 
international community actors were to be apprised of the findings and conclusions at 
each stage of the review, in concert with regular briefings to the ISSR Steering 
Committee and Kosovo Assembly.  
 
However, this holistic approach was designed not only to ensure local 
involvement; the review also aspired to more than dealing solely with the traditional 
relationship between security actors and security institutions.  It took note of the 
perceived security needs of the population and then analysed the capacity of PISG 
institutions to deal with the identified security threats.  This took the Review into 
areas that many would not consider the province of a security sector review, such as 
the impact of the economy, educational and health services on the overall security of 
the population.  The ISSR found, from their public consultation, that the population 
of Kosovo were concerned not only with those institutions that directly provide 
security within Kosovo but also with the competence of the ministries and institutions 
that had an impact on their daily lives.  Therefore, matters of health, education, trade 
and industry, employment, the provision of electricity and the efficiency of the civil 
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service all played a part in determining if the people of Kosovo feel secure in their 
homes, their communities and their society. 
 
This holistic approach goes beyond the remit of the SSR process.  Although 
the OECD heralded the programme as far reaching (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 249), it 
was a challenging process and engendered strong opinions among the international 
community and the local leadership alike.  There were those, principally within the 
UN and international communities in Kosovo, who saw the holistic and locally 
centred process as a threat to their authority over the security of the province.  Within 
the local community, there were those who believed that the ISSR might undermine 
the positions held by those who considered themselves the architects of the Kosovar 
Albanian victory over the Serbs in 1999 and, therefore, were the natural custodians 
of Kosovo’s security.  At the same time, there were many among the minority 
population who feared that the recommendations of the ISSR would offer too much 
authority in security matters to the Albanian majority population thus undermining 
their own sense of security. 
 
Thus the difficulties of establishing cooperation and eliminating inter-
institutional competition, already identified in earlier chapters, were found to be 
present in Kosovo.  Indeed, they appeared more acute than had been experienced by 
other SSR processes, as the problems not only encompassed a multiplicity of 
organisations and departments but also seemed more pressing because of the limited 
time available to undertake the ISSR programme.  In addition to the incidents of 
rivalry at the local level, the problems of competition at the strategic level were also 
to impinge on the work in the field.  
 
The next chapter examines the relationships within and between the 
international organisations working, both locally and internationally, in the area of 
Kosovo’s security.  These relationships and organisational interactions impacted 
upon the structure and implementation of the ISSR programme and served to shape 
its outcomes.  The competition for ownership and influence over the security sector 
in Kosovo, within and between the international communities, provide insights for 
future security reviews and security sector reform.  
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Chapter Seven: ISSR, Rivalry, Competition and the 
International Community 
 
Introduction 
 
“International organisations have become major players on the international scene, 
whose acts, actions and omissions affect individuals, companies and states” (Wellens, 
2002, p.i).  Clark (1999, p.4) suggests that organisations perform within the dual 
realms of organisational action and the context in which they have to operate.  
Organisational action is the indeterminate outcome of struggles between people, who 
deploy different resources (Clegg, 1989, p. 197).  
 
This chapter describes and examines the relationships within and between 
IGOs and the key international actors, the UK, US, Germany and Russia, in Kosovo 
at the time of the ISSR programme.  It assesses the impact of the relationships 
between these actors and the programme and relates them to the theories discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three.  It seeks to discover how far rivalry and competition 
influenced the outcome of the ISSR programme.  
 
7.1. The UNMIK Structure, UNDP and ISSR 
 
In the first mission of its kind, UNMIK brought together four functional 
‘pillars’ under UN leadership in Kosovo.  Although not designated as such, the 
UNMIK could be termed an integrated mission in the sense that it was a multi-
dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation involving a number of IGOs, 
headed by a SRSG.  Under the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999), UNMIK was 
charged with the restoration of an autonomous, self-governing Kosovo, capable of 
exercising democratic governance (UN, 1999, p.2).  In order to achieve this aim, 
along with the wider objectives of restoring democratic institutions and economic 
stability, UNMIK organised itself as follows: 
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Pillar 1:  Headed by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and responsible 
for coordinating humanitarian assistance;  
 
Pillar 2: Headed by the UN DPKO and responsible for 
public services; 
 
Pillar 3: Headed by the OSCE and responsible for 
institutional development and human rights; 
 
Pillar 4: Headed by the EU and responsible for economic 
reconstruction and development. 
 
Separate from this structure were a number of other UN agencies, including 
the UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food 
Programme (WFP).  These UN bodies were not included in the UNMIK framework 
as it was considered that they were in support of the main operation and their 
incorporation into the pillar system would make it too unwieldy.  However, in 2000 
after the UNHCR component was downsized and removed from the pillar structure 
(thus reducing the ‘pillars’ to three), no attempt was made to integrate the other UN 
Agencies into the UNMIK formation.  Paradoxically, the configuration of UNMIK, 
after the departure of UNHCR, created a stovepipe effect that exacerbated intra-
organisational tensions (1).  Rees suggests that, “the divisions between the UN, 
NATO, OSCE and EU make it virtually impossible to create mission coordination” 
(2006, p.13). 
 
By the end of 2005 UNMIK, along with KFOR, had established a basis for 
security in Kosovo.  The incidence of ethnic violence had decreased from its height in 
2004 and, in general, the citizens of Kosovo lived in an uneasy equilibrium.  
However, the ICG (2005, p. 1) believed that, “the status quo would not hold… Kosovo 
Albanians were frustrated with their unresolved status, the economic situation, and the 
problems of dealing with the past.”  UNMIK had, by 2005, delineated the essential 
institutional frameworks by which justice and human security could be delivered.  It 
had been less successful in delivering initiatives that could develop the ability of the 
PISG to control internal security.  Where progress was made, in the areas of policing 
and corrective services for example, the work in capacity building was largely 
outsourced to the OSCE.  Kosovo’s SRSG therefore believed that the time was right 
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to move ahead with a security review leading to reform, to be undertaken in close 
cooperation with the local community and its leaders.  
 
Although the product of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of 
Defence/Department for International Development/Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (MODUK/DFID/FCO) sponsored SSDAT, the UK Government determined 
that the Kosovo security review programme should not be seen as a solely British 
endeavour.  A member of the SSDAT Scoping Study Team, which tested the feasibly 
of the ISSR programme, believed that: 
“…there was sufficient concern within the UK Government that Kosovo 
would once again erupt into violence; consequently they did not wish to 
be seen as the only donor state supporting a SSR process that might go 
very wrong.  In addition, it was a matter of cost; the UK did not want to 
foot the whole bill for ISSR.” (2)  
 
  SSDAT believed that the ISSR should be supported by international donors 
and suggested that the programme be placed within the Support to Security and Rule 
of Law Cluster of the UNDP mission in Kosovo.  The UNDP had committed itself to 
placing the prevention of conflict at the centre of its poverty reduction activities.  
Consequently, SSDAT let it be known that they believed that the ISSR process would 
benefit from UNDP’s experience in the development sector and from the 
relationships built up by UNDP Kosovo office with key local stakeholders. (3) 
 
The UNDP was housed separately from the UNMIK Headquarters in 
Pristina and was seen as a junior partner within the Kosovo international 
community.  Indeed, a study found that there was an, “absence of a formal 
relationship between UNMIK and UNDP” (Conflict, Security and Development 
Group, 2003, p.31).  Many UNMIK staff considered UNDP as an interloper in the 
immediate post conflict arena and that the organisation possessed limited expertise 
in the security field.  This low opinion of UNDP’s abilities was shared in the UNNY 
where an independent assessment, led by Kaldor, concluded that UNDP was 
overextended and that it tended to replicate its programmes from country to country 
thus repeating mistakes and shortcomings (UNDP, 2006, p.41).  Despite these 
reservations, SSDAT believed that UNDP Kosovo would be a suitable candidate for 
the role of overseeing the ISSR process.  It was the only international agency that 
could receive and dispense donor funds and this ensured that UNDP was given 
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oversight of the programme (Security Sector Development Advisory Team, 2005b, 
p.7).  Thus the base from which the ISSR structure could be built was put in place.  
 
7.2. Inter­ and Intra­Organisation Rivalry and Cooperation 
 
The most critical component for the involvement of international organisations in the 
fields of peacebuilding and SSR is the ability to successfully coordinate and 
cooperate (Law, 2007, p. 4).  Intergovernmental organisations have both strengths 
and weaknesses in the area of cooperation and coordination, which influence their 
ability to perform in the post-conflict arena.  This was to prove to be the case in 
Kosovo.  Cooperation and coordination difficulties, however, were to impact on the 
ISSR programme before it was even started. 
7.2.1. Intra­Organisation Rivalry: DPKO and UNDP.  
 
If international donor partners were to be found for the ISSR programme, a 
single agency needed to act both as the banker for the donations raised and as a 
guarantor of the technical competence of the programme.  Nevertheless, it quickly 
became apparent that there was opposition within the UN pillars in Kosovo to the 
UNDP taking on this overarching role; one UNMIK official suggested that, although 
UNDP Kosovo’s function in the ISSR process could be that of a banker, it had neither 
the capability nor the experience to get involved in the technical aspects of an SSR 
programme. (4) 
 
 Opposition to UNDP Kosovo being the custodian of the ISSR programme 
was to also be found in the wider UN system.  A senior UNMIK official remarked 
that, “DPKO was against the idea... there was no guidance from New York and we 
took this to mean that they …wished that it would all go away.”(5)  In the UN 
Secretariat the reaction to the ISSR programme being placed within the UNDP was 
equally unequivocal leading another official to suggest that, “UNDP in New York did 
not understand SSR.  They lacked expertise in the security field and did not fully 
appreciate the linkages between development and security.”(6) 
 
 At an early stage in the ISSR preparation it became evident that, despite the 
SSDAT planning, funding was to be a problem.  UNDP Kosovo turned to the UNDP 
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Headquarters in New York for financial assistance.  They approached the Bureau of 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) for funding of the ISSR. (7)  At first, the 
BCPR appeared keen to be involved, indicating that they might invest US$1 million.  
However, after the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in Kosovo had emailed 
the BCPR eight times in three weeks, requesting information on the allocation of the 
funding but receiving no response, he became concerned that the programme would 
fail before it had started. (8)  The problem appeared to be a delay in gaining clearance 
from the DPKO in for UNDP to undertake the review.  This was necessary because 
the DPKO was the administering department for UNMIK within the UNNY and no 
UN related activity could take place in Kosovo without its approval. (9)  
 
 On the 31st August 2005, the BPCR coordinator informed the UNDP Deputy 
Resident Representative in Kosovo that additional financial clarification was needed 
by DPKO.  UNDP Kosovo responded by saying that “until this time we had not 
received any indication that further clarification was necessary, nor did we know that 
the proposals would not be on the agenda for the 23rd August [funding allocation] 
meeting”.  He added that, “… it was a bit frustrating to be in the dark for so long and 
now we had to wait another two weeks [until the next allocations meeting].” (10) 
 
 On the 5th September 2005 the requested clarification information was sent to 
New York and ISSR funding was placed on the agenda of an Allocations Committee 
scheduled for the 16th September 2005.  An official in UNDP Kosovo informed the 
BCPR coordinator that:  
“…many potential donors have mentioned that their financial support 
would be conditional to the commitment of other donors to ensure that 
there is a multi-national, collegial support to ISSR and not a single 
source support. Consequently, my hope is that should BCPR accept to 
fund part of ISSR, the support to this process will automatically become 
an international one and many of these other donors will then follow 
suit.” (11) 
 
 The Security Sector Advisor to the BCPR then informed UNDP Kosovo that 
the ISSR proposal was not in the correct UN format and that a more detailed case for 
funding had to be made.  On the 8th September 2005, the UNDP Headquarters Senior 
Programme Manager for the Western Balkans, suggested that the original US$ 1 
million request was too high and that UNDP Kosovo’s bid had to be adjusted 
downwards.  
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 At this point the media took an interest:  Zeri, a daily newspaper in Kosovo, 
stated that it “…had found out that the ISSR Secretariat has not done its job as 
expected because it is not even established due to lack of funds for developing this 
process” (Krasniqi, 2005, p.2).  This press report spurred UNDP Kosovo to greater 
efforts; by the 15th September 2005 the reworked format and budget, confirming the 
total requirement at US$ 2,310,908.00 had been lodged in New York, ready for the 
following day’s Allocations Committee.  On the 16th September 2005, UNDP New 
York informed UNDP Kosovo that the Allocations Committee had been postponed 
because of the UN World Summit.  Ironically, it was at this Summit it was noted the 
importance of SSR as an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-
conflict environments.  It was not until the 17th October 2005 that the Committee 
finally granted US $672,840.00 to the ISSR programme.  This was fully three months 
after the start date for the programme envisaged by SSDAT and not one member of 
the ISSR Secretariat had been recruited: 
“…by that time, the preparatory work had suffered serious delays, the 
credibility of the process had been questioned, and some donors and 
partners manifested an understandable uncertainty regarding the long-
term viability of the review process" (Mellon, 2006, p.18). 
 
Much of the delay in getting the ISSR budget requests tabled at the BCPR 
Allocations Committee was occasioned by inter-organisational rivalry between the 
UNDP and the DPKO.  A senior diplomat, seconded to UNDP New York by a 
member state, believes that the DPKO were displeased when it was decided that 
UNDP was to be the institutional home of ISSR. (12)  DPKO’s view was that SSR 
was primarily a peacekeeping operational tool and only secondly an aid to institution 
building and post-conflict development.  Therefore, the DPKO (and by extension, 
UNMIK Pillar 2) believed that they should be responsible for the ISSR programme 
rather than the UNDP.  There was, however, another strand to this rivalry; 
competition between the DPKO and UNDP was a longstanding issue.  Since the early 
days of the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (UNPROFOR) there had 
been rivalry between the two UN departments over their respective role in 
peacekeeping and post-conflict development.(13)  Tetlock (1998, pp.868-912) 
suggests that, if there has been competition between organisations over an extended 
period, distrust increases between them.  This distrust erupted over the ISSR 
programme as both the DPKO and UNDP firmly believed that the other wished to 
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take control of SSR to “corner the market as far as post-conflict security reform was 
concerned.” (14)  
 
Emanating from the highest level, this rivalry was taken up in the field in 
Kosovo, where cooperation between UNMIK and the UNDP often became the least 
desirable course of action.  Moller (2008) has noted that a lack of common ground 
between and within organisations is based on differing approaches and understanding 
of the problem.  He suggests that they are particularly prevalent in matters concerning 
security where traditionally cooperation was hindered by suspicion and mistrust of 
outsiders (2008, p.9).  It became evident that, despite the backing of Kosovo’s SRSG 
for UNDP involvement in ISSR, there were some within DPKO New York who 
opposed any security related activity being undertaken outside the DPKO bailiwick.   
One official in UNNY believes that DPKO attempted to undermine UNDP’s efforts 
to get the ISSR programme under way by disputing UNDP Kosovo’s ability to 
undertake the management of the programme; “It was a hatchet job to get at UNDP.” 
(15)     
 
Mearsheimer (2001) and Morgenthau (1948) both suggest that rivalry is 
closely related to the pursuit of power.  Many realists argue that positioning is a 
system-induced mechanism of rivalry.  In Chapter Two it was noted that sociological 
institutionalist theory suggests that organisations pursue legitimacy over efficiency 
and that organisations will typically select options that enhance their standing in 
relation to others over action that leads to more efficient working practices 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Maximising organisational legitimacy rather than 
growing efficiency is a strategy by which organisations seek to reduce turbulence and 
maintain stability (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, pp. 348-349).  In addition, the 
organisation that commands the greatest esteem is able to draw the greater attention 
(Alvarez and Robin, 1992, p. 1398), which then improves its ability to attract funding 
and to function effectively in relation to other organisations and institutions.  So it 
proved with the rivalry between the DPKO, UNMIK and UNDP over the Kosovo 
ISSR. 
 
The DPKO’s determination to direct the UN’s SSR efforts has resulted in the 
forming of a SSR Team within the DPKO in New York.  This has created ongoing 
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friction between the DPKO and UNDP.  At the time of writing, the dispute over the 
ownership of SSR continues in East Timor, where work to reform the security sector 
is being hampered by just the same territorial debates between DPKO and UNDP as 
occurred in Kosovo.(16)  Thus rivalry and defensive behaviour has been demonstrated 
in response to the interaction between the two entities, with its attendant increase in 
distrust and hostility.  Duration also has become a factor in the ongoing rivalry 
between the two agencies; Colaresi and Thompson’s (2002, p.269) suggestion that 
negative opinions and prejudice increase over time is ably demonstrated by the 
ongoing antagonism between DPKO and UNDP.  
 
However, this was not the only impediment to the programme; there was also 
reluctance by some UNDP senior officials to assume what was regarded as a difficult 
and politically sensitive process.(17)  Within UNDP Kosovo there was the perception 
that, in the UNDP New York Headquarters, some senior officials would prefer that 
the programme failed to attract the necessary funding and, therefore, would have to be 
abandoned.  This ambivalence was based on the fact that many high level officials 
had no understanding SSR.(18)  Indeed, Scheye notes (2008, p. 201) that the BCPR 
“washed its hands” of the ISSR and “no bureau staffer was conversant with the 
programme findings or challenges”.  There was also a measure of ‘not invented here 
syndrome’ (Husted & Michailova, 2002, pp.60-73; Katz & Allen, 1982, pp. 7-19) in 
that the information produced by SSDAT was not fully accepted by UNDP.  This 
inability to recognise the value of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it 
is largely a function of an organisation's level of related prior knowledge.  An 
individual's capacity to accept information is a function of both prior knowledge and 
their multiplicity of experience.  At the management level, absorptive capacity is 
affected by the diversity of expertise within an organisation (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990, 128-152). This diversity of experience and expertise were clearly lacking in 
UNDP Headquarters.  Therefore, despite the Kosovo SRSG’s wishes, confusion 
generated in part by intra-organisational rivalry and competition, surrounded the 
ISSR process.  The ICG noted “although blessed by the UN Secretariat in mid-2005, 
it has lacked senior support … and finding funds for the ISSR Secretariat has been 
difficult” (2006, p. 10).   
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7.2.2. Inter­ Organisation Competition: Kosovo IGOs and ISSR. 
 
A manifestation of the institutionalist pursuit of legitimacy over efficiency was to be 
found in the UNMIK Headquarters in Kosovo.  At the beginning of 2006, there were 
five UNMIK Working Groups considering the post-Final Status arrangements; two of 
which dealt specifically with the security sector.  They were made up of 
representatives from all the Pillars in UNMIK.  These working groups, one of which 
had no less than thirty members, struggled to define the role that the various 
international agencies might play post UNSCR 1244 (1999) and where any residual 
UN presence might fit into the new EU led structures.  The ICG commented that: 
 
“ …despite the new [PISG] ministries and the ISSR, which is meant to 
produce Kosovo’s own proposal for security services configuration, 
UNMIK continues to be the driving force behind new security 
initiatives” (2006b, p.4). 
 
Thus UNMIK staff was displaying the classic behaviour, described by Law (2008, 
p.59), whereby they sought to dominate Kosovo’s security agenda by surrounding 
themselves with like-minded actors and excluding those who might oppose them.  
Through these unwieldy committees they strived to maintain their legitimacy over 
security issues and to position themselves to the best advantage in relation to the PISG 
and the EU.  
 
However, despite the attempt to gain consensus of opinion, the UNMIK 
security working groups found their existence constantly under threat as they sought 
to remain relevant to the changing environment.(19)  The UNMIK Security Working 
Group Steering Committee was to be chaired by the new arrived Principal DSRSG, 
Steven Schook.  The size of the committees, designed in part to enhance the control 
of the security agenda by UNMIK, had the effect of making consensus difficult.  The 
need to form coalitions among the multiple autonomous actors slowed the decision-
making process and the relationships among the committee members often were 
strained.  Schook, after discovering that the Steering Committee had little direction or 
purpose, handed the responsibility for chairing the meetings to the KPC Coordinator, 
Major General Christopher Steirn. 
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Hermann & Hermann (1981, pp.209-232) have noted the problems associated 
with multiple autonomous actors and suggest that issues of personal ambition and 
status within the group can influence them.  Schook did not want to be linked with a 
failing structure so early in his tenure and Steirn, having been given the role of 
chairman, needed to demonstrate that he could turn the situation around. (20)  Steirn, 
fearing that the UMIK Security Working Groups would collapse because of lack of 
direction, convinced the Kosovo Contact Group that he should be formally instructed 
to produce a matrix for the orderly hand-over of responsibilities from UNMIK to 
either the EU or PISG.(21)  A member of the ISSR Secretariat commented after 
attending a Steering Committee Meeting, “Steirn suddenly found his Committee had 
a role so he could barely contain his excitement”.  However, dissent within the 
Steering Committee continued as the UN, NATO and OSCE vied for position. (22) 
 
The role of human actors and their decision-making environment will affect 
both the decision-making process and the outcome (Alison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43).  
Thus an essential element in the consideration of decision-making is the forum in 
which the decisions are made, taking account of the personality of the decision-
makers and the internal and external pressures they experience.  This mixture of 
human agency and the bargaining forum creates a predisposition for rivalry and 
competition (Biermann, 2007).  Thus the process of defining the security sector in 
Kosovo and handing over of control to the Kosovar authorities was not going to be 
achieved as easily as some international officials, including the SRSG and 
COMKFOR, had hoped.   
 
Throughout his time as SRSG, Jessen-Peterson had asserted that the ISSR 
programme was one of his top priorities but when the UN Secretary-General’s report 
to the Security Council on Kosovo was published ISSR did not feature.  A SSDAT 
official commented: 
“We have just had sight here of the latest Secretary-General’s report on 
Kosovo and, what do you know, there is not a single mention of ISSR, 
even in the dedicated security section. With [ISSR] advertisement 
hoardings all over Kosovo, one has to wonder what planet UNMIK are 
on, especially as they requested the programme.” (23) 
 
Thus, Jessen-Peterson’s support for the programme and for local ownership of 
the security sector largely was disregarded both in UNNY and by his own staff.   
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Veton Surroi, a leading Kosovar politician, aptly summed up the position of 
Kosovo’s SRSG, “You will have god-like status in Kosovo, but no real power.  The 
fact that you are omnipotent with a UN mandate does not add up to much” (2004, 
p.1).  The position of a UN Special Representative is always a difficult one.  
Although the figurehead of the UN Organisation in the field, they are seldom trusted 
in New York and often find that their decisions are undermined. Vieira De Mello 
found himself in this position both when SRSG in East Timor in 1999 and Iraq in 
2003 (Power, 2008).  This was certainly the case in Kosovo; “…the tendency [of 
UNNY] to second guess their people on the ground…significantly reduced the UN 
Kosovo mission’s ability to deal with crises and press forward advantages at key 
moments” (Ashdown, 2007, p. 170).  Annoyed by UNNY’s interference, Bernard 
Kouchner, when SRSG in Kosovo, placed on the door of his office a sign that read, 
“UN Motto: No good deed goes unpunished, no bad deed goes unrewarded.”(24) 
Suspicion and the need to assert authority over the field mission was a feature of the 
UN’s handling of UNMIK leading to Eide’s (2004, pp. 4-5) assertion that UNMIK 
was used by the DPKO to keep the lid on the Kosovo situation.  
 
 In June 2006, UNMIK produced a report reflecting the key findings derived 
from their proposals on future international arrangements in Kosovo.  The eighty-
four-page report (Wesslau, 2006) did not mention the ISSR’s recommendations for 
the orderly handover of security responsibilities to the PISG.  A UN official remarked 
that the work seemed, “largely concerned with preserving positions for currently in-
post UNMIK international staff after the conclusion of UNSCR 1244.” (25)  Indeed, 
this attitude had become the tenor of the UNMIK mission.  Higate and Henry (2009, 
p.69) noted that, in 2006, Kosovo had become “a ‘cushy’ tour for UN Staff … and 
that the longer the tensions existed, the longer these privileged individuals were able 
to enjoy the relative safety of the province.”  Therefore there was unwillingness 
among many UN officials to work at finding solutions for Kosovo.  This 
organisational culture, Higate and Henry assert, was more “a matter of contingency 
rather than outright conspiracy” (2009, p.69). 
 
In this atmosphere of institutional foot-dragging, it was the ISSR’s concern 
with matters outside the strictly traditional view of SSR that seemed to exasperate 
those who saw the governance of Kosovo as their business.  A number of officials, 
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both in Kosovo and in the wider international community, suggested that a 
shortcoming of the ISSR was that, although it pointed to the problems facing the 
security sector in the province, it did not satisfactorily present solutions to these 
problems.  One official concerned with Kosovo’s security and development suggested 
that the “threats were not adequately linked to remedies” (26).  He used the example 
that, when dealing with the economy, the report recommended strengthening the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry’s (MTI) capacity to attract foreign investment but it 
did not describe how this was to be achieved.  A prominent economic expert was 
Joachim Rücker, who was to become Jessen-Peterson’s successor as SRSG in 
Kosovo.  Foord suggests that:  
“As the former head of the EU pillar of the interim administration, 
Rücker had been the official with the greatest responsibility for the 
economic development of Kosovo…he was perhaps less than 
welcoming of a review that could be seen to be trespassing on his 
territory and moreover, a report that stated what needed doing, without 
answering the question of how (2007, p. 47). 
 
The ISSR Secretariat experienced hostility from several other international 
institutions.  An ISSR team member commented that the European Commission (EC) 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) had made it clear that they regarded 
economic development as “their job.”  Their view was that it was the task of the 
Kosovo Development Strategy and Plan (KDSP) to make macro-economic 
recommendations.  Whilst the ISSR Secretariat was invited to contribute material to 
the KDSP, the economists involved in the KDSP were unprepared to return the 
favour (27).  The propensity for rivalry was to overcome the need for cooperation. 
 
The ISSR was working in line with OECD DAC and UNDP principles, which 
proposed that development and security policies should be integrated.  These 
principles also determined that SSR should be founded on multi-sectoral strategies, 
based on an assessment of the security needs of the people and the state (OECD 
DAC, 2007; UNDP, 1994).  However, there was concern, within the international 
community in Kosovo, that these values were not adequately reflected in the ISSR 
programme, “because of a lack of cooperation between the review team and 
international economic expertise” (Foord, 2007, p. 48).  Lafay (2000, pp. 47-63) 
points to the presence of inter-level rivalry in the management of information in 
bureaucratic settings, which mirror the lack of trust between international 
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organisations in Kosovo.  In this case the lack of cooperation was to undermine the 
effectiveness of the ISSR programme’s economic review. 
 
Some IGO relationships with the ISSR Secretariat were clearly strained.  The 
ISSR researchers felt that they were regarded as latecomers and interlopers in Kosovo 
and that many officials considered that the responsibility for a security review should 
lie with them and not with UNDP.  As the scope of the ISSR became more widely 
known there was concern among officials that their departments would be criticised 
in the ISSR Final Report and that their personal positions could be undermined.  The 
imperative to preserve reputations and, ultimately, employment prospects appeared to 
infuse any issue concerning the work of UNMIK and other institutions or agencies.  
Additionally, there seemed to be a form of denial prevalent in UNMIK that prevented 
many officials from accepting that their influence in Kosovo was drawing to a close.  
Several UNMIK officials were so confident that they would be in Kosovo for many 
years to come that they moved their wives and children from their home country to 
Kosovo despite UNMIK being a non-family mission. (28) 
 
7.2.3. Cooperation or Assimilation: UNOSEK and ISSR. 
 
The most important organisation for the ISSR Secretariat, after UNMIK, was 
the UNOSEK, which was overseeing negotiations on the future status of the province.  
The delays in the start of the ISSR programme meant that it could not finish the 
review before UNOSEK started its work, as had been envisaged by the SSDAT.  
Therefore, although there was no formal connection between the two organisations it 
was essential that, given the overlap in timing of the two processes, the ISSR worked 
closely with UNOSEK.   
 
Towards the end of 2005, the international administration in Kosovo faced the 
possibility that the province might, within eighteen months, become the first post-
colonial state to emerge in Europe since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.   In October 
2005, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decided that the time had come to 
settle the future of the province.  He announced that he would appoint the former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy for the future status process 
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for Kosovo.  The Security Council approved the appointment in November 2005 
(UNOSEK, 2006).   
 
Given the parallel paths to be taken by UNOSEK and ISSR, it was agreed that 
the ISSR Coordinator regularly would brief the UNOSEK staff.  He would present an 
interim report on the review process in early June 2006, followed up by a fuller report 
in September 2006.  To assist in the passage of information, President Ahtisaari 
appointed Brigadier General Dennis Blease, a NATO officer seconded to UNOSEK, 
as the liaison officer between UNOSEK and ISSR.   
 
Once the relationship between the two organisations was established, the 
UNOSEK insisted on the right to embargo publication of any recommendations from 
the ISSR that they felt might jeopardise the Final Status negotiating process. This was 
particularly relevant in the case of determining the need for a future Defence Force 
for Kosovo.  The creation of a Defence Force was viewed by the Serbs and some 
European states as unacceptable, given the presence of a large NATO force in the 
province and the history of the KLA and its linkages to the KPC.  The Kosovar 
Albanians, however, generally were resolute that the KPC would form the basis for a 
national Army once independence was declared.  The ISSR, after due consideration, 
decided that they would recommend the creation of a small Kosovo Defence Force, 
after independence, drawn from all citizens of Kosovo.  The UNOSEK requested an 
embargo on this draft recommendation until after the meeting in Vienna, at the end of 
July 2006, when the Albanian and Serbian negotiating teams were to face each other 
for the first time.  It transpired that the fortuitous timing of the publication of an ICG 
Report ‘An Army for Kosovo’ (2006, July 28) allowed the ISSR Secretariat, with the 
agreement of UNOSEK, to promote their ideas, using the medium of the ICG Report, 
without giving the negotiators cause for alarm. 
 
Contrary to the experience with other UN organisations, cooperation between 
UNOSEK and ISSR was achieved with only a limited amount of opposition from 
some members of Ahtisaari’s team.  However, all was not completely 
straightforward; there was palpable tension at the first meeting in Vienna, in March 
2006, held to discuss the strategy for ISSR and its relationship with the UNOSEK.  
Some UNOSEK officials were suspicious of the ISSR programme believing that it 
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could hinder their work.  Opposition to the ISSR was confined to two groups within 
the UNOSEK structure; the representatives of the US Government and those who had 
served with UNMIK.  Their objections were largely based on two factors; in the case 
of the US officials, the objective was to ensure that the UNOSEK process was 
completed on time and with the result required by the US Government; the political 
independence of Kosovo.  These officials were suspicious of any parallel programme 
that might be used by either the Albanian or Serbian negotiating teams to delay or 
derail this objective.  The second group was officials that were closely linked to 
UNMIK (and would return to it once the UNOSEK mission was completed).  They 
carried with them the prejudices related to the UNDP and its ability to fulfil the ISSR 
remits (29).  
 
The firm support for the programme, displayed by President Ahtisaari, 
ensured that the two endeavours were able to co-exist and to cooperate.  Ahtisaari 
was briefed on the final recommendations of the ISSR Report in November 2006 and, 
despite lingering objections from some of his officials, endorsed them.  In this case, 
Ahtisaari clearly demonstrated the attributes of the predominant leader; “A man of 
great authority, he ran his office with the proverbial iron fist in a velvet glove. 
Everyone knew who was in charge” (30).  Consequently, the security section of the 
UNOSEK recommendations for Kosovo’s final status bears a close resemblance to 
the ISSR recommendations for the Kosovo’s Security Architecture (see Cleland 
Welch, et al, 2006 pp. 134-153 and United Nations Security Council, 2007, p. 49). 
 
Thus, elements of the transformative strategies described by Law (2008, p.58) 
were at work, with the ISSR integrating with UNOSEK, less in a formal manner than 
as a collaborating body cooperating for mutual benefit.  UNOSEK‘s focus on 
working in harmony with the ISSR team was because it had a clearly defined 
objective that had to be completed in a finite timescale.  There were no personal 
reputations at stake or threats to continuing employment, as was the case with 
UNMIK.  Cooperation, including taking note of the preferences of partners, was 
demonstrated.  However, in reality, UNOSEK always was the dominant player, with 
ISSR requiring its acceptance of their findings and recommendations, despite being 
an independent body.  UNOSEK was able to cooperate with ISSR because it provided 
a means of airing possibly unpalatable recommendations ahead of any formal 
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UNOSEK statement.  Nevertheless, one UNOSEK official was clear that, had the 
ISSR made recommendations that ran contrary to Ahtisaari’s wishes, these proposals 
would certainly have been prohibited or their publication delayed until after the 
UNOSEK recommendations had been made public. (31) 
 
7.3. The Implications of Interpersonal Rivalry  
 
Collective social behaviour is motivated by the requirement for emotional association 
coupled with the need for status and the achievement of personal goals (Meilaender, 
2003; Druckman, 1994).  However, Kosterman and Fesbach, (1989) suggest that the 
relationship between an individual’s positive attitude to his peers and associates and 
negative feelings towards others are largely based on in-group loyalties.  In the 
context of IGOs there exists opportunities for inter-personal rivalry and competition 
based on the nature of the duties performed by functionaries and their corresponding 
relationship with officials from other organisations.  The greater the domain 
similarity the more intense the animosity can be.  In several cases this was borne out 
by experiences during the ISSR programme.  
 
A part of the Office of the SRSG for Kosovo was the Advisory Unit for 
Security (AUS), which had been created to coordinate the actions of KFOR and 
UNMIK Pillar 2 within the security sector.  The AUS was partnered with a new entity 
in the PISG, the Office for Public Safety (OPS) and the AUS and OPS were, by 
default, to become the drivers for the activation of the ISSR.  The AUS consisted of 
only four people, of whom only one had any military or security sector experience.  
Nevertheless in late 2005, in the absence of the ISSR Secretariat under the control of 
UNDP, this small team was made responsible by the SRSG for setting up the internal 
security review process.  There was some satisfaction in the DPKO Pillar 2 of 
UNMIK that UNDP had fallen at the first fence.  One official remarked, “UNDP had 
lived up to their reputation... they were totally ineffectual.” (32) 
 
However, the SRSG’s initiative to appoint his AUS as the activation unit for 
the ISSR was to have repercussions.  The Head of the AUS, having taken 
responsibility for the programme, proved reluctant to hand over to the ISSR 
Secretariat once it was formed.  He insisted that he undertook all briefing of senior 
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officials, including the SRSG, Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), Contact Group, the 
UNOSEK Team and the EU, on ISSR matters.  Indeed, the Senior Political Adviser to 
the SRSG was so confused over the ownership of ISSR that, when the newly 
appointed ISSR Coordinator called to brief the SRSG in late January 2006, he was 
directed to the Head of the AUS as ‘he was running the ISSR.” (33) 
 
The AUS also organised, early in 2006, a Donor Conference in conjunction 
with the British Office in Pristina for the funding of security sector capacity building 
initiatives.  This ran contrary to the ISSR methodology, which called for the views of 
the local community, and their leaders to help shape the security related capacity 
building measures to be adopted.  This issue was to create a rift between the ISSR 
Secretariat and the AUS.  It was only a combination of the Head of the AUS reaching 
the end of his tour of duty and the confusion among the donor community, over 
which organisation was to be the custodian of their funds, which ensured that the 
AUS finally gave up its hold on the process.  Nevertheless, the episode created 
distrust between the AUS and ISSR, which were not overcome during the lifetime of 
the programme. (34)   
 
At the beginning of 2006, the AUS had only been established for a few 
months and the first Head of Office was a newly promoted Colonel with ambition to 
undertake further UN employment.  He was new to the UN system and keen to make 
his mark in UNMIK.  His deputy, a statistician with no background in security 
matters, also was keen to further his career.  He had applied for a post in the UN 
Secretariat in New York, in the security field, and wanted to ensure that his superiors 
in UNMIK would support his application.(35)  Duckitt (1989) and Berry (1984) 
believe that there is a direct link between the feelings of confidence within a group 
and the relationship with others outside that group.  The leaders of the AUS needed to 
prove their worth within UNMIK and it is possible that they saw the ISSR as an 
impediment to their ability to demonstrate their control over security sector matters in 
Kosovo.  These feelings of insecurity and the need to further their personal ambitions 
led to ambivalence over the ISSR programme.(36)  Neustadt (1972, p.78) has noted 
that, “the personal is tightly interwoven with the institutional” and the marriage of 
organisational competition and personal rivalry was evident throughout the life of the 
ISSR programme.  In Chapter Two it was noted that many sociological 
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institutionalists emphasise the interactive character of the relationship between 
organisations and individual action.  Individuals characterise themselves as actors by 
engaging in acts that reinforce the network in which they are involved and the 
institutional world provides a means of accomplishing this imperative. 
 
Van de Ven and Walker (1984, p. 601) have suggested that rivalry presupposes 
a state of domain similarity, which implies a shared issue area with related overlaps 
of competency.  This overlap became a major obstacle in Kosovo and the difficulties 
over who was in charge were to continue to create competition and rivalry. (37)  In 
2006 the European Commission began to prepare for the expected downsizing of 
UNMIK and the hand-over of monitoring responsibilities to the EU.  However, the 
Commission was slow to build up its team in the province.  By July 2006, there were 
just 26 EU planners in Kosovo and discussions with the UN had begun only in June.  
UNMIK SRSG Jessen-Peterson realised that it would be helpful to bring the EU into 
the ISSR process and therefore appointed Torbjörn Sohlström, the Personal 
Representative of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) in Pristina, as Deputy Chairman of the ISSR Steering Committee.(38)  
This appointment signalled the increasingly important role that the EU would play in 
the future of Kosovo. 
 
Sohlström was initially pleased to be afforded a leading position on the ISSR 
Steering Committee and with the acknowledgment of the EU’s future pivotal role in 
Kosovo.  However, he soon became disillusioned by the process as he was rarely 
consulted on security matters by the UNMIK AUS and KFOR and felt that the ISSR 
Steering Committee international members did not show him due deference.(39)  This 
situation arose due to the continuing struggle for dominance of the security sector.(40)  
The COMKFOR also was reluctant to discuss military matters with Sohlström, given 
that EU role would be confined to monitoring progress in the area of rule of law and 
governance.(41)  The situation worsened when Joachim Rücker who had replaced 
Jessen-Peterson as the SRSG decided that, as he was unable to attend the third ISSR 
Steering Committee (and his first as SRSG), he wanted his Principal DSRSG (who 
did not have a seat on the Steering Committee) to take the chair in his absence.  He 
was dissuaded from following this course of action by his political advisers, who 
could see the diplomatic difficulties that this action could engender.  However, 
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Rücker decided to cancel the meeting, despite the wishes of the President and Prime 
Minister of Kosovo to meet under Sohlström’s chairmanship. (42) 
 
Two issues brought about these difficulties; firstly, the UNMIK leadership 
was resentful of the EU’s growing influence in the province.  Increasingly, the PISG 
were consulting the EU representative rather than the UNMIK SRSG as they 
perceived that the future of Kosovo lay in eventual membership of the EU.  In the 
manner of a lame-duck administration, UNMIK was seen to be shedding power and 
influence and the media and the PISG were constantly alluding to its perceived errors.  
The EU, on the other hand, was seen to be essential to the future economic survival of 
Kosovo and to hold the prospect of eventual EU membership, something the UNMIK 
was never able to promise, let alone bestow.  The Prime Minister Thaçi was to state, 
after the declaration of independence, that:  
 “The EU mission was invited by … Kosovo; it is therefore welcomed by 
us and all the citizens.  It will fulfil its role in accordance with the mandate 
given to it, as it is a counselling mission and not a parallel mission with 
Kosovar institutions.  Kosovo has a European perspective…Kosovo’s 
vision is very clear, integration into EU and NATO” (Radio Free Europe, 
2008). (43) 
 
The Kosovo Early Warning Report noted that UNMIK's approval rating in July 2006 
stood at 30 %, falling to 28% in October, and that it constantly ranked as the least 
respected organisation in Kosovo (USAID, 2006, p.13).   
 
The nature of the personalities involved also was a factor; Sohlström was thirty-
four years old and the personal appointee of Solana.  He therefore wished to 
demonstrate a proactive role for the EU in Kosovo with himself as the leading actor.  
Rücker was 55 years old and wary of anything to do with security.  His previous high 
administrative positions, before coming to Kosovo, had been as Mayor of the City of 
Sindelfingen in Baden-Württemberg in Germany and Head of Finance and Budget in 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Sarajevo; he was therefore an 
economist with limited experience in post conflict security. (44)  Rücker relied upon 
Principal DSRSG, Steven Schook, for advice on all matters to do with the military 
and internal security.  Schook had been a Brigadier General in the US Army and had 
previously served in KFOR.  Rücker also had a German COMKFOR and, given his 
nervousness over security issues, leaned heavily on both his American Deputy and 
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the German Military Commander for advice.  A UNMIK Regional Administrator 
believed that: 
“Rücker was completely out of his depth.  He had been put in to see 
UNMIK out of Kosovo, when it was thought that independence was 
imminent.  As a former mayor and accountant he was in a situation he 
was not qualified to handle.” (45) 
 
In the event, Sohlström did not attend another Steering Committee meeting.  
The move to bring the EU closer to the ISSR process had miscarried.  The 
relationship between the EU and UNMIK was further strained when no decision was 
taken in the UNSC over international oversight of the new state.  An NGO official in 
Kosovo suggested that: 
“The EU is struggling to establish itself north of the Ibar [River], and the 
south is far from a done deal.  Brussels was counting on a Security 
Council resolution that would have asked UNMIK to pack up … and 
establish the EU as the new top man in town, but this didn't happen.  So 
EU [personnel] are being deployed throughout Kosovo and find 
themselves stepping on UNMIK counterparts who are still firmly on the 
job, with no instruction as to any departure or handover… The ICO is 
lacking the legal basis of a UN Security Council resolution to back its 
executive powers and potential interventions, so we are faced with two 
agencies claiming executive powers, UNMIK and the ICO (46). 
 
 
 The relationship between UNMIK and KFOR was vital to the international 
administration in Kosovo.  These two organisations bore the brunt of the work to 
establish a secure and functioning society out of the post-conflict chaos of June 1999.  
At the beginning of the ISSR process, KFOR was commanded by General Giuseppe 
Valotto of Italy who showed enthusiasm for the programme.  A factor influencing his 
support was the relationship between UNMIK and other organisations working in 
Kosovo.  Successive UN SRSGs had been resentful that they had little jurisdiction 
over the KFOR Commanders (COMKFOR) who reported to and received instructions 
from the NATO headquarters in Brussels.  King and Mason (2006, p.149) comment 
that: 
“The level of coordination, control and communication between the 
military and civilian sides of the international administration depended 
upon the personal dynamics between the KFOR Commander and the 
SRSG”.   
 
A number of the military commanders since 1999 had made it clear that they 
intended to run their operation as they saw fit with little regard to UNMIK’s political 
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intentions or strategies (King and Mason, 2006, p.150).  The propensity for rivalry 
between NATO and other IGOs has already been noted earlier in this work and is 
recounted in some depth by Cascone (2008, pp.143-158) who suggests that there is an 
element of ‘muddling through’ in the relationship between NATO and other 
organisations in the field.  Indeed, approaches to the normalisation strategy for 
Kosovo differed between the COMKFOR.  Higate and Henry (2009, p. 68) point to 
the difficulties inherent in KFORs peacekeeping role which “perpetuated and 
reinforced” the distance between ethnic groups in the province by “providing too 
much security” for minority groups in their enclaves.  KFOR sought to protect 
minorities from attacks by helping to secure ethnic enclaves.  This spatial separation 
contributed to a hardening of ethnic divisions and ran contrary to the stated UNMIK 
aim of a multi-ethnic society. 
 
Nevertheless, in at least one area KFOR tried to encourage integration between 
Serbs and Albanians.  Shopping days were organised to allow Serbs to move freely in 
the Albanian-dominated town of Gnjilane, which, whilst not making the town multi-
ethnic, allowed a degree of normalcy for the Serbian population (King & Mason, 
2006, p.112).  As an adherent to this more open policy General Valotto saw an 
opportunity, through the ISSR, to engage more closely with the communities.  He 
also noted the reluctance of the UNMIK AUS to connect with the programme once 
the ISSR Secretariat had been established.  This lack of UNMIK enthusiasm gave 
him the opportunity to support ISSR efforts with KFOR resources and, consequently, 
be involved in determining Kosovo’s future security structure. (47) 
 
General Valotto noted that the ISSR did not have the necessary resources to 
undertake a full survey of the perceptions of security in the community.  He therefore 
offered his military Liaison and Monitoring Teams (LMT) to assist the ISSR 
Secretariat gather this information.  He also invited ISSR Team members to 
accompany him on visits to Municipal Mayors.  Almost at once, difficulties arose 
from the General’s open attitude; UNMIK officials, who believed that he was 
interfering in civilian matters, frowned upon his visits to the Municipalities.  The 
General was annoyed by this reaction and cooperation with the ISSR ceased.(48)  His 
irritation with UNMIK remained until the end of his mission.  On leaving his post in 
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August 2006, he remarked that the ISSR Coordinator would need a great deal of luck 
to complete his mission given the attitude of some highly placed UN officials. (49) 
 
The incidence of inter-personal discord was not confined to UNMIK.  In the 
autumn of 2005, meetings took place between the OSCE Deputy Head of Mission 
(DHoM), UNMIK and SSDAT to discuss the possibility of OSCE hosting the ISSR 
process.  After a number of discussions, and consultation with the OSCE 
Headquarters in Vienna, this proposal was rejected.  A senior official, who was to 
become the main interlocutor between OSCE and the ISSR Secretariat during 2006, 
believed that the OSCE Mission in Kosovo did not feel that it had a mandate for SSR, 
being authorised for only institutional capacity building within the province.  He 
further believed that, as the ISSR process was initially unclear and wholly unfamiliar 
to the OSCE management, they were reluctant to become involved.  Consequently, as 
there was no one at senior level in the Kosovo Mission with SSR experience, it was 
decided to reject the proposal. (50) 
 
The OSCE Head of Mission (HoM), Werner Wendt, represented Pillar 3 on 
the ISSR Steering Committee and as the ISSR process became clearer OSCE Kosovo 
took a closer interest in the programme.  Their senior officials realised that there was 
a distinct institutional and capacity building element in the methodology.  The Deputy 
Head of Mission (DHoM), Jens Modvig, saw synergy and, perhaps, overlap in the 
OSCE and ISSR mandates and advocated closer OSCE involvement in the 
programme.  
 
This closer association took several forms; the OSCE recently had 
reconstituted its field structure within the 32 Municipalities of Kosovo.  There was a 
realisation that the public outreach process of the ISSR was a unique opportunity for 
the OSCE field teams to get a better understanding of local issues.  At this early 
phase, the ISSR public outreach programme was proving difficult to translate into 
action on the ground.  Seeing a role for his organisation, Modvig offered the services 
of the OSCE Community Safety Programme as the vehicle for arranging and 
conducting public consultations.  
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As the OSCE grew more confident of their involvement in ISSR, Modvig 
established and chaired an OSCE Internal Security Development Coordination 
Working Group, which was much influenced by the ISSR methodology.  However, 
the HoM did not support this initiative; a senior OSCE official suggests that, due to 
acute personal differences between Wendt and Modvig, the Working Group was not 
allowed to fully cooperate with the ISSR programme.  In addition, Wendt did not 
relay the recommendations of his Deputy to the ISSR Steering Committee.  The 
OSCE official commented that, “if Modvig suggested one thing, then Wendt would 
do the opposite.”(51) 
 
Personal relationships are largely founded on interaction and inter-personal 
communication (Anderson and Neistadt, 2003, p.3).  Generally, a deficiency of trust 
and the resultant breakdown in communication are at the heart of deteriorating inter-
personal relations.  The lack of trust can be promoted by competition and the 
resulting emotional reaction to it.  It can also be provoked by a clash of personalities, 
which, inter alia, may be the result of a lack of effective communication between 
individuals.  Thus it is argued that these tendencies to promote and protect the self, in 
relation to others, exist in individuals working within international organisations and, 
in the case of the ISSR programme, influenced the understanding of what it was 
trying to achieve. 
 
7.4. State Influence on the ISSR Programme 
 
Those states that had an interest in the future status of Kosovo and its effect on the 
wider Balkans region wanted to have a basic understanding of the methodology and 
progress of the ISSR programme.  Donor and Contact Group member state views on, 
and aspirations for, Kosovo were to impact on the programme.  Pressure to conform 
to a particular standpoint was placed on the ISSR Secretariat by these states, often 
through functionaries working within international organisations.  The reasons for 
such pressure were not always readily apparent as they formed a ‘sub-plot’ to the 
larger act being played out in the international arena.  This was not an unusual 
occurrence; Webster and Walker (2009, p. 31) note that balancing pressures from 
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governments, donors, partners and beneficiaries are a particular source of tension in 
field operations.  
 
7.4.1. The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom, having started the Kosovo ISSR process with the UK 
Government sponsored SSDAT as its main architect, displayed a waning of 
enthusiasm for the task.  Beyond the UK’s public face on SSR there was rivalry 
between the MOD, DFID and the FCO.  This was based on a disagreement over 
which Ministry held primacy for policymaking on SSR and its relationship to 
development.(52)  The MOD believed that security reform, a type of defence 
diplomacy, was its responsibility and should be largely restricted to the traditional 
areas of the first generation SSR.  A comment made, by a senior MOD official to a 
member of SSDAT, on the ISSR methodology was that it should have “stuck to 
creating a Ministry of Defence for Kosovo.”(53)  DFID viewed SSR more broadly 
with development at the centre of the process.  Meanwhile, the FCO had become 
increasingly concerned that the MOD and DFID were straying into their areas of 
expertise and responsibility and that SSR and defence diplomacy should be subjected 
to FCO oversight and direction (54).  Indeed, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard is of the 
opinion that, “there is not doubt that inter-institutional jealousy was present in the 
reaction of the FCO to the MOD’s growing involvement in defence diplomacy.”(55) 
 
Another facet to this problem was that both the FCO and DFID had ongoing 
projects in Kosovo, which ran parallel to the work of the ISSR.  DFID had the 
Kosovo Development Strategy and Plan (KDSP) process, which aimed to provide a 
strategic vision for Kosovo thus allowing the PISG to allocate its resources more 
effectively and to better co-ordinate donor inputs behind Government priorities.  It 
also had a Public Administration Reform programme designed to build capacity for 
policymaking, planning and coordination at the centre of government.  Finally, DFID 
ran a Functional Review of Ministries project, which was intended to help identify 
and develop new functions for the Government should a final status solution, be 
found. 
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The FCO British Office in Pristina was responsible for the Global Conflict 
Prevention Pool (GCPP) programme for Kosovo on behalf of DFID and the MOD.  
The GCPP was established in March 2001 with the aim of reducing conflict, 
including the potential for war.  The FCO had responsibility for GCPP projects 
related to dealing with organised crime and strengthening democracy and inter-ethnic 
relations; DFID were accountable for projects related to safety, security and access to 
justice; and the MOD for projects related to SSR.  Two senior UK Government 
officials suggest that it was inevitable that the representatives of all three 
organisations were wary of ISSR and how it might impact on the projects being 
funded through the GCPP. (56) 
 
Notwithstanding their internal disputes, the three UK Government 
Departments were remarkably unified in the face of perceived interference in their 
projects by the ISSR Secretariat.  DFID had reason to fear the influence of the ISSR 
as they were responsible for the far reaching and costly KDSP project which was due 
to report at about the same time as the ISSR.  It seemed incongruous that a 
Department of State, which co-sponsored the SSDAT, was financing and managing a 
parallel project.  A DFID official based in London suggests that the only explanation 
was that it had failed to grasp the meaning of holistic SSR and believed that ISSR 
would not stray beyond dealing with military, police and judicial matters.(57)  
Whatever the reason, the result of DFID’s reluctance to engage at strategic level was 
to influence the reactions of officials in the field, so serving to transmute “…the 
initial enthusiasm for ISSR into a position amounting to denigration.” (58) 
 
The MOD and FCO had combined their efforts on GCPP, which was managed 
from the British Office in Pristina by a Lieutenant Colonel, who acted as the Defence 
Adviser.  Relations between the British Office and the ISSR Secretariat rapidly 
became strained because of the considerable overlap in their work and the British 
Office’s support for DFID’s refusal of further funding to the ISSR Secretariat.(59)  
The situation was not helped by the British Office’s encouragement for the UNMIK 
AUS’s security support donor conference described earlier in this Chapter.  
 
In mid June 2006, when the ISSR Coordinator requested additional funds for 
ISSR from the UK, the Defence Adviser told him that there would be no further 
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funding from the MOD, DFID or FCO.  The distancing of the UK from UNDP 
security reform activities did not end with the ISSR.  In August 2007, the UK 
declined to contribute to the funding of the UNDP Support to Security Sector 
Development (3SD) Project, which was to implement the recommendations of 
ISSR.(60)  In March 2008, after Kosovo’s independence had been declared and the 
UK had recognised the Republic of Kosova, the British Office refused a request by 
UNDP 3SD Project Manager to organise a briefing by the UK FCO, MOD and the 
Government Communications Unit in London for the new Kosova Government 
Security Adviser.  DFID then announced that 3SD was to be ‘MOD-led’ as far as the 
UK interests were concerned.  For its part, an MOD official is reported to have 
declared “we are not in the market for a ‘son of ISSR’ offering more theoretical and 
conceptual stuff which UNDP and some others are gearing up for”.  This official then 
emailed the 3SD Project Manager stating that the British Office would be advising all 
UK Government Departments not to support the UNDP 3SD initiative.(61)  There 
was, therefore, a continuation of the UK policy of non-support to the Kosovo SSR 
process under the auspices of the UNDP.  Over a period of eighteen months the UK 
had changed its position from sponsoring UNDP’s security sector efforts in Kosovo 
to withdrawing support for it.  However, the GCPP fund continued to contribute to 
security initiatives in Kosovo on a bi-lateral basis.(62)  Thus, having been established 
during 2006, the animosity between DFID and UNDP continued and increased; a 
situation which accorded with Colaresi & Thompson’s, (2002, pp. 265, 269) view 
that prejudice and negative opinions accumulate with time.  Unsympathetic images 
are formed and hostility emerges.  Suspicion becomes a major restraint to the 
development of trusting relations between the opposing sides and, therefore, 
organisations involved in protracted rivalry are prone to distrust each other's motives 
(Tetlock, 1998, pp.868-912; Vasquez, 1996, pp. 548-549). 
 
 7.4.2. The Federal Republic of Germany 
 
Germany’s participation in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 represented a turning 
point for Germany foreign and defence policy in relation to the use of military force 
in crisis management.  The deployment of German troops on Operation Allied Force, 
the 1999 NATO air campaign, and thereafter on PSOs in Kosovo signalled that 
Germany’s constitutional post war reluctance to burden share in deployments 
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alongside NATO allies had been overcome.  However, Germany still remained a 
cautious actor where troop deployment was concerned, despite its seeming sea 
change in the late nineties (Miskimmon, 2008, p.1).  
 
 Germany had maintained a considerable degree of continuity in its foreign 
and security policy after unification, which included a desire not to take part in large-
scale military operations.  In 1999, Germany’s presidency of the G8 and the 
EU/WEU gave credence to its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo 
crisis, thereby demonstrating to the German people that its participation in the 
Kosovo air campaign was very much a last resort.  The decision to be involved in the 
Kosovo mission brought about significant adjustments in German foreign policy after 
1999.  These included the development of the Bundeswehr as a globally deployable 
force and the emergence of Germany as a leading actor in crisis management 
operations, largely within ESDP.  It also generated an acceptance of Germany’s 
international responsibilities within the majority opinion in the Bundestag, where 
constitutionally all deployments of the Bundeswehr are debated (Miskimmon, 2008, 
pp. 2-3). 
 
There was not, however, complete consensus within Germany on involvement 
in Kosovo; the use of military force had been a difficult issue for policy-makers since 
the end of the Cold War, to which was added sensitivities concerning Germany’s role 
in the Balkans during World War Two and the Luftwaffe’s bombing of Belgrade.  In 
addition the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Green Party coalition government 
had strongly held convictions, on non-violent means for solving crises, to overcome.  
Nevertheless when the Kosovo dilemma emerged Joschka Fischer, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, was inclined towards action stating, “…I haven’t only learned no 
more war, I’ve also learned no more Auschwitz” (Financial Times, 1999, p.3).  The 
Green Party was not entirely convinced that Germany should support NATO in 
Kosovo; Hans-Christian Ströbele summed up the difficulties when he stated,  “ I am 
ashamed for my country that is again conducting war in Kosovo and again throwing 
bombs on Belgrade” (Friedrich, 2000, p.18).  Gerhard Schröder also faced opposition 
in the SDP, including confrontation with Oskar Lafontaine who was opposed to 
action in Kosovo.  Nevertheless, Fischer was able to survive a party debate in May 
1999 which, had he lost, would have brought down the SDP/Green coalition.  He 
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proposed a motion for a ceasefire to resume diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities.  
This ‘Fischer Plan’ was eventually to evolve into the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe (Miskimmon, 2008, p. 5).  
 
Germany’s ability to continue to successfully balance its internal and external 
difficulties in the crisis management arena has regressed since the late 1990s.  
Disagreements over the question of armed action were to come to the fore again, in 
the new millennium, when Germany was at odds with the US over the Bush 
Administration’s policies post the 9/11 attacks.  The pressure on the Atlantic Alliance 
was considerable and Germany found itself at the forefront of the argument. The 
break in relationships became very public with Condoleeza Rice’s pronouncement 
that the USA would, “punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia” and 
Donald Rumsfeld’s denouncement of the Franco-German European alliance for their 
opposition to the Iraq invasion in 2003. (63) 
 
The lessening of transatlantic influence was to impact on Germany’s 
confidence in terms of forming a coherent foreign and security policy.  This 
confidence gap was further enhanced by the EU enlargement to 27 states, which 
made it more difficult for Germany and other older member states to continue to 
assert their influence on the workings of the EU.  The Iraq invasion and its 
consequences for Germany highlighted the difficulty that faces a middle ranking 
power which had been reliant on multilateral cooperation at times of stress in the 
international community. 
In the early 2000s Germany began to regain confidence in its ability to operate 
through multinational interaction; it took control of the EUFOR Democratic Republic 
of Congo mission and believed that ESDP could be a significant mechanism through 
which it might conduct its foreign and security policy.  Germany however soon 
discovered that, with the ESDP‘s lack of cohesion and scope and NATO’s continued 
dominance of hard security, there was a limit on what it could achieve within this 
medium.  Nevertheless, Germany found that it could fulfil some of its defence and 
security aspirations by involving itself in NATO field missions.  KFOR has had two 
German Commanders in the last seven years and they have been noted for their 
“steady, if uninspiring hand.”(64)  Germany also had military control of 
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sector of Kosovo since 1999.  An OSCE official commented that, “Prizren was 
always seen…to be the model sector; well controlled, clean and orderly; just like a 
German town (61)” but this was to change in 2004. 
During the March 2004 riots, Albanians looted and burned 29 Serb churches 
and monasteries in Prizren, and forced several thousand Serbs to leave their homes. 
The Daily Telegraph, quoting excerpts from a report on the conduct of the 3,600-
strong German contingent based in the city, disclosed that UNMIK police were left to 
fend for themselves at the height of the rioting:  
"Despite continuous appeals for help from KFOR, nobody from the 
military appeared to back up the police… [German] KFOR proved to be 
incapable of carrying out the duties to which it has been assigned” 
(Paterson, 2004, p.5). 
 
The ICG believed that: 
 “…a more determined effort by German KFOR could have prevented the 
destruction of churches, monasteries and seminaries. There were reports 
of soldiers stepping away from their checkpoint positions as mobs 
approached (2004, p.20). 
 
It is the opinion of the commander of the Multinational Task Force (East), 
which abuts the German area of operations (AOR), and of the KFOR Chief of Staff 
that the perceived failures during the 2004 riots affected the thinking of the German 
Government on Kosovo.  The basis for this attitude was that Germany judged 
members of the KPC, and those associated to it, as the main instigators of organised 
crime in the German AOR.  They were also seen as orchestrating many of the 
problems that beset the German soldiers during the 2004 riots.  One view was that the 
KPC commander in the region could have halted the destruction by ordering the 
rioters off the streets. (65)   
 
This mistrust of the KPC and its senior officers was to put the German KFOR 
at odds with the local population.  The lack of progress on defining a future for 
Kosovo had angered Kosovar Albanians who believed the KLA (whose ex-members 
made up the bulk of the KPC) were the victors in the Kosovar Albanian struggle to 
gain independence for the Serbs.  Many felt that this victory was now being denied 
them by UNMIK and KFOR.  The ICG position on the local population’s views was 
that: 
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“…many Kosovar Albanians had come to believe that the KLA heritage 
was being delegitimized by the peacekeeping mission.  In autumn 2003 
this began to dovetail with deft Belgrade tactics that unnerved Kosovar 
Albanians, who saw their liberation struggle being bracketed as criminal - 
squeezed by both Serbia and the international community. Criminal 
elements in turn exploited this nervous reflex by wrapping themselves in 
the KLA banner” (2004, p. 8). 
 
Indeed, the Germans were not alone in their mistrust of the KPC; the 
COMKFOR in 2003/2004, General Fabio Mini, considered the KPC and organised 
crime to be ‘two sides of the same coin’, a view which was in accord with the belief 
pertaining in Belgrade.  The ICG noted that, in September 2003, Mini briefed the 
incoming SRSG, Hans Holkeri, on alleged KLA/KPC-criminal networks from 
evidence provided to him by the Serbian security services (2004, p.8, footnote 34).  
Both Ashdown (2007, p.126) and Shawcross (2000, p.351), commenting on the 
immediate aftermath of the 1999 conflict, note that Kosovo was supposed to be 
administered by the UN but the KLA had seized businesses and, as related in Chapter 
Six, established networks of local ministries and were collecting taxes.  
 
Thus it was not surprising to find that the German position on ISSR was one 
of extreme caution, preferring the status quo of strong oversight of the Kosovo 
security sector by NATO through KFOR.  Perhaps based on its experiences in Prizren 
in 2004, it became apparent that the German Government wished to see the 
dissolution of the KPC and, preferably, no local security force whatsoever.  Brigadier 
General Blease noted that the Germany delegation in the Quint went to considerable 
lengths to water down the UNOSEK recommendations on the creation of a Kosovo 
Security Force (KSF).(66)  Blease was moved, at one point, to comment to 
Ambassador James Pardew, Deputy Special Adviser to the US President and 
Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton implementation, that some of the 
suggestions made by the Germans could have, “a deleterious impact on the creation 
of the KSF and the potential length of the KFOR mission.”(67)  The Germans seemed 
determined to delay the handing over of the security mandate; they objected to the 
wording of the draft UNOSEK Recommendations and indicated that the transfer of 
security responsibilities to the PISG and KSF should be “at a later stage.”  Blease 
commented to Pardew that, “if NATO is going to get out of Kosovo in the medium 
term this phrase needs to be removed.”(68) 
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The Political Adviser to DCOM KFOR believes that Germany’s reluctance to 
see a national army for Kosovo stemmed from two imperatives; the belief that there 
was no need for such a force, given the strong international military presence in 
Kosovo, and nervousness about the involvement of former KLA fighters in the 
structure:  
“The German position is still grounded on [UNSCR] 1244 and will 
probably not change.  The main point is the principle that there has to be 
a clear break between KPC and KSF.” (69) 
 
The German Head of Mission in Pristina, who was adamant that Kosovo did 
not need an Army but rather a small Gendarmerie, confirmed this view.  He believed 
that, if a KSF was thought to be desirable it should be no more than Battalion strength 
(about 800 personnel) and should confine its activities to the ceremonial, plus some 
UN Peacekeeping support roles.(70)  The Quint German delegation’s reaction to the 
ISSR’s recommendations was in a similar vein.(71)  This position reflected the 
concern of the German Government in relation to responsibility for security within 
the province after final status had been determined. 
 
More critical to the presentation of the ISSR final recommendations were the 
actions of the COMKFOR.  General Roland Kather of Germany had replaced General 
Valotto in August 2006.  General Kather was uneasy about the possible impact that 
the ISSR Report might have on the Serbian population, despite the fact that the 
findings had been briefed to a wide audience, including members of the Serbian 
Parliament, in Belgrade on the 4th October 2006 and widely reported by both the 
Albanian and Serbian media.  He was keen that his time in Kosovo would run 
smoothly and that there would be no repeat of the problems that faced the German 
military in 2004 when province-wide rioting had broken out. (72)  
 
Although his position automatically made him a member of the ISSR Steering 
Committee, General Kather avoided being briefed on the ISSR and his role on the 
Committee.  He caused the final Steering Committee meeting to be cancelled on two 
occasions when he became unavailable at the last minute and persuaded the SRSG 
that the meetings should not be convened without him.  Significantly, it was General 
Kather who took the initiative to delay the publication of the ISSR Final Report in 
December 2006 and who ensured that NATO was not associated with the Report 
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when it was eventually published in January 2007.  A communication from his 
Military Assistant to the ISSR Coordinator stated that: 
“He [General Kather] wants me to make sure that you know his opinion: 
1. He agrees to the release of the document, however he is convinced 
that this - a few days before the visit of Pres. Ahtisaari - is an 
inappropriate timing.  2. The content of the document is not fully agreed 
upon by all members of the board.  3. COMKFOR in this moment only 
agrees with those proposals and recommendations of the document, 
which are not depending on a later status agreement (i.e. future KSF) 
[Kosovo Security Force].  4. There will be no participation of KFOR in 
the release or any conference.”(73) 
 
 His remark that the document had not been fully agreed by all members of the 
ISSR Steering Committee referred to the fact that the SRSG had stated that, as the 
representative of the UN Secretary-General, he had no authority to agree any 
recommendations that fell outside the life of UNSCR 1244 (1999). 
 
 The recommendations that gave General Kather the most difficulty were those 
that dealt with Kosovo’s security architecture, once authority had passed from 
UNMIK to the Government of Kosovo and, additionally, those that dealt the future 
status of the KPC.  A senior diplomat in Vienna believed that COMKFOR’s 
opposition stemmed from the position his national Government had taken on the 
future of the KPC and the employment of ex-KPC personnel in a future Kosovo 
security force. (74)  This view was later confirmed by the KFOR Chief of Staff. (75). 
The COMKFOR, as the senior NATO commander in Kosovo, nevertheless was 
moved to follow the instructions of his home state.  Meilaender (2003) considers that 
social behaviour is motivated by the requirement for a complex mixture of emotional 
associations.  Commanders of multi-national forces often are divided between the 
requirement to provide unbiased leadership of an international force and the need to 
remain loyal to their homeland and principal employer (Costa, 2003, p. 523).  This 
role can become difficult, particularly when the objectives of the home state do not 
accord with the wishes of the international body.  Costa (2003, pp. 519-548) believes 
that individuals, faced with this dilemma, will inevitably seek out the best provider of 
guarantees for the achievement of personal goals and status and will grant it their 
loyalty. 
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Thus the German view on the future security of Kosovo and the Kosovar 
Albanian citizens’ desire that their former guerrilla army should be the basis of the 
new national security force were at odds.  The experience of German KFOR soldiers 
in Prizren had a negative influence on the opinion of the German Government.(76)  
This attitude was to drive their reactions to the ISSR Final Report, given that it made 
recommendations contrary to their views on the future security arrangements in 
Kosovo. 
7.4.3. The United States of America  
 
The Americans were initially unenthusiastic about the ISSR programme.  On the 10th 
August 2005 Larry Rossin, the then American Principal DSRSG, told a senior 
military officer that the American Representative Office in Pristina (USOP) was 
strongly opposed the ISSR and wished to see any donated monies used for minority 
returns initiatives.(77)  Rossin stated that: 
“…[I ] had no faith in ISSR; it had too much process and too little activity. 
The USOP believe that the SSDAT process was appropriate for an 
established government but not for Kosovo.  I was personally so against it 
I even considered not getting involved in the selection process for the 
ISSR Coordinator.” (78) 
 
The ICG commented that, “among those blowing cold draughts on the ISSR, the US 
has been concerned by its slow rhythm, risking the introduction of delay into a final 
status it wants decided within 2006” (ICG, 2006, p. 21).  The US was keen to see the 
situation in Kosovo resolved:  “Clinton had acted to end tyranny in Kosovo and now 
the US wanted to demonstrate that it could support the creation of a Muslim state. 
This would balance what was going on in the Middle East.” (79) 
 
The State Department was keen to see Kosovo move swiftly towards 
independence.  Early in the new millennium, US policymakers began to emphasise 
the need to find a viable political settlement for Kosovo.  In 2006, U.S. officials made 
repeated statements against maintaining the status quo and in favour of resolving 
Kosovo’s status in order to achieve US goals for a peaceful Balkans region (Kim & 
Woehrel, 2008, pp.2-3).  Since 2004, leading U.S. officials had publicly expressed 
U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence and it was feared by the US State 
Department and the USOP that ISSR might interfere with this ambition by making 
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recommendations that would prove unacceptable to one or other of the negotiating 
parties.(80)  Thus national agendas drove the US reaction to the ISSR programme. 
 
At the same time as the ISSR was being planned, the Pentagon was embarking 
on its own SSR programme for Kosovo.  This project had been sub-contracted to a 
private consultancy firm, DFI Government Services, based in Washington D.C.  The 
review “Security Assessment of the UN-Administered Province of Kosovo: Security 
and Threat Assessment Roadmap and Recommendations” was conducted over a 
period of just a few weeks and the first draft was presented to the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and State Department in February 2006.  However, the DoD and State 
Department were unhappy with the recommendations of the DFI Report, which was 
judged to be lacking in detail.(81)  The Report was never published and the DoD 
began to reconsider their opposition to the ISSR process. 
 
Meanwhile, in Pristina, the ISSR Secretariat was undertaking a concerted 
effort to influence the thinking of the Americans on the ISSR programme.  They were 
well aware that without the support, or at least acquiescence, of the US there would 
be little international backing or finance for the programme.  These efforts in Kosovo, 
plus the DoD and State Department’s disappointment with the DFI Report, bore 
results and the USOP Defense Attaché warmed to the ISSR process.  In June 2006, he 
arranged for a Constitutional and Governance Lawyer to join the ISSR Secretariat, at 
the Pentagon’s expense, to draft the recommended legislation for the Kosovo security 
architecture post- UNSCR 1244 (1999).  In addition, the DoD approved the placing of 
a second US national in the Secretariat as the Strategic Drafter of the ISSR Final 
Report.  UNDP was then able to demonstrate that the US were content with the ISSR 
programme and this helped considerably in fund raising and with the legitimacy of 
the process in the eyes of the international community. 
 
The initial reaction to the ISSR was akin to that of a number of other countries 
in that the Americans were worried that the process might interfere with the 
UNOSEK negotiations.  In addition, the DFI security review was underway and the 
DoD and State Department saw no reason to support ISSR when they had a process, 
over which they had control.  This negative position was to change, however, for 
three reasons: firstly, the less than detailed report produced by DFI was countered by 
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the ISSR’s Interim Report to UNOSEK, which the ISSR Secretariat shared with the 
American Office in Pristina; secondly, UNOSEK’s acceptance of the Interim Report 
calmed US fears that there would be a disconnect between the two processes and, 
thirdly, the backing of the US Defense Attaché in Pristina for the ISSR process 
helped sway doubters in Washington D.C. 
 
A convert to the ISSR process within the DoD was the Chief of the Balkans 
Desk, who had attended the Chiefs of Defence Staffs Contact Group briefing in 
London conducted by the ISSR Coordinator in June 2006.  Having listened to a 
detailed account of the process being undertaken and the efforts to include the views 
of the population, regardless of ethnicity, he was persuaded that ISSR would benefit 
the final status discussions.  For the ISSR process the backing of the US DoD and 
State Department, albeit low key, was a major advantage.  
7.4.4. The Russian Federation 
 
The situation within the Kosovo Contact Group was further clouded by the 
Russian Federation’s attitude to the future status of the province, itself engendered by 
national considerations (Gvosdev, 2006).  Russia strongly objected to what it 
described as a dangerous precedent for separatists.  However, the separatist theme 
was moderated by Moscow according to context: Russia opposed separatism in 
Chechnya, but endorsed the efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to break away 
from Georgia.  It also used separatist entities in the Trans-Dniestria region to put 
pressure on Georgia and Moldova.  The separatist movements in all these areas 
demanded Russian recognition, and subsequent incorporation into Russia (Brudenell, 
2008).  Therefore Russia found itself in the position that, if it agreed the Ahtisaari 
plan, it would have to insist that the same approach be applied to Russian allies or 
lose face both with them and with its own increasingly nationalist population.  
Should, on the other hand, Russia disrupt the Ahtisaari plan on grounds of opposing 
separatism it would have to find a better rationale to encourage its own separatist 
clientele. 
As an historical ally of Serbia, Russia needed to demonstrate support for 
Belgrade’s position, particularly at a time when Putin was promoting an image of 
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himself as a defender of Russia and its allies against the perceived aspirations of 
NATO.  Russia had reacted badly to NATO’s military intervention in 1999 to the 
extent that public opinion polls demonstrated the collapse of popular Russian 
approval of the USA and moved the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to denounce 
NATO’s action as a violation of the UN Charter.  In the wake of the military 
intervention and the air campaign against targets in Serbia and Kosovo, the Russian 
Ministry of Defence suspended its involvement in NATO programmes and recalled 
Russian students from US Military Education Institutions.   
The situation was exacerbated by American plans to place anti-missile bases 
in Poland and the Czech Republic.  Russia also was concerned about the expansion of 
NATO into the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  Many 
influential Russians accused NATO of seeking to carve out a sphere of influence in 
the Balkans region and there was complaint about perceived indifference to Russian 
concerns (Arbatov & Hartelius, 1999, pp 9-17; Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2000, pp. 36-43).  The Kosovo issue also had implications for Russia in the 
Islamic world: helping Muslim Albanians win independence might help the Western 
powers repair their image in the Middle East, whereas resisting the Albanians' bid for 
secession would cause difficulties for Russia in many Muslim states (Zarakhovich, 
2007, p.14). 
Averre (2008) suggests that the legacy of the 1999 NATO action in Kosovo 
coloured Russia’s attitude to European security developments and to foreign and 
security policy.  He is of the opinion that Russian belief that NATO’s action in the 
Balkans in 1999, “was a selective defence of interests of the leading Western powers” 
has influenced Moscow’s position on subsequent developments in the region, 
particularly Kosovo’s independence (2008, p. 11).  This attitude led Russia to 
withdraw from the Kosovo Contact Group consultations and to Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov, warning: 
“Attempts to present [Ahtisaari’s] proposals to the Security Council… are 
pointless and counterproductive. I cannot imagine how it can adopt a 
resolution that would not be acceptable to the Serbs … They should have 
thought about that before, such as when they bombed Serbia without a 
mandate from the Security Council and attacked more than military 
targets” (Der Spiegel, 2007). 
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Thus, Russia’s objections to the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state were 
to cloud all the issues surrounding the future of Kosovo, including the ISSR process.  
 
Given Russia’s intransigence over the future of Kosovo a group, known as the 
Quint, became an informal vehicle for discussion among the key countries.  In 
essence, the Quint, made up of the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy, was the Contact Group without the Russian Federation.  The 
Quint of Foreign Ministers originally had developed during the 1999 Kosovo 
campaign.  The existence of the Quint was hidden, during the conflict, to avoid 
offending other alliance nations but it was this group that first put together NATO's 
conditions for the ending of the campaign.  Seven years later it was to take the lead in 
efforts to achieve political agreement for the future status of Kosovo (Prantl, 2006, 
pp.209-249) and it was the representatives of the five states who would consider the 
ISSR process  
 
The ISSR Secretariat briefed the Quint through the medium of the Chiefs of 
Defence Staffs monthly working group meetings.  Such was the Quint’s 
concentration on the outcomes of the UNOSEK deliberations anything that might 
detract from that process needed to be neutralised. The ISSR fell within this category. 
(82) 
Conclusions 
 
Duffield (2009, p. 648) suggests that empirical evidence points to IGOs having 
modifying effects on state behaviour by the presence of international rules and 
through state involvement in such organisations.  However, he concedes that little has 
been said, within the field of institutionalist theory, about how these effects occur and 
more empirical research is needed to explain the triggers for such behaviour.   
 
 This Chapter has provided evidence of competition and rivalry within and 
between the IGOs involved with Kosovo’s SSR programme.  This existed on three 
levels: within IGOs and government departments, between organisations and between 
the international officials.  The first level was demonstrated by the rivalry between 
the UN DPKO and UNDP, as they vied to control of SSR processes.  Rivalry was 
most evident in UNNY, where DPKO hostility to UNDP being given the lead on the 
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ISSR programme contributed to the delay in approving the ISSR budget, thereby 
impeding the start of the process.  However, the rivalry was present also in Kosovo 
where the events related in this Chapter demonstrated UNMIK’s desire to continue to 
control the security sector in Kosovo.  This wish, motivated by both organisational 
and personal considerations, impeded a timely transfer of security information and 
authority from the international community to the PISG. 
 
Rivalry and competition between government departments was demonstrated 
by the actions of the UK Government in relation to the ISSR programme.  Rivalry 
was centred on disputes over which Department of State held primacy for 
policymaking on SSR matters.  To further complicate matters, three UK Departments 
of State had projects, aimed at reforming the security sector, running in Kosovo at the 
same time as the ISSR programme.  This resulted in tension between the UK 
government and UNDP, which contributed to the withholding of support for the 
follow on UNDP 3SD implementation project.  Halperin (1974) has described similar 
rivalry within the US Government; Dijkstra (2008) within the EU structure and Esson 
(2009) demonstrated its presence in the private sector. 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, individual relationships have a marked effect on 
the success of any enterprise.  In particular, a programme that involves international 
functionaries holds the possibility that national interest will influence the decisions of 
those who should be acting in a non-partisan manner.  Personal ambition or the need 
to secure or retain employment is a powerful incentive to act in other than an 
impartial manner.  Sinclair’s (1934, p.148) suggestion that, “it is difficult to get a man 
to understand something when his salary depends on him not understanding it” may 
apply in these cases.  The need for officials to demonstrate success in order to further 
personal aims, as described by Feshbach (1987) and Berry (1984) was identified in 
Kosovo.  Much of what happened at field level was driven by individual motives 
which accords with Meilaender’s (2003) belief that the reasons for inter-personal 
rivalry are complex and often are motivated by the desire to fulfil personal goals and 
achieve recognition within their own peer group. 
 
Institutionalist theory suggests that individual decisions do not equate to 
collective decisions because of the influence of institutions tends to be biased in 
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particular directions.  Rational choice theory points to the equilibrium of preferences, 
whilst historical institutionalism favours the maintenance of the status quo and 
sociological institutionalism the consolidation of institutional authority.  As states and 
organisations vied over the ISSR process all of these theoretical positions became 
evident and, from the friction that they caused, so rivalry and confusion ensued.  
Institutional theories provide a complex view of organisations, in that they are seen to 
be influenced by normative pressures, sometimes arising from the state and 
sometimes from within the organisation itself.  These pressures tend to lead an 
organisation to be influenced by the need for legitimisation, which can deflect from 
task performance and goal realisation. 
 
Coupled with these issues was the influence of inter-personal communication. 
Anderson and Neistadt (2003, p.3) have indentified inter-personal communication as 
a key driver within IGOs.  An influencing factor in Kosovo, during the ISSR, was the 
interaction of individuals at the senior level.  Thus the relationship between the SRSG 
and the Personal Representative of the EU High Representative for the CFSP in 
Pristina was to have a negative effect on the ISSR process.  The reluctance of the 
Head of the AUS to relinquish his authority over the ISSR process, once the 
Secretariat was established, likewise led to friction between individuals in the 
Secretariat and members of his Unit.  Equally as corrosive was the animosity between 
the OSCE HoM and DHoM, which adversely affected cooperation between the ISSR 
Secretariat and the OSCE.  In addition, the criticism of the COMKFOR by UNMIK, 
for involving his organisation in matters they believed to be outside the KFOR area of 
responsibility, denied the ISSR a useful agency for reaching the Kosovo population. 
 
The ISSR programme was considerably influenced by the discord within and 
between IGOs and their officials.  The delay in starting the review process came close 
to halting the programme completely.(83)  The fact that the ISSR programme ran 
parallel with the UNOSEK negotiations was a major contributor to the unease felt 
about the programme by several states.(84)  It was competition and confusion in 
UNNY that led to the prolonging of the start-up period, impeded the recruitment 
process and obstructed the search for donor funding.  In addition, inter-personal 
rivalries were such that much of the impact of the programme, in terms of achieving a 
more meaningful survey of local communities, was lost.  Had the OSCE and KFOR 
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been able to lend greater assistance to collecting data from the municipalities the 
research of the ISSR programme would have been better informed.  Finally, 
animosity between UNDP ISSR and the British Office, DFID and the COMKFOR 
was to undermine the essential follow-on work of the UNDP 3SD project to 
implement the ISSR recommendations. (85)  
 
The ISSR programme may well have been better been placed within the 
UNMIK DPKO-based Pillar 2 structure.  This would have been possible if a 
mechanism could have been found for administering donor funds.  However, Rees 
(2006, p.23) notes that the UN DPKO was “not well suited to provide for a successful 
SSR.”  He suggests that SSR increasingly needs the skills of administration, 
institution building and policy development that are not available in the peacekeeping 
operations community and that this type of engagement is “deeply political in nature” 
and therefore needs experienced staff (2006, p.25).  Given the empirical evidence 
there was, during 2005/6, a mix of competition and rivalry, between the UN DPKO 
and UNDP New York, over the ISSR programme.  These difficulties then affected 
both progress and relationships on the ground in Kosovo.  Rivalry within the UN over 
the ownership of SSR, which was to continue into the future, had an immediate 
impact on the ISSR process.  
 
 Edomwonyi, (2003, p.43) has noted that SSR activities are invariably 
unsustainable if outsiders design them and they are merely implemented locally.  In 
addition, there has been a tendency for western democracies to use post-conflict 
interventions to instil principles and practices, which are wholly inappropriate for the 
culture of the host state (Ashdown, 2007, p. 135).  As was noted in Chapter Two, 
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, p.21) emphasise that close cooperation between 
local stakeholders, the implementing IGO and the international donor community is 
crucial in ensuring successful security reform efforts.  The fact that SSR is funded, 
planned and driven by the international community means that tension between local 
ownership and external assistance is created (Bryden, 2006, p.23).  The ISSR was 
designed to overcome this problem by drawing the local community into the heart of 
the process.  Although some success was achieved, significant additional involvement 
of the local community and its leaders would have been accomplished had there been 
less animosity within and between the international agencies in Kosovo.  In the next 
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Chapter the relationship between the international community, the ISSR Secretariat 
and the local leaders and community will be examined. 
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Chapter Eight: ISSR and the Local Community  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ISSR was designed to be a holistic process that placed emphasis on local 
ownership.  It was necessary, therefore, to ensure that there was local leadership and 
community involvement in the programme.  Thus the relationship between local and 
international actors was to have a marked effect on the ISSR process. 
Local ownership has long been advocated as a crucial aspect of SSR.  Ball 
(1998) believes that SSR must integrate all issues relevant to internal security and the 
civilian institutions responsible for managing and monitoring the security sector.  
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002, pp.30-33) describe SSR as an attempt to develop 
a coherent framework for reducing the risk that state weakness will lead to violence.  
These definitions suggest that SSR has two different but closely connected goals.  
The first is to make certain that security sector authorities function effectively and 
efficiently.  The second is to ensure that these authorities have effective democratic 
oversight of the security sectors' performance.  Sugden (2006, p.2) refers to the first 
goal as the efficiency aspect and the second as the democratic aspect. Local 
ownership of both these aspects is a critical element in ensuring that they function 
effectively. 
Nathan (2007, p.8) argues that SSR programmes must be flexible and 
responsive to local actors and conditions.  Local ownership must be the primary 
objective for developing an approach to SSR that empowers local actors, thereby 
increasing the chance of long-term success; reforms should be designed, managed 
and implemented by local actors.  To be effective, SSR requires a context of 
democracy or democratisation, the technical and material capacity for sustainable 
reform and a willingness on the behalf of the local government to exercise control 
over the security sector.  All this can be achieved only if the local community and its 
leadership are working in concert with the SSR programme. 
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Although donors and IGOs generally acknowledge these tenets, they are 
frequently breached in practice.  Donor governments often impose their own models 
on local actors thereby creating the risk of generating resentment and resistance.  A 
major oversight in SSR planning has been a lack of local input and the resultant 
deficiency in local ownership of the reform agenda.  Although many donors and 
IGOs have made public commitment to the principle of local ownership, this has 
become more a rhetorical device rather than a guide to practice.  Despite the 
theoretical commitment to the notion, in practice it is frequently reduced to a demand 
for acquiescence by recipient governments to externally produced strategies.   
In emerging democracies and post-conflict societies, external actors regularly 
ignore the principle of local ownership.  There are several explanations for this.  
Many developing states have weak governments and fragile civil societies. In the 
aftermath of war and state collapse, the government can lack legitimacy or local 
actors may lack the expertise to prepare sound security policies.  In addition, the 
political elite can be too divided or disorganised to reach consensus on policies and 
priorities.  Therefore IGOs and donor government officials are inclined to justify the 
absence of local ownership on the grounds that local actors lack capacity and 
legitimacy (Nathan, 2007b, pp.6-7).  Yet these are precisely the problems that SSR is 
meant to address and their presence should not constitute valid grounds for 
circumventing local involvement in SSR programmes.  If the security of citizens is to 
be enhanced, and if the provision of security is to conform to democratic norms, then 
it is crucial to rebuild the capacity and legitimacy of the institutions and actors that 
comprise the security sector of the host state. 
 
The attitude of donors may, in fact, be based on ignorance of local 
communities and their attitudes to security.  At an international workshop, held at the 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy to consider security reform in the post-conflict 
phase, a broad consensus was reached by the delegates that the international 
community see locals as a homogeneous entity and has little comprehension of their 
needs.  There was a belief that the opinions and concerns of local communities should 
be better accounted for, but there persists a lack of knowledge about how this should 
be done (Tardy & Ama Mani, 2005). 
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However, Reich (2006, pp.5-13) argues that the pursuit of local ownership in 
externally funded projects is counterproductive, if viewed as a project objective.  She 
suggests that, instead of aiming towards the impossible goal of literal local ownership 
of a foreign-funded programme, the focus should be on the nature of the relationship 
between donors and beneficiaries; “It is within this relationship that power is or is not 
shared and that the equality of the partners may or may not be realised”.  
Nevertheless, the aim of local ownership has importance as a policy ideal. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of definition and application, the principle of 
local ownership is applicable in both post-conflict and developing states, and in 
sectors other than security, such as development and economic reform.  The absence 
of local ownership of SSR is detrimental to the realisation of security reform and, 
therefore, it should be pursued as a matter of necessity. 
8.1. Partnership, Participation or Patronage 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, although used extensively in conflict transformation and 
development literature the term ‘local ownership’ has never been precisely defined 
(Aga Khan Foundation, 2005).  Although local ownership has been afforded 
increasing prominence in post-conflict and development fields, the literature directly 
addressing its conceptualisation or implementation is modest (Saxby, 2003) but it is 
apparent that the term is seldom used to indicate full control by local actors over all 
aspects of the peacebuilding or security reform process. 
 
   Commentators on SSR increasingly have acknowledged the significance of 
local actors, with activities being more conceptualised as an engagement involving 
the entire recipient society and not as a top-down process.  Supporting local actors 
who wish to build security should be seen as a “key principle of civil conflict 
management” (Ropers, 2000, p.35).  Narten (2007, p.7-9) however suggests that, 
from the beginning of UN peacebuilding in Kosovo, the interaction between external 
and local actors seems to have been significantly influenced by promises of local 
ownership by external peace-builders that had little foundation in practice. 
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Elsewhere, however, attempts have been made to include the local community 
in its own security solutions.  Despite the problems confronting Afghanistan there is 
one area where a modicum of local ownership success has been achieved, namely, the 
creation of Community Development Councils (CDC) under a National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP).  This has allowed local communities across the country to decide 
where funds should be used for the common good without interference from 
international organisations.  All that is required of the NSP participants is that they 
form a village council, have a quorum of the community to determine their projects 
and place the details of expenditure in a public place for all to see.  In concert with 
this initiative, the Afghan National Army Programme is designed to create units made 
up of recruits from different parts of the country, thereby reducing ethnic separatism.  
These initiatives served to create a sense of empowerment and trust within the 
communities (Lockhart & Ghani, 2008, p.93: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008).  
Rather than perpetuating the traditional international community-led peacebuilding 
and SSR initiatives, a more perceptive and inclusive view of local involvement should 
be embraced. 
 
The ISSR was committed to wide consultation with the local community and 
its methodology was based on local ownership and involvement of the people of 
Kosovo and their leaders.  In the Foreword to the ISSR Final Report, signed by the 
President and Prime Minister of Kosovo, it was written that the review had, “taken 
the thoughts, fears and aspirations of all the people of Kosovo and translated them 
into positive recommendations of how threats to our security can be dealt with” 
(Cleland Welch, Kondi, Stinson et al, 2006, p. ix).  However, only days after the 
ISSR Report had been published the UK based NGO, Saferworld (2007), commented 
that the review had undertaken only limited public consultation.  Additionally, in an 
email sent at the beginning of 2008 to the Director of the Security Cluster in East 
Timor, an official from the ICG commented that: 
 
“The 18-month ISSR … was compromised … by the political context in 
which it was conducted.  It was created largely by UNMIK and the UK 
and initially lacked wider political support.  In its latter stages the political 
requirements of interested bodies and countries fed a top-down dynamic 
into a comprehensive review that claimed to be approaching security from 
the bottom up.” (1) 
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Given the emphasis by the creators of the ISSR on the need for local ownership 
it is significant that the above criticisms were made.  The UNDP already had 
acknowledged the UN’s failings to engage the local community: 
“Kosovo in some ways best exemplifies the pitfalls associated with 
peacekeeping operations that mutate into state-building exercises: the 
failure of the international community to shift in a timely enough manner 
its mindset from operational fire fighting to transition planning.  While 
this strategic choice makes sense in the immediate aftermath of violent 
conflict, ….the focus [should] be on engaging the local population in 
institution building with the view of promoting democratisation, good 
governance, and sustainable development” (UNDP, 2004b, p.32).  
 
From the beginning of the ISSR programme the SSDAT had insisted that the 
Review “be based on the principles of [local] participation and ownership to 
determine what might be the most effective design for the security architecture of 
Kosovo after final status” (Security Sector Development Advisory Team, 2005b, p.3).  
This position was established on the joint UK DFID/FCO/MOD declaration that SSR 
must “engage the interests of local constituencies at the earliest opportunity…[and] 
local partners for capacity-building measures” (Global Conflict Prevention Pool, 
2003, p.6) and the OECD DAC statement that: 
 “ if local ownership of security system reform processes is to be taken 
seriously, international support should help increase the capacity of 
partner country policy makers and civil society to analyse, understand and 
debate their own security problems” (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 37). 
 
8.2. Involving the Local Community  
 
The ISSR Secretariat set out to embrace the imperative of supporting local actors in 
building peace.  It based its review on the Kosovo population’s perceptions of its 
security.  Some 8000 interviews were conducted throughout the 32 Municipalities of 
the province and the goal of this public outreach was: 
“to ensure that all of Kosovo’s communities were not only aware of, but 
had the opportunity to be engaged in the ISSR process…[with] the aim to 
enhance public dialogue about security and encourage transparency 
among Kosovo’s security institutions and policy making process” 
(Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2006, p.5). 
 
The ISSR Secretariat also engaged with civil society through their consultative 
groups (Chapter Five, Table 5.3).  Civil society plays a vital role in encouraging 
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transparency and accountability in the security sector.  It was, therefore, encouraged 
to have a role in influencing security policy formation and to help inform the wider 
society.  Donors and practitioners frequently advocate the importance of local 
ownership and civil society to SSR, but in many cases their policies actually impede 
deep and meaningful involvement (Ball, 2006, pp.49-61).  Despite the opportunities 
that exist, more often than not, civil society and particularly women are excluded or 
choose to stay away from discussions on security matters (Anderlini & Conaway, 
2008, p. 34).  Nevertheless, Kosovo citizens generally were enthusiastic about their 
involvement in the ISSR programme.  The ISSR Final Report noted that, in the 
opinion of local communities, the public outreach programme and consultative 
groups had “given an opportunity for many different communities to have their 
voices heard [on their security] for the first time” (Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2007, 
p. 18). 
 
Although it is acknowledged by Saferworld (2007, p.3) that the first part of the 
aim of local participation was achieved, the second requirement of embracing the 
views of the Kosovo policymakers was deemed to be less successful.  Saferworld 
believed that ISSR had failed to address fundamental questions, particularly how the 
new security architecture was to bind together the Albanian majority and Serb 
minority populations.  This was of particular importance in the north of the province 
where a tightly knit Serb population, with the backing of Belgrade, continued to defy 
both the international and local authorities in Pristina and where the international 
community’s authority was weak.  Therefore, according to Saferworld, although the 
ISSR made a contribution in persuading European governments of Kosovo's future 
need for its own security infrastructure, the review’s outcomes had failed to gain the 
unqualified respect of professional peers (2007, p.1). 
 
This perceived failure largely was based on the inability of the ISSR Secretariat 
to fully engage the local politicians in the review process, despite being partnered by 
the Prime Minister’s advisers in the OPS and being based in the Prime Minister’s 
Office.  The membership of the ISSR Steering Committee embraced a cross section 
of Kosovo’s local leadership (see Chapter Five, Table 5.2) including representatives 
from the Turkish, Bosniac, Gorani and Egyptian communities, two Opposition Party 
members and Kosovo Serb representation.  However, the Serbs refused to attend any 
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of the Steering Committee meetings and Kosovar Albanian opposition party members 
attended only spasmodically.   
 
These difficulties could have been foreseen; the Serb leadership had been 
boycotting meetings where the PISG was represented as they had declared that they 
did not recognise the PISG or its Kosovar membership.  There were two Serbian 
members of the PISG who had participated in Kosovo Assembly meetings until the 
start of the UNOSEK negotiations but the Serbian political leaders in the North of 
Mitrovica and in the enclaves largely ignored them.  The animosity between the 
Serbian hard-line nationalist politicians and those Serbs wishing to open dialogue 
with the ethnic Albanian dominated PISG and the international community in Kosovo 
was demonstrated in a violent manner.  Oliver Ivanović had defied the Serbian 
Government in Belgrade by taking part in elections to the Kosovo Assembly and had 
been advocating closer dialogue with UNMIK and the PISG.  He was to be the 
subject of an alleged assassination attempt when his car was blown up in North 
Mitrovica (Center for Security Studies, 2005; Staletović, 2005). 
 
In addition, Kosovo politics was at a critical juncture, leading up to possible 
independence, and the Kosovar Albanian opposition parties actively were distancing 
them selves from the PISG leadership.  An opposition party member, who attended 
some of the Steering Committee meetings, commented that although his party 
leadership believed that the ISSR was beneficial to the determination of the future 
security architecture of the province, they did not believe that the PISG was capable 
of driving through the necessary reforms.  It was, in his opinion, only through a 
change of government that anything could be achieved and, therefore, his party would 
not support the security reform measures put forward by the PISG. (2) 
 
The attitude of those members of the PISG who were active in the ISSR 
process was important to its success.  There was a misconception among many 
Kosovo Assembly members that local ownership meant exactly that; the ISSR would 
be staffed and run by Kosovars and paid for by the international community.  One 
Kosovar official suggested that this was the main failing of the process; it had not 
handed over responsibility for the structuring of the security sector to the PISG but 
continued to dictate what would happen in Kosovo, post independence, from an 
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international community point of view.  His opinion was that “this was not local 
ownership; it was local dictatorship” (3).  Conversely, a UNMIK official suggested 
that, “ideally the [ISSR] posts would have gone to Kosovans, but the truth was there 
was nobody who could have done the job.”(4)  However, Narten (2008, pp. 369-390) 
makes the point that the later local ownership is achieved and authority is transferred 
to local representatives, the more local actors are likely to challenge the legitimacy of 
the reform agenda and engage in confrontation with international actors. 
 
The difficulties over local involvement in the security sector were not 
confined to the ISSR process.  The UNMIK Security Working Group Steering 
Committee was reviewing the orderly handover of security arrangements to either the 
EU or PISG during 2006 (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1).  However, the Committee 
refused to involve any PISG representatives in their deliberations, on the basis that 
UNMIK was still in charge of security issues. 
 
Moreover, Principal DSRSG Schook delayed the setting up of the Prime 
Minister’s Situation Centre (SITCEN), designed to keep the PISG Cabinet informed 
of security incidents in the province, believing that the PISG should not be involving 
itself in security matters (5).  Even when the UNMIK Security Working Group 
reached the stage of deciding the shape of the future security architecture for Kosovo 
it was disinclined to include Kosovo institutions in the debate because of a belief that 
security matters should remain solely in the hands of UNMIK until final status was 
implemented.  The prejudice went even further; whilst granting the ISSR Secretariat a 
seat on the Security Working Groups Steering Committee, UNMIK officials were 
unwilling to allow an Albanian (from the Republic of Albania) diplomat, who was the 
ISSR’s Governance Adviser, to attend Security Working Group meetings.  Only 
internationals from northern Europe or the US, it seemed, could be trusted with 
Kosovo’s security. (6) 
8.3. Perceptions of Local Ownership 
 
Towards the end of 2005 recruitment of staff to the ISSR Secretariat began.  The 
problems over the comprehension of local ownership quickly became apparent: the 
post of Coordinator was advertised and a shortlist of candidates was advised that they 
would be interviewed, by telephone, by the SRSG, Prime Minister and Resident 
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Representative UNDP Kosovo.  The time for the scheduled calls passed without any 
interviews taking place.  Finally, a UN staff member rang the candidates to say that 
the interviews were cancelled because, “the shortlist had been reduced to one 
applicant who would be called to Pristina for a formal interview by the selection 
board.”  The interview took place on the 2nd December 2005 but without the SRSG, 
who was in New York.  Larry Rossin, the Principal Deputy SRSG, took his place.  It 
transpired that the Kosovar members of the selection committee (the Prime Minister 
and his Security Adviser) were annoyed that there were no local candidates for the 
position and that, although all the candidates were highly qualified in the field of 
SSR, only one had any relevant experience of Kosovo.  They therefore insisted that 
only the candidate who had previously worked in Kosovo be interviewed and that the 
others be dropped from the list. (7) 
 
The recruitment of other members of the team was equally challenging. The 
Security Sector Development Adviser was due to be interviewed in late November, 
by telephone.  This interview was cancelled when the Kosovar members of the panel 
walked out in protest to the position again being offered only to international 
candidates.  The Kosovar board members finally were persuaded to undertake the 
selection procedure with no Kosovar candidate and the international aspirants were 
finally interviewed in late December 2005.(8)  In the same manner, the Media Adviser 
had her first interview cancelled because there was again no local candidate. To make 
matters worse, no interpreter had been provided for the non-English speaking 
members on the Selection Board, who promptly left in protest.(9)  The Kosovar 
members of the Board were persuaded to return to interview her after several days 
delay. 
 
It is perhaps understandable that PISG officials were angered that the initial 
short-list for the composition of the ISSR Secretariat did not contain any Kosovar 
candidates but the UNDP human resources department claimed that no local applicant 
met the professional requirements.(10)  It was only following a boycott of the 
selection process by PISG officials, including the Prime Minister, that the search for 
suitable local applicants was accelerated.  It was agreed that UNDP would hold 
interviews to find local candidates to fill the positions of expert advisers, in a 
supernumerary role, as part of the capacity building process of the programme.   
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Underlying this dispute was the problem of ethnocentrism. Bennett (1999) and 
Rosinski (2008) have explored issues of cultural influences to explain the inclination 
to ignore information that does not match an individual’s cultural norms.  They 
suggest that ethnocentrism is an assumption that an individual’s own culture is the 
centre of reality.  There is a tendency to ignore differences, evaluate differences 
negatively and downplay their importance.  Ethnocentricity was to influence both 
international and the local understanding of the ISSR programme.  
 
Foord believes that there was consensus in favour of local involvement in the 
ISSR process amongst internationals.  However, he suggests that there was a need to 
strike a balance between local ownership and the capacity of the local officials and 
politicians:  
“[They] were all aware that local ownership was key; but less the 
Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) and a 
few in the KPC, neither was there sufficient understanding of the issues 
nor was there the capacity for the hard work needed to undertake this 
sort of project; thus the over-reliance on internationals” (2007, p. 58). 
 
The reasons for the capacity shortfall can be explained by the fact that there 
was no Kosovar Albanian involvement in security policy formation after 1989 due to 
discrimination against them by the Serbs.  One UNMIK official suggested “we didn’t 
want people who were involved security before 1989 because they learned the 
communist way of doing things and are no use to us when trying to build a 
democratic system” (11).  Foord (2007, p.56) suggests that it is ironic that the security 
review process, which drew upon the tenets of local ownership, found that the 
Kosovar Albanians and minorities were penalised because of the discrimination 
practised against them by the Yugoslav Government in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
 
In addition to a lack of local security expertise in Kosovo, the review had to 
deal with the immature state of politics within the province.  Mellon noted that “PISG 
officials seem to have seen in the ISSR Secretariat an opportunity to increase their 
political influence”; and, “people, including government officials, often tend to look 
[at] such projects with an intention to personally profit” (2006, pp.7-8).  As soon as 
the ISSR Secretariat announced the recruitment of local advisers many Kosovar 
politicians suggested persons known, and in many cases related, to them as potential 
candidates.  This attempt at nepotism was not confined only to the local leaders.  A 
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high level international official openly lobbied UNDP for a job for his partner 
although she had no relevant qualifications and was not a Kosovo citizen but came 
from the Republic of Albania. (12)  
 
The financial difficulties related earlier in this thesis also were to have 
repercussions in the relationship between the local leadership and the programme.  
Due to the delay occasioned by the difficulties over funding the ISSR, it was decided 
that the first two stages of the process should be sub-contracted to the Geneva Centre 
for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).  The decision to bring in DCAF 
was taken by SRSG Jessen-Peterson, a former director of the Centre.  The 
Netherlands agreed to pay for the first two ISSR stages through DCAF who, in turn, 
sub-contracted the in-country work to KIPRED.  This created tensions within the 
Kosovo PISG; Edith Harxhi commented that “because there was a feeling that the 
fledgling institutions of self government had been so hard won it was inconceivable 
to the politicians that a process of such importance should be given to an NGO, even 
if it was a local one.  Once again internationals had disregarded local 
sensitivities.”(13) 
 
Within a few weeks of the ISSR process getting under way, as the result of an 
internal AAK Party reorganisation, Bajram Kosumi was replaced by Agim Çeku as 
the Kosovo Prime Minister.  Kosumi’s Security Adviser, along with most of the civil 
servants in the Prime Ministers Office, was removed from his post.  Thus the 
tendency within Kosovo politics to replace civil servants, who elsewhere would act, 
as continuity through any change of government or leadership, was to undermine 
sustainability within the security sector.  This lack of continuity was not confined to 
the local community; by the end of August 2006, all the key international players in 
Kosovo who had been present at the start of the ISSR process had gone; the SRSG, 
Principal Deputy SRSG, COMKFOR, Head of the UNMIK AUS and KPC 
Coordinator had all changed.  However, most germane to the local ownership 
objectives of the programme was the rapid change in PISG politicians and their staff. 
The limited ownership of the ISSR by the PISG was, in part, a factor of the lack of 
continuity.  Where elsewhere a firm government lead would be the feature that would 
make such a programme sustainable, in Kosovo the PISG relationship with the ISSR 
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programme was marred by a lack of continuity in both the political and civil service 
structures. 
8.4. Engaging with the Kosovo Serb Leadership  
 
Just as important to the future security of Kosovo was the ability of the ISSR 
Secretariat to engage with the Serbian politicians in Kosovo in a meaningful way.  
Although able to interview a fair representation of the Serbian community, during the 
public outreach programme, the ISSR researchers had far less success with the 
Serbian politicians.  Some were content to speak privately to the ISSR team and all 
accepted copies of briefing papers and meeting minutes but none would attend 
official meetings or comment openly on the process.  Most of the Serbian leadership 
in Kosovo saw the ISSR as “a coalition of the international community and the 
Albanians for the removal of the Serbs from Kosovo.”(14)  The line taken by Serbian 
politicians in the enclaves and north Mitrovica was that the only legitimate source of 
security they would accept was an International Community commanded and Serbian 
manned Police Force, with the overarching protection of the Serbian Government in 
Belgrade.(15)  Many Serbs worried that an independent Kosovo with a strong security 
sector, particularly if it contained a Kosovar security force, might be used to 
persecute the minorities.  Consequently, they preferred to see an international 
presence as the instrument of security in Kosovo. (16) 
 
Commentators generally acknowledge that oversight of the ISSR process by 
the PISG was poor (Rees, 2006, p. 37; Saferworld, 2007; ICG, 2006, p. 56).  Some 
members of international community were critical of the programme for failing to 
fully engage with the PISG, however, a UK civil servant suggested that planning for 
the Kosovo security sector was not likely to begin with Prime Minister Çeku looking 
at a report to see what other Kosovar citizens wanted.(17)  Additionally there were 
those who believed that, in some quarters of the international community, there was 
little interest in the ISSR being truly locally owned.  Foord suggests that the real 
reason for the ISSR was that the international community did not trust Kosovar 
politicians to do what they wanted them to do in the security sector (2007, p.41). 
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The OECD DAC (2007, p. 28) believes that, “reform processes inevitably 
create winners and losers as they challenge vested interests and power relationships… 
justice and security reform is therefore best approached as a governance issue and not 
simply as a technical activity”.  The OECD DAC (2007, p.29) further suggests that, 
“external actors may initially be required to take more of a leading role to help 
stabilise the security situation.  But the focus should be on building the capacity of 
local actors to take on the leadership role as soon as possible”.  Indeed, Lulzim Peci, 
the Director of KIPRED holds that: 
“The expectations of the ISSR process will be fully met if its outputs and 
the new security architecture of Kosovo will address the concerns of its 
citizens and ethnic communities.  However, the achievement of these 
expectations will depend on …the effectiveness of [the] international 
missions in making Kosovo self sustainable.” (18)  
 
In 2008 the UNDP had secured funding for the support to security sector 
development project (3SD), following on from the ISSR recommendations.  It 
planned to hand this follow-up programme to the Kosova Government within two 
years.  At the time of writing none of the 3SD projects have been transferred to the 
new government. (19) 
 
To many citizens of Kosovo it appeared that the international community did 
not believe that Kosovars could handle their own affairs and that their declared 
independence was being undermined.(20)  As faith in the international community’s 
desire to promote local ownership waned the people of Kosovo began to show their 
frustrations.  At the end of 2008, protests over the deployment of the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which included nearly 2,000 EU police, justice and 
customs officials, were a weekly occurrence in Pristina, despite the earlier acceptance 
of mission under the Artisaari plan.  The offices of the ICO were mortar bombed and 
EULEX vehicles attacked in November of the same year.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The Kosovo ISSR was to be the most holistic and locally oriented SSR programme to 
be undertaken.  However, its critics suggested that it failed in the second part of this 
aspiration, as it had not fully engaged with the local community despite its ambitious 
outreach programme.  Perhaps most damaging to the eventual outcome of the ISSR 
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process was the belief by local Kosovar officials and politicians that they were being 
treated as second-class citizens in relation to the internationals involved with the 
programme. 
 
Equally damaging was the refusal by UNMIK to involve Kosovars in the 
deliberations on the future structure of the Kosovo security sector and the Principal 
DSRSG’s reluctance to allow the Prime Minister an overview of security within the 
province.  A belief was created within the Kosovar leadership that a divide existed 
between the ‘cosmopolitan’ internationals and the ‘locals’ and this led to a lack of 
faith in the ISSR programme.  Baskin (2005, pp.4-29) points to missed opportunities 
by UNMIK and other IGOs to engage with the local leadership, coupled with a lack 
of a consistent strategy to enhance local ownership of democratic transition and the 
accountability of local authorities.  Webster and Walker (2009, p. 34) have stressed 
that a major challenge in post-conflict situations is the lack of transparency and 
communication between national and international leadership, which leads to poor 
working relationships.  They state that this “can be one of the greatest obstacles to an 
effective response”.  However, relevant to this discussion is the view that unless local 
governments share the financial and intellectual burdens of a SSR programme or at 
least get involved in the design of the project the 'local buy-in' will be superficial and 
the level of involvement, responsibility and accountability will remain low. (21) 
 
Underlying the interactions at local level during the ISSR process, were the 
ongoing tensions between the ethnic groups.  Although levels of violence had 
diminished over the years since 1999, there remained hostility that increased with the 
prospect of independence.  The ISSR Secretariat attempted to overcome the effect of 
these tensions by inviting all members of the Kosovo community to comment on their 
personal and collective security.  At community level this strategy worked well.  
However, because of the hostility within the Kosovar political arena and the 
boycotting of the ISSR Steering Committee by Serbian politicians, this approach was 
less well developed within the PISG and at the minority population political level.  
Thus the inability of the ISSR Secretariat to surmount the acute sensibilities of local 
leaders was to undermine the effectiveness of the programme.  Ethnic group rivalry 
was always likely to be present in the post-conflict situation in Kosovo.  It was, 
indeed, a leading factor in the internal security situation in the province and was 
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highlighted in the ISSR Final Report along with other drivers of insecurity (Cleland 
Welch, Kondi et al, 2006, pp.8-14).  Perhaps a clearer understanding of the 
vulnerabilities of the politicians within the PISG and a more considered approach to 
the question of cross-ethnic receptiveness and ownership of the ISSR process would 
have assisted in bringing about a more coherent involvement of the local authorities.  
 
Although SSR takes place in a variety of environments, thus limiting the 
applicability of generalisations, there are lessons that can be learned from 
programmes that have already taken place.  There has been very little examination of 
past SSR interventions when designing new endeavours.  In a complicated arena such 
as the security sector, IGOs should avoid formulaic approaches to SSR and should 
instead develop programmes that are flexible and responsive to local actors and 
conditions.  The final Chapter of this thesis explores how the difficulties encountered 
by the Kosovo ISSR, in terms of the contradictory understanding of SSR and the 
influence of institutional and personal competition and rivalry might be avoided in 
future.  It then draws together the findings of the research and makes 
recommendations for ongoing work in the SSR field. 
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Chapter Nine: Implications, Recommendations and 
Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has considered the sources and impact of confusion, rivalry and 
competition within and between organisations undertaking SSR in post-conflict 
states, using Kosovo as the case study.  It has identified a continuing debate over 
what constitutes the security sector, how far it should take account of the doctrines of 
human security and local ownership and how widely the reform process should be 
applied.  It has examined the linkages between the theories of neo-institutionalism 
and rivalry and competition between and within IGOs and how the strive for 
legitimacy can disrupt goal achievement and efficiency. 
 
Caparini (2004, p.4) has observed that SSR requires inter-agency cooperation 
but that this is rarely achieved in practice.  The study of the 2006 Kosovo ISSR has 
tested the hypothesis that IGOs are impeded in their pursuit of coherent and effective 
SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry and contradictory agendas.  The 
presence of inter-and intra-organisational and inter-personal rivalry and competition 
were found to have significantly diluted the effectiveness of the ISSR programme.   
 
Despite assertions that local ownership is the key to security reform, 
international actors give scant regard to the security aspirations of local communities.  
Hendrickson (2000) suggests that insufficient attention has been paid to the balance 
between external and local visions of reform, the role of civil society in SSR and the 
impact of institutional fragility on reshaping the security sector.  It has been 
established that the ISSR Secretariat attempted to overcome these failings but was 
hampered by a lack of commitment to local ownership by many of the international 
elite in Kosovo. 
 
Security sector reform can only be successful if the aims and objectives of the 
SSR programme are rational and achievable, whilst taking account of the risks and 
difficulties inherent in the work to reform and manage security sectors after conflict 
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or state failure.  It is only by monitoring and evaluating the outputs of the reform 
process that a clear understanding of its accomplishments can be gained.  It was 
found that monitoring and evaluation procedures were not undertaken in Kosovo and 
therefore a precise measurement of the ISSR’s achievements could not be made.  
 
This concluding chapter will rehearse these findings and suggest strategies for 
reducing the influence of rivalry, competition and confusion in the application of 
SSR. 
9.1. Institutionalism, Competition and Rivalry 
 
Neo-institutionalists argue that organisations create a set of formal rules whenever 
they see that these rules will serve their interests.  They do so by increasing the 
options available to states and by altering the incentives to select appropriate courses 
of action.  Institutional theorists see four ways by which institutional rule sets can 
make a difference, firstly by acting as a focal point to help states solve macro-level 
coordination problems (Duffield, 1992; 1994).  Secondly, they may assist in ensuring 
standards of state behaviour. Thirdly, institutions can reduce uncertainty.  If 
cooperation and adherence to rule sets have been accepted then states can gain a 
clearer understanding of other’s interests and capabilities.  Finally, institutions 
provide opportunities for negotiation.  By reducing the price of interaction, 
institutional procedures assist states to resolve disputes and to react effectively when 
non-compliance occurs (Keohane, 1984, pp 86-88; Martin, 1992, pp. 143-178; 
Tuschhoff, 1999, pp. 140-161).  
 
 Proponents of institutionalism point also to the pursuit of organisational 
legitimacy and suggest that organisations look to the wider institutional environment 
for direction.  In addition to the isomorphism, produced by this quest, organisations 
are subject to pressures exerted by other organisations and by the expectations of the 
society within which they operate.  Thus isomorphism and domain similarity are 
often the outcome of the need for both legitimacy and institutional survival.  
Functionaries become inculcated with the identity associated with the role of their 
organisation and tend to define themselves in terms of this identity (Simon, 1995, pp. 
115, 136). 
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 Three decades ago Meyer, Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977) articulated the 
initial neo-institutional arguments.  This new vision proposed that formal 
organisational structures reflected not only technical demands and resources, but were 
also shaped by institutional forces, including rational myths, knowledge legitimated 
through culture and the professions, public opinion, and the law.  The basic idea was 
that organisations were deeply embedded in social and political environments and 
thus organisational practices and structures were often reflections of, or responses to, 
these beliefs and conventions.  
 
 The argument emphasised the relevance of systems, cultural scripts, and mental 
models in shaping institutional effects.  It was, however, somewhat vague in respect 
to the mechanisms by which culture and history cemented the social order and 
constrained organisational choices.  Early theoretical thought identified institutional 
effects as concerned principally with social stability, drawing attention to processes 
that functioned as stable patterns for activities that were routinely enacted (Jepperson, 
1991, pp.144-145).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlighted coercive, normative, 
and mimetic processes.  Scott (2001) developed three pillars of the institutional order: 
regulative, normative, and cultural/cognitive.  Each of Scott’s pillars offered a 
different rationale for legitimacy, either by virtue of being legally sanctioned, morally 
authorised, or culturally supported.  These key treatments of institutional mechanisms 
underscored that it is critical to distinguish whether an organisation complies out of 
expedience, from a moral obligation, or because its members cannot conceive of 
alternative ways of acting.   
 
 This thesis has employed neo-institutionalism as its initial basis for theoretical 
discussion.  The approach was used as it was argued that IGOs were the main 
producers of SSR activity and interacted with governments and departments of state.  
It therefore was axiomatic that institutional theory would have a part to play in 
determining of the influences on the practice of SSR.  Indeed at the strategic level 
there was some resonance for, as was noted in Chapter Five, the end of the Cold War 
saw an increase in the IGO isomorphism.  This institutional survival mechanism 
created domain similarity, which in turn lead to competition, rivalry and confusion.  
This had a degree of synergy with neo-institutionalist theory where rational choice, 
historical institutionalism and the isomorphic consequences related to sociological 
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institutionalism have significance.  
 
 However, it has been questioned if the new schools of institutionalism have 
presented anything innovative in the study of IGOs engaged in security sector reform 
and management.  It has been noted that the unravelling of institutionalism is difficult 
“in multilevel and multicentred institutional settings, characterised by interactions 
among multiple autonomous processes” (March & Olsen, 2009, p. 8) as is the case in 
SSR programme delivery.  Some academics (Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Olsen, 2005) 
observe that actors within organisations sometimes deviate from what institutional 
rules prescribe.  It has been argued that it makes a difference how interaction, 
experience and memory are organised and to what degree goals are shared, and how 
the needs of the organisation and the individual are satisfied.  
 Nevertheless, Miles and Snow (1978, pp.21-32) suggest that institutional 
effectiveness relies on the perception of the operating environment and decisions 
about coping with it.  Taken in the round, the principle objective is to reduce 
uncertainty within the organisational operation.  The ideal organisation will have 
systems that ensure efficiency and reduce uncertainty, while simultaneously allowing 
appropriate innovation.  This appreciation is in accord with the work of IGOs in the 
field of SSR.  However, it is concluded that although the theories of the neo- 
institutionalism may be useful for understanding the strategic level of the institutional 
environment, in which SSR operates, it is silent on the issues that dominate and shape 
the successful realisation of SSR in the field.  It is argued that the theories of neo- 
institutionalism, in all is guises, is better suited for the more ordered world of 
business, corporations and organisational headquarters than for the highly volatile, 
acutely political and uniquely unpredictable world of grass-roots security sector 
management and reform.  
 That being said, neo-institutionalism is based on the insight that organisations 
operate amidst both competitive and cooperative environments, along with other 
organisations.  This attention to the structure of relations and the formulation of 
logics within a field has provided an opportunity to study the emergence of 
competing mind-sets and logics, as well as an understanding of how contention 
develops.  The latter focus has led some institutionalists to consult with political 
sociologists and social movement analysts (Davis et al, 2005).  While several early 
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statements, such as by DiMaggio (1988) and Powell (1991), noted the limitations of 
institutional arguments with respect to assuming that ideas and practices spread 
seamlessly and without contestation, more recent work (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005) 
has looked at how political opportunities and cultural frameworks shape the diffusion 
process, and note that social movements are critical to the acceptance of ideas.  
Another strand of research (Drori et al, 2006) has pursued the development and 
diffusion of new modes of governance at the transnational level.  Research on the 
world polity stresses that organisational fields transcend national borders, and while 
some note that global associational activity generates common standards and 
evaluative metrics, others (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) point to complex 
coalition formation and multi-directional influences and conflicts.  
  
 An institution is a web of interrelated formal and informal norms governing 
social relationships.  It is by structuring social interactions that institutions produce 
group performance (Nee & Ingram, 1998, p.19).  There is, nonetheless, a danger in 
relying too heavily on just one set of theories when examining a subject as wide 
ranging as the reform and management of the security sector.  Understanding security 
sector issues requires that researchers consult a wider literature than they are perhaps 
accustomed to.  This thesis has proposed that the external relationships and internal 
feuds associated with international post-conflict endeavours had a pronounced effect 
on intervention outcome, which goes beyond the more structured approach of the 
neo- institutionalists. 
 
 Higgot (2009, p. 627-629) believes that any future research into 
institutionalism must be bedded in the wider study of governance and the ability of 
IGOs to provide more effective decision-making and, at the same time, legitimate 
their actions.  He suggests that it will be difficult to separate practice from theory in 
such a research agenda.  Despite normative arguments for multilateral cooperation, 
via IGOs, in reality such cooperation will be difficult to realise and the key issues for 
future research will revolve around questions of what supports or undermines this 
goal.  
 
 It has been suggested above that the theories of institutionalism are less 
apposite below the macro-level of investigation, however they provide a sound base 
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for further analysis of what drives the functioning of organisations involved in 
security sector reform and management.  They are less certain when the influence of 
competition, confusion and rivalry are considered.  The institutional requirement for 
legitimacy and survival remain extant at both the systemic and actor levels but it is 
argued that other forces are also at play.  Legitimacy, within institutionalist theory, 
depends not only on actions that accomplish objectives, but also that actors behave in 
accordance with legitimate procedures ingrained in a culture (March & Olsen, 1986).  
However, the legitimacy of structures, processes and efficiency do not necessarily 
coincide and thus rivalry and competition ensues.  Thus, as has already been noted, 
the unravelling of institutionalism is difficult in the context of a multilevel and 
multicentred institutional setting as is the case in SSR programme delivery.  
Understanding security sector issues requires an exploration of a number of issues not 
commonly considered by the academic community when researching security sector 
management.  Thus this thesis has proposed that the external relationships and 
internal feuds associated with international post-conflict endeavours have a 
pronounced effect on SSR outcomes. 
 
 Previous Chapters have examined the competition and rivalry that engenders 
discord between organisations and officials when engaged in SSR activities.  
Chapters Five and Six pointed to the occasions of competition and rivalry leading up 
to and during the Kosovo ISSR and how they undermined the work being undertaken 
in the province.  This existed on three levels; within IGOs and government 
departments, between organisations and between the international officials.  
 
It has been noted in Chapter Four that rivalries are determined either by 
structure or in response to interactions among competing groups.  However, it is 
contended that rivalry is initiated and maintained by both structural and actor-driven 
causes and that presenting them as separate stimuli is misleading.  Structure and 
activity are both essential to the concept of competition and rivalry between 
organisations and social groups.  Rivalries have a structural and a relational 
dimension and both interact.  Through functional and regional overlap organisations 
become significant for one another.  Although seemingly structural, domain similarity 
is an actor-driven choice and although it does not predispose organisations towards 
rivalry it enhances the prospects for reinforcing rivalries. 
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The search for central positions in a network is the primary causal mechanism 
for rivalry among organisations.  Even though it is structurally motivated, it allows a 
range of options, from defensive positioning to protect relative positions to strategies 
for the offensive expansion of the organisation’s domain and it’s strive for legitimacy.  
The pursuit of organisational autonomy can restrain organisations from cooperating.  
To cooperate means sharing responsibility and therefore reducing autonomy.  There 
is a dichotomy between maximising autonomy and keeping control, thus cooperation 
can even have the adverse effect of increasing rivalry.  What an organisation, or 
department within it, perceives as defensive positioning, others see as encroachment 
upon their own domain.  Inter- and intra-organisational rivalry is engendered and 
maintained.  Thus rivalry is an antagonistic role perception, posing one against 
another.  This antagonism tends to become constant over time and accumulates 
‘psychological baggage’ which distorts perceptions and creates distrust.  
 
In Kosovo the incident of rivalry and competition were present on a number of 
behavioural levels.  The first was the intra-organisational rivalry between the UN’s 
DPKO and UNDP, the outcome of which served to delay implementation and funding 
decisions in New York.  This, in turn, created suspicion in key states and 
organisations, which feared that, because of the delayed timing, the ISSR would 
encroach upon the UNOSEK final status process.  The seven-month delay in starting 
the ISSR programme also disrupted inter-organisational relationships in the field.  
Having been made accountable for implementing the much delayed programme, the 
leader of the UNMIK AUS was reluctant to hand the process over to the incoming 
UNDP team.  This was to cause friction between the two organisations, which 
remained throughout the ISSR process and beyond into the UNDP’s 3SD programme. 
 
Inter-personal rivalry and competition also were present during the ISSR 
programme.  Personal rivalries contributed to the erosion of the ability of the Kosovo 
ISSR to fully achieve its aims.  Social psychology theories suggest that individual 
actors within groups are likely to be convinced of the validity of their own beliefs and 
distrust those of others.  The Head of the UNMIK AUS, the Principle DSRSG, Head 
of the OSCE Mission and the COMKFOR all displayed this distrust when dealing 
with aspects of the ISSR programme.  Relations between individuals also played their 
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part in the blunting of the ISSR’s validity.  The OSCE assisted the ISSR Secretariat 
gather information from the local population.  With their mandate to further good 
governance in the province they were ideally placed to undertake similar assistance 
with the PISG.  However, personal animosities within OSCE mission meant that this 
support was never fully realised, as the acrimony between senior officials fed into 
OSCE’s relationship with the ISSR process.  It a similar manner, the unease of SRSG 
Rücker over security matters and of the emerging role of the EU in Kosovo led to 
decisions being made which caused offence to the principal EU official in the 
province, who then withdrew from the ISSR Steering Committee.  Anderson and 
Neistadt’s (2003, p.3) contention that inter-organisational relations are largely 
founded on inter-personal communication was substantiated in Kosovo.  
 
The approaching decisions on the future political status of the province served 
to undermine international engagement in the security review and reform process. 
International backing, both in the province and in the wider international community, 
was at best apathetic.  Arguably the setting and timing of the ISSR programme was 
such that it could not succeed.  Many of the impediments to international support to 
the programme were based on concerns that it would detract from the final status 
negotiations.  However, intra-organisational competition and rivalry delayed the start 
of the ISSR programme, which originally had been designed to precede and 
complement the work of UNOSEK. 
 
The presence of other internationally sponsored security-related activities, 
running parallel to the ISSR programme, served also to detract from its impact.  
Timing and the situation within which the ISSR had to operate were of the utmost 
importance to its outcome.  Delays occasioned by rivalry and competition, 
compounded by confusion over its objectives, was to shape its outcome.   
 
The US DoD and State Department’s initial ambivalence to the process was a 
factor in the slow realisation of donor support for the programme.  The desire of 
Germany to avoid the creation of a local military force for Kosovo, based on KPC / 
KLA membership, served to delay the publication of the ISSR Final Report.  Time 
and space therefore became major factors in determining the outcome of Kosovo’s 
ISSR. 
  SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS: THE CASE OF KOSOVO                                                                                                                                                          CHAPTER NINE   
 
247 
 
Given the importance attached to SSR interventions it is clear that the 
international community should seek to provide assistance in a manner that takes a 
long-term perspective.  Discussion on the approach to SSR increasingly recognises 
the need to combine the economic and social aspects of security with traditional 
military reforms.  Security reform interventions need to be designed to provide a 
long-term solution to the challenge of rebuilding formal security mechanisms in a 
post-conflict society.  In the case of Kosovo, however, this imperative seems to have 
been overtaken by the apparent need to get the ISSR ‘out of the way’. 
 
Thus the problems confronting the ISSR were related to the failure, at 
policymaking level, to take note of the likelihood of inter-organisational competition, 
given the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo in 2006.  This embraced the inherent 
need of organisations to pursue autonomy and longevity and the negative effects of 
domain similarity.  The underlying tensions generated within the IGOs and the 
competition between the international and local communities were to have a marked 
effect on the progress of the ISSR programme.   
 
In sum, if the likely occurrence of rivalry and competition is anticipated and 
addressed within the planning and design phase of the process, then their influence 
can be minimised.  The necessity for strategic, integrated planning before a SSR 
intervention is of paramount importance.  Looking to the future of Kosovo, Dagand 
(2008, p. 9) stresses that coordination and cooperation across the external relations 
and legal competences of the EU institutions will be necessary if security is to be 
maintained in the new republic.  The European Commission will need to support 
Kosovo in its socio-economic and administrative restructuring, in conjunction with 
reforms under the EULEX mandate.  Attention to a security and development nexus 
in approaching SSR, across EU institutional implementation, should reflect the 
stipulation of the Lisbon Treaty to ensure EU cross-pillar cooperation.  The 
requirement for poverty reduction and human development, within a stable security 
environment is critical to averting the tensions created by the lack of opportunities for 
Kosovo citizens.  Without adequate consideration to these needs, rising discontent 
within Kosovo could fuel further conflict in the region. 
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9.2. Planning, Coordination and Cooperation  
 
In Chapters Two and Three the approach to understanding security, the security 
sector and its reform were examined.  Each major IGO had viewed SSR from 
different standpoints and competition between organisations has caused disruption in 
both the planning and execution of SSR programmes.  The inherently political nature 
of SSR requires a nuanced analysis of the security threats, of potential national 
security strategies, the feasibility of sustainable security architecture and the viability 
of civilian oversight.  
 
In Chapter Four, Lederach’s pyramid was used to illustrate the requirements 
for peacebuilding and, when characterising the essential elements for planning a SSR 
intervention, the building metaphor can be used again.  The foundation of any SSR 
programme must be solid; there must be a clear and collective understanding of what 
the security sector consists of and how it is to be reformed.  Agreement should be 
reached, at all levels of participation, on the scope of the reform processes and the 
objectives of the SSR programme.  The donors, local actors, practitioners must share 
this understanding and the institutions engaged in the process.  Etherington considers 
this to be a practical “unitary framework, based on the search for coherence” (2008, 
p.6).  The basis for SSR must consist of agreed solutions that delineate the scope and 
size of the intervention.   
 
However, there continues to be wide debate as to exactly what constitutes the 
security sector and how it is to be reformed.  There is a plethora of interpretations and 
IOs and IGOs continue to deliberate over them.  The OECD has followed up its 
seminal examination of security reform (OECD-DAC, 2005) with two further works 
(OECD-DAC, 2007: OECD-DAC, 2007b) expanding its view of SSR and how it 
should be applied in the field.  The larger IGOs also are refining their understanding 
of SSR.  In June 2008, the UN brought together SSR practitioners, from across the 
UN departments and agencies, to familiarise them with the UN’s emerging view on 
the application of SSR.(1)  Meanwhile, NATO, at its SSR Department in Naples, 
continues to develop its own SSR methodology. (2) 
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The academic community also is considering how SSR should be conducted.  
During 2008, three major works were published exploring the theory and practice of 
SSR (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2008; Spence & Fluri, 2008; Law & Myshlovska, 2008) 
and numerous conference papers were presented and published on the subject.  
Despite this activity, it is disconcerting to find that the major IGOs and IOs seem 
unwilling to pool their knowledge or strive to reach a shared understanding of the 
difficulties facing SSR application in the field.  Additionally, none of the 
organisations appear to have requested recipients of reform programmes to comment 
on SSR methodologies or indicate if the objectives of the host state had been 
achieved.  Although the debate is extensive, there is yet to be a universal 
understanding of objectives of SSR and how they should be achieved. 
 
There is little sign that organisations are coalescing around a common 
approach to SSR.  For instance, the planned 2010 DFID Security Sector Development 
and Defence Transformation Support (SSDDT) programme in Southern Sudan will 
use the OECD Implementation Framework (OECD-DAC, 2007b).(3)  However, the 
UN, the US and other international actors will operate in Sudan alongside DFID.  
There are indications that these organisations do not share DFID’s enthusiasm for the 
OECD’s Implementation Framework and will base their activities on different 
methodologies. (4) 
 
Thus there is still a need for a pan-organisational agreement on the basics of 
SSR.  The definitions of the security sector, the depth and breadth of the approach to 
its reform and how donors, organisations and practitioners cooperate in the forming 
of a concept for SSR should constitute the foundation for SSR practice.  Debate on 
SSR should not be undertaken in isolated groups or solely within institutional 
structures.  Etherington believes that there is:  
“…a need to raise the game; integrated pre-planning is very necessary 
with a blurring of the boundaries between civilian, military and local 
authorities.  Regrettably, institutional protectionism is very present in the 
existing system” (2008, p.8). 
Nevertheless, the international community has had difficulty with the 
concepts of security and there is a responsibility to ensure that governments provide 
security for all their citizens.  An independent Commission on State Security and 
Intervention introduced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in 2001.  The 
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R2P was prompted by the turmoil in Rwanda and the Balkans and is grounded in the 
belief that the state has primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens.  In 
December 2005, 150 countries in the UN General Assembly endorsed this concept 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2005, pp.1-5). 
State sovereignty implies responsibility; when a state is unwilling or unable to 
provide security for its people, the wider international community has a collective 
responsibility to take action.  This action may include the use of military force in 
exceptional cases.  Evans suggests that R2P is far better equipped to end mass 
atrocities than is humanitarian intervention (Evans, 2008).  However, much remains 
to be done to solidify political support and understanding of the R2P concept and to 
build institutional capacity (Powers, 2008, p.365). 
Contemporary research into the security sector and human security has given 
rise to debate on what actually constitutes ‘security’.  Further, it has been observed 
that security means different things to different people at different times.  This 
implies that, given the SSR’s ephemeral nature, the promotion of human security, as a 
constituent part of the process, is difficult to characterise and equally challenging to 
achieve.  However, it is clear that to have any chance of providing security for the 
population of a post-conflict state there must be clear understanding of what is 
required and how it is to be achieved.  This will require close coordination between 
both international and local actors.   
 
Jackson (2007, p. 212) uses the analogy of a length of rope to describe PSOs 
in post-conflict situations; traditional security sector reform is only one strand that 
makes up his rope; others are economic and social progress, political stability and 
humanitarian assistance.   Singularly the strands cannot resist the strains inherent in 
the post-conflict environment but together, he suggests, “the strands become stronger 
than the sum of their parts.”  This example can be equally applied to the application 
of SSR in that the means of achieving the overall objective must be interrelated and 
coordinated.  
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Table 9.1:  Interrelated Strands of Security Sector Reform  
 
The illustration, however, emphasises the need to understand exactly what 
constitutes the security sector and how holistic the reform process must be.  It has 
become fashionable to talk about ‘holistic SSR’ but there remains little understanding 
of what this means in practice.  It is often left to the practitioner on the ground to 
determine how wide the interpretation of the meaning of the word ‘holistic’ should 
be.  Thus the donor community, IGO and the local community have little idea, before 
a SSR programme starts, what the project is trying to achieve, save for broad 
assertions of realising sustainable peace and security.   
 
9.3. International Control or Local Ownership  
 
The importance of local actors has been increasingly acknowledged, with 
peacebuilding activities being conceptualised as an activity involving the entire 
society (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999).  Indeed, experience has shown 
that such actions are unsustainable if they are conceptualised entirely by outsiders and 
merely implemented locally.  Local actors have to be integrated into the design and 
decision-making process in order for the process to work at all.  It is crucial for long-
term sustainability that conflict transformation efforts are locally conceived and led 
(Edomwonyi, 2003).   
 
 However, little account is taken by the international community of the fact 
that some states see SSR as a tool of western neo-colonialism.  Incentives, such as 
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NATO or EU membership and the PfP, to encourage the implementation of SSR can 
be viewed by some nations as ways to increase western control.  The extent to which 
SSR activities are devoid of political motives is questionable, as is who are the 
greatest beneficiaries of the process.  There are fears that SSR is merely a cover for 
an intrusion into the sovereignty of the host nation and that it conceals more malign, 
self -serving motives.  Additionally, some states suspect that there may be financial 
and economic incentives behind SSR, determining where the reform efforts will be 
carried out.  These fears can serve to undermine more altrulistic and humanitarian 
motivations and inhibit cooperation and partnership. 
 
  Current democratisation models primarily focus on inter-state relations and 
ignore the fact that establishing democracy can be a highly adversarial measure 
within states.  This focus adds to the difficulties of pursuing the concept of a mutual 
exploration of local ownership and self-determination in security sector management 
matters.  The dichotomies of local engagement and the effects of the developmental 
approach to stabilisation and SSR, favoured by the international community, often 
overlook the culture, sensitivities and aspirations of the host nation.  This is coupled 
to the pressures that emanate from the donor states to conform to their understanding 
of the SSR requirement. 
 
Earlier in this thesis it was noted that the ISSR Secretariat strove for local 
ownership of the programme but failed to fully engage the Kosovo political 
leadership.  This failure, in part, can be traced to the reluctance at a high level within 
the UNMIK to allow the PISG to become involved in security matters.  In Chapters 
Six and Seven it was suggested that the UNMIK’s attitude was founded on the belief 
that the local leadership were incapable of dealing successfully with Kosovo’s 
internal security problems.  The resultant exclusion of the PISG from security 
planning ran entirely contrary to the aims and objectives of SSR, which include the 
promotion of both capacity building and local ownership.  Zerinini (2008, p. 11) 
believes that SSR must include integrated action that allows a policy process that is 
owned by the host nation. This did not occur in Kosovo.  
 
The lack of a coherent understanding, at strategic level, of what constitutes the 
security sector and its reform impacted on the ISSR programme’s ability to interact 
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with the local population.  At no time in the development of the ISSR process was the 
scope and depth of the review delineated, or was there prior discussion with the PISG 
on which Ministries or Departments were to be the subject of review.  The initiators 
of the programme did not direct the ISSR Secretariat, in any detail, as to how the 
review of the security sector should be undertaken.  It became the responsibility of 
the ISSR Secretariat to decide what was to be reviewed and how far reaching that 
investigation should be. (5)  The ISSR researchers therefore determined to take the 
security perceptions of the Kosovo population and then review the capabilities of the 
Ministries and Departments, which had influence or responsibility in the areas 
identified by the population as a threat.  At no stage in its deliberations did the 
Steering Committee question or modify the recommendations set before it. (6) 
 
It appears that reliance on the practitioners to decide on the methodology for 
an SSR intervention is not an unusual feature of SSR interventions.  Hänggi and 
Scherrer (2008, p.235) note that generally there has “been a lack of SSR strategy … 
emanating from headquarters…SSR strategies mostly evolved on an ad hoc basis 
within field missions”.  This was the situation also in the SSR missions in Burundi 
(Banal & Scherrer, 2008, pp. 46-48), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(Dahrendorf, 2008, pp. 68, 90) and in Haiti (Mobekk, 2008, p.153).  Arguably 
devolving responsibility for the shape and scope of a SSR programme to the lowest 
level is the practical and, indeed, the only feasible solution.  By leaving the detailed 
planning to field missions, the programme will be grounded at ‘grass-roots’ level and 
can be adapted for local conditions, thereby taking account of local requirements and 
aspirations.  However, it is apparent that often this is not a conscious decision by 
policymakers; rather it comes about due to the absence of coherent planning.  
Practitioners, in the absence of strategic guidance, tend to do what they think is best 
and often this ad hoc approach leads to a disorganised approach which undermines 
the value of the intervention. 
 
Any merit accruing from the ‘grass-roots’ approach can be maximised only if 
there is genuine local inclusion in the process.  In Chapter Two it was noted that local 
ownership is difficult to achieve and indeed the best that can be hoped for is the 
active inclusion of the local population and leadership in the SSR process.  It was 
observed in Chapters Six and Seven that, during the Kosovo ISSR, there were 
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elements within the international community who discouraged local inclusion in the 
security review and reform process.  Again this is not atypical; recent research reveals 
that “local actors were not always present in the discussions on international support 
to SSR…and the needs of the [local] authorities were not always understood” (Banal 
& Scherrer, 2008. p. 53); “…local ownership [is] disregarded…and there [is] a 
tendency to define local ownership too narrowly…civil society [is] left out of the 
process” (Mobekk, 2008, p.152). 
 
However, Hänggi and Scherrer assert that, of all the SSR programmes they 
have studied, only the Kosovo ISSR utilised a broad local consultative process (2008, 
p. 233).  Nevertheless, criticism of the ISSR programme was not that it had ignored 
local inclusion but that it had failed to convince the local leadership to become 
actively engaged in the process.  This was certainly true as there was no overt 
participation by the Serbian leadership in the ISSR and many of the Kosovar 
opposition political parties were ambivalent about the programme.  In Chapter Seven 
the reasons for this were discussed; however, it was a significant lapse in a 
programme that heralded itself as being based on local ownership.  Nonetheless, it is 
not completely the fault of the international community that local leaders are not 
more committed to security reform.  A senior NGO official has remarked that: 
“When institutions start paying for their own consultants, then we will 
see real commitment.  Unless the local institutions start paying for the 
SSR projects or at least get involved in the design of it and publicly 
sign binding memorandum of understanding, the local buy-in will 
remain superficial and the level of involvement, responsibility and 
accountability will remain low.” (7) 
 
It is probably too ambitious to expect post-conflict states to fund their own SSR 
activities but the official’s point is clear; local leaders must be actively encouraged to 
become involved in the design and development of a SSR strategy.  Chapter Two 
contained discussion of the issues of partner identification, the lack of dialogue with 
the local population and the problems of creating norm resonance, all of which 
impede local ownership.  Some “national governments [are] not willing to engage in 
SSR at all” (Hänggi and Scherrer, 2008, p. 233).  Nevertheless in order to achieve a 
sustainable outcome to SSR activities local commitment must be realised.  However, 
both local and international acceptance and approval of SSR programmes will be 
based on successful outcomes.  In Kosovo, there existed a miscalculation that was to 
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undermine the impact of the ISSR Secretariat’s work.  This was the absence of a 
viable monitoring and evaluation system, which could have strengthened the authority 
of its work. 
H,9.4. Measuring Progress 
 
In Chapter Two it was noted that the application of security reform in the field has 
lacked a credible and universally recognised measurement tool for SSR outcomes.  
Despite the effort of the international community in supporting the SSR interventions 
there remains little agreement on how programme success should be measured.  
Saferworld (2007, p.1) has suggested that: 
“…practice and thinking in this area is at best divergent, at worst 
significantly lacking [and that] while the task of monitoring and 
evaluating SSR interventions may not be significantly different from that 
in related fields, the lessons and methods of humanitarian aid, conflict 
prevention and development do not appear to have been consciously 
analysed and taken up”  
 
 With its emphasis on transformational change of security institutions, many of 
which have been leveraged by elites to gain and maintain power, SSR is necessarily 
political. There will therefore be dichotomies resulting from reform efforts; some 
groups, such as military and political leaders from both predecessor and current 
regimes, are well aware that their authority and power is in danger of being 
undermined.  SSR practitioners, therefore, operate in a highly charged milieu, where 
asking politically sensitive questions or sharing sensitive data with unapproved 
parties, could have negative outcomes.  They must impress the advantages of SSR on 
local stakeholders, working with and supporting their host nation counterparts in 
designing and implementing SSR programmes that reflect the state’s cultural norms, 
political realities, and other needs so that improvements can be sustained over the 
long-term.  SSR assessment has two imperatives; the initial assessment to understand 
what is required, what the capacity of the host nation’s institutions are and how best 
to undertake the reform process.  The second assessment should provide feed –back 
to both the donor and host nations on the performance and applicability of the reform 
process.  This second imperative is essential to gain and maintain funding for the SSR 
programme. 
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 The initial assessment of SSR needs provides a tool for future change 
management efforts, as it provides a vision of the current state of the host nation’s 
security sector. This data can be used to determine opportunities for aligning 
stakeholder and donor priorities and challenges that need to be mitigated.  If 
grounded in well-formulated data, assessments can also be used to establish SSR 
project baselines and assist in the measurement of programme applicability. While 
the assessment is not an end to itself, it nonetheless can provide practitioners with the 
political and diplomatic cover to develop knowledge that will support programme 
planning and implementation without raising stakeholder expectations to unrealistic 
levels.  
 
 All SSR programmes come with at least an element of donor national interest in 
their make-up.  It is therefore essential that the host nation’s trust be gained, even 
when it is clear that SSR is being undertaken in the donor states’ national interest.  
Stakeholders are not naïve; they understand that donor priorities drive SSR projects 
and therefore they may need convincing that the reform process will meet their own 
interests.  Security sector reform implies that a nation’s security systems and 
processes are deficient and require reform. In some post-conflict environments, the 
word “reform” is presumptuous. Furthermore, even the term ‘assessment’ can be 
threatening, signifying a shift in power and attack on national sovereignty. This can 
prove an impediment to building collaborative, trusting relationships on the ground.  
In several SSR projects it has been found that the word ‘development’ elicits better 
responses from host nation stakeholders and may be more appropriate politically 
(Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, 2009, pp. 6-7).  
 
 However, SSR initial assessments can be used to build awareness of, and 
consensus around, the need for change.  Although SSR practitioners typically develop 
the questions they ask host nation stakeholders, it may be beneficial if they can help 
their host nation counterparts ask the questions themselves.  SSR practitioners should 
display political and cultural sensitivity and avoid stigmatising institutions and 
processes, which also necessarily characterises local actors.  If SSR practitioners 
position their work appropriately, they can reinforce a state’s commitment to 
rebuilding its systems and processes and involve civil society in the reform process. If 
they position it poorly, however, they could gain, at best, superficial commitment and 
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compliance.  
 
 National actors are in the best position to determine their priorities and which 
initiatives will strengthen the capacity and capabilities of state and non-state security 
and justice providers, while addressing critical issues.  The goal is to create a highly 
responsive security system: one that does not simply meet current needs, but also 
evolves to keep pace with a changing society.  To accomplish this objective, a host 
nation will need to involve stakeholders at all levels, so that ownership is truly “local” 
and reform efforts benefit all the citizens in communities throughout the state, not just 
elites or certain ethnic groups.  
 
  
 Security sector reform practitioners should take care to maintain an open mind 
and practice cultural sensitivity in their work.  SSR’s mostly western-based 
practitioners will bring biases into the initial assessment phase, which can influence 
the questions they ask, the recommendations they make, and the programmes they 
seek to design.  For example, SSR actors’ bias to set up state-centric judicial systems 
that may not translate to certain countries’ judicial systems was demonstrated in 
Kosovo when international lawyers instituted a legal system based on the western 
style legal system which had to run alongside the already established Yugoslav law 
and laws created by UNMIK in the early days of their administration (Betts, Carlson 
et al, 2001, 371-382).  Even so, maintaining parallel systems may be nothing more 
than a political and financial expedient to keeping a fragile peace while working 
towards creating systems that protect the rights of all citizens, not just certain ethnic, 
political or religious groups.  
 
 Nevertheless, national actors faced with the potential loss of power may 
sometimes acquiesce to an initial assessment for one reason only: so that they can 
maintain full control of the process.  In such a scenario, potential spoilers may be 
senior members of the recipient government who ostensibly cooperate, simply 
because they view the political risk of explicit opposition as more dangerous to their 
interests than short-term acquiescence.   However, donor state national concerns can 
sometimes blind donors to political and other realities that indicate a lack of state 
readiness for SSR.  Launching SSR programmes when the host nation lacks the 
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political will or capacity to help drive them is politically high risk, as well as of 
questionable effectiveness.  That being said, external actors are primed to engage and 
will often overlook warning signs so that they can move ahead with development 
programmes.  This needs an accurate assessment of the situation, both political and 
technical, in the host nation and an understanding of the problems that will confront 
practitioners undertaking the reform process.  
  
Although these are all relevant capacities none of them, save for the capacity 
to engage stakeholders, indicate how an institution interacts with others within the 
security sector.  The UNDP methodology addresses institutional arrangements as a 
core issue of capacity. It states “institutional arrangements refer to the policies, 
procedures and processes that countries have in place to legislate, plan and manage 
the execution of development, rule of law, measure change and such other functions 
of state” (UNDP, 2008, p.11).  However, beyond acknowledging this issue, the 
methodology does not establish guidelines on how to assess institutional 
arrangements. 
 
A credible system, which assists the monitoring and evaluating (M&E) of 
project progress, is required to ensure that the SSR process remains true to its 
objectives.  It needs to assist policymakers and practitioners to marshal resources and 
expertise to best effect.  Chapter Three noted that the use of the logical framework 
concept of M&E, at present the favoured method of measuring SSR programmes, 
lacks the flexibility needed to accurately measure the effectiveness of complex 
security reform activities.   
 
Apart from the ‘logframe’ approach to M&E, there are other result-based 
management methodologies that can be explored by SSR implementing 
organisations.  M&E systems relevant to SSR have been identified by Fitz-Gerald & 
Jackson, (2008, p.6).  These methodologies include a “balanced scorecard” approach 
that is seen as a practical tool for SSR measurement.  Shalamanov & Nikolova (2005) 
note that this method “…is a balanced system of indices for effectiveness and has 
been widely accepted in the management of small, medium and large organisations 
from [both] the private and public sector.”  
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The European Commission’s guide to analysing and addressing governance in 
security sector operations utilises principle-agent theory (PAT) in assessing 
institutional arrangements.  The Commission identifies governance as a priority based 
“upon fundamental principles such as participation, inclusion, transparency and 
accountability.  Promoting these principles helps… to consolidate democracy, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008, p.5).  Further, SSR assists sustainability in sector development 
and aid effectiveness.   Based on PAT, the Commission lays out four governance 
mechanisms that dictate relations: hierarchical governance; patrimonial governance; 
market-based governance, and network governance (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008, pp.43-47).  These are divided into formal (patrimonial and 
market) and informal (patrimonial and network) governance mechanisms that are also 
arranged vertically (hierarchical and patrimonial) and horizontally (market and 
network).  Although the European Commission does employ PAT terminology, the 
mechanisms are not challenged and thus programme design recommendations lack 
specificity. 
 
A model is required that concentrates on the principles driving the framework 
used, as opposed to focusing on the minutiae of measurement as earlier SSR M&E 
models tended to do.  There is a need to overcome concerns regarding the choice of 
appropriate indicators and the tendency to confuse indicators with objectives.  
Notably, more recent M&E models take the military’s Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) approach as the basis of their measurement criteria.  Based on indicators 
utilised by the military, measurement criteria are developed for functional areas (for 
example, political, rule of law, human rights and good governance).  Civilian and 
military actors then can work towards goals based on appropriate analytical inputs.  
In February 2008, UNDP Kosovo developed an M&E system for its 3SD project, 
which uses indicators in support of impact assessments similar to the CIMIC 
approach (UNDP, 2008).  Nevertheless, the lack of strategic planning, the need for 
involvement by local actors and the unreliability of the evaluation of SSR 
programmes remain problems to overcome.   
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9.5. A Way Forward 
 
Every SSR scenario is different; what works well in one setting may not work in 
another.  It could be argued, therefore, that strategic planning is wasteful and each 
SSR intervention should be designed in situ and be prepared to adapt.  This approach, 
it is suggested, would be a naïve and wasteful way to attempt SSR, even though there 
are illustrations that this is exactly how SSR programmes have been undertaken in the 
past.  In the last five years, however, there have been attempts to regularise the 
approach to SSR or, at least, quantify how activities in the field should be structured.  
Sadly, in many instances, IGO attempts to set strategy and then apply it in the field 
have been ill defined. 
 
Martin and Sayigh (2009, pp.2-6) have noted, using Iraq as their example, that 
the transformation of the security sector involves reform that is often reflective of the 
society at large.  Moreover, changing the core objectives of security organisations 
will necessarily alter the organisations themselves and their position in society.  
Therefore, the substantial modification of interior ministries is in itself a sovereign 
matter.  In post-conflict societies the common political frameworks are largely 
broken, meaning that a re-alignment of political power is a highly sensitive issue to 
all concerned.  When a society lacks agreement on fundamental issues such as the 
functions and responsibilities of the security sector, political deadlock may forestall 
attempts at SSR. 
 
A further issue is the need to revise donor policy and practice in SSR 
programmes.  Without the reform of donor attitudes and practise, investment may 
prove counter-productive.  The most difficult subject is that of donor coordination, 
because it restricts the freedom of donors to act as they see fit.  A more horizontal 
approach is required, where provision of security and justice is seen from the point of 
view of the citizen. 
 
There is an urgent need for the rudiments of SSR intervention to be agreed by 
the international community.  The lack of consistency in ordering SSR mandates, 
whether by the UN, NATO or on a bilateral basis, has led to an absence of clarity, 
efficiency and effectiveness on the ground.  More positive and inclusive action must 
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be taken, at international level, to reach a common understanding of SSR and its 
implementation.  Moller (2008, pp.11-12) suggests that there must be a move from 
the theoretical to the practical.  Little research, he contends, is undertaken on what 
actually works in security reform.  The differences in priorities at the local level and 
in the minds of international planners are stark.  Local imperatives have been ignored 
or judged inconsequential.  In addition, SSR programmes often have been designed 
and implemented in isolation from other international initiatives and the resultant 
domain similarity has led to rivalry and competition.   
 
In the case of Kosovo, the SSDAT made a detailed study of the requirement 
for the ISSR.  It also attempted to ensure that the political climate was appropriate for 
the intervention.  In the initial stages of the planning cycle both the local and 
international communities confirmed their support for the process and there were 
indications that funding would be readily available from the donor community. (8)  
However, as related in earlier chapters, much of the strategic planning for the 
programme was soon to become redundant as confusion, competition and rivalry 
delayed and distorted the process.  SSDAT’s carefully calculated timelines were 
rapidly overtaken by infighting and confusion.  Thus the realities of political and 
institutional agendas were to pervert the orderly progression of the ISSR programme 
methodology. 
 
A lesson, therefore, to be taken from the Kosovo experience, is that 
consideration must be given to other activities within the host state and the wider 
international donor community.  The issues of time and space; can the programme be 
completed in the desired timeframe or will other activities or issues disrupt it, are 
vital to the outcome.  Not enough attention was given in Kosovo to other activities; 
indeed, it came as a surprise to the ISSR Secretariat to discover that a number of 
analogous projects were being undertaken alongside ISSR, some sponsored by the 
same organisations that were funding their programme. (9) 
 
There also were strains at the lower level of engagement.  In Chapter Four the 
triggers for, and possible solutions to, inter-personal rivalry were discussed.  
However, it must be acknowledged that, within any human interaction, this 
impediment to progress can seldom be eradicated.  It is only by the careful selection 
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of staff and by effective line management that the influence of negative inter-personal 
relationships may be combated.  As Chapter Seven illustrated, the ISSR programme 
was by no means immune from the problems that inter-personal discord can bring. 
 
The Kosovo experience demonstrated that assurances of support from local 
leadership are not enough.  Local actors must have an active role in the design of the 
SSR concept and the methodology to be employed on the ground.  Wherever possible 
host state civil servants and military officers should be part of both the scoping and 
implementation teams.  If this expertise is deficient in the local community, capacity 
building by appointing suitable local candidates in ‘shadow roles’ to international 
experts should be undertaken as a firm objective of a SSR programme.  It is essential, 
however, that these ‘shadows’ be returned to government posts, for an agreed period 
of time, as soon as the SSR programme is completed. (10)  
 
It has been noted that the ISSR programme suffered from a lack of M&E 
procedures, which could adequately measure the impact of the programme.  To date, 
most performance frameworks have existed either solely at practitioner level, or have 
been developed retrospectively as an assessment tool to measure programme effect.  
Monitoring and evaluating the performance of an SSR programme is central to the 
evaluation of its sustainability and achievement of the wider strategic objectives.  
More research is necessary to develop a credible M&E system that is flexible enough 
to cater for the complexities of holistic SSR programmes. 
 
Intra-and inter-organisational rivalry and competition are more difficult 
obstacles to overcome.  However, there are ways of surmounting these problems that 
might have the supplementary advantage of adding robustness to the whole SSR 
process.  The method of planning and executing an SSR programme should be 
undertaken in two distinct but interlinked phases.  The first phase should be a scoping 
and planning mission where the suitability and acceptability of the programme is 
explored and the methodology for implementation designed.  The second phase takes 
the design and put it into practice.  It might be argued that this is what is happening 
already; in the case of the ISSR, SSDAT undertook a scoping study and UNDP 
implemented the design.  However, as we have seen, there was a lack of cohesion 
between the findings and recommendations of the SSDAT Scoping Study and 
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implementation in the field.  In part, the problems of inter-organisational rivalry 
started with SSDAT that, as a group jointly funded by the UK MOD, DFID and FCO, 
found itself at the centre of a struggle for primacy between the individual departments 
of state. (11) 
 
The scoping and detailed planning for a SSR mission should be undertaken by 
a private body rather than an IO, IGO or government department.  It is further 
recommended that this body should come from the academic community where 
expertise in the myriad of disciplines of a holistic SSR programme can be found.  
These skills already exist in a number of universities and some principal NGOs and 
can, no doubt, be found or fostered in others. 
 
In the absence of an agreed delineation of the security sector, the planning 
body should make recommendations to the both the international supporting body and 
the host state as to which functional areas should fall within the intended SSR 
programme.  At this point funding can be attracted from the donor community, as it 
will be possible to judge the scope of the SSR and the merits of its aims and 
objectives.  As has been suggested earlier in this Chapter, the planning phase should 
pay close attention to local requirements and ideally should incorporate local 
expertise into the planning structure.  The Scoping and Planning Report should be co-
signed by the President or Prime Minister of the host state indicating full endorsement 
and acceptance of the programme and its methodology.  However, the overarching 
argument for removing the scoping and planning phase from the jurisdiction of IGOs 
or IOs is that it greatly reduces the potential for inter- and intra-organisational rivalry 
and increases the breadth of expertise that can be brought to bear in the vital planning 
stages. 
A more systematic approach, than heretofore undertaken, to the design and 
implementation of a SSR intervention should be developed in order to reduce the 
negative impact of confusion, competition and rivalry on the execution of the 
programme.  Table 9.2 below illustrates the factors that impact on the development of 
a SSR programme, based on the experiences of the Kosovo ISSR:  
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Table 9.2: Factors that impact on the development of a SSR programme. 
 
The interconnection of activities at the red box level will ensure that the planning of 
the SSR activity is acceptable to all concerned and is a practical undertaking.  By 
interlocking the scoping and planning function with the approval of both the 
international and local communities, the requirement to create a firm foundation for 
the intervention is met.  At the green level, the activities move into the 
implementation phase where, again, interlocking requirements are designed to ensure 
that the programme can be launched with the expectation of inter-organisational and 
local cooperation and coordination.  Finally, at the purple level, the practical 
requirements for the SSR programme come into play, with a measurement system 
designed to ensure that programme aims and objectives are met to the satisfaction of 
local and international actors and of donor states. 
 
It is recommended that SSR field programmes be initiated by an IO or IGO 
(perhaps to be known as the Initiating Authority), which can attract and account for 
donor funding (12).  The Initiating Authority should, in consultation with the host 
nation, co-opt local expertise as part of the mission management team.  Having 
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agreed the feasibility and methodology for the SSR programme the Initiating 
Authority should appoint an Implementing Team.  The Implementing Team should 
not come from the Initiating Authority or a partner IO or IGO but from a suitable 
third source.  Martin and Sayigh (2009, p.3) believe that those best to undertake SSR 
activities are technical experts:  
“The systems and processes involved in [SSR] are very complex, and as 
such unsuitable for amateur involvement…The type of people who are 
needed for such large scale projects are not general practitioners, they are 
the consultants who work with similar sized organisations, both 
government and business...In some senses developing security institutions 
after conflict has much in common with private sector management 
consultancy… This is a highly technical activity, and the same level of 
technical expertise is required in security sector development.” 
 
It has been noted in Chapter Four that the private sector is well aware of the 
financial costs of internal and external competition and rivalry and devotes funds for 
research into ways of reducing its effect.  In addition, the private sector (including 
academia) is less risk adverse that the public sector, IOs and IGOs.  Ashdown (2007, 
pp.169-170) observes that IGOs, particularly the UN, avoid risk in peacemaking and 
peacekeeping.  There is also a tendency for IGOs to interfere in the day-to-day 
running of field operations that, in turn, leads to micro-management within the 
mission.  It is suggested therefore that the private sector may have attributes lacking 
in IGOs that can be applied to the furtherance of SSR implementation.  
PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR  
(IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS) 
Objective: Financial Return: Objective: Stability, economic regeneration, 
social cohesion: 
Therefore:  
a). Tolerance to risk is high as there must be risk 
to give adequate financial return. 
 
b). There is an expectation of a degree of project 
failure therefore it is guarded against.  
 
c). There is no stigma in failure therefore it holds 
less fear and greater risks can be taken.  
Therefore: 
 
a). Tolerance to risk is low. 
 
b). It is difficult to calculate success therefore   
little to be gained from aiming for it.  
 
c). Primary objective is to avoid risk and 
organisational exposure therefore a conservative 
approach is used. 
Therefore:  
a). M&E is detailed and sophisticated because of 
the risk-taking culture and financial imperatives. 
 
b). Demand for knowledge is high because of the 
need to understand the risk/market, which in turn 
engenders M&E against strict criteria. 
 
Therefore:  
a). M&E criteria are vague and implementation 
inconsistent given the risk adverse culture and 
need to protect organisational reputations. 
 
b). Understanding of the environment is minimal 
with weak monitoring against complicated targets. 
Table 9.3: Comparison of the motivation and outcomes of Private and Public Sector Organisations in  
Post Conflict Situations. 
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To overcome the lack of professionally qualified SSR staff, the DPKO Rule of 
Law and Security Institutions Office have built a database of 30 SSR expert 
practitioners for use in UN programmes.(13)  However, it remains to be seen if this 
initiative will transcend the intra-organisational divisions within the UN system 
described earlier in the thesis.  Notwithstanding the UN’s attempt to consolidate and 
coordinate its SSR efforts, the application of SSR practice does not remain the sole 
preserve of that organisation. 
 
Despite efforts to improve the quality of SSR field practitioners the 
recruitment and retention of suitable experts remains problematic.  Webster & Walker 
(2009, p. 35) assert that:   
“the system is only as good as the people who steer and staff it. 
Recruiting, training and retaining the right leadership, at all levels of 
the operational chain, are the most vital prerequisites of a successful 
operational structure.”  
 
This has yet to be achieved in the structure of SSR field operations.  
As noted in earlier chapters, private companies, NGOs and academic 
institutions, with varying degrees of success, have undertaken SSR implementation.  
The rationale for recommending a third party is that where private company or 
academic reputations and funding are at stake there is a greater likelihood of an 
effective and efficient performance than with ad hoc teams put together from a 
database. 
9.6. Proposals for Further Research  
 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2002-3, 
sought to encourage a concept of holistic democracy which encompassed Roosevelt’s 
beliefs of freedom from want and freedom from fear.  He also urged the end of 
“dysfunctional definitions of security” (2003, p.3).  Vieira de Mello believed that 
inter and intra-state stability were founded on the tenets of human security and that 
respect for human rights was essential to the promotion of the rule of law, the 
creation of a stable society and the regulation of state behaviour (Powers, 2008, pp. 
358-359).  SSR seeks to advance these goals but can do so only if all those involved 
in its implementation are working together and have clearly defined and measurable 
aims and objectives.  
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The foundation for this thesis is that, based on the Kosovo case study, 
although the international community shares the desire to ensure an efficient security 
sector in post-conflict or transitional states, confusion, competition and rivalry 
between the actors, at all levels, have served to undermine such programmes.  SSR 
activities remain confused and often are contradictory.  The research undertaken for 
this thesis has considered a single case study and, although there is empirical 
evidence of similar problems occurring in other SSR programmes, more research is 
needed to understand the nature and influence of confusion, rivalry and competition 
in SSR interventions.  Clearly confusion, rivalry and competition are not confined 
just to the security field.  They exist in all human activity and, perhaps, this explains 
why their impact on SSR has not been analysed in any depth.  It may be that theorists 
and practitioners accept the confusion and competition nexus as unavoidable 
aggravations.  It is proposed that ignoring the problem is counterproductive.  By 
acknowledging that the confusion, rivalry and competition exist and by seeking 
measures to counteract their effects, the environment for applying SSR can be greatly 
improved.  
In common with all taught academic programmes, the limitations of time, 
funding and resources have served to restrict the scope of the research for the thesis; 
nevertheless it has demonstrated the stated hypothesis.  It has identified and explained 
the destabilising effects of confusion, inter-organisational competition and inter-
personal rivalry.  The research has revealed a number of instances of theoretical and 
policy confusion and multi-levelled rivalry and competition, which affected the 
application of the Kosovo ISSR programme.  It has exposed the lack of local political 
ownership, which detracted from the validity of the process.  Other authors have 
pointed to similar defects in the policy and practice of SSR but none have traced their 
links, by dint of field research, to the underlying influences of inter- and intra-
organisational competition and the presence of inter-personal rivalry.  Nor have the 
studies of rivalry and competition in developmental psychology, social psychology, 
sociology, administrative and political science been linked to the study of post-
conflict SSR processes. 
 
Further research is necessary to explicate the impact of confusion, competition 
and rivalry on the theory and practice of SSR.  This work has shown that there is 
prima facie evidence that intra-organisational competition, the desire for autonomy 
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and the presence of inter-personal rivalry have been powerful stimulants to confusion 
in SSR.  There would be benefit in continuing research into inter- and intra-
institutional competition, particularly to theories relevant to the structural and actor-
driven causes of rivalry.  This should be multi-disciplinary research, which takes 
account of the social, behavioural, physiological and political sciences. 
 
In terms of SSR application in the field, the thesis suggests that there exists a 
tendency to competition within and among IOs and IGOs.  It has pointed to confusion 
over the basic definitions of security and SSR, itself a product of a lack of 
cooperation and coordination between organisations.  There is a tendency for IGOs to 
focus on pressing issues, often in areas, which are most familiar to the organisation.  
The thesis has illustrated the presence of inter-personal rivalry that has diluted the 
work towards the attaining SSR objectives.  It has shown that international espousal 
of local ownership tends to be desultory in application, routinely being placed below 
the agendas of IGOs and member states.  It has recognised that implementing IGOs 
have yet to find a reliable way of measuring SSR programme outcomes to the 
satisfaction of both the donor and local communities. Finally, it has recommended 
greater involvement by the private sector, academic institutions and NGOs in the 
planning and execution of SSR programmes to assist in countering many of these 
deficiencies.   
 
In order to better understand the experiences described in this thesis there is 
merit in reviewing the disposition and progress of other SSR programmes.  Targeted 
study of both multi- and bi-lateral SSR projects would serve to identify the incident 
of confusion and divergence, as products of competition and rivalry.  In addition, 
further research on the barriers to local ownership should be undertaken in order to 
find ways to ensure that SSR provides a solid platform for sustainable security in 
post-conflict and transitional states.  It is also recommended that further research be 
undertaken to ascertain which formed bodies, in the private sector, academic and 
NGO fields, have the ability to implement complex SSR programmes. 
 
As a result of the deficiencies in the planning and practice of SSR and the 
resultant lack of success of high cost and politically sensitive programmes, many 
donors have been reluctant to lend political and financial support to such reform 
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endeavours.  Nevertheless, as Ashdown (2008) comments, “The lesson is not to never 
to do it again, the lesson is to learn to do it better”. 
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   Annex A:  Interviews, Notes and Other Enquiries 
 
Introduction: 
1. Three conditions are required for an IGO to exist; independent political 
communities, rules agreed within those communities which profess to 
regulate their relations with each other and a formal structure to 
implement and enforce those rules (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004, 
p.1).  The definition of an IGO, used in this thesis is, that, 
“intergovernmental organisations are permanent bodies that states create 
to address matters entrusted to them and which result from international 
agreement among states” (Archer, 2001, pp.31-36).  However, if the 
broader term ‘international organisation’ (IO) is considered it can be said 
to include both IGOs and also international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), defined by the UN Economic and Social Council 
as any international organisation not created by means of an 
intergovernmental agreement (ESOSOC, 1968, Part III).  
 
Chapter Three: 
 
1. A Senior UK Military Officer. Interviewed on 03 November 2007, 
Pristina, Kosovo. 
2. The Webster Collegiate Dictionary classifies competition, conflict, 
emulation, strife, striving, tug-of-war, and warfare as synonyms for 
rivalry. 
3. Gender Issues in the European Parliament. Women’s Hour. Radio, 
BBC Radio 4, January 2008, 10.28 hrs. 
 
Chapter Four:  
 
1. Inkster (2009) suggests that we are moving from a ‘multi-polar structure’ 
to a ‘non-polar structure’ where the world is longer be policed by the US 
and is policed by nobody.  Meanwhile China waits in the wings deciding 
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if it wants a global role. The UK National Security Strategy recognises 
this shift, and acknowledges that, “at the state level, we are witnessing a 
massive and historic shift in power from the Atlantic seaboard to Asia and 
the Pacific” (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, p.28).  
2. Argjentina Grazhdani, East-West Management Institute, Kosovo.  Taken 
from an interview on 17 June 2004.  RTK Television, Kosovo.  
Chapter Five:  
 
1. Baroness Sarah Ludford. Interview on 26 November 2007.  European 
Parliament, Brussels. 
2. Baroness Sarah Ludford. Interview on 26 November 2007.  European 
Parliament, Brussels. 
3. Frode Mauring, Resident Representative UNDP Kosovo. Interviewed 
01 November 2007.   
4. A NATO Military Officer serving with KFOR. Interview on 10 
October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
5. A British Army Officer serving in the NATO International Staff 
Division. Interview on 03 October 2007.  Pristina, Kosovo.  
6. The clearing house concept aims at creating a framework by which 
Member States can, on a voluntary basis, exchange information on 
their contributions to UN operations and co-ordinate these national 
contributions. Such a clearing house process would not modify 
modalities for national decision making and national participation in a 
UN operation, or affect existing bilateral arrangements with the UN 
DPKO. Such participation remains a national decision and is managed 
in accordance with UN Force Generation procedures (Council of the 
European Union, 2004, p.3). 
7. A senior official from UNMIK. Interview on 29 October 2007. 
Pristina, Kosovo. 
Chapter Six: 
 
1. A Kosovo Assembly Member of ethnic Albanian origin.  Interviewed 
on 3 November 2007.  Pristina, Kosovo. 
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10. Hildebrants, M. Kosovo ISSR. [online]. Message to: Andrea Goodman. 
01 September 2005. [Accessed 3 November 2007]. Personal 
communication. 
11. Mellon, J. Kosovo ISSR. [online]. Message to: Andrea Goodman. 05 
September 2005. [Accessed 3 November 2007]. Personal 
communication. 
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15. A UNNY Official.  Interviewed on 03 November 2007, New York, 
USA (by telephone). 
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[online]. Message to: Michael Page, 17 February 2008. [Accessed 18 
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19. KFOR Military Officer. Interviewed on 10 October 2007.  Pristina, 
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20. Brigadier General Blease. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, Pristina, 
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21. UNMIK Official.  Interviewed on 04 November 2007. UNMIK 
official. Interviewed on 29 October 2007. Pristina, Kosovo. 
22. Dr. Michael von Tangen Page Interviewed on 25 February 2008. 
London. 
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Anthony Cleland Welch. 14 June, 2006. [Accessed 14 June 2006].  
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25. UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 04 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
26. UNDP Official. Interviewed on 13 October 2007. Pristina, Kosovo. 
27. Dana Stinson. Interviewed on 29 December 2007. Portsmouth, United 
Kingdom; Sokol Kondi on 16 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo; Dr. 
Michael von Tangen Page on 25 February 2008. 
28. UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 04 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 29 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
KFOR Military Officer. Interviewed on 10 October 2007.  Alastair 
Livingston, Director OSCE Mitrovica. Interviewed on 28 November 
2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
29. Brigadier General Blease. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, Pristina, 
Kosovo. Former Senior UNOSEK Official. Interviewed on 02 October 
2007, Pristina, Kosovo.  
30. Brigadier General Blease. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, Pristina, 
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31. Former Senior UNOSEK Official. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, 
Pristina, Kosovo. 
32. UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 04 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
33. Personal experience of the author. 23 January 2006. 
34. Former ISSR Secretariat member, Interviewed on 05 November 2007. 
35. UNMIK Official.  Interviewed on 04 October 2007.  Helena Vasquez.  
Interviewed on 09 November 2007. Pristina, Kosovo. 
36. Both individuals achieved their aims; the Colonel was posted to the 
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37. Joakim Robertsson, Head of UNDP 3SD. Interviewed 11 October 
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Pristina, Kosovo. Dr. Gerry Gallucci. Interviewed on 28 October 2007. 
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38. UNMIK Official.  Interviewed on 04 November 2007. Pristina, 
Kosovo. 
39. Helena Vasquez.  Interviewed with on 09 November 2007. Pristina, 
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40. Dr. Michael von Tangen Page on 25 February 2008. Helena Vasquez.  
Interviewed with on 09 November 2007. Pristina, Kosovo. 
41. KFOR Military Officer. Interviewed on 10 October 2007.  Pristina, 
Kosovo. A senior diplomat on 30 October 2007 Pristina, Kosovo. 
42. A senior PISG member. Interviewed on 02 October 2007. Pristina, 
Kosovo. 
43. The Italics are mine. The animosity of the Kosovo Government 
towards UNMIK and, to their eyes, its reluctance to give up power 
continued into 2008 and beyond. 
44. View based on a series of interviews with an UNMIK Official on 04 
October 2007, a senior diplomat on 30 October 2007 and with an 
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UNMIK political adviser on 04 November 2007. All interviews took 
place in Pristina, Kosovo. 
45. Dr. Gerry Gallucci. Interviewed on 28 October 2007. Stepće, Kosovo. 
46. Saferworld Official. Kosovo. [online]. Message to: Anthony Cleland 
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communication. 
47. KFOR Military Officer. Interviewed on 10 October 2007.  Pristina, 
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48. KFOR Military Officer. Interviewed on 10 October 2007.  Pristina, 
Kosovo. UNMIK political adviser.  Interviewed on 04 November 
2007. 
49. Personal conversation between the author and General Valotto at the 
General’s End of Tour Parade at the KPC Headquarters on 17 August 
2006. 
50. Kim Vetting. Interviews on the 15th and 26th October 2007. Pristina, 
Kosovo. 
51. Alastair Livingston, Director OSCE Mitrovica. Interviewed on 28 
November 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
52. Mark Posten, Head of the DFID Office, Interviewed on 8 November 
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55. Discussion with the author at the UACES 37th Annual Conference & 
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56. Mark Posten, Head of the DFID Office, Interviewed on 8 November 
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58. Dr. Michael von Tangen Page on 25 February 2008. 
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61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid. 
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Iraq.  US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in March 
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Interview on 10 November 2007. 
65. Kim Vetting.  Interviewed on 26 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 
66. Brigadier General Blease. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, Pristina, 
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Personal communication. 
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8. Rod Evans, SSDAT. Interviewed on 24 November 2007, Shrivenham, 
United Kingdom. 
9. Dr. Michael von Tangen Page, Security Development Adviser, ISSR 
Secretariat. Interviewed on 05 February 2008, London, UK 
10. The author was told by the Deputy Defence Minister of Croatia that a 
major human resource retention problem for his Ministry was that civil 
servants and military officers, who had gained experience by working 
alongside international counterparts, frequently accepted better paid 
positions in the private sector.  (Discussion in Naples on 13th February 
2008).  None of the occupants of ISSR ‘shadow’ posts subsequently 
took up employment with the Government of Kosova. 
11. Chris Goostrey, SSDAT. Interviewed on 14 November 2007. London, 
UK. 
12. This suggestion may cause difficulties within the UN system.  The 
officials in the newly created DPKO SSR Team are seeking to have 
UN Integrated Missions take responsibility for SSR activity although 
they have no mechanism for accounting for the donor contributions 
that would fund such interventions. They are considering funding SSR 
activity from UN Trust Fund budgets. This has put pressure on the 
UNDP who are keen to protect their lien on their Rule of Law and 
Justice funding streams (Dr. Michael von Tangen Page, Interviewed on 
25 November 2007. London, UK). 
13. Security Sector Reform Team (2009), Update on the development of 
the UN Roster of Senior SSR Experts [online]. Message to:  Welch et 
al. Sat, 16 May 2009 1:17 [Accessed16 May 2009]. Personal 
communication. 
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 QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS OUTLINE QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Name: 
Organisation: 
Link to ISSR: 
Date of Interview: 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. What was your role in the ISSR process (if any)? 
 
2. Were you a member of the ISSR Steering Committee? 
 
3. Were you a member of the Core Consultancy Group? 
 
4. Please describe how the ISSR process impacted on your Organisation, 
both from a positive and a negative point of view? (i.e. Was the process 
seen as a useful tool which was accepted by the Organisation) 
 
5. Does your Organisation/ Government have a SSR policy? (i.e. Where does 
the Organisation stand on SSR as an instrument in post-conflict 
stabilisation?) 
 
6. If your Organisation has a SSR policy is it in accord with the processes 
undertaken by the ISSR Secretariat in 2006? (i.e. Does the Organisation 
favour the traditional or holistic approach to SSR?) 
 
7. Were there any disagreements within your organisation over the ISSR 
process? (Intra-institutional rivalry?)  
 
8. Where there any disagreements between your organisation and others over 
the ISSR process? (Inter-institutional competition?) 
 
9. Can you describe the attitude of your colleagues/collaborators to the 
process? Was it positive or negative? (Was there internal disagreement at 
the working level on the ISSR process and how did it impact on the 
Organisational attitudes). 
 
10. Do you believe that the timing of the ISSR was correct? (Explore the 
matter of UNNY / UNDP Kosovo delays)  
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11. Given its proximity to the UNOSEK final status talks, was the ISSR 
process helpful? (This question should draw out any concerns over the 
ISSR hindering the Final Status processes) 
 
12. Do you believe that it was correct to lodge the ISSR process with the 
UNDP? (Inter-institutional competition?) 
 
13. If not, where do you believe SSR in Kosovo should lie; with the:  
a. UNMIK  
b. KFOR  
c. PISG  
d. Bilateral Arrangement  
(This question should build upon the answers given at Q8 and 12 above and 
give further indications on inter-institutional/organisational relations). 
 
 
KOSOVO PARTICIPANTS OUTLINE QUESTIONNAIRE  
Name: 
Organisation: 
Link to ISSR: 
Date of Interview: 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. What was your role in the ISSR process (if any)? 
 
2. Were you a member of the ISSR Steering Committee? 
 
3. Were you a member of the Core Consultancy Group? 
 
4. Please describe how the ISSR process impacted on your Organisation, 
both from a positive and a negative point of view? ( i.e. Was the process 
excepted by the Ministry/Assembly/Party as a useful tool for security 
reform in Kosovo)  
 
5. Were there any disagreements within your organisation over the ISSR 
process? 
      (Intra-institutional rivalry?) 
 
6. Where there any disagreements between your organisation and others over 
the ISSR process? (Inter-institutional competition?). 
 
 
7. Can you describe the attitude of your colleagues/collaborators to the 
process? Was it positive or negative? (Explore the feelings over transfer of 
competencies from the UN to the PISG) 
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8. Do you believe that the ISSR process was sufficiently orientated to the 
situation in Kosovo? (i.e. Did it sufficiently take note of local perceptions 
and aspirations?) 
 
9. Do you believe that the ISSR process was sufficiently sensitive to local 
needs and ownership? (i.e. Was this perceived as just another 
internationally imposed solution?)  
 
10. Do you believe that the timing of the ISSR was correct? (This question 
should draw out a number of responses as to the delays in transferring 
security competencies, addressing the problem of final status and  the 
matter of UNNY / UNDP Kosovo delays and their affect on local 
ownership of the process)  
 
11. Given its proximity to the UNOSEK final status talks, was the ISSR 
process helpful? 
(This question should draw out any concerns over the ISSR hindering the 
Final Status processes) 
 
12. Do you believe that it was correct to lodge the ISSR process with the 
UNDP?  
(Again this question explores the judgments about local ownership and the 
perceptions of domination of the security sector by the International 
Community) 
 
13. If not, where do you believe SSR in Kosovo should lie; with the:  
e. UNMIK  
f. KFOR  
g. PISG  
h. Bilateral Arrangement  
(This question should build upon the answers given at Q9 and 12 above and 
give further indications on inter-institutional/organisational relations) 
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List of Participants  
 
 
Serial Name Position Code Date of Interview      
1 Ahtisaari, Martti UN Special Envoy for Kosovo IC (t) 20/11/07      
2 Ariaj, Rame Security Adviser to the Prime 
Minister. 
LG(n) 03/10/07 
20/02/08 
     
3 Blease,  Brig. Gen. 
Dennis 
NATO Adviser, UNOSEK IC(n) 03/10/07 
 
     
4 Çeku, Agim Prime Minister of Kosovo LG(n) 02/10/07      
       5 Cooper, Isabella Media Adviser, ISSR II(r) 25/02/08      
6 Davoren, Brig. Gen.  John Cmdr MNTF(E) (2007/8) IK(n) 28/10/07      
7 Di Stefano, Marko Political Adviser to DCOM KFOR. IK(r) 27/02/08      
  8 Dugolli, Illir Dep. Director, KIPRED. LN(n) 29/10/07      
  9 Earhart, Brig. Gen. Doug
  
Cmdr  MNTF (E) (2006/7). IK(n) 28/10/07      
10 Elgersma, Steffen  Political Adviser to UNOSEK IC(r) 20/03/08      
11 Evans, Rod Balkans Expert, SSDAT IC(n) 25/11/07      
12 Fejza, Ejup Investment Promotion Agency, MTI LG(n) 02/11/07      
13 Gallucci, Dr. Gerard Regional Administrator, Mitrovica IU(n) 28/10/07      
14 Gashi, Colonel Xhavit Chief of Staff, Kosovo Protection 
Corps 
LK(n) 11/10/07      
15 Gashi, Ibrahim  University of Pristina LN(n) 13/10/07      
16 Goostry, Chris SSR Expert, SSDAT IA(r) 14/11/07      
17 Gorani-Gashi, Visari  Prime Minister’s Gender Adviser LG(n) 31/10/07      
18 Guardans, Ignasi Member of the European Parliament IC(r) 27/11/07      
      19 Harxhi, Edith Office for Public Safety, Office of the 
Prime Minister 
LG(n) 10/10/07      
20 Hildebrants, Martins Dep. Resident Representative, UNDP IP(n) 17/10/07      
21 Ibishi, Nuredin Adviser to the Min. Interior. LG(n) 09/11/07      
22 Ivanović, Oliver Leader, Serbian List. LS(n) 02/11/07 
20/03/08 
     
23 Jessen-Peterson, Søren   SRSG Kosovo (2004/6). IU(t) 20/11/07      
     24 Kacin, Jelko Member of the European Parliament IC(r) 26/11/07      
        25 Kondi, Sokol Governance Adviser, ISSR II(r) 16/10/07      
     26 Kuci, Blerim Deputy Minister of Interior LG(n) 10/11/07      
        27 Livingston, Alistair Director, OSCE Mitrovica IO(r) 28/11/07      
28 Lulford, Baroness Member of the European Parliament IC(r) 26/11/07      
      29 Mauring, Frode Resident. Rep. UNDP Kosovo IP(n) 01/11/07      
30 Mellon, Jérôme  Programme Analyst, UNDP Kosovo IP(n) 13/10/07      
31 Naim Maljoku President, Security Committee 
Kosovo Assembly 
LG(n) 01/11/07      
32 Peci, Lulzim Director, KIPRED LN(n) 29/10/07      
33 Playford, Col. James Defence Attaché, US Office, Pristina IC(n) 01/10/07      
34 Posten, Mark Head of DFID Kosovo IC(n) 02/11/07 
08/11/07 
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35 Robertsson, Joakim 
 
3SD Capacity Building Adviser, 
UNDP 
IP(r) 11/10/07 
21/02/08 
     
 36 Rossin, Larry  PDSRSG, UNMIK (2004/6 , 2008) IU(n) 28/02/08      
        37 Ruairí O’Connell  Dep. Head of Mission, British Office, 
Pristina 
IC(n) 30/10/07      
 38 Selimi, Lt. Gen. Sylejman COMKPC LK(n) 30/10/07      
39 Smit, Caroline  BCPR, UNDP, New York IC(t) 03/11/07      
40 Sohlström, Torbjörn  Pers. Rep. of EU High Representative IE(n) 13/10/07      
41 Spahui , Ardian  Governance Adviser, OPS LG(r) 27/02/08      
         42 Standish, Alex Communications Advisor 3SD IC(n) 13/12/07      
43 Stinson, Dana Strategic Drafter, ISSR II(n) 29/12/07      
44 Surroi, Veton Leader, ORA Party LG(n) 12/10/07      
45 Tolaj, Valon AAK Party  LG(n) 18/10/07      
        46 Vazquez, Helena  Director, SEESAC Kosovo IC(n) 09/11/07      
         47 Vetting, Kim Democracy Expert, OSCE. IO(r ) 15/10/07 
26/10/07 
     
48 Von Tangen Page, Michael Security Sector Adviser, ISSR II(n) 24/11/07 
05 /02/ 08 
     
49 Warren, Michael  Programme Analyst, UNDP Kosovo IP(n) 10/10/07 
26/10/07 
     
50 Watson, Graham Member of the European Parliament IC(r) 27/11/07      
51 Wokalek, Karl Head of the German Mission, Kosovo IC(n) 03/10/07      
52 Wolf, Brig. Gen. William Chief of Staff, KFOR. IK(n) 28/10/07      
        53 A.N. Other Serbian National Council of Kosova 
and Metohije 
LS(n) 01/11/07      
54 A.N. Other  Police & Justice, UNMIK IU(n) 29/10/07      
55 A.N. Other Adviser to DFID 
 
IA(n) 12/02/08 (t)      
56 A.N. Other Ministry of Justice LG(n) 05/11/07      
57 A.N. Other Member of KFOR LG(n) 10/10/07      
58 A.N. Other UNMIK Official IC(n) 04/10/07      
59 A.N. Other Municipality, Zubin Potok. LS(n) 21/11/07      
60 A.N. Other Serbian Socialist  Party  (SPS), 
Mitrovica 
LK(n) 12/10/07      
 
 
 
CODES:    II  ISSR Staff   IO  OSCE  
  
   IP UNDP Staff   IE EU 
   IC International Community   IN International NGO 
   IK KFOR     LG PISG 
IU UNMIK    LK KPC 
IA International Agency  LN Local NGO   
(t)  Telephone Interview  LS Local Serbian 
(r) Tape Recorded Interview  (n) Transcribed Interview 
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Adapted from Alkire,(2001), p.48.
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KOSOVO ISSR PUBLIC OUTREACH COMMUNICATIONS 
 
 
(1) An ISSR Billboard: 73 boards, in Albanian, English and Serbian, were erected 
throughout Kosovo’s towns and on major highways.  
 
(2) The ISSR Television Debates, “Forum on Security”, were 10 one hour programmes, 
broadcast in Albanian and Serbian, with a live audience and telephone call-in ran 
throughout the review process.  
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(3) Stage and Music personalities featured in television spots talking about what security 
meant to them and urging citizens to give ISSR their views on security. 
 
 
 
 
(4) The ISSR Bus toured Kosovo acting as a mobile studio and post office to allow 
citizens to record, either publicly or confidentially, their views on the security 
challenges in the province.  
 
